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Preface
Wow, it’s done! While I am happy it is finished, the insertion of the final full stop is much more
difficult than I had imagined. The finalisation of this thesis means the end of a journey that I
have greatly enjoyed and of which little more than a tiny fragment is reported here (I once
planned to write a ‘True Story’- version, but well...).
I hope that at least at a few points in the following academic chapters my appreciation for La
Laguna and its people shines through. This study is about an incredibly industrious industrial
region with wonderful people. A region that has known many adverse conditions, with people
that face these conditions and ride out their ride to the end. People that recognise an
opportunity and do not hesitate to react to it. The entrepreneurial spirit of La Laguna is
impressive. I was most impressed by the people of my age, or younger, that managed and/or
owned garment factories, bore the responsibility for their personnel and did so with reckless
courage, respect and great determination. Equally striking were the pioneers of the old times
who watched and followed the changes of the new times but refused to get caught up in the
turmoil and madness of globalisation in which not even the sky appeared to be accepted as the
limit. Mi respeto. I hope to have done justice to your daily work and maybe in some way to have
contributed to it by sketching what you are up against.
The hesitation and suspicion that also characterise the Laguna garment cluster, made a
maximum call on my stubborn nature and caused me to spend hours on the phone, but they
usually dissolved during the first minutes of an interview. Many interviews were thoroughly
enjoyable and I want to thank everybody who contributed their time and expertise to this
study – they are listed in Annex 1. Most special were those interviews in which the very Mexican
mixing of business and personal (how come several of these talks turned to Amsterdam,
Utrecht, my ambitions and then back to their sons or nephews?) sparked a connection. A few
people need to be mentioned here personally: Rigoberto Soto, Roberto Tohmé, Juan Miranda,
Felipe Pamanes, Fernando Carzo and the Juárez family: thanks for always receiving me with a
smile, open arms and new information!
A number of organisations also supported me. I am indebted to the UAL for giving me an
office to work from. Most especially I am indebted to Lic. Pepe Castro for it was his office that I
was to share. You were a good colleague and regulator of my work pace. SECOFI-Torreón, CNIV
and FOMEC have also given me their much appreciated help.
Life in La Laguna has been more than ‘just’ this study. I have tried to have my own place and
have had many different addresses in La Laguna. But I most enjoyed my time with Rhodante,
Adela, Hans and Wilma and especially Piet and Martha, who opened their houses to me and
have contributed immeasurably to my feeling at home in Torreón and Cd. Lerdo. Also, several
women have tried to upgrade my cooking, make-up and dancing skills, assuring me of their
indispensability. While not much has come of making mole or tamales, I have really enjoyed the
hours spent chatting, dancing, eating and cooking (or looking) in the kitchens of Tita & Nena,
Sandra (and family) and Martha. Finally, looking out over the city from Cristo Rey, driving
through the countryside (with the radio blasting) or the city centre to look at the mariachis,
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enjoying the scent of the orange tree blossom and listening to Mexican pop music make very
vivid and cherished memories. Jorge, Ernesto, Lalo or Alberto were there with me in many of
these moments. I need to thank you for being my friends and for being there whenever I
needed a shoulder, hand or a good laugh. The time spent with you left me with a liking for hats
and cowboy boots, for Mexican music of all kinds and a love for the desert and cacti that have
not always been easy to match with my daily routine in Utrecht (but have definitely made it
more colourful). Gracias.
There were also times when I felt lost or out of place and at those moments I could almost bet
on the miraculous appearance of one of my two ‘wise old men’: Cor Zwezerijnen and Allen
Levine. With their outsider views, Cor’s contagious laughs and Allen’s sarcasm they never failed
to cheer me up and put me back on track. Cor: I really enjoyed our trips to the factories but feel
I still need to apologise for my possibly all-too-adapted driving style that appeared to really
scare you.
Another halfway station between La Laguna and home was (Johannah, Julian and) Cheryl’s
kitchen in El Paso. A place to put things in perspective, to relax and to get inspired again.
Cheryl, I hope you know what a difference you have made, just by listening and making time to
share a drink at your kitchen table.
Each time I came back from the Mexican desert and sun I had trouble re-adjusting to the dreary
Dutch reality, which appeared to be personified by the architectonial horrors of the van
Unnikgebouw. I am glad that after my first fieldwork my colleague and friend Gery Nijenhuis
suggested we might share an office, which we soon turned into a semi-jungle with colourful
posters on the wall. That greatly eased the transitions. The friendship, support, coffee and
lunches shared with Gery and our other colleagues Leendert, Floor and Paul made the writing
phases and grey weather seem okay (and were missed during the last six months of self-
imposed isolation). Thanks.
Of course, my promotores Otto Verkoren and Menno Vellinga and co-promotor Guus van
Westen deserve many thanks. Otto has been greatly involved with this project ever since (and
even before) its conception. His steadfast, calm and reassuring focus on the larger picture and
efforts to tame my impatience have been vital to its successful finalisation. Despite the distance
Menno’s encouraging e-mails arrived just at the right moment and struck the right cord. I am
also thankful for Guus van Westen’s late but valuable involvement in this project. Meetings
with Guus were never very long, but always to the point, helpful and encouraging.
For the nice-looking book that you now have in front of you, thanks are due to Rien Rabbers at
the KartLab who made the figures and did the final lay-out and to Jeremy Rayner who corrected
my English.
Of course, there are ‘innocent bystanders’ who proved to be of vital importance. Invaluable are
those friends who always knew when to ask and when not to ask... I want to thank my parents
for setting me off on the adventure path; they gave me the freedom and confidence to search for
my own ways and never held me back on account of their own doubts (and of course for telling
me to stick with it when that was what I needed to hear). Finally, ‘eagle-eye’ Quinten has
worked very hard to eliminate my typos and organise my reference system chaos when I was
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really fed up with those sides of the study. More importantly, he never doubted the fact that
one day this would all be over and has supported me until it was. Love.
Utrecht, August 2003.
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Glossary: Abbreviations and Definitions
AAMA American Apparel Manufacturers Association
Avecindados Landless farmers in the rural areas of Mexico
Cabeceras (municipales) Municipal towns
CBI Caribbean Basin Initiative: a trade agreement between the USA and
Caribbean countries that allowed access to the US market – under specific
conditions – of garment produced in Caribbean countries.
CTM Confederación de Trabajadores Mexicanos, Mexico’s largest and
institutionalised trade union
Cluster A geographical and sectoral concentration of firms
CMT Cut-Make-Trim
Descampesinización De-agrarianisation; process marked by rural depopulation and growing
importance of non-agricultural sources of income for the rural
population.
EDI Electronic data interchange; systems used in the garment industry to
create an integrated information channel between retailers and
manufacturers/suppliers.
Ejidos Organisations of agricultural small-holders in Mexico that came into
existence after the land reform in 1936. Ejido land is in communal
ownership, but commonly divided into individually exploited plots.
Ejidatarios Agricultural small-holders in Mexico, members of an ejido community
EOI Export-oriented industrialisation. Implementation of EOI in Mexico has
entailed far-reaching liberalisation and a radical remodelling of the
relationship between the state and the market. In essence, the role of the
Mexican state under EOI is limited to securing stable and beneficial
macro-economic conditions: state interventions through industrial or
social policies are abandoned.
EPZ Export processing zone
FDI Foreign direct investment
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Guayaberas Short-sleeved, embroidered men’s shirt. Traditional garment product of
Yucatán.
GVC Global Value Chain; a network of labour and production processes whose
end result is a finished product. Syn. Global Commodity Chain (GCC) or
filière.
Hacendado Owner of a very large farm estate in Mexico prior to land reform in 1936
Haciendas Large or very large farm estate. In La Laguna, as in the rest of Mexico, these
were expropriated and ceased to exist during the late 1930s. Syn. latifundio.
HTS 9802 Harmonized Tariff Schedule item that regulated production sharing
arrangements, it was formerly known as the US 807/807A Program.
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ISI Import substitution industrialisation. From 1940 to 1970 Mexican
economic policy was based on import substitution industrialisation.
Initially, high economic growth rates were achieved but when growth
stagnated, ISI was abandoned in the late 1970s.
LMIC Low and Middle Income Country, syn. Lesser Developed Country (LDC)
Maquiladoras Mexican assembly factories that paid no duties on imported components
under the condition that products were exported after assembly and not
sold on the Mexican market.
Municipio Municipality
MFA Multi-Fibre Agreement; initiated in 1974 to liberalise international trade
in textiles and clothing as well as to protect the domestic markets of
importing countries through the ‘orderly’ development of international
trade flows. Renegotiated four times to become increasingly more
restrictive. MFA restrictions are currently being phased out so that
textiles and clothing will be fully liberated 1 January 2005.
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement: agreement that since 1994 unites
Canada, the United States and Mexico into the North American Free
Trade Area.
NIC Newly industrialising country
NIDL New International Division of Labour; results from a process of
geographical relocation of labour intensive production activities to
LMICs while more knowledge- and capital intensive activities remain in
developed countries (DCs). NIDL is facilitated by improved
communication and transportation technology and divisibility of the
production process.
OBM Original Brand Manufacturer; involved in independent production and
export of finished garment under own brand.
ODM Original Design Manufacturer; manufacturer engaged in design and
manufacturing of garments for export to be marketed by a foreign buyer
(under the latter’s label).
OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer; syn. full-package
supplier/commercial subcontractor/contractor; manufacturer involved in
the production of finished garments based on specification of a (foreign)
buyer.
OPT Outward processing trade
Pequeños proprietarios Literally: small owners. Privately-owned farms, in La Laguna commonly
located on the best lands. Many have expanded over the course of time to
become fairly large farms.
Piratería Production of cheap brand rip-offs, commonly sold on informal markets
Private label lines Labelled garment/merchandise lines manufactured for specific retailers
and sold exclusively in their stores.
SME Small- and Medium-sized Enterprise
Subcontracting Production of components or finished products by one firm for another
firm based on the latter’s specifications. Syn. sourcing
Tianguis Street markets in Mexico[ 16 ]
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TNC Trans-National Corporation: a firm which has the power to co-ordinate
and control operations in more than one country, even if it does not own
them
UPS Unit Production System; a rail transportation system that transports
individual garments or garment pieces on a hanger between sewing
operators
Vertical The splitting off of parts of the production process to separate firms or 
disintegration establishments
WTO World Trade Organisation
[ 17 ]
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Introduction
Several decades ago the Institute of Development Studies at Utrecht University (IDSUU)
became involved with research on the US-Mexican border region and Northern Mexico. Since
then, the research undertaken by IDSUU students and staff members in the border region has
focused on three main themes: urbanisation (Hoenderdos, 1983), migration (Verkoren &
Beneker, 2000; Hoenderdos & Schuurman, 1985) and industry (Verkoren & Hoenderdos, 1985;
Haring, 1985; Verkoren, 1994; van Dooren & Verkoren, 2000). This study ties in with the latter
theme.
More in particular, this study has its roots in research undertaken in 1996 in El Paso and Cd.
Juárez, two cities on opposite sides of the US-Mexican border. The aim of that research – which
is reported in the MSc thesis ‘The garment industry in El Paso and Cd. Juárez: automate,
emigrate or eliminate?’ (van Dooren & van der Waerden, 1997) – was to examine production
linkages in and between the garment industries of the two cities. Whilst unintended and in
part unexpected, during my fieldwork two years after the passage of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), I was directly confronted with the agility of the garment industry
in a globalising world economy, and with the devastating effect such agility can have on a
region, a local economy, entrepreneurs, workers and their families. Within only a couple of
years, most local garment factories had been closed down and thousands of workers had lost
their jobs and income. El Paso – the ‘Jeans Capital of the World’ – was one of the US cities most
hard hit by NAFTA.
Despite decades of specialisation and a concentration of jeans-specific infrastructure and
know-how in El Paso, most local capacity became redundant as El Paso’s clients shifted their
demand for jeans from El Paso to Mexican production locations such as Puebla/Tehuacan and,
most notably, La Laguna. In many ways, El Paso provides an example of the potential danger of
globalisation for local industrial clusters that depend on external linkages for production
orders and, more in general, for market access. This dramatic development posed several
interesting questions. Was El Paso little more than a way station along the winding route of the
never-ending relocation process in the garment manufacturing sector (see van Dooren &
Verkoren, 2003)? Was its demise inevitable, or were other outcomes possible? To what extent do
alternative outcomes depend on local level production organisation, linkages and business
strategies? As a very large share of production from El Paso was shifting to the Laguna region in
Northern Mexico, a central question also concerned the possibility that the problems in El Paso
would eventuate in La Laguna and at other new production sites. In order to shed light on this
last question it is necessary to examine the driving forces in the global garment industry, as well
as the production structure, the intra- and extra-cluster links, and many other characteristics of
the industry in such a new production location, in this case, La Laguna.
(i) Background to the study
The garment industry and the textile industry were the first manufacturing industries to take
on a global dimension. Moreover, no other industries are more geographically dispersed across
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developed and developing countries than the garment industry (Dickerson, 1995; Dicken,
1998). This progressive globalisation process is driven by the international relocation of
production from industrialised countries to low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), many
of which are just starting their industrialisation process. Most notable is the early participation
of the Southeast Asian newly industrialising countries (NICs), which continue to be successful
players. Likewise, countries such as Turkey and Morocco (Broer, 1977; Scheffer, 1992) and
Caribbean countries, which are on the periphery of the European and the US market,
respectively, have been popular production sites.
The Southeast Asian NICs were in the cradle of the garment industry’s globalisation. Since the
1960s, they have built on their early participation in Western garment markets to spark a
further and wider industrialisation process. Several of these countries were able to upgrade
their position in the garment industry by moving low value added production activities
offshore. They became coordinating hubs of high value-added activities, able to coordinate and
control production throughout Asia and to connect it to demand in the US and European
markets. While Asia continues to occupy a hegemonic position in garment trade, faster-paced
fashion changes and the resulting pressures to shorten order cycles and response times may set
in motion a relocation process benefiting production locations closer to the markets. The
resulting regionalisation of garment sourcing may provide new, latecomer countries with
development opportunities based on garment production and export.
Mexico is one of the most commonly quoted examples of a country benefiting from this
regionalisation trend. It is a relative newcomer on the global garment scene: it became a
significant player in the global garment trade only after the passage of NAFTA in 1994. The
question now is whether these more recent developing country garment exporters, including
the countries on the periphery of the main markets, will be able or should strive to follow the
path pioneered by the Asian NICs (Gereffi, 1999).
Since the 1960s, when the Asian NICs initiated their garment export participation, the world
economy has changed – and so has the garment industry. In the main Western markets,
garment retailing is increasingly concentrated in the hands of fewer and larger retailers.
Garment sales are driven by faster-paced fashion changes and the marketing strategies of mass-
advertised global brands. Meanwhile, the international sourcing strategies of garment retailers
and other buyers that first centred on a few Asian countries have continued and expanded.
Buyers occupy a pivotal role in global production networks that may cover numerous LMICs.
These networks operate within a global trade regulation system based on quotas and duties
that has restricted global garment trade over the past decades. Within this context of powerful
buyers, a web of restrictive trade regulations and a large and increasing number of LMIC
competitors, latecomer suppliers are faced with the challenge to connect to the demands of
modern garment markets and to use that connection to secure a strong position in them. There
is reason to believe that today’s new exporters are operating in another context and face other
challenges than their Asian predecessors of several decades ago.
The academic approaches used to analyse the functioning of new exporters have also changed;
they now have different focuses and emphasise different aspects. In the academic discourse on
industrial development in LMICs, attention has shifted from the role of transnational
corporations (TNCs), whose foreign direct investment in developing countries carried with it
the risk of converting these countries’ economies into branch plant economies, to clusters of
[ 20 ]
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local firms and to production networks that may connect these firms and clusters to export
markets. The central question of these studies is the ability of LMIC firms and clusters to use
their export participation as a lever for sustainable industrial and/or regional development.
There is a strong localisation tendency in garment manufacturing, as reflected by the
presence of garment clusters in many developed and developing countries (Tewari, 1999;
Cawthorne, 1995; McCormick, 1999; Visser, 1996, 1999; Peña St. Martin, 1994). Garment
companies in these clusters benefit from clustering through various mechanisms. As a
consequence, clustered garment firms in LMICs may be able to penetrate export markets. Most
commonly, they do so by establishing supply relationships with Western buyers. Especially for
latecomer firms that supply the complex and dynamic Western garment markets, the linkage
to a buyer and the access to know-how, information and experience with regard to market
standards and conditions embedded in that linkage are essential. Facing the new competition
in garments requires more from LMIC suppliers than just low/competitive prices: quality,
flexibility, service and short turn-around times are becoming the keywords in the global
competition between garment manufacturers. In most instances the capabilities in these and
other areas are new to latecomer suppliers, and therefore the relationship between them and
their buyers is marked by tight governance and the transfer of information and know-how
from buyer to supplier. Vertical linkages to global buyers allow LMIC exporters to attain the
standards of export markets. However, in order to remain competitive, learning and constant
upgrading by LMIC suppliers are prerequisites that may also be stimulated by buyers or by the
entrance of new buyers (buyer succession).
On the other hand, the development of a cluster or its firms in the global economy does not
depend directly or solely on outside impetuses. A cluster’s participation is generally the
outcome of a long evolutionary process marked by change, adaptation, specialisation (of firms
and institutions) and path dependence or even lock-in. Evolutionary and institutional
economics have pointed to the importance of these processes (Boschma et al., 2002).
Furthermore, the competitive strength of export clusters is commonly derived from their
ability to stimulate the cementing of strong, trust-based and embedded intra-cluster links.
Such linkages and accumulated specialist knowledge may facilitate local learning, innovation
and upgrading – processes that support the competitive position of the cluster.
The questions that spring to mind based on these general characteristics of global garment
production concern the interaction between ‘the global’ and ‘the local’ in this garment
production system. These questions touch upon a more general debate about the relevance of
and interaction between various levels of geographical scale in the globalised/globalising world
economy. Is the local being overruled by and subordinated to the global, rendering local
economies and cultures helpless and insignificant in the face of global forces? Or is
globalisation leading to a rediscovery and appreciation of localities and regions? Perhaps the
local-global dichotomy is unnecessary, as a process of ‘glocalisation’ is affecting
interrelationships between various levels of scale. One thing is certain, however: more research
is needed into the interaction between global forces in the world economy and local dynamics,
especially in industrial clusters (Amin & Thrift, 1992; Humphrey & Schmitz, 2000). The
garment industry provides ample opportunities for examining the dynamic linkages between
local-level cluster dynamics and global/international production networks. [ 21 ]
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From a development angle, relevant questions relate to the long-term developmental results of
the incorporation of LMICs (and their clusters and suppliers) into industrial export markets.
There is little doubt that industrialisation and development are not synonymous. In fact,
several cases of LMIC lock-in or even immiserating growth have been documented (Kaplinsky,
1993; Mathews, 2002; Mortimore, 2002). Especially Latin American countries have a record of
industrial growth that is not or only to a limited extent reflected in improvements in per capita
income, income distribution and human development indicators, such as access to health and
education. Export success is not necessarily translated into development.
(ii) Why Mexico?
For several reasons that extend beyond the particular background to this project, Mexico is a
highly interesting location for the study of above mentioned issues. Since NAFTA came into
effect almost a decade ago, Mexican exports to the US have grown explosively and garment
exports have been amongst the fastest growers. This recent, explosive growth of garment
exports appears to qualify Mexico as a latecomer country. Yet, Mexico’s industrialisation
process started several decades ago. In fact, its apparent success based on import substitution
industrialisation as early as the 1960s and 1970s caused it to be qualified, together with
Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela, as a Latin American NIC. However, so far Mexico has not been
able to use its industrial success to spark a development process for the benefit of the entire
Mexican population. Industrialisation was and still is highly concentrated geographically and
its benefits primarily accrue to the middle- and upper-class strata of Mexican society.
Even though Mexico is a latecomer in garment exports, it is not a latecomer in garment
production or in industrial production in general. Over the past decades, Mexico’s industrial
exports, including garment exports, were predominantly destined for the US and were
overwhelmingly part of a production sharing or export processing type of arrangement. In this
arrangement, those parts of the production process that are labour-intensive and low value
added were undertaken in Mexico, while the remainder was carried out in the US. This export
model, based on assembly for export, has hampered or truncated the industrialisation process
and limited its potential to spark economic development in Mexico; the same applies to those
Caribbean countries operating under similar trade regimes (Bair & Gereffi, 2001, 2002;
Mortimore, 1999).
For Mexico, this situation changed radically with the passage of NAFTA. NAFTA liberalisation
eliminated the duty-based logic behind this export-processing arrangement and paved the
road for the integration of the production process in Mexico. Within the general NAFTA
context of the economic integration of complementary economies, larger parts of the garment
manufacturing process are expected to shift to Mexico, turning the country into a more
important and all-round supplier for the US market.
In contrast to other latecomer garment exporters (e.g. Vietnam and Cambodia), Mexico is not
using garment exports as a stepping stone to an industrialisation process. Instead, Mexico
needs to undergo a transformation in order to get out of its deep-seated, historically grown role
of export assembly platform of a number of different industrial products to the US. It is striving
to attain a more all-round position in the US, and possibly in other markets. Geographically,
this particular process is played out most clearly in a few particular regions, many of which have
specialised in the production of specific industrial products. This development has been most
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pronounced for the garment regions: based on a humble tradition in garment production,
these Mexican regions have grown explosively into major export clusters. Garment export
clusters are located outside the border region. With its high concentration of maquiladoras
(export assembly factories) of many different industries, the border region has traditionally
received the most attention in the literature on the recent industrial development in Mexico.
NAFTA is now stimulating the geographical dispersal of industrial export production in
Mexico to more southern locations. The garment industry is a forerunner in this process.
(iii) Why La Laguna?
A large part of the jeans production capacity that was made obsolete in El Paso as a result of
NAFTA was transferred to regions in North and Central Mexico. One of the most notable
upcoming production locations is in and around the city of Torreón in the Laguna region. As a
result, La Laguna represents the most spectacular example of post-NAFTA growth in Mexico
resulting from garment exports. So much so, that in only of couple of years it became known as
the ‘New Jeans Capital of the World’, easily overshadowing its predecessor, even in the latter’s
heydays.
On the basis of a comparatively limited local production capacity in dress pants and jeans, a
full-fledged blue jeans export cluster has been built up in only a couple of years. As such, the
Laguna cluster provides a unique research location for the investigation of the impact of
participation in a demanding export market on a industrial cluster in an LMIC environment.
This study reports on the development of the Laguna cluster, most specifically the interaction
within the cluster and between the cluster and its buyers in the US. Bearing in mind the fate of
its predecessor El Paso, attention is paid to the external network linkages that connect the
cluster to its US buyers. Attention is also given to the local production structure and
organisation, and changes therein, as well as to intra-cluster links, the sociocultural
environment, and local learning and upgrading processes.
(iv) Research goal and research questions
This study presents an analysis of the interaction between local-level cluster dynamics and
globalisation processes in the garment industry. Geographically, the focus is on La Laguna, a
garment export cluster in Northern Mexico that has become an important foothold for US-
Mexico binational production networks of standardised, mass-produced garments, most
notably jeans. The examination of the development of the cluster since its export boom as well
as its prospects for the future is broken down into six research questions:
1 What are the main features and trends of the global and North American industrial context within which the
Laguna garment cluster is operating?
2 What are the main economic, geographical and historical characteristics of the Laguna region, and does its current
position as garment export cluster stem from these characteristics?
3 What is the structure of the Laguna garment cluster, in terms of product- and market-orientation and firm
characteristics and does it correspond to the structure of other garment clusters?
4 To what extent is the garment industry in La Laguna locally embedded through intra-cluster linkages? If it is
embedded, how does embeddedness in the economic and sociocultural environment affect the competitive position
of the cluster and its firms?
5 What is the composition of the garment production networks connecting La Laguna to the US market, in terms of
the actors involved and their productive, organisational and strategic activities and responsibilities?
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6 Have upgrading processes taken place in the garment cluster, and if so, what kinds of upgrading processes are
found, which factors are driving these processes and who are the actors involved?
(v) Terminology/definition of the main concepts
The garment industry: that part of the textile apparel complex whose end product is clothing rather
than other sewn products, such as household or industrial goods. In this study, two terms are
used as synonyms for the garment industry: the clothing industry and the wearing apparel
industry.
Garment production networks: different types of garment firms – including buyers in Western
markets and suppliers/subcontractors in LMICs – that act and maintain relations across various
distances and levels of scale and through diverse intermediaries for the (joint) production of
garments.
Buyers: the broad denominator used for different types of garment lead firms, such as retailers
(department stores, mass merchandisers, discounters), designers/marketers and branded
manufacturers. The use of this general term evinces the homogenisation of their strategies and
underscores the general importance of buying or sourcing as part of the strategies of all lead
garment firms. Increasingly, buyers focus on strong sales and marketing competencies while
outsourcing all manufacturing responsibility to a large, international production network of
LMIC suppliers/subcontractors.
Subcontractor: a firm that produces components or finished products based on another firm’s
specifications.
Cluster: a geographical and sectoral concentration of firms. Commonly, clustered firms maintain
network links to each other and other actors within the cluster.
The Global Value Chain (GVC): a network of labour and production processes whose end result is a
finished product. This study’s principal concern is with the garment value chain.
Other concepts, terms and abbreviations are included in the glossary.
(vi) Research methodology
The fieldwork and data collection were carried out during three rounds conducted between
October 1998 and December 2000. The first round was dedicated primarily to collecting
information on the composition of the local garment industry and to surveying garment firms
in order to create a database. The available information on the composition of the local
garment cluster was highly fragmented and incomplete. Therefore, data from different sources
were combined to create a new listing of companies. Since export networks are the central
theme of the study, the decision was taken to select a number of large companies that could be
identified as local lead export firms. The selected companies were surveyed using an extensive,
standard questionnaire. After these interviews, where possible the subcontractors of the local
lead firms were contacted and surveyed, and this process was continued until no further tiers of
subcontractors were found. This manipulated snowball methodology could have led to an
oversampling of large companies and a bias towards the export sector. In order to limit this
potential bias, the data obtained during the first survey round was complemented by randomly
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selecting and surveying a number of small and medium-sized companies from the listing. A
total of 73 local garment companies are included in the database. The factory tours that
followed many interviews were also highly informative.
The second round of fieldwork was used to gain a more detailed understanding of the wider
cluster context of local garment firms in La Laguna. To gain insight into the employment
structure and labour conditions in the local garment industry, a small-scale employee survey
was carried out. Information was also systematically collected from a number of suppliers of
different materials, ranging from machine parts to needles and thread and from a number of
laundries. Finally, more in-depth information, in particular on topics such as industrial policy,
rural garment factories, informal local linkages and relations with buyers, was gathered by
means of semi-structured, open-ended interviews with key entrepreneurs, informants at
organizations such as SECOFI, Bancomext and CNIV, and with other closely involved parties,
such as suppliers, specialist merchandisers and personnel transporters.
The third round of fieldwork was used to investigate and map the external environment of the
Laguna cluster. Two other important garment export clusters – Puebla/Tehuacan and Yucatán
– were visited. Locally, secondary sources on the structure of the clusters were gathered, and
interviews with entrepreneurs and key informants in both clusters were carried out. These
interviews concentrated on various local and external aspects of the clusters’ development. In
addition, a few of La Laguna’s main buyers in the US were visited. The interviews held with
them in El Paso, Miami and New York were focused specifically on their global sourcing and
business strategies, and on the role of Mexico and La Laguna within these strategies. These
interviews helped to see the Laguna region and its development from the buyers’ global
perspective. All the buyer interviews were open-ended and semi-structured. During all the
fieldwork rounds, both national and local newspapers were frequently consulted. In addition, a
large body of other secondary sources was consulted.
Finally, when it became clear that the Laguna jeans cluster had been suffering from a severe
downturn in demand since early 2001, a brief field visit was organised to gain insight into the
nature and impact of the crisis. The main findings of this last visit are reported in Appendix IV.
Appendix I contains a detailed overview of the methodology used in this study.
(vii) Outline of this study
Chapters 1 to 3 present an overview of the broad, global and North American industrial context
of the Laguna garment cluster, based on literature and secondary sources (see Figure 0.1).
Chapter 1 sketches the basic characteristics of garment production and marketing as well as
more recent changes therein. Within the general outline of global trends, special attention is
paid to the US, as it is the main market for the Mexican garment export sector. Chapter 2
introduces the various theoretical perspectives and their insights pertinent to the analysis of
the interaction between localised garment firms and the global garment industry and its main
actors. Globalisation in the case of the Mexican economy largely coincides with its economic
integration into NAFTA, most notably its trade with the US. Therefore, Chapter 3 deals with
the garment industries in the US and Mexico, as well as with the linkages between them and
the challenges posed by economic integration under NAFTA. [ 25 ]
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Chapters 4 and 5 discuss the most important features and structural aspects of the region and
the local garment industry. Chapter 4 presents the main spatial and socioeconomic features
and the historical development of the study area, the Laguna region, which straddles the states
of Durango and Coahuila in Northern Mexico. Chapter 5 presents the basic structure of the
Laguna cluster and pays attention to, for example, market- and product-orientation, and
cluster size and firm size.
[ 26 ]
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Chapters 6 to 8 present the main findings of the field research. Chapter 6 examines intra-cluster
links and sheds light on the role of such links and the wider sociocultural and economic
environment of the cluster on the competitive position of the cluster and firms. Chapter 7
focuses on network relations, centred on and orchestrated by various types of US buyers that
connect La Laguna to the US market and their role in the development of La Laguna. Chapter 8
reviews the development of the cluster since NAFTA and examines whether upgrading
processes have taken place that may contribute to strengthening or improving the position of
La Laguna. The chapter is concluded with a brief discussion of the impact of the crisis that
affected the local cluster since mid 2001.
Chapter 9 summarises the main findings of the study and answers the research questions.
These are then placed within the general and theoretical context as sketched in Chapters 1 and
2.
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1 The global garment industry:
organizational and geographic features
and trends
The history of the industrial production of garments dates back to the early nineteenth
century. Since then there have been few truly revolutionary changes: the basic principles in the
organization of garment production have remained unchanged, and fashion and a dichotomy
between retailers and manufacturers continue to characterise the industry1. However, market-
related aspects became much more pronounced in the last decades of the twentieth century. In
fact, sales and marketing now play a dominant role in clothing. The most notable evidence of
this trend is the proliferation of brands and labels on clothing. Several of these brands and
labels have a global reach and are both sold and produced around the world. The fact that the
global success of these highly advertised brands and labels is often based on a global
manufacturing strategy in which low-wage countries – and especially the most sensitive
segments of the labour force in those countries – perform the lion’s share of production, is
characteristic of the past decades. It has also caused the industry and many of its high-profile
firms to be at the centre of both academic and popular polemic2. This chapter does not take
sides in this moral debate, but gives an overview of the basic organizational and geographical
features and trends that underlie the current structure of the global garment industry.
This chapter highlights the industry’s distinctive characteristics. It also sketches the most
important dynamics over the past decades, based on a synopsis of existing garment studies. The
aim is to outline the global industrial environment within which the local garment industry in
La Laguna is operating, as well as the challenges posed by that environment. The focus of the
first section of the chapter is on the organization of production. It uses the garment production
process as a stepping stone for a brief and broad introduction to the basic structural and
organizational characteristics of the garment industry. Also, the most basic organizational
principles in garment production – viz. vertical disintegration and subcontracting – are
discussed. Likewise, the progressive dominance of sales and marketing over manufacturing, the
emergence of new actors and strategies and shifts in existing power balances are introduced. All
of these phenomena are affecting and transforming organizational practices and structures in
the industry.
The second section of this chapter focuses on the geography of garment production. It shows
the garment industry to be a truly omnipresent industry, displaying high mobility on a global
scale. Within the broad globalisation pattern, a number of sub-patterns can be noted: for
example, the decline in garment production in developed countries is paralleled by growing
participation of a greater number of developing countries. There is little doubt that simple
production techniques and the labour-intensive nature of the garment production process are
pushing the relocation of garment production to low and middle income countries (LMICs).
However, developing countries on the periphery of the main market appear especially
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successful. The resulting patterns and their underlying strategies are highly complex, dynamic
and even volatile.
1.1 Characterising the industry
The garment industry is part of the textile-apparel production complex, as illustrated in Figure
1.1. The individual parts of this complex – the clothing/garment, apparel and textiles industries
– are common subjects of industry studies. Because of their interlinkages and partial overlap
they are quite commonly grouped together and even (mistakenly) treated as one3. To avoid
confusion, Figure 1.1 highlights the subject of this study: the shaded area is the garment or
clothing industry as defined here. As such, the garment industry produces only clothing and no
other sewn products (see also Spinanger, 1992). In this study, two terms are used as synonyms
for the garment industry: the clothing industry and the wearing apparel industry.
One of the first characteristics of the garment industry that deserves attention is that it is
highly segmented. There are numerous clothing categories, with segmentations, among others
for types of consumers (children, men, women), product categories (e.g. casual clothing, work
wear, sportswear) and market segment (low-end vs. high-end). Each product category unites a
number of particular product types with specific characteristics, which in turn are reflected in
the nature of the production process. Also, in most literature on the garment industry a very
broad distinction is made between fashion and standardized, mass-produced garments that are
generally believed to have slightly different characteristics and dynamics (Taplin, 1994; Dicken,
1992, 1998; Mody & Wheeler, 1987).
The garment production process consists of three broad groupings of production activities: the
pre-assembly, assembly and post-assembly production phases (see Figure 1.2). Pre-assembly
involves grading and marking patterns, and cutting fabric into individual pattern pieces.
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Figure 1.1: The textile-apparel production complex
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Assembly is the sewing together of these pattern pieces. The traditional garment assembly
process is called the ‘bundle system’, since it involves the sequential transportation of bundles
of about thirty garment pieces along sewing lines of specialist, one-task operators. Post-
assembly is in most cases a synonym for finishing and consists of such activities as re-screening,
trimming, pressing and packaging. Only few types of garments, most notably jeans, require
laundry as part of the post-assembly process. Each phase of the production process has distinct
labour requirements and specific capital-labour ratios, which opens up different possibilities
for new technology and plant locations for each phase. Prior to the manufacturing or
production process, which runs from pattern making to packaging, product development
takes place. Product development and sales and marketing are generally carried out close to the
final market.
The production column in Figure 1.2 depicts the production process for clothes as a
continuous sequence. In the old days, most garments were produced domestically or by tailor
shops, and the production process was integrated; pre-assembly, assembly and post-assembly
processes were carried out in one location. However, since the establishment of the first
clothing ‘manu-factory’ in the early nineteenth century – which started the industrialisation of
garment production – vertical disintegration of the production process was introduced
(Dickerson, 1995). Mass production and the vertical disintegration of the production process
became standard practice in Western garment production (Jernigan & Easterling, 1990;
Dickerson, 1995; Berry et al., 1976). At that time, urbanisation and factory-based
industrialisation caused an increase in demand for mass-produced garments. With the
concentration of production in factories, the possibilities for specialization increased.
Specialization and flexibility advantages associated with vertical disintegration led to the
emergence of an institutionalised division of labour. In the USA, for example, jobbers close to
the main market in New York performed design and marketing activities, while
manufacturing was often done by contractors in rural locations in the Northeast or in southern
parts of the country (Hall, 1959; Jernigan & Easterling, 1990; Taplin, 1997). Production was
coordinated through subcontracting/contracting linkages between these two types of specialist
garment firms. Over time, vertical disintegration and subcontracting have become the rule
rather than the exception (Hall, 1959; Taplin, 1994, 1997; Dickerson, 1995; Dicken, 1992, 1998;
Elson, 1988). Specialization is also reflected in the scale of operation of garment firms. Overall,
the garment industry is a comparatively fragmented, small-scale industry, consisting primarily
of small production units (Hall, 1959; Dickerson, 1995; Dicken, 1998).
Inter-firm production networks, based on the above-mentioned specialist subcontracting
linkages, have long been the backbone of the industry. These networks have recently become
characterized by deeper specialization. Bull et al. (1993) also note this: ...’variegation in products
and processes leads to effective specialization opportunities, which in turn make intra-industry
linkages more important’. Within these networks small- and medium-sized contractors
generally take care of the lion’s share of manufacturing. However, very large and modern ‘lead’
firms play a central role in these networks. Increasingly these lead firms derive their strong
competitive position from global retailing strategies based on mass marketing and the creation
of global brands and labels. While they handle very large volumes they are often not involved in
manufacturing but instead coordinate and control manufacturing activities as carried out by
the contractors in their networks.
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One of the interesting aspects of Figure 1.2 is that its basic elements have hardly changed over
time. The modernisation of products and processes has been limited, undergoing only fairly
humble changes. One of the reasons is that, compared to other industries, automation options
are limited. The few technological innovations that have taken place have had the most impact
on the pre-assembly activities of design and cutting (Hoffman, 1985; Mody and Wheeler, 1987;
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Figure 1.2: The garment production column
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OTA, 1992; Audet, 1996; Wyatt, 1989) and on distribution. By contrast, assembly technology has
changed little: conventional sewing machines, only slightly more sophisticated than those of
several decades ago, still dominate factory floors. The soft, limp nature of the fabric limits the
advancement of automation in assembly (OTA, 1992; Taplin, 1994; Dickerson, 1995). Thus, the
few advances that have been made are mostly geared towards the mechanised transportation of
garment pieces on the factory floor and to the automation of specialized operations (such as
buttonholing, pocket setters and collar attachers). In other words: ‘the one operator/one
machine link has not been broken’ (Hoffman, 1985, p. 378). As a consequence, garment
production is highly labour-intensive: estimates of the relative importance of labour cost in
total manufacturing cost vary between 25 and 35 percent (Scheffer, 1992; Jernigan & Easterling,
1990). Also, compared to other industrial sectors, garment production requires skilled workers
(Berry et al., 1976; Alexander & Gibson, 1979; Audet, 1996; Taplin, 1997; Dicken, 1998). Much of
the speed and quality of production depends on the sewing skills of the operators, who turn
flat, one-dimensional fabric into three-dimensional garments. Sewing skills can be passed on
relatively easily through on-the-job training (Spinanger, 1992).
The generally low technology levels in garment manufacturing lead to low barriers to entry,
which is reflected in the earlier mentioned fragmentation and the presence of a multitude of
small- and medium-sized firms. Combined with general improvements in
telecommunications and transportation technology, it also facilitates the globalisation of the
garment industry through the incorporation of garment firms in developing countries into
global garment production networks. Thus, low barriers to entry and high labour intensity of
the production process make the garment industry a common first stepping-stone for LMICs
into the industrialisation process. Producers in LMICs are becoming more and more involved
in garment production for export: the share of LMICs in garment imports of the main Western
markets is increasing (Audet, 1996; WTO, 1994, 2000). Moreover, an increasing number of
LMICs are participating in this development. As will be explained in more detail in the second
section of this chapter, certain patterns can be discerned with regard to the involvement of
LMICs in garment export. Though overall low levels of technology and high labour intensity
characterise the garment industry, it is important to recognise, as mentioned earlier, that each
phase of the production process has distinct capital-labour ratios. The assembly phase is the
most labour-intensive, which is why assembly is especially amenable to international
relocation to LMICs. The internationalisation of garment production thus commonly involves
a geographical separation between the pre-assembly and the assembly stages of production
(Fröbel et al., 1980; Dicken, 1998; Audet, 1996; see also section 1.2.2).
In both developed countries and LMICs the garment industry is typically seen to employ the
most vulnerable or sensitive segments of the labour force (Dicken, 1998). On average, 80% of
garment workers are female (Spinanger, 1992). Unsurprisingly, there are many studies of
seamstresses in LMICs concerning their position in the factories and households (Benería &
Roldán, 1987; Robert, 1983; Wilson, 1993; Lawson, 1999; Peña St. Martin & Gamboa, 1991;
Estrada Iguíniz, 2002). Especially in LMICs, garment workers are often young, have a low
educational level and only limited working experience. Skills are often the result of on-the-job
training and are not easily transferable to jobs in other industries. In industrialized countries,
and also in LMICs, immigrants typically make up a large share of the workforce. Several studies
document the employment of immigrants in sweatshops and semi-underground factories in
large metropolises (Glasmeier et al., 1992; Taplin, 1994; Ross, 2002; ILO, 1996; Hartog & Zorlu,
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1999; Kumcu, 2001), resulting in ‘an international division of labour within developed
countries’ (Scheffer, 1992, p. 15). At the same time, garment employment is also present in rural
areas, where it may be a dominant factor in the local economy (Jernigan & Easterling, 1990;
Glasmeier et al., 1992; Estrada Iguíniz, 2002; van Dooren & Zarate Hoyos, 2003; Simmons &
Kalantaridis, 1996). Overall, the garment industry is notorious for its bad labour conditions,
low wages and low unionisation levels, whether in underground sweatshops, in factories in
export processing zones in LMICs, or the hired-and-fired homeworkers or outworkers
(Fernandez-Kelly, 1983; Wilson, 1993; Benería & Roldán, 1987). Generally, instead of receiving a
set wage, garment workers are paid a rate for each piece completed (Jernigan & Easterling, 1990;
Taplin, 1997). This is called ‘piecework’ or the ‘piece rate system’.
The following section expands on this first introduction by examining the two most basic and
interlinked characteristics of the organization of garment production: vertical disintegration
and subcontracting. The section after that deals with aspects of the garment industry that have
been latently present for a very long time but became especially pronounced in the 1970s to
1990s. Attention is paid to the increasing power of retailers, the increasing prominence of
segmentation and fashion as drivers of the garment market, and the increasing prevalence of
branding and labelling as tools for product differentiation. The final section looks ahead and
examines incipient and expected changes in the garment production arena as a consequence of
the recent market dynamics.
1.1.1 Organizational cornerstones of garment production
Vertical disintegration
As discussed above, early and pervasive vertical disintegration lies at the root of the current
organization of garment production. Here, vertical disintegration is understood as the
splitting off of parts of the production process to separate firms or establishments, or the
externalisation (buying) – as opposed to internalisation (making) – of certain production
activities or services of the production process (see Figure 1.3). A business firm’s decision
concerning what to make and what to buy is central to industrial organization. Since the 1930s,
transaction costs have played a determinant role in answering this question. The basic
contention was that a firm will internalise transactions ‘until the costs of organising an extra
transaction within the firm become equal to the cost of carrying out the same transaction by
means of an exchange on the open market’ (Coase, as quoted in Yeung, 1998, p. 105).
While still a valid observation, in the context of today’s global economy Coase’s insights can be
seen as economically deterministic (see also Yeung, 1998). Such criticism is prompted by the
fact that new and multiple competitive pressures on business enterprises during the last
decades of the twentieth century have complicated the ‘make or buy’ dilemma. Most
noteworthy in this respect is the need to become more flexible4. One way to achieve flexibility is
by corporate restructuring aimed at specialization or emphasising/re-emphasising core
competencies and the outsourcing of other production and service activities (Porter, 1980;
Dicken, 1998). As such, since the 1980s and 1990s flexibility has often been obtained through
specialization and vertical disintegration (Piore & Sabel, 1984; Best, 1990; Malecki, 1997; Dicken,
1998; Storper, 1997).
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Figure 1.3: Vertical disintegration and subcontracting arrangements
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In the garment industry, vertical disintegration pre-dates the flexibilisation trend of the late
twentieth century. For example, textbooks on economic geography written several decades ago
(Hall, 1959; Berry et al., 1976, 1987; Alexander & Gibson, 1979) trace the separation of
production from design and marketing in the US garment industry back to over a century ago.
In recent decades the division of labour has become more complex and fine-grained: a great
variety of garment firms – such as retailers, marketers, jobbers, vendors, buying agents/traders
and manufacturers – have sprung up, each performing a part of the production process.
Vertical disintegration in the garment industry is facilitated by the fact that the garment
production process is easily segmented into separate production activities or nodes, each of
which has a different capital-labour ratio (see section 1.1).
Subcontracting
With vertical disintegration and increasing specialization in garment production,
subcontracting relations have become an integral part of the production organization. Here,
subcontracting is understood as the production of components or finished products by one
firm for another firm based on the latter’s specifications. A commonly used synonym for
subcontracting is ‘sourcing’5. Such an intermediate, ‘neither purely firm-like nor purely
market-like’ (Casson, as quoted in Malecki, 1997, p. 114) coordination mechanism allows lead
garment firms to maintain the flexibility associated with vertical disintegration (Holmes, 1986;
Crewe & Davenport, 1992; Crewe, 1996). On the other hand, through tight coordination
embedded in subcontracting relations, lead garment firms still have control over their
subcontractors and are able to dictate prices and impose product specifications, quality and
delivery standards (Humphrey & Schmitz, 2000; see also Chapter 2). In reference to
subcontracting relations, the firm placing the order or contract is generally called the ‘principal
firm’. The division of labour in subcontracting arrangements is such that the principal firm has
total control over the marketing of the product.
Several types of subcontracting may be distinguished on different grounds. For this research,
the most appropriate, broad distinction is between industrial and commercial subcontracting
(Dicken, 1998; see Visser, 1996; Holmes, 1986; Hayter, 1998, for alternative approaches). In
industrial subcontracting arrangements, either components or processes may be contracted
out. Dicken (1998) further subdivides industrial subcontracting into largely self-explanatory
types: speciality subcontracting, cost-saving subcontracting and complementary
subcontracting6. Between the three types of industrial subcontracting, not only does the
principal firm’s reason for involvement vary, but so too does the extent of its and the
subcontractor’s7 involvement in the production process. In Figure 1.3 the shift of assembly
from firm B to firm C is an illustration of an industrial subcontracting arrangement.
In commercial subcontracting, the contractor produces a finished product. In the garment
industry, commercial subcontracting is a central notion and is commonly referred to as ‘full
package’ production (Gereffi, 1997). In full-package production arrangements, subcontractors
purchase all the material inputs and use these to produce a finished garment in accordance
with the specifications of their principal firm, to which the garment is subsequently sold. Since
the insertion of LMIC contractors in the production networks of Western lead firms often starts
with pure assembly activities, full-package production is seen as an important step in a
development trajectory, in which LMIC contractors gradually extend their command over the
production process (Gereffi, 1999). As will be further discussed in Chapter 3, full-package
production features especially prominently in recent studies on the Mexican garment industry.
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The shift of the entire manufacturing process from firm A to firm B in Figure 1.3 is an example
of commercial subcontracting or full-package production.
In all subcontracting arrangements, marketing is the sole responsibility of the principal firm.
In the case of garments, this latter observation is often taken to an extreme as the role of the
principal (or ‘lead’) firm is increasingly assumed by retailers whose only involvement is with
retailing and marketing. As will be discussed in the following section, their leading role is
based on the fact that they have slowly gained power and have come to hold and consolidate a
position of power over manufacturing firms.
1.1.2 Changes in the garment market
For a long time, a fairly clear and deep dichotomy based on the separation of manufacturers
and retailers characterised the wearing apparel industry. The division of labour between them
was fairly clear-cut: manufacturers took charge of the production, and often also the design of
garments which they sold to retailers, who in turn sold them to the final consumers.
Nowadays, the situation is not as straightforward. Sophisticated marketing has become an
essential element in the strategies of all successful lead garment companies. In fact, the
overwhelming importance of marketing is the basis for an entirely new type of garment firms,
the ‘marketers’ or ‘manufacturers without factories’. These marketers have built their business
on marketing without getting involved in manufacturing (Glasmeier et al., 1992; Gereffi,
1994a). They compete directly with retailers and branded manufacturers. Currently, all three
types of garment firms are combining manufacturing and retailing strategies and adopting
more hybrid forms of organization8. As a consequence, it has become hard – certainly in the US
– to clearly distinguish retailers from marketers and branded manufacturers; all are involved to
some extent in retailing as well as in manufacturing or the coordination of manufacturing.
Meanwhile, garment retailing has changed dramatically as such marketing tools as brands and
labels are used to segment the market and for the frequent introduction of new fashion
elements.
Product differentiation through brands and labels
As mentioned, garment manufacturing is characterized by fragmentation and small- or
medium-sized companies. Only a few manufacturers, viz. those that are known as ‘branded
manufacturers’, have managed to distinguish themselves from this small- and medium-sized
enterprise (SME) manufacturing army by building a strong brand image. Traditionally, their
garment brands were attached to only a few models of one type of standardized commodity
garments such as jeans, socks or tee-shirts. Well-known brand examples are Lee, Wrangler, Levi
Strauss, and Fruit of the Loom. These brands are owned and managed by branded
manufacturers, whose main preoccupation for decades was the manufacturing of garments
worthy of their brand, and less with the marketing side of their business and the brand.
Nevertheless, the success of brands inspired retailers to develop their own private labels.
The development by retailers of their own private label lines marks an important change in the
marketing of garments as well as a shift in the relation between various actors in the industry.
Private label lines are manufactured for specific retailers and sold exclusively in their stores
(Dickerson, 1995). For retailers, these lines have two clear advantages. Firstly, they give retailers
direct control over the types of garments sold in their stores, enabling them to seek variety and
exclusivity as a way to differentiate themselves from the competition. Secondly, private label
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products are generally sourced directly from LMIC manufacturers at low prices, allowing for
higher mark-ups – certainly compared to domestic sourcing (Dickerson, 1995). In the USA,
retailers started to develop private labels during the 1960s and 1970s as a means to maintain
profits in a market characterized by stagnant sales, stable and homogeneous prices, and the
consumer demand for greater product-mix variety. Typical examples of private labels are
Kmart’s ‘Route 66’, JC Penny’s ‘Arizona Jeans’ and ‘Canda’ by C&A. Generally, private labels are
positioned in the lower-priced segments of the market. The private-label strategy has been
highly successful. Inspired by the success of manufacturers’ brands they are now means to
compete with them (Palpacuer, 2002). So much so, that instead of being the main clients of
domestic manufacturers, retailers have become important competitors of garment
manufacturers, especially as they are developing direct relationships with overseas producers.
The development of private-label lines by department stores and other traditional retailers is
not an isolated phenomenon. Besides brands and private labels, the 1970s also saw the birth of
‘designer labels’. These are owned by marketers or designers such as Calvin Klein, Ralph
Lauren, Zara, Gucci, and Mexx (Dicken, 1998; Palpacuer, 2002). They are similar to private labels
but have a more exclusive image and predominate in the middle- to high-price segments.
The general aim of brands, private and designer labels is to differentiate between largely
similar products. Though applied throughout the industry, brands and labels are most
effectively used as marketing tools in the mid to high segments of the clothing markets.
The branding and labelling strategy has been so successful that it has been taken one step
further in a process that has been called ‘horizontal brand stretching’ (Gibbon, 2000).
Horizontal brand stretching involves the sourcing and marketing of non-clothing items under
brands or labels. Stretching into non-clothing items such as furniture, wristwatches, perfumes,
jewellery, and bed- and bath linens (Gibbon, 2000; Speer, 2001a) turns clothing ‘styles’ into
‘lifestyles’. This phenomenon is becoming more and more common; marketers of designer
labels are particularly proactive in this respect. Furthermore, marketers and designers engage
in internal brand differentiation, through the development of slightly differentiated, often
sound-alike brands (Gibbon, 2000), such as ‘Liz’, ‘Liz Claiborne Casual’ and ‘Claiborne Men’ by
Liz Claiborne Inc. Similarly, ‘GapKids’, ‘BabyGap’ and ‘GapBody’ are spin-off labels of Gap Inc..
Clearly, brands and labels provide the retailers, marketers and branded manufacturers behind
them with a powerful marketing tool. Through the consistent association of a brand or label
with a certain style and/or with other product characteristics, such as price or quality, its
owners seek to manipulate and control the garment market. They try to win consumer loyalty
by segmenting the market and stimulate sales through frequent fashion changes.
Market dynamics: segmentation and ‘fashionisation’
The garment industry is also characterized by high levels of segmentation (section 1.1).
Segmentation may be based on the final consumer (man, woman, child), type of garment
(bottoms/tops, outerwear/underwear) or price/exclusivity (cheap, mass-produced/expensive,
exclusive), etc. After massification in garment marketing and production during the 1960s and
early 1970s (Griffin et al., 1971; Crewe & Davenport, 1992), the 1980s saw a renewed tendency
towards segmentation of the mass market for garments9. Current market segmentation is
based on the creation of specific clothing styles that correspond to consumer profiles and the
use of brands or labels to achieve consumer recognition and loyalty. During the 1990s,
consumption patterns for clothing became highly opaque, as price, fashion, brands/labels and
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style played a role in determining garment sales. The dualism between ‘cheap and cheerful,
throw-away fashion’ and higher value, quality clothes appears to have become less absolute. In
attempting to maintain garment sales and gain control over fickle and stagnant consumer
demand (Audet, 1996), the creation of clear and popular clothing styles is an increasingly
important instrument. The aim is to identify or even create discrete segments of the consumer
market – or discrete consumer profiles, such as skaters, female professionals and young urban
professionals – for which a specific style, often under a separate brand or label, can be
developed.
Besides the segmentation of the garment market into a greater number of specific styles, the
greater importance and faster-paced nature of fashion change is dynamising the garment
market. Though pinpointed as a trend many decades ago (Hall, 1959; Berry et al., 1976),
nowadays fashion change is seen by some as the main motor behind the continued consumer
demand for clothing (Dicken, 1998; Dickerson, 1995; Crewe & Davenport, 1992), which would
otherwise be hampered by clothing’s negative elasticity of demand and a saturation of Western
mass markets (Audet, 1996). Across the various segments, fashion changes are frequent and
multiple fashion collections cater for such changes as well as stimulate sales. Six or even eight
fashion seasons a year has become the rule rather than the exception. It is important to note
that this applies to the industry as a whole. Fashion trends are incorporated into most
garments, from cheap lower-end to expensive and exclusive (OTA, 1992). Even garments such as
jeans, tee-shirts and underwear, which are traditionally characterized by a high degree of
standardisation, have increasingly had to incorporate fashion elements in order to maintain
market share (Gibbon, 2000).
Brands and labels are important tools in the segmentation of the market and they have become
key assets. Manufacturers, designers and retailers concentrate efforts and capital investment on
the creation of a global brand or label image. The capital investment necessary to launch and
maintain a successful mass advertised, global image have contributed to strengthening the
barriers to entry in garment retailing. As will be discussed next, the branding and labelling
trend has re-enforced the power of lead firms that are successful in this segment over other
garment firms.
Lead garment firms: examining the positions of retailers and manufacturers
In recent literature on the garment industry, one general trend stands out above all others: the
increasing dominance of retailers over manufacturers (Clairmonte & Cavanagh, 1981; Scheffer,
1992; Taplin, 1994; Dickerson, 1995; Elson, 1988; Dicken, 1998; Jernigan & Easterling, 1990;
Gibbs, 1988). In more general terms, there has been a shift of core competencies away from
manufacturing towards the marketing and design phases of the production process. Strong
design and marketing competences, rather than manufacturing skills, are the keys to success in
the garment industry today. Changes have been especially dramatic in the UK, where the
phenomenon has been referred to as a ‘retailing revolution’ (Crewe & Davenport, 1992;
Scheffer, 1992). Similarly, in reference to the USA, Dickerson (1995, p. 453) speaks of ‘power
retailers’.
Concentration in retailing has increased. Nowadays fewer retailers enjoy larger market shares
and increased purchasing power over manufacturers (Crewe & Davenport, 1992; Scheffer, 1992;
Dickerson, 1995; Gereffi, 1994a). Retailers increasingly exercise command and control over the
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products in their stores as well as over the manufacturers that produce these clothes. Many
retailers occupy the position of lead firm in garment production networks. Traditional general
retailers, including mass merchandisers, department stores and mail-order companies, are
participating in this shift, as is the new type of retailer, the marketers. The result appears to be a
general power shift from manufacturers to retailers.
However, manufacturers have not been passive bystanders: especially branded
manufacturers (that have a long history of working with brands) have adapted their business
strategies to be able to confront the competition from retailers (see also Box 1.1). In most cases
their strategic reorientation has involved the increased promotion of existing brands and/or
the acquisition of new brands, whilst de-emphasising their production activities. Most have
not completely divested out of manufacturing, but have opted for a combination of in-house
production and subcontracting. Several branded manufacturers have integrated forward into
retailing mostly through the establishment of ‘outlet stores’. Based on the success of such and
other strategies, several branded manufacturers are able to maintain a position of power and
control over their ‘filière’ or production column and production network. Smaller
manufacturers that do not produce under their own brand are generally finding it hard to carve
out a niche for themselves. They occupy a dependent position vis-à-vis retailers and other lead
firms and may be threatened as the latter internationalise their sourcing networks (see also
section 1.2).
As lead garment firms become more hybrid and business strategies converge, retailers,
marketers and branded manufacturers are commonly grouped together under the broad
denominator ‘buyers’. This nomenclature points to the homogenisation of their strategies and
the declining relevance of the manufacturing or retailing ‘roots’ of individual buyers. More
importantly, it also underscores the general importance of buying or sourcing as part of the
strategy of all lead firms. Increasingly, lead firms in the main Western markets have strong sales
and marketing competencies, and outsource manufacturing responsibility to a large and often
international production network. They orchestrate the production of their clothes by tightly
coordinating and controlling these networks and participant producers.
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Box 1.1: The dynamics of garment marketing: the case of blue jeans
Though they have an image of being quintessentially American, blue jeans have a very international
background: their inventor, Levi Strauss, was a German immigrant from Bavaria; ‘jeans’ is derived
from Genoa (‘Genes’ in French) in Italy where local sailors were the first to wear jeans; and ‘denim’
comes from Nimes, the French town where the fabric for the first jeans was bought (Knight, 1999).
Since their invention, jeans have only become more internationalised; they are now as international
as any other type of garment. In addition, they have lost their status as the uniform of the blue-collar
worker and the American cowboy and – after what appears to have been a brief identity crisis – are
moving towards the centre stage of fashion. All in all, jeans provide an excellent illustration of the
dynamics of the garment industry in general.
Branding and market segmentation feature prominently in the strategies of blue-jeans producers
nowadays. Evidence to this is a Levi Strauss press release in which the company announces the
launch of a new Levi Strauss & Co. brand, Levi Strauss SignatureTM:
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‘Entering the mass channel in the United States with a new brand is a natural next step for us as we
continue to broaden our product availability through a portfolio of brands. We’ve segmented the
marketplace by consumer types, product, price and retail channel. For example, consumers will easily see
the difference between the jeanswear lines within the Levi Strauss Signature(tm) and Levi’s(r) brands. Each
brand will have differentiated products in distinctive fabrics and finishes at various price points [...] but they
will all be rooted in what we stand for – originality, quality and style. (Company press release, 30 October
2002)
Levi Strauss’ most direct competitor – VF Corporation – appears to be following a more aggressive
strategy to broaden its portfolio of brands, in which the acquisition of existing brands plays an
important role. Currently (2003), VF owns and manages sixteen brands, including Lee, Wrangler,
Rustler and Gitano, as well as non-jeans brands such as East Pack, The North Face and JanSport.
The upsurge in private labelling has also affected the blue-jeans segment. One of the companies seen
to have initiated this trend in the 1970s was Gap Inc. (Knight, 1999), a company that moved from
retailing Levi jeans to becoming the marketer of its own private-label lines. At that time jeans sales
were at an all-time high and both retailers in the lower segments of the market and designers for the
higher segments began to launch private-label jeans. By the beginning of the 21st century, Arizona
Jeans (by JC Penney), Route 66 (Kmart), Guess, Diesel, Polo and many others were firmly established
names in blue jeans.
Finally, blue jeans have not escaped the fashionisation trend, so that now one can distinguish fashion
jeans from basic jeans, where the former are progressively taking over market share from the latter.
This change was not made overnight, certainly not by the main players, the branded manufacturers
such as Levi Strauss and VF Corporation. The laggardly attitude towards fashionisation of the
segment’s traditional leaders – most notably Levi Strauss, which as a consequence suffered great
losses in market share – as well as the uncertain direction and success of this fashionisation trend
caused a number of industry watchers to publish alarming reports on the ‘disappearance of jeans’
(Tubantia, 1999). The initial narrow focus on standardized 5-pocket jeans of many of these reports to
some extent explains the overly dramatic picture they paint. Furthermore, efforts were made to
recover the lost market share, most notably by increasing the design efforts in jeans. New fashion
elements were incorporated not only by retailers and marketers, but also by the branded
manufacturers. This appears to have paid off: the street scene of today shows that jeans have by no
means disappeared. A considerable share of the loss incurred by 5-pocket jeans is being balanced by
growth in fashion denim products. Thus, once the classic example of a mass-produced, standardized
garment, the progressive but cautious incorporation of fashion elements during the 1990s and the
active participation in the generation of new trends around the turn of the new century have radically
changed the face of blue jeans. Reports in industry magazines bearing titles such as ‘Denimwear is
hotter and more fashion forward than ever’ (Swedberg, 2002) confirm this trend. The range of denim
fabrics has expanded dramatically over the past years, especially with regard to stretch fabric and new
types of weaves, but finishing techniques now determine the look of jeans. Low-rise jeans are popular
and these are treated with finishing techniques such as sand-blasting, hand-sanding (creating faded
patches on thighs and seat) and ‘whiskering’ (artificial creases at the crotch and knees). These and
other treatments with chemicals, dyes or abrasives determine the appearance and popularity of a pair
of jeans.
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1.1.3 Changing to face new challenges
From the above it is clear that non-price aspects have become crucial to building and
maintaining a strong position in the wearing apparel market. Besides price, garment sales are
now determined by brand reputation, which amongst other things depends on product
quality, styling, advertising, and rapid and accurate response to fashion trends (Richardson,
1996). The garment marketing arena has witnessed fairly radical changes leading to the
progressive subordination of production to marketing and a more central position of retailers
in garment production networks. However, this is just one step in a sequence of changes that is
transforming garment production networks and organizational processes as well as
manufacturing firms. This section connects recent developments in the industry with the
production organization in order to highlight incipient and expected changes in garment
networks and firms.
Technological innovations and rapid progress in computer technology are transforming the
competitive dynamics of the industry by allowing the easy and low-cost collection, processing
and dissemination of consumer sales data (Abernathy et al., 1995; Dicken, 1998). Similarly, the
internet is affecting the organization of garment production, mainly by facilitating fast and
direct business-to-business (B2B) contact and data exchange between geographically distant
participants in a production network. The result is an ‘information-integrated channel’
(Abernathy et al., 1995)10.
The industry-wide fashionisation trend creates a push for short delivery or turn-around times.
It also diminishes the predictability of sales and discourages the issuing of predictable bulk
orders, which is reflected in an overall reduction of order sizes and the break-up of orders into a
large initial order complemented by smaller replenishment orders. The resulting pressures on
garment manufacturers and contractors to become more flexible are paramount (Audet, 1996;
Malecki, 1994). At the same time, greater variety, volatility and uncertainty in the market pose
considerable risks to retailers. Risk minimisation or aversion is achieved by ‘lean retailing’: the
direct transfer of risk – most notable in inventory management – and responsibility to
manufacturers and contractors. It is also achieved by closer cooperation between buyer and
manufacturer.
Risk minimisation is also important with regard to control over suppliers in the sphere of
labour conditions and environmental standards. Consumer pressure and boycotts based on
concerns over labour conditions and/or pollution can easily blemish the reputation of brands
or labels. The reputation of brands has proven to be vulnerable, and malpractices – or
allegations thereof (Berron, 1999) – can have a notable negative impact on sales. Following a
number of labour condition scandals involving, amongst others, Nike and Gap Inc., many
buyers have formulated corporate codes of conduct (see Annex 2). Nowadays the codes of
conduct of most garment buyers specify the labour condition and environmental requirements
with which factories that produce for them need to comply (Hale, 2000)11.
These very broad changes affect the production organization in a number of ways. First, to
reduce inventories and make production correspond more directly to sales, retailers are
building closer working relationships with manufacturers. These retailer-manufacturer
partnerships are especially needed in the fields of inventory control and product development
(Abernathy et al., 1995; Palpacuer, 2002; Wyatt, 1989). The formation of these relationships goes
hand in hand with a streamlining and rationalisation of the production networks, in which
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those manufacturers are favoured that can meet not only price and quality requirements but
can also offer high flexibility and responsiveness to market changes and retailer demands.
Abernathy et al. (1995, p. 176) note that:
‘...lean retailing strategies place pressure on apparel manufacturers to adopt information systems, order fulfilment
practices, distribution practices and related services that allow them to fill retailers’ orders rapidly, efficiently and
flexibly ... the long-term competitive performance of the firms responsible for the production and distribution of
apparel products will therefore be shaped by their capabilities to respond rapidly to consumer demand while
minimising exposure to inventory risk. This fact potentially places a premium on such characteristics as geographic
proximity to market; technological sophistication in planning, distribution and production; and investment in closer,
longer term relationships with the other players in the channel.’
The pattern of regionalisation of sourcing mentioned by Abernathy et al. will be dealt with in
the second section of this chapter; here the focus is on the organisational transformation of
production networks. In that respect, close and strategic buyer-supplier cooperation combined
with the large production volumes involved explains the concentration on fewer but larger and
more capable manufacturers as ‘key suppliers’ in the networks.
Which manufacturers or suppliers are in the best position to attain a key supplier position?
Such a position requires more than investment in technology, the transformation and
adaptation of the organization of production in order to shorten delivery times, and more
flexibility. Common elements of what in the industry is known as a ‘quick response’ strategy
are better communications between buyer and manufacturers (based on electronic data
interchange (EDI), which may go as far as the direct transmittance of point-of-sale data to the
manufacturer) and improved inventory tracking. However, flexibilisation of the production
process on the factory shop floor may also be needed (AAMA, 1988; KSA, 1988; Bailey, 1993;
Dicken, 1998). The traditional bundle system is typically Taylorist12 in its focus on high
specialization of workers – whose earnings are based on piece rates – and promotion of
individual productivity. The downsides of the system are tremendous amounts of in-process
inventory (several bundles each comprising thirty garment pieces may be awaiting each
operator) and complicated quality control. This implies quality risks, long throughput times
and inflexibility. The installation of a unit production system (UPS) – a rail transportation
system that transports individual garments or garment pieces on a hanger between operators –
is one way to reduce in-process inventory. Module systems, in which workers have more
responsibilities and each garment piece is immediately handed from one operator to the next,
are thought to be a good alternative, especially because they bring dramatic reductions in in-
process inventory and in throughput time (Bonacich & Waller, 1994a; Bailey, 1993). The
flexibility gains associated with the module system are great: lead times may be reduced from
several days to a few hours (see KSA, 1988). However, its implementation may be complicated,
not in the least because it requires a new division of tasks and a departure from many typically
Taylorist features of the production organisation (Bailey, 1993).
All in all, the responsiveness and flexibility on the shop floor as well as in the relations with
others in the network require key suppliers to implement strategic management and to make
capital investments. These are great challenges, especially to new manufacturers, and the stakes
are high. Key suppliers may serve as gatekeepers between retailers and the rest of the
production network, where they monopolise the information exchange with retailers. They
translate retailer demands into the practical programming and organization of production and
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exercise control over the army of other subordinate contractors/subcontractors in the
production network. The result is a hierarchy of suppliers in which the position of key supplier
is highly desirable, not in the least because it ensures direct access to the market and to strategic
information.
1.2 Garments: straddling the globe
The characteristics and trends presented in the first part of this chapter are only one part of a
broader overview of developments in the garment industry. The discussion in this chapter
would be far from complete without an examination of the main geographical shifts and
patterns in garment production and trade over the past decades. This will be done in this
section.
For most of its existence, the garment industry has served local, regional or – at most – national
markets. Until the 1960s, garment producers in most countries were oriented towards the
domestic market. In that decade, Japan initiated extensive international subcontracting in Asia.
This indirectly stimulated the first-generation of newly industrialising countries (NICs) – viz.
Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea – to make their first garment exports (Dicken,
1998). They soon established themselves as major players (see Table 1.1) and caused great
concern and protest in Western Europe and the US (Dickerson, 1995; Bonacich & Waller,
1994b). Garment sales in these markets were largely stagnant and the growth of exports from
LMICs was largely at the expense of domestic production in the importing countries.
This pattern of shrinkage of the industry in most industrialized countries – even in some
traditionally highly competitive producers and exporters such as Italy, Germany and the UK –
and the growth and export success of LMICs caused much upheaval, involving labour unions,
an influential lobby of industry representatives and government officials (Dickerson, 1995).
Growing garment exports from LMICs were perceived as a serious threat to the traditional
producer countries. The characteristics of the garment labour force added to the concern, since
those in highly sensitive segments of the labour force stood to lose their job and become
unemployed. In response to these concerns, in 1974 an international regulatory framework for
the clothing industry was established. This framework – the Multi Fibre Agreement (MFA) –
was meant to curb and contain the growth of garment production for export in LMICs, and
more specifically to limit their penetration of the main Western markets. In practice, however,
it did the reverse: it stimulated rapid sophistication of the industry in a number of NICs. MFA
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Table 1.1: Annual growth (%) in value added in garments
Country groupings 1963-1973 1973-1980 1980-1990 1990-1998
Industrialized countries 2.1 0.2 -0.6 -1.4
Eastern Europe and the former USSR 6.7 5.2 1.7 n/a
All developing countries 5.8 4.2 2.6 -0.3
Asia 4.8 5.6 n/a n/a
1st generation NICs 2.2 -3.5
2nd generation NICs 5.5 7.1 *
Source: Scheffer (1995); UNIDO (International Yearbook of Industrial Statistics)
* refers to 1990-1993; no data are available for 1998
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also caused the industries’ further proliferation and global dispersal (Glasmeier et al., 1992; see
Table 1.1 and section 1.2.1). As decades went by, the increasing volumes of LMIC garment
exports as well as the growing number of LMICs involved in it proved irreversible trends,
despite – or possibly stimulated by – the strict international regulatory framework.
Table 1.1 shows that the pattern of selective growth and decline extends into the 1980s and
1990s, the era of the extensive use of protective measures. During the 1980s rapid and
widespread growth in LMICs was accompanied by the considerable decline of the industry in
industrialized countries (see also Dicken, 1998; Dickerson, 1995; Audet, 1996). For the 1990s the
overall pattern in Table 1.1 is less clear, but the most important figures stand out clearly: the
decline in value added in garments in the industrialized countries continued in a more
dramatic manner than in the previous decade. The overall value added for garments in LMICs
eroded, but only slightly. This erosion, however, is the result of two opposite trends: decline in
the first-generation NICs and rapid growth in the second generation. The decline of the first-
generation NICs appears in part to have been a result of the successful continuation of their
industrialisation process (see also Box 1.2). They are now competing in a wider array of
industries and are de-emphasising garment manufacturing activities.
How much impact has this pattern of selective growth and decline based on world trade had on
the actual pattern of clothing production across the globe? Where are garments produced?
Which are the main producing countries? By presenting garment employment figures across
the globe, Figure 1.4 gives a broad indication of the location of garment production worldwide.
First and foremost, the figure shows the garment industry to be omnipresent, on every
continent in a very large number of countries. The very large numbers of garment workers in
China, and throughout most of Asia, is one of the first features in the map that stands out. The
predominance of Asia vis-à-vis other LMICs is the result of an early start in garment
production, sustained regional growth rates and sizeable intra-regional trade. Similarly
noteworthy, however, is the continuing importance of the industry as an employer in the US
and most European countries. Much of the current writing on and concern with the
globalisation of the industry and its growth in LMICs, might cause one to forget that the
largest garment producers are still the industrialized countries that have a very long history in
this industry (see also Table 1.2). Finally, open spots on the map are also remarkable, indicating
limited industrial garment employment in large parts of Africa and the Middle East.
The data presented in Figure 1.4 concern overall garment employment, without distinguishing
between production for export and that for the domestic market. Although some domestic
market production takes place in LMICs, its relative importance in most of these countries is
limited. Increasing shares of garment production of LMICs are destined for export rather than
the domestic market. As a consequence, world trade in clothing is still expanding: the global
garment trade grew by 6% a year in the period 1990-1999 (WTO, 2000).
In order to provide a more detailed understanding of global garment production and trade,
Table 1.2 lists the top ten global garment producers, exporters and importers of the late 1990s.
It clearly confirms the still very strong position of the US, Japan and several European countries
in garment production (Figure 1.4). In fact, the only LMICs in this top ten are Brazil and China.
The exceptional position of both these countries is based on the combination of a large
domestic market and significant exports. The table, however also indicates the overwhelming
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export position of China built up during the 1990s, whereas Brazil’s large production volumes
appear to be largely sustained by and destined for the countries’ enormous domestic market.
Interestingly, columns 1 and 2 in Table 1.2 consist of mostly the same Western countries: most
of the leading garment producers are also the largest importers. Sizeable domestic production –
part of which is exported (as indicated in column 3) – is clearly insufficient to satisfy domestic
demand in these countries. In fact, large import volumes cause many of these countries to
maintain a negative trade balance in clothing (WTO, 2000). Overall, garment imports and
production are highly concentrated and dominated by just a few countries.
Of special interest in Table 1.2 is the list of the top ten garment exporters. Although half of this
list coincides with the lists in the first two columns of the table, the other half is occupied by
LMICs that are not amongst the largest producers, nor amongst the largest importers. The
main LMIC exporters as listed in the table may hardly be a surprise, given the broad trends and
shifts outlined above: with the exception of Mexico, all LMICs in the list are Asian countries.
Despite international trade limitations, China, Hong Kong and other Asian countries have
successfully penetrated the world market, in a sense doing so against all odds.
Overall, the concentration of garment exports is less pronounced than that of production and
imports. This confirms the successful participation in world exports by a larger number of
LMICs. More and more new countries are becoming active participants in garment production
and export. For example, several African countries are garment suppliers for the US and
European markets. Building on different backgrounds and linkages, Mauritius/Madagascar
(Gibbon, 2000), Kenya (McCormick, 2001) and South Africa/Lesotho (Gibbon, 2002) are amongst
the African newcomers. Many LMICs rely relatively heavily on garment exports. The share of
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Figure 1.4: Worldwide employment in the garment industry, 1995
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clothing in world trade in manufactured goods was almost 6% in 2002 – up from 3.3% of total
manufactured exports in 1973 (Spinanger, 1992). However, for Africa, clothing made up 18%, for
Latin America 10.7% and for Asia 10.3% of their total manufactured exports (WTO, 2000). For
individual LMIC economies, dependence of clothing may be much more pronounced still:
clothing accounts for 75% of Bangladesh’s, 64% of Mauritius’ and 50% of Sri Lanka’s export
earnings (EC, 2003). These figures underline the importance of clothing production in the early
stages of industrialisation.
The position of Mexico is noteworthy, not only because it is the subject of this study, but also
because of its surprisingly prominent presence in Table 1.2. Just a decade ago, Spinanger (1992,
p. 91) ranked Latin America – and more specifically Mexico, Brazil and Colombia – next to Africa
because of their poor export performance in garments. Now, however, Mexico is the only non-
Asian LMIC amongst the top ten garment exporters and the only LMIC in the importers list. Its
unique position can be explained by the importance of production sharing arrangements
between Mexico and the USA. As will briefly be discussed in the following section, this type of
production is limited to assembly or cut-make-trim (CMT) processes using imported materials.
In these arrangements, Mexico imports pre-cut fabric from the USA for assembly, and then re-
exports it to the USA (see Chapter 3 for a more detailed case discussion).
NAFTA combined with Mexico’s proximity to the US provides a solid and unique base for
Mexico’s position as ‘the industrial backyard’ of the US. However, the strong ties between the
two countries also point to the more general importance of regional trade patterns as part of
aggregate, global trade flows. An examination of the sourcing patterns for the main garment
markets in the world – viz. Western Europe, the US and Japan (see Figure 1.5) – reveals clear
regional patterns. For the Western European market as a whole, most clothing imports come
either from within Western Europe or from Eastern Europe. For Japan, 86.3% of total garment
imports are sourced from other Asian countries. For the US, Asia is still the most important
source of garment imports, but Latin America is second and is catching up.
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Table 1.2: World-leading garment producers, importers and exporters (in US$ value)
World-leading producers in 1998 World-leading importers in 1999 World-leading exporters in 1999
Country Share (%) Country Share (%) Country Share (%)
USA 24.7 USA 30.0 China* 16.2
Japan 12.2 Germany 10.6 Italy 7.1
Italy 11.5 Japan 8.4 Hong Kong 5.1
France 3.7 UK 6.4 USA 4.4
UK 3.6 France 5.9 Mexico* 4.2
Brazil 3.2 Italy 3.0 Germany 4.0
Germany 3.2 Netherlands 2.6 Turkey 3.5
Spain 3.0 Belgium 2.5 France 3.1
Canada 2.8 Mexico* 1.9 South Korea 2.6
China 2.7 Spain 1.8 India 2.6
Total 70.6 73.1 52.8
Sources: WTO (International Trade Statistics 2000), UNIDO (International Yearbook of Industrial Statistics 2001).
* includes significant shipments through processing zones
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Regional sourcing has been stimulated by a number of trade regulations that favour sourcing
from nearby countries; these regulations are discussed in the following section. They support
the internationalisation of domestic manufacturers to nearby countries as a way to lower total
production cost and remain competitive vis-à-vis Asian competitors. On the basis of these trade
benefits, existing import linkages between Western Europe and North Africa, Eastern Europe
and the Mediterranean were consolidated and expanded. For the US, a large share of clothing
imports originate from the Caribbean, Mexico and Central America. Recent market changes
and trends, mentioned in the first part of this chapter, also firmly underpin regional sourcing.
The pressures in the direction of shorter order cycles and quick response provide a powerful
stimulus for the increased regionalisation of trade flows (Gereffi, 1997; Dicken, 1998; Dickerson,
1995; Scheffer, 1992; Audet, 1996; EC, 2003).
This is also beginning to be reflected in trade statistics. For example, recent WTO statistics
confirm the regionalisation of US sourcing, as imports from Latin America – most notably
Mexico – are growing much more than those from Asia are. At the same time, for Western
European markets intra-European imports are shrinking, and imports from nearby sources
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Figure 1.5: Origins of garment imports for main markets
Box 1.2: Asia – the making of a garment giant
‘Asia has been a powerhouse of growth’ (Dickerson, 1995, p. 147). Interestingly, a common element in
the economic success of Japan and Asian NICs such as Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea is their
emphasis on export-oriented industries, most notably textile and apparel production. The
development strategies of the NICs mirror Japan’s economic development strategy and the central
role the state and textile production played in it. Though there are differences between the
industrialisation paths of individual NICs, with regard to the garment industry a number of common
elements stand out.
First, the NICs used their successful textile and apparel production and export to spark a wider
process of export oriented industrialisation. As their industrialisation process progressed, textile and
apparel production lost relative importance and employment in the industry declined. As other
industries grew and began to compete for industrial workforce, the textile and apparel industries in
these countries were plagued by labour shortages and rising wages. Some nations have tried to
counter this trend by facilitating the incorporation of immigrant workers into the textile and apparel
workforce. Nevertheless, the upward pressure on wages has continued, as has competitive pressure
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from low-wage production locations in the Asian region. As a result, all NICs have at some stage
become engaged in foreign investment and offshore production. Especially the Hong Kong and South
Korean textile and apparel industries are active foreign investors; they have factories throughout Asia
as well as in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Secondly, these industrialisation paths – including the growth and downsizing of domestic textile and
apparel production – of most Asian nations did not develop without the interference of state
governments. In Japan, Taiwan and South Korea, the state is especially known to interfere directly in
the economy by forging linkages between the state, the financial sector and industrial sectors. In
Singapore, too, the government devised measures to manipulate the local industrial environment in
order to steer the national economy in the desired direction of higher value-added and capital-
intensive activities (Smakman, forthcoming). In several cases, macro-economic variables were
dominated by industrial priorities (Dussel Peters, 1997a, 2000). In many nations the general effect on
the garment industry has been a push to upgrade to higher value-added activities and to relocate
manufacturing to offshore low-wage locations. On the whole, the East and Southeast Asian
economies can be characterized as developmental states: market economies with highly
interventionist governments. In whatever shape or form, on the whole state intervention and strategic
guidance have been fundamental factors in the transition of many Asian economies (Dicken, 1998;
Gereffi, 1989). It is therefore all the more surprising that the Asian development model has been used
as the case for export-oriented industrialisation, as well as for neo-liberal policy reforms and a retreat
of the state in other parts of the world. In the discourse adopted by the Washington Consensus, most
especially the World Bank, governments in LMICs were presented with an ‘East Asian Miracle’ model
in which the role of the state was reduced to ‘getting the fundamentals/prices right’. Development
was to be based on ‘hands off, export-based industrialisation’ (Dicken, 1998).
Finally, international trade restrictions have been a major influence on the development of these
industries in Asia. Japan was largely unrestricted and Hong Kong obtained generous export quotas
before the mushrooming of LMIC participation in the late 1960s and 1970s. This was not the case for
most other Asian garment nations: those countries that began to engage in textile and apparel
exports later were bound by strict MFA trade limitations (see also section 1.2.1).
The combination of labour shortages, government policies and restrictive trade regulations led to the
‘flying geese’ model of progressive relocation of industrial production in the Asian region. This flying
geese pattern started with Japanese investments in offshore production locations in the NICs. As the
NICs were confronted with labour shortages and restructured towards less labour-intensive
industries, they relocated production to the ASEAN countries (most notably Singapore, Indonesia,
Malaysia and the Philippines) and China. Later on, other newcomers such as Cambodia, Vietnam and
Bangladesh were also incorporated. The resulting regional production system has been called
‘triangle manufacturing’. In triangle manufacturing, suppliers in the first-generation NICs become
intermediaries that control production in many, generally Asian countries (Bonacich & Waller, 1994a;
Gereffi, 1996). These triangles make use of the state-of-the-art capabilities and skills built up over
decades in the first-generation NICs. Thus the continuously strong position of exports from the Asian
region as a whole are based on, among other things, the coupling of industrial knowledge and
capabilities built up in, for example, Hong Kong and Singapore, with the large low-cost labour
reserves in their regional backyards. While both upgrading in early participants as well as low labour
costs in Asian newcomers have received attention, it is the combination of the two factors that
underpins the competitive position of the region as a whole.
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such as Turkey and Tunisia are growing. However, working against the regionalisation stream,
Asian imports into the EU are still growing (WTO, 2000). Ironically, the continuing success of
Asia is at least partially also based on the regional division of labour arrangements (Gereffi,
1996; Bonacich & Waller, 1994a; see Box 1.2).
1.2.1 Regulating apparel
Since the early 1960s the garment industry has been subject to international regulations, first
through the ‘Short- and Long-term Arrangements’. 1974, however, saw the introduction of the
MFA, a more strict and elaborate international regulatory framework. The aim of the MFA was
to liberalise international trade in textiles and clothing as well as to protect the domestic
markets of importing countries through the ‘orderly’ development of international trade flows.
The MFA in itself was quite general. Orderly development was to be achieved through bilateral
agreements specifying a combination of tariffs and especially quota, which were set per product
category (Dickerson, 1995). Thus, in practice, the MFA led to the creation of highly detailed and
relatively strictly controlled listings that specified the export volume quota for each country, in
each product category. Once a country had filled its quota for a certain product, no more of that
product could be exported to the main markets. The MFA was originally intended to be in force
for four years, but has been extended or renegotiated four times (1977, 1982, 1986, 1991), each
time further restricting imports and allowing less room for liberalisation.
Ironically, the repeated extension of MFA and its increased emphasis on restriction is, in some
way, the result of its own success (Glasmeier et al., 1992). The MFA was intended to limit the
growth and development of manufacturers in developing countries. Soon after the MFA came
into force, manufacturers in these lesser developed countries (LDCs) began to seek (and indeed,
found) ways to circumvent the restrictions. They did so in a number of different ways
(Dickerson, 1995; Glasmeier et al., 1992). Firstly, manufacturers illegally hid the true nature of
their products, mainly through false labelling. Secondly, and more importantly, many turned
to the production of other types of garments as soon as the quota for the garment they
originally produced had been filled. In many cases this resulted not only in a diversification of
the product base, but also in upgrading through a shift towards more sophisticated garments
with higher margins. Furthermore, the agreement indirectly stimulated manufacturers to shift
part of their production to nearby countries that had not filled their quota or were not bound
by restrictions. Thus the above mentioned intricate webs of trade and production relations
came into existence, linking especially manufacturers in Asian countries. Finally, some LMIC
suppliers established FDI facilities in their main markets to circumvent quota limitations.
Within the international MFA framework, a few countries, most notably the US and Germany
but also other EU countries, designed their own, additional national policies or provisions.
Two types of national regulations or policies can be distinguished (Dicken, 1998): policies
designed to encourage restructuring of the domestic industry, and those that
stimulate/facilitate offshore assembly arrangements. Whereas the former may indirectly affect
international trade patterns, the latter have had a direct impact on global production and trade
patterns. Offshore assembly arrangements – also called ‘production sharing’ in the US, and
‘outward processing trade’ (OPT) or ‘traffic de perfectionnement passif’ in Europe – allow the duty-
free, temporary export of fabric and material inputs for garment assembly in low labour cost
countries. Though generally not restricted to certain groups of countries, in practice the
logistics and costs involved in the shipment of materials and finished products means the
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provisions were mostly used by Western manufacturers to shift assembly to supplier countries
on the periphery of their markets. In practice, offshore assembly provisions thus underpinned
the tendency towards regionalisation (Smith et al., 2002; EC, 2003). The US 807 and Caribbean
Basin Initiative (CBI) programs, for example, mostly benefited Mexican and CBI assemblers
(Glasmeier et al., 1993; Spener, 2002; see also section 3.2.1).
However, LMICs are not passive subjects of externally devised policies. In fact, in LMIC
garment-export countries, national policies may play a very important role in the development
of the industry. As mentioned, the governments of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore
for example actively stimulated the upgrading and modernisation of the industry in order to
maintain its competitive position and to facilitate the switch to higher value products and
processes (Dicken, 1998, Smakman, forthcoming; see Box 1.2). In many other countries, the role
of the government has been more facilitative and geared to the attraction of FDI in garments.
As will be discussed in Chapter 3, Mexico is an example of a country with a government that has
decided to play a more facilitating role. Governments may also play a significant role at the sub-
national level, especially in LMICs in the early stages of industrialisation. In decentralised
political environments, state governments are actively pursuing FDI in the garment sector as a
way to create employment and possibly spark a further industrialisation process within the
confines of their state.
Clearly, trade policies have been a determining factor in the shaping of geographical garment
trade flows for decades, and they still are. Indeed, the current trade patterns of garments are
shaped largely on the basis of the existing myriad of quota and tariffs, a practice which goes
directly against the spirit and agreements of the WTO. The exceptional position of garment
trade has not gone unnoticed: as a result of the GATT Uruguay Round, clothing was
incorporated into the WTO and a ten-year phase-out (1995-2004) of the MFA was negotiated.
Existing tariffs and quotas will soon be completely eliminated, and this will no doubt have a
profound impact on the global garment production landscape (EC, 2003). In this respect,
especially the lifting of limitations on Chinese garment exports is causing great concern
amongst garment exporters in other LDCs.
1.2.2 Production networks and strategic localisation
This section examines the interrelations between the changes in the main garment markets
and lead firms, and the patterns in the garment trade as illustrated above.
As mentioned, the internationalisation of clothing production was sparked by US and
European retailers and marketers that began to buy finished products (full packages) for their
private label lines from overseas suppliers – mostly in Asia. After that, US and EU
manufacturers began to engage in international subcontracting of assembly services. The
resulting pattern of increasing participation of LMICs – on the periphery of final markets and
further away – in global garment exports is not a result of arms-length trade or a reflection of
independent, successful penetration by LMIC manufacturers of markets in developed
countries. In large part this pattern is orchestrated by Western lead firms, or buyers (see
Chapter 2). Individual firm strategies of buyers in developed countries and of their producers in
LMICs, are the basic building-blocks behind this pattern.
The omnipresence of the garment industry is widely recognized. It is one of the most
globalised industries, if not the most globalised industry, in the world (Bonacich et al., 1994;
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Dickerson, 1995; Dicken, 1998). Following Dicken (1992, 1998), this study defines globalisation
as the functional integration between internationally dispersed production activities (see also
Mittelman, 1996). Vertical disintegration and international subcontracting being common
practice, the garment industry has long displayed the far-reaching, kaleidoscopic
organizational and spatial fragmentation of the production process regarded as characteristic
of globalised industries.
Table 1.3 gives an overview of the relationships between buyers, types of orders and favoured
production locations (see also Dicken, 1998; Gereffi; 1994; Toyne et al., 1984) and provides more
insight into the sourcing trends that underlie the broad garment trade patterns found.
As expected based on the previous sections, Table 1.3 does not confirm the popular view of the
garment industry as an industry that buys its products at the lowest prices from the poorest
countries. Rather than a straightforward relocation of production to a few of the world’s lowest
wage countries, the table shows considerable variation. In fact, the very least developed and
lowest wage countries in the world are hardly represented in the table. The observed
complexity confirms that aspects besides labour cost also matter, viz. the characteristics of the
labour force, political stability, the quality of the infrastructure, business mentality and
flexibility (see also Elson, 1988). The lowest wage regions in the world do not offer these basic
requirements necessary for garment export industrialisation. Thus, at the very minimum, the
determinant role of labour cost only works within the boundaries of certain operational
requirements. While Table 1.3 illustrates a great complexity in sourcing patterns, production
sites and trade flows, it is not the result of complete anarchy and random behaviour. On the
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Table 1.3: Global sourcing patterns, late 1990s
Type of retailer Representative firms Main sourcing areas Characteristic of 
Buyer’s orders
Fashion-oriented Donna Karan, Ralph Western Europe Small batches
designer companies Lauren, Gucci, Hugo 1st generation NICs Designer labels
Boss, Esprit Sophisticated
garments: high needle-
time and skill-levels
Department stores Macy’s, Marks and 1st generation NICs Medium to large
Spencer 2nd generation NICs batches
Speciality stores Gap, Liz Claiborne, The Established supplier Private labels
Limited, Mexx, Zara, countries in E. Europe High priced garments,
Benetton and Latin America high to medium quality
Mass merchandisers Sears, J.C. Penney, Established supplier Large batches
Woolworth, Carrefour countries in E. Europe Good quality, medium-
and Latin America priced garment
Private labels
Discount chains Wal-Mart, Kmart, New entrant countries Very large batches
Target, C&A (Africa, Asian periphery) Low-priced garments
Small importers New entrant countries Small quantities of
(Africa, Asian periphery) ‘pilot purchases’
Source: adapted from Dicken (1998) and Gereffi (1994)
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contrary, it implies a strong link between the market segment or sophistication of a product
and the industrial history of the production location (Glasmeier et al., 1992). Mair (1997) called
the result of such matching between product and the characteristics of the production location
‘strategic localisation’. There appears to be a general tendency with regard to strategic
localisation in the industry: countries with a longer industrial tradition in garments – which
often means higher wage but also skill levels – produce more complex and sophisticated
clothes, often in smaller batches. Hence, buyers in the upper segments of the market source
predominantly from the NICs. Gereffi (1999, p. 40) discusses this pattern in terms of
organizational succession:
‘There is a clear pattern of organizational succession [...] whereby foreign buyers that occupy positions or price points
in their home markets source from each of the major exporting nations in distinctive cycles or sequences. This
succession drives the geographical expansion of global sourcing networks, as buyers for less expensive goods are
pushed into lower-cost production sites ...’.
Though there is a basic truth in the pattern illustrated in Table 1.3, four complicating factors
need to be mentioned. First, through smart branding and segmentation strategies many buyers
– especially the department and speciality stores in the middle rows of Table 1.3 – operate in
various price segments. To serve these segments, a buyer may well source from various country
groupings at the same time. The all-round involvement of many buyers in various price
segments with collections consisting of many different product types and operating under
time pressure, means that their sourcing pattern may be highly dispersed.
Second, the importance of labour cost in relation to total cost differs per product type: the
number of minutes required to produce a product determines its sensitivity to labour cost. For
example, small orders of complicated garments such as suits or evening dresses may be
produced in small batches in metropolitan sweatshops close to the main Western markets
(Massey, 1984; Dicken, 1998; Scheffer, 1992; Taplin, 1997). Alternatively, especially when larger
batches are needed, the large number of production minutes – also called ‘needle-time’13 –
explains their production in low-wage countries, mostly in Asia (Crewe & Davenport, 1992). By
contrast, basic or standardized items, such as blue jeans and plain tee-shirts, are produced in
very large volumes through slightly more automated processes. Comparatively high levels of
automation and short assembly time explain their lower sensitivity to labour costs and hence
their location in peripheral regions in or close to the Western final markets.
Thirdly, market dynamics and the new set of retailing strategies aimed at minimising risks
by adjusting the supply of garments as closely as possible to actual demand complicate matters.
They favour the geographical proximity of buyer and supplier14. Production countries on the
periphery of the final markets benefited greatly because they represent the best of both worlds:
their low-wage labour can offer quick turnaround at the lowest cost (Appelbaum & Gereffi,
1994; Dicken, 1998; Dickerson, 1995; Scheffer, 1992; Gibbon, 2000).
Finally, the extent of the involvement of LMIC suppliers in the production process may vary
widely; from participating in product development and the supply of full packages to doing
only assembly. Table 1.4 gives a very broad overview of garment supplier countries and their
position and activities within international production networks.
A clear element within the globalised complexity of garment production, illustrated in Table
1.4, is the link between types of buyers’ orders and the capabilities of sourcing areas.
Newcomers to the industry generally start off with the assembly of basic, low-cost and low-
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quality clothes for small importers and discount chains. By implication, newcomer countries
that rely on assembly activities need to be part of a network in which other manufacturers
participate. In fact, their insertion into global garment trade flows is commonly initiated by
manufacturers in more expensive locations wanting to bring down their production costs. As
such, the constellation of the production networks and the sourcing strategies of participants
add to the complexity by giving rise to global assembly lines parts of which may be in a number
of different countries. The emerging global division of labour can be described as follows
(Mittelman, 1996, p. 6):
‘Within a globalizing division of labour, technological and managerial cores form specifically regional divisions and
redivisions of labour and generate their own peripheries subject to both constraints and developmental opportunities.
Distinct regional divisions of labour [...] provide diverse modes of coordinating capital flows but are ultimately
subordinate to the globalisation process.’
One of the interesting questions – and a central theme in this study – is how such a starter’s
position in garment assembly may be used as a lever for a further industrialisation and
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Table 1.4: Position of supplier countries in international production networks
Position/Role Characteristics Geography
Pure assembly contracting Syn. industrial subcontracting: Established: Mexico, CBI,
assembly subcontractor/ Central America, China, Central
contractor assembles garments & Eastern Europe, Turkey, North
from inputs supplied by its Africa, South Asia (India, Sri
buyer, to the specifications given Lanka);
by that buyer. Newcomers: South Africa, the
former USSR (especially Belarus
& Ukraine), South Asia
(Vietnam, Cambodia,
Bangladesh).
Full package/OEM Syn. commercial subcontracting: Established: Central Europe,
production of finished garments Southeast Asia;
by locally owned firms in LMICs. Newcomers: Mexico, China,
Product development, sales & Eastern Europe, Turkey.
marketing are undertaken by the 
firm’s buyer.
ODM Independent, locally-owned Established: US, Italy, France,
manufacturer in LMIC UK, Japan;
develops/designs and Newcomers: Hong Kong,
manufactures garments for Singapore.
sale to export buyers.
OBM Independent, locally-owned Established: US, Italy, France,
manufacturer in LMIC exports UK, Japan;
own garment under its own Newcomers: Hong Kong,
brand. No subcontracting Singapore.
relation between manufacturer 
and retailer.
Source: based on Gereffi (1992), Sturgeon (2001) and EC (2003)
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development process. The importance of such an upgrading process will be discussed in
general terms in the next chapter and specifically for the Mexican case in Chapter 3.
So far, the discussion of trade and production patterns has concentrated on the global and
national developments. This overlooks the fact that the garment industry displays a strong
localisation tendency, favouring regions with a tradition in the manufacturing of clothing. In
other words: the production of garments, like other industrial as well as artisan products and
even services, tends to agglomerate into localised, specialist clusters within nations. Bull et al.
(1993, p. 21) point to complex divisions of labour across various scale levels:
‘... different patterns and levels of interdependence [exist] within regional and national filières and in the
international market place ... The wide mix of potential industrial and commercial strategies introduces further
elements of variegation into the complex picture in which local, national and international comparative advantage
constrain in-firm strategy formulation and lead to discrete geographical patterns of specialization.’
The analytical challenge then appears to be to do justice to the myriad of production and trade
considerations and the resulting highly complex pattern, without falling into the trap of
assigning a caricatural, dominant role to labour cost considerations as the one and only driving
force behind spatial relocation in garment manufacturing. Ultimately, individual firm
strategies shape global, regional or local division of labour patterns (Spinanger, 1992; Bull et al.,
1993; Scheffer, 1992; Appelbaum & Christerson, 1997; Smakman, forthcoming; see also Box 1.3).
Individual firm behaviour may be unpredictable and erratic. Therefore, the behaviour of
individual firms cannot be predicted on the basis of the observed patterns, a point also made by
Scheffer (1995, p. 46):
‘Within certain boundaries individual firms do possess a large degree of freedom and it is more often the quality of
management, daily practices and opportunistic factors that determine outcomes, rather than deeper rooted structural
changes [...] A given firm might opt to change its marketing strategy in order to preserve its production organization,
or it might decide to retain its market position but change its allocation of production.’
Thus, relocation of garment production to and between LMICs is growing, but garment buyers
have considerable room to manoeuvre. The spatial and organizational constellation of their
international production networks do not necessarily always fit the theoretically ‘optimal
global division of labour’ solution. As will be discussed at some length in this study, one of the
reasons for the discrepancy between theoretical and actual patterns is the, sometimes
overlooked, social, interpersonal aspect of business.
1.3 Summary
The first chapter of this study introduced the main characteristics of and trends and traits in
the global garment industry. Since the industrialisation of garment production in the early
nineteenth century, some of its basic characteristics have remained largely unchanged. The
production process is divided into separate phases or activities, and vertical disintegration is
standard practice in the wearing apparel industry. Furthermore, in the manufacturing stages of
the production process, automation options are limited and, as a consequence, these are
characterized by high labour intensity. The combination of specialization opportunities based
on vertical disintegration and low barriers to entry caused by limited automation and low
capital intensity, have laid the basis for high levels of fragmentation. Garment firms of many
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Box 1.3: Illustrating diversity
In the garment industry, vertical disintegration and international subcontracting are pervasive, but by
no means self-evident. The current era of quick response and rapid fashion changes – combined with
the continued need to keep production cost low – may call for unorthodox measures, some of which
may even go against such established best practices as vertical disintegration and
internationalisation. That this applies across the board and not just to insignificant ‘odd ones out’
can be illustrated by a brief outline of the strategies of two highly successful clothing multinationals,
Benetton and Zara. Both use technology to reduce design-to-delivery times as well as small
workshops (many of which are on the brink of ‘informality’) in Europe and on its periphery, in order to
achieve flexible yet affordable manufacturing.
The Italian company Benetton was founded in 1963 and is now a large and successful multinational
with a strong global brand image. Design, technology-intensive activities and a limited amount of
manufacturing are undertaken by the company itself in Treviso, Italy. In line with general practice in
the industry, the company relies heavily on independent subcontractors for the production –
especially the assembly, finishing and pressing stages – of its garments. However, contrary to global
relocation trends, most of Benetton’s subcontractors are located in Italy, not in LMICs. Its
independent small subcontractors work exclusively for Benetton and even though the relations in the
networks are mostly informal, production planning and coordination is tight and based on
technology and effective information management systems. Sales are organised in a similar way,
around a decentralised sales network with sales agents as intermediaries between the independent
shops and Benetton. Benetton elaborates marketing strategies and guidelines and controls the
critical resources for all the shops. Shops do not pay royalties, are completely independent and bear
all the risks, but they sell only garments with the Benetton label. They are expected to forecast 80% of
the season’s requirements; the remaining 20% can be requested on urgent order. Benetton’s
philosophy is to hold minimal stock. Its automated systems allow the company to pick individual
shop orders for over 6,000 shops dispersed across 110 countries. Orders are taken by the companies
three times a day and are processed during the night to ensure that they are available for production
the day after; all the production processes – from programming, material requirements, etc. to
packaging – are managed by computers using highly sophisticated, tailor-made application systems.
If they enter an order for restocking, the shops will receive the goods within, on average, eight days in
Europe and twelve days in the USA (see also Fornengo Prent, 1992; Dicken, 1998).
The Spanish company Zara – which is part of the holding company Inditex – was established in 1975
and owns well over 500 stores in 30 countries around the globe. One of the reasons for the
company’s growing profits is its ability to respond rapidly to fashion trends. Like Benetton, its
strategy is unconventional: while a part of its production is outsourced to LMICs, Zara is vertically
integrated in order to retain total control of design, production and distribution. A 16-factory
production complex in the Spanish town of La Coruña is the heart of Zara’s operation. The company
creates, selects and cuts the fabrics treated and finished in its own mills and makes its own patterns,
many of which are sewn on-site. The remainder is sewn by small ‘grey-economy’ subcontractors in
Spain and Portugal. This organization has brought design-to-delivery lead times down from four to
six months to a few days. Also unorthodox and in stark contrast with Benetton, Zara’s higher
European labour costs are offset by spending virtually nothing on marketing or advertising (see also
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different sizes and specialisations exist next to each other. Through subcontracting/contracting
relations they form inter-firm production networks, which are the basic vehicles of garment
production.
While these basic features have been retained, over the past decades garment production
networks have taken on a international or even global dimension. Also, the dynamic of
production and the organization thereof has been changing quite dramatically over the past
few decades under the influence of shifts in the wearing apparel market and/or the marketing
strategies adopted to shape it. Market saturation and stagnant garment prices have led to a
greater focus on consumer behaviour and demand in order to make production respond to
them as accurately as possible. In fact, accurate response to or prediction of consumer demand
(styling, price) has become a prerequisite for sales and success in the main garment markets.
Getting a grip on these aspects and manipulating them – through the use of brands and labels
and the creation of ‘lifestyles’- has led to the growing importance of marketing and retailing
and to the concentration of power in the hands of retailers rather than garment manufacturers.
Facilitated by recent developments in telecommunications and computer technology, these
trends are transforming the structure and organising principles of production networks of
wearing apparel. Fashionisation is reflected in a greater number of seasons or collections per
year and in the fact that garments, such as jeans and tee-shirts, which traditionally were highly
standardized, are no longer excluded from fashion trends and hypes. Great flexibility is needed
to respond to rapid and frequent fashion changes.
As a result of the recent changes, and most especially the need for increased flexibility, lead
garment firms are seen to forge closer cooperation with a smaller number of, more capable
suppliers. These suppliers may be internationally dispersed, but increasingly suppliers on at a
shorter distance, on the peripheries of the main markets, appear to be favoured.
With regard to the geography of garment production, the most salient feature of wearing
apparel production is its omnipresence. Participation in garment exports (to the main markets
in the US and the EU) is spreading to an ever larger number of LMICs. While the garment
industries in the US and the EU are shrinking or at best stagnating, the participation of LMICs
is both growing and spreading. Two factors explain the industry’s global presence. First, trade
policy has had a great impact. In response to early internationalisation of garment production,
which became visible in the late 1960s, the elaborate MFA trade regulation system was designed
to protect Western markets from disruptive imports. With regard to protecting Western
markets, it has had mixed results at best. However, MFA has (had) a decisive impact on the
current global locational pattern of garment production through stimulating still further
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CNN Online, 2001; Forbes Online, 2001). Fashion retailers spend on average 3.5% of their revenue on
advertising their products, while Zara’s parent company, Inditex, spends just 0.3% (CNN Online,
2001). Like Benetton, the company decides on the contents of all its shop windows. However,
contrary to the general industry trends also outlined in section 1.1.2, Zara believes they are all the
advertising it needs and it does not invest in advertising campaigns. Zara shop managers report back
every day to designers in La Coruña on what has and has not sold. The information is used to decide
which product lines and colours will be kept or altered, and whether new lines should be created. All
this happens within just a few days. The efficiency of the system means the company can keep costs
down by keeping stocks low. Zara’s design team produce 11,000 different designs a year.
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dispersal. Within the global MFA system, trade blocks and a variety of production sharing
regulations serve to favour LMICs on the periphery of the large markets.
The second factor is a matching of a country’s or region’s characteristics and capacities with
product requirements. The extent to which LMICs are inserted into garment exporting
channels that feed into the Western markets appears to vary, depending on wage, industrial
experience and skill levels in the LMIC. The result is a broad strategic localisation pattern that
matches product types and market segments to production cost and experience. Within this
pattern, few of the world’s lowest wage areas achieve significant garment production levels,
while several high-wage countries have maintained considerable production levels.
Highly interesting is the development perspective that may be implied by or extrapolated
from this pattern; this will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapters as it is an
important theme in this study. In broad terms, it is often implicitly assumed that recent LMIC
garment exporters should strive to follow the upgrading path blazed by the pioneering NICs.
Mexico is one of the popular subjects for this discussion. Its geographical proximity to the US
and, more importantly, its preferential access to the very large US market put it in a position of
booming newcomer in garment exports with the (theoretical) potential to use this as a lever for
upgrading processes and economic development.
The organizational and geographical dynamism of the garment industry as outlined in this
chapter raises the question how effective coordination and control are exercised over the
complex garment production system. The following chapter presents some approaches and
perspectives, and the debates surrounding them, which can be used to analyse the multifaceted
dynamism of a volatile industry such as the garment industry.
Notes
1 Most of the developments, especially the changes in the garment market, described in this chapter are based on
literature sources dealing with the US or the UK garment industry. In broad terms, many of the noted changes
apply to most Western markets, but the timing and pervasiveness may differ considerably from country to country
(see Scheffer (1992) and Broer (1977) for detailed comparisons of developments in European countries).
2 Well-known NGOs and pressure groups that represent the rights of garment workers and expose exploitation are
The Clean Clothes Campaign, the Canadian Maquiladora Solidarity Network, the UK-based Labour Behind the
Label and the American Press for Change.
3 Two approaches are especially common. Firstly, many studies group textile production and all apparel production
(encompassing clothing, sewn household goods and sewn industrial goods) together under the broad denominator
‘textiles’. Following Scheffer (1992), here it is proposed that the two industries differ so greatly in organizational
structure and dynamics that they are better studied in separation. Secondly, it is also highly common to use apparel
and garments as synonyms. Though they overlap greatly in subject matter, it is important to note that the term
apparel is broader, and that the apparel industry produces a wider range of sewn products encompassing more than
‘just’ garments/clothing (see Figure 1.1).
4 Flexibility and specialization are the main ingredients of post-Fordist production systems. ‘Flexible specialization’
is seen as the fundamental alternative to Fordist mass production, i.e. as basic elements of post-Fordist production
systems (Storper, 1997; Piore & Sabel, 1984). Piore and Sabel (ibid.) put the combination of flexibility and
specialization on the map, but limited it (unnecessarily) to small firm interaction.
5 The use of the term ‘sourcing’ often implies low levels of coordination and control between buyer and
subcontractor and relatively great responsibility on the part of the contractor. Another common term for
subcontracting in industrial development literature is original equipment manufacturing (OEM), where
subcontractors produce products designed and specified by their customers. This is distinguished from original
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design manufacturing (ODM) in which subcontractors are responsible for design in addition to manufacturing.
Finally, in original brand manufacturing (OBM) LMIC producers export products of own design and manufacturing
under their own brand name.
6 Speciality subcontracting is the performance of a specialized function by a skilled or specifically equipped
subcontractor. Cost-saving subcontracting is employed as a means to lower production cost. Complementary
subcontracting is employed as a flexible way to cope with temporary surges in demand (see Dicken, 1998).
7 Subcontractors may be referred to in different sources as subcontractors, assemblers, suppliers, manufacturers or
producers. The terminology is applied quite loosely, but may indicate the extent of their involvement in the
production process. The terms subcontractor and assembler are generally associated with a limited role of the
subcontractor. The use of the term suppliers or even manufacturers commonly implies a commercial
subcontracting relation, i.e. the production of full packages.
8 This is neatly illustrated in the foreword to the analysis of the top-50 apparel manufacturers in 2001 in Bobbin
Magazine (Speer, 2001a), one of the leading industry magazines in the USA: ‘What is the difference between apparel
manufacturers and retailers? In a nutshell, much less than there used to be (...) we have now opened up the
floodgates to include apparel retailers that essentially function as manufacturers – those ‘vertical’ retailers that
design, market and source the manufacturing and merchandise the majority of products for the retail stores.
Likewise, we continue to include those traditional manufacturers that have spread their wings into the retail and
direct-to-consumer markets (...). While these companies may have begun at different points along the supply chains
spectrum, they now hold responsibilities – and face risks and rewards – both in the manufacture of their products
and their sale at retail.’
9 It is important to insert a caveat here: although national markets for clothing may be segmented in ways described
in this section, the global reach of many of the largest garment buyers means they handle very large volumes. Thus,
though less standardized through progressive incorporation of fashion, garment manufacturing is still a matter of
mass production.
10 Textile companies are an important part of this channel. Like retailing, the textile industry has gone through a
phase of concentration. Two decades ago Clairmonte and Cavanagh (1981) already characterized it as the ‘world
textile oligopoly’ (see also Dicken, 1998; Abernathy et al., 1995). Global players in textiles are the British ‘Coats
Viyella’ and the Japanese ‘Toray’; in denim the US ‘Cone Mills’ and ‘Burlington Mills’ lead the rankings. It is
important to note the effect this has on manufacturers: they stand the risk of being sandwiched between large,
powerful textile mills on the one hand, and large, oligopolistic retailers on the other.
11 In addition there are overarching, industry-wide efforts such as the Worldwide Responsible Apparel Production
(WRAP) industry standards, supported by the AAMA. The Dutch NGO Solidaridad is assuming a pioneer position
through the development of true fashion jeans with a fair-trade mark. These ‘Kuyichi’ labelled jeans were launched
in the exclusive segment of the Dutch market at premium prices.
12 In Taylorist production systems ‘time and motion’ principles are applied to break down the production process into
the simplest possible tasks which can be performed by specialist (but poorly educated) workers. Taylorism is tightly
linked to Fordist mass production (Hayter, 1997).
13 Production costs in garments are generally calculated on the basis of standard production minutes or standard
assembly minutes, which take into account labour productivity as well as cost. Costings per product are then
calculated based on the required minutes, also called ‘needle-time’. Since the early 1990s, distance to the market or
lead times are also included in these calculations (Dickerson, 1995). See Blyth (1996) for a detailed explanation of
sourcing decision-making in garments.
14 This was so firmly believed to be a trend that authors and experts from different perspectives theorized about the re-
relocation of production from developing to developed countries (Abernathy et al., 1995; Audet; 1996, Malecki, 1997;
see also Scheffer, 1992, pp. 14-15, for a discussion of these considerations). Scheffer (1992) has shown that reversal of
the NIDL shift back to industrialized countries did not occur in Europe. Relocation back to the USA is not apparent
either. The explanation is simple: the market does not reward shorter lead times with higher prices (Scheffer, 1995).
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2 A framework for analysis
The previous chapter showed that the garment industry has become globalised through large
international sourcing networks, centred on a small number of powerful lead firms. Through
incorporation into these networks, a large and increasing number of LMICs and LMIC
producers are participating in garment exports. On the other hand, localisation tendencies in
garment production are pronounced and garment producers commonly agglomerate in
clusters throughout the world. As such, the garment industry provides an illustration of
globalisation processes characterised by global integration and regional concentration of
economic activity. What appears to emerge in garment production – as in other industries, and
in fact in capitalism in general – is a pattern of intensified regionalisation rooted in a global
division of labour (Scott, 1996). This pattern raises a number of questions, the most important
of which regards the interaction between globalised production and regional or local
industries, especially those in LMICs. Of further interest are the opportunities embedded in
this pattern for the economic development of participating LMIC producers and the regions
housing them. Finally, the way in which development opportunities are best exploited deserves
attention. Because in later chapters these questions will be applied to the case of the Laguna
region in Mexico, this chapter presents the relevant theoretical approaches.
Many modern studies of industrial development are based on a network-centred view of the
economy. This chapter presents two network-based approaches that can be used for the
analysis of the interaction between global industrial dynamics and local LMIC garment
producers. Before discussing these two specific approaches, the first section presents a brief
introduction of the rise of network-based approaches and of their main elements.
The second section presents one of the network-based approaches currently receiving much
attention in industrial development studies: the global value chain (GVC) perspective (Gereffi
& Korzeniewicz, 1994; Gereffi et al., 2001). This perspective concerns globalised industrial
activity and emphasises the importance of vertical chain-based linkages and governance
exercised through such linkages. Section 2.3 deals with localised industrial activity that
commonly also relies on (local) network linkages. This section outlines the theoretical debate
on the regionalisation of economic activity, in particular on industrial clusters in LMICs. The
structure of such clusters, as well as the potential benefits of geographical agglomeration and
localisation of horizontal inter-firm relations – especially in an LMIC environment – are
discussed. One of the main benefits of the geographical proximity of production units within
clusters may be the rapid diffusion of innovations and local best practises. Nowadays, the
ability to learn and improve or upgrade is central to the discussion of industrial development,
and these issues figure prominently in both GVC and cluster studies.
2.1 A new approach: focusing on firms and networks
Traditionally, the garment industry has been most directly associated with the new
international division of labour (NIDL) theory formulated by Fröbel, Heinrichs and Kreye
(1980). NIDL and the broad pattern it describes received much attention during the 1980s. It
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was also increasingly criticised as mechanistic and simplistic, as explained in Box 2.1. Most
importantly, the fact that it leans heavily on a world systems-type use of country groupings
renders it incapable of dealing with the complexities of globalisation. This being so, NIDL is
still closely associated with the garment industry and its internationalisation. It has influenced
some more modern network-based perspectives on industrial globalisation, most notably the
GVC perspective that will be discussed later in this chapter.
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Box 2.1: The new international division of labour theory
NIDL is one of the most well-known theories dealing with the international relocation of garment
production (Fröbel et al., 1980; see also Elson, 1988; Ernst, 1980; Massey, 1984). Based on
developments in the German garment industry in the early 1980s, it proposes a progressive
redistribution of labour-intensive manufacturing between DCs and LDCs. According to Fröbel et al.
(1980), three preconditions apply for the NIDL to materialise. Firstly, developments in
communications and transportation are needed for the rapid and reliable exchange of information
and goods over large distances. Secondly, technical fragmentation of the production process should
allow the shift of labour-intensive production activities to low labour cost locations. Finally, suitable
locations with a cheap, abundant and disposable labour reserve need to be identified. When these
conditions are satisfied, the result of NIDL is a relocation of labour-intensive production processes
from industrialised countries to LDCs.
Fröbel, Heinrichs and Kreye regarded their NIDL as an inevitable outcome of the capitalist system –
independent of the national development strategies of countries or the business strategies of trans-
national corporations (TNCs) – in which relocation was the best way to increase a firm’s profitability.
At a practical level, during the 1960s an increased variety of clothes, although based on a more
differentiated demand, was hardly or not rewarded with higher prices. Automation applied to increase
productivity and maintain domestic production in industrialised countries had largely reached its
limits1. When on top of that the labour cost gap between industrialised countries and LMICs widened,
relocation became inevitable and irreversible (Scheffer, 1992, 1995).
Based on its straightforward logic and powerful implications, NIDL theory has left its imprint on
writing on international trade and production, especially with regard to the garment industry. At the
same time, there was much criticism of the NIDL theory, mostly for its mechanistic character and for
presenting a simplified view of both the world and the garment industry (Scheffer, 1992; Elson, 1988).
One of the reasons NIDL cannot deal with the complexities of the worldwide trade patterns is its
presentation of DCs and LDCs as a dichotomy. NIDL fails to differentiate between, for example, the
‘Asian Tigers’ and a country such a Cambodia that is just getting involved in the production and
export of garments. Furthermore, NIDL pays no more than passing attention to the role of the state.
As discussed in the previous chapter, this is an important weakness because regulations have
contorted trade flows and forced garment buyers to depart from locating production in what
otherwise might be ‘ideal’ sites (see also Glasmeier et al., 1992). In addition, NIDL is based on a
highly simplified view of the garment firm (see Scheffer, 1992) and the entire garment industry: it
does not take into account either product differentiation – for example, between standardised and
fashion items – or market segmentation. As discussed in Chapter 1, both these aspects play a
determining role in strategic localisation in the garment industry.
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Since the 1990s, globalisation has characterised the world economy. A heated debate surrounds
globalisation, its distinctive features and the way the globalisation process may affect and
change business, cultural and political relations at various scale levels in the world economy.
The garment industry is highly globalised and illustrates the main dilemmas of the
globalisation process in general, as is discussed in Box 2.2. The great influence of the state on
garment production and trade patterns through regulation at the supra-national and the sub-
national levels has been discussed in the previous chapter. In the context of this chapter,
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Box 2.2: The globalisation debate
Although globalisation may be ‘difficult to pin down conceptually and to demonstrate empirically’
(Vellinga, 2000, p. 4), since the 1990s it has become a buzzword in both academic and popular
literature. Globalisation has been defined, approached and analysed from different angles and in
numerous ways, focusing on its economic, political, social or cultural aspects (Ohmae, 1995; Ruigrok
& van Tulder, 1995; Castells, 1996; Dicken, 1992, 1998; Hirst & Thompson, 1996; Mittelman, 1996). It
is the topic of a heated debate, sweeping generalisations and useful insights. A basic understanding
of globalisation as a compression of time and space is now widely accepted.
Focusing on the spatial impact of globalisation, as is done in this study, Dicken (1992, 1998) has
contributed significantly to the ongoing debate by arguing that rather than quantitative increases in
economic international trade and investment, the distinctive feature of globalisation is a qualitative
one. In this view, globalisation is characterised by high and increasing levels of intra-industry trade
tying together geographically dispersed production locations (of raw materials, components and
finished products) into one ‘global assembly line’ (Dicken, 1992, 1998; Mittelman, 1996; Kaplinsky,
2000).
Within the globalisation debate, two topics are receiving special attention: the significance and
interrelations between various levels of geographical scale, and the role of ‘the state’. The basis for
the discussion with regards to geographical levels of scale in globalisation is based on the observed
tension between ‘territorialisation’ and ‘de-territorialisation’ tendencies within the globalisation
process (Storper, 1997; Vellinga, 2000; Cox, 1997). On one hand capital is increasingly mobile and
production processes are being extended and shifted over large distances across the globe. However,
on the other hand, actual production sites are not incidental or insignificant. In fact ‘...the most
dynamic forces in contemporary capitalist development [...] are both localised and territorially
specific’ (Storper, 1997, p. 6). In other words, the globalised economy is by no means placeless.
However, rather than a dichotomy between ‘the global’ and ‘the local’, the result may be a highly
complex reconstruction of geographical scales or spheres of influence, of which the supra- and sub-
national appear to be privileged (Swyngedouw, 1997; Sassen, 1996; Vellinga, 2000). Both
Swyngedouw (ibid.) and Vellinga (ibid.) use the term ‘glocalization’ to underscore the complex
interplay between global, local and intermediate scale levels. The role of the state as an actor in the
globalisation process and in a globalised world is another much debated issue. Rather than a general
demise of the nation state and the reduction of the state to a powerless and meaningless entity,
Dicken (1998) and Vellinga (ibid.), amongst others, have argued for a continuing but increasingly
more complex role of the state which is more and more directed and played out at the supra-national
and sub-state level.
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attention is focused on the analytical challenges that stem from the dynamic relationship
between global and sub-national levels of scale.
In the last decades of the twentieth century, there were significant shifts in industrial
economics and in regional development perspectives, most recently in response to the
globalisation of the world economy (Preston, 1996; Hoogvelt, 2001). Traditionally, geographers
concerned with regional development issues focused on local factors in explaining economic
conditions. Later, under the influence of the ‘dependencia school’ the emphasis shifted away from
such horizontal factors towards vertical forces in a hierarchical world system as explanatory
factors for underdevelopment. The emergence of globalisation as a discourse in world affairs
and development studies in the 1990s, borrows from both earlier approaches. The globalisation
approach:
‘... challenges the separation of the various spheres of life (as between the economic and the cultural), is preoccupied
with interaction patterns between actors (perceiving networks and clusters everywhere), and it raises the issue of scale
levels. This last factor means that instead of implicitly adopting a horizontal (as the traditional regionalists did) or
a vertical approach (as the structuralists did), the globalisation approach focuses on the questions what different
scale levels mean in the development process and how vertical and horizontal forces interact with one
another.’ (van Westen, 2001, p. 227; emphasis added)
For this study, the rise of the network concept as the new model of organisation of production
in the globalisation era is particularly relevant. The network perspective, which emphasises the
importance of regarding firms in relation to their environment, is far removed from the neo-
classical economic models of the firm as an atomistic, abstract entity or ‘black box’. Capello
(1996, p. 490) describes the consecutive shifts in economic thinking on firm behaviour:
‘The traditional models of the large, vertically integrated firm of the 1960s, and the small, autonomous single-phase
firm of the 1970s and part of the 1980s, are replaced by a new type of large networked firm, with strongly decentralised
strategic functions extending in several directions, and by new types of small enterprise, integrated into a multi-
company network.’
Thus, since the 1990s, discussions on the driving forces behind globalisation have been based
on a network-centred view of the world economy (Yeung, 1994, 1998, 2000; Dicken et al., 2001;
Castells, 1996). Foreign direct investment by TNCs as representatives of large-scale Fordist
production organisations and drivers of the internationalisation of production and trade is no
longer the centre of attention in this view. Instead, the focus has shifted to trans-national
networks as transmitters and reflections of their strategic behaviour.
In the 1990s, networking became akin to a new best business practice in the day-to-day reality
of industries and business participation in business or production (Storper, 1997). This is in
stark contrast to the network approach as an analytical tool, developed for the research of
networks. Networks have become popular research subjects in economic geography and other
disciplines. However, the multitude of interpretations has caused networks as academic,
analytical concepts to be characterised as ‘a chaotic conception instead of a rational abstraction’
(Yeung, 1994). In a valuable attempt to re-focus the network approach Dicken et al. (2001, p. 94)
argue the merits of a broad definition of networks:
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‘Networks are structural, in that the composition and interrelation of various networks constitute structural power
relations, and they are relational because they are constituted by the interactions of variously powerful social actors.
These relationships can exist in the forms of rules, conventions, values, regulations and so on.’ (see also Yeung,
1994, 1998).
In this view, networks comprise various types of agents or institutions that act across various
distances and through diverse intermediaries, rather than on a particular level of scale.
Following this interpretation, this study focuses on participants in networks as well as on their
relations and the structural outcome of these relations.
In network approaches many types of actors or agents – such as firms, states and labour
unions – can be included in the analysis (Dicken et al., 2001; see also Yeung, 1994, 1998).
Generally, however, firms and inter-firm relations are taken as a point of entry for the study of
production networks (Gereffi, 1994a; Sturgeon, 2001; Christensen et al., 1990). Though the
importance of including inter- and extra-firm linkages has been stressed, they have generally
remained somewhat underexposed in network studies (Yeung, 1998).
Network relations are usually not narrowly understood as ‘pure business’ but are seen as
embedded or ‘socialised’, and political, cultural or social relations feature prominently in many
network studies. Network studies that stress interdependency between more or less equal
partners tend to be optimistic in tone, stressing trust and cooperation over power, antagonism
and enforcement mechanisms (Yeung, 1994; Schmitz, 1995, 1999; Piore & Sabel, 1984;
Humphrey & Schmitz, 2000). Especially the issue of trust as part of economic network relations
is receiving much attention (Fukuyama, 1995; Schmitz, 1999; van Dijk & Rabellotti, 1997). On
the other hand, recently there has also been increased interest in the issue of power in the
context of production networks (Yeung, 1994; Gereffi, 1994a; Gibbon, 2000; Dicken et al., 2001).
Power can be exercised to control resources, influence events, exclude or marginalise, or create,
join or escape networks.
In the context of international garment production networks, the roles of positive, trust-based
coordination and of power deserve attention. Two network approaches that are compared and
contrasted in this chapter stem from different theoretical backgrounds and emphasise different
aspects and mechanisms. The global value chain (GVC)2 approach is based on a world systems
view of the world economy, and places emphasis on vertical intra-chain linkages and
governance or on power relations in explaining global divisions of labour. Cluster studies and
other perspectives that deal with regional economic agglomerations tend to focus on
horizontal, intra-regional linkages of an embedded nature, in which trust, cooperation and
shared values play an important role. First, the global value chain perspective will be discussed,
after which attention will shift to the analysis of networks from a cluster perspective.
2.2 A network view of global divisions of labour: the value chain
General trends towards enhanced flexibility based on, amongst other things, specialisation and
vertical disintegration, coupled with the need for effective supply chain management, explain
the rise of chain-based network concepts. In search for theoretical concepts that fit the
workings of a globalising networked world economy, a number of authors have opted to
‘modernise’ existing production process-based concepts such as the filière and the production
column3. The 1990s saw the birth of a number of concepts that use production processes as a
basis for the analysis of economic processes at different levels of scale (see Porter, 1990; Dicken
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1992, 1998; Boomgard et al., 1992; Gereffi & Korzeniewicz, 1994; Raikes et al., 2000; Ruigrok &
van Tulder, 1995). Of all production process-based network concepts, most attention is focused
on Gereffi’s global commodity chain (GCC).
Not coincidentally, the GCC concept is based primarily on findings related to the most
globalised of industries: the garment industry. However, its influence extends beyond the
garment industry and it is used to conceptualise the production process and global industry
dynamics in various industries. The GCC can be defined as ‘a network of labour and production
processes whose end result is a finished product’ (Gereffi & Korzeniewicz, 1994). As such,
commodity chains consist of nodes of operations that together constitute the whole of the
production process (supply of raw materials, R&D, design, manufacturing, export and
marketing), across the entire spectrum of activities in the world economy (Gereffi, 1992, 1994a).
Since the 1990s an avalanche of case studies using the GCC perspective has hit academic
journals dedicated to economic and/or industrial development issues. Indeed, a wide variety of
products and industrial sectors have been subjected to GCC analyses in just the last few years
(see e.g. on horticultural products, Dolan & Humphrey, 2000; on primary commodities,
Gibbon, 2001; on timber, Edgington & Hayter, 1997; and on tobacco, Vargas, 2001). The
application of the GCC perspective to different industries has led to new insights into the
structure and functioning of specific chains.
Though akin to the production column – which assigns a central role to the material aspect of
production – the GCC perspective is distinguished by its explicit focus on a number of non-
material dimensions of the chain. As part of an ambitious research agenda, Gereffi (1994a)
distinguished three basic dimensions of GCCs: an input-output structure, a territoriality and a
governance structure. The most basic dimension of GCCs is the input-output structure, from
the design and procurement of raw materials, to the distribution and marketing of the finished
product. The second dimension – ‘territoriality’ or geography – identifies the geographical
dispersion or concentration of raw materials, production, export and marketing activities4. The
third dimension – governance structure – is seen as an integral and highly important part of
the chain. In fact, based on differences in governance structures, Gereffi (1994a) identified two
distinct types of GCCs: ‘producer-driven chains’ and ‘buyer-driven chains’5. The former are
those dominated by large, vertically integrated TNCs that control the production system. Such
governance is characteristic of capital- and technology-intensive industries, such as the
automotive and electronics industries. By contrast, buyer-driven chains are typical of labour-
intensive, consumer goods industries (such as toys, shoes and garments), in which retailers,
brand-name merchandisers and trading companies play the pivotal role. Governance in GCCs
entails allocative power and authority based on the ability to coordinate the chain’s input-
output structure and control the core nodes of the chain. The governance structure determines
how financial, material and human resources as well as economic surplus are allocated and flow
within the chain (Appelbaum & Gereffi, 1994, p. 43; see also Schmitz & Knorringa, 2000).
Attention is focused on vertical linkages mostly between unequal partners. Kaplinsky (1998) has
pointed out how a strong position in core nodes of the chain, viz. those with high barriers to
entry, allows lead firms to extract different types of rents. In the case of buyer-driven chains,
relational rents (which are related primarily to the effective management or governance of
inter-firm relationships), trade policy rents and brand-name rents underpin the strong
position of buyers. Finally, a few early publications on the GCC concept mention the
importance of an institutional framework ‘that identifies how local, national and international
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conditions and policies shape the globalisation process at each stage of the chain’ (Gereffi,
1994b, p. 97). However, so far most GCC studies have not dealt with the institutional
dimension beyond the mere recognition that commodity chains are influenced by state policies
in both producing and consuming countries.
Even though the GCC perspective has been applied to a number of industries the theoretical
engagement with the GCC concept itself has been limited, which seems to have hampered its
progression. Recently, a number of researchers have re-asserted the value of chain-based
research and of a clear research agenda. They introduced the currently preferred term, which is
also used in this study, ‘Global Value Chain’(GVC)6 (see Gereffi et al., 2001; Humphrey &
Schmitz, 2000; Kaplinsky, 2000).
By systematically incorporating production column elements into the study of international
division of labour patterns, GVC represents in essence a valuable refinement of NIDL. Like
NIDL (see Box 2.1), the GVC concept has its roots in world systems theory (see Terlouw, 1992).
There are many similarities between NIDL and the GVC approach: both focus on vertical
divisions of labour in the world economy as an integral part of the capitalist system, and both
interpret such divisions in core-periphery terms. The focus on the chain of production
activities and the attachment of core-periphery status to nodes in this chain – rather than
centralising the nation state as unit of analysis as in the case of NIDL – allows GVC studies
greater leverage in the examination of industrial coordination and control mechanisms. It also
allows LMICs and LMIC producers considerable room for improving their position through
extending their command over the chain, including over more core-like nodes. In the
following subsections, coordination and control or ‘governance’ mechanisms will be examined,
and then attention will shift to the value chain approach to LMIC upgrading.
2.2.1 Governance in GVCs
Governance7 in economic relations generally refers to the inter-firm relationships and
institutional mechanisms through which non-market coordination of interdependent
activities is achieved (Humphrey & Schmitz, 2001; Jessop, 1998; Yeung, 1998). In other words,
governance concerns any situation where the anarchy of the market can be avoided and
production parameters are set jointly either through inter-firm cooperation or the exercise of
power, without necessarily falling back on an ownership relation. Many different modes of
governance or coordination can be distinguished, ranging from very fairly formal, ‘market-like’
modes such as cooperative agreements, to closer mechanisms such as those observed in
conglomerates and especially in family businesses. A general term which applies to all
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Figure 2.1: Network spectrum of governance modes in production chains
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intermediate modes of governance that couple autonomy with interdependence (in the centre
of Figure 2.1) is ‘heterarchy’ (Jessop, 1998). Figure 2.1 gives an overview of the various economic
governance mechanisms.
In its treatment of governance, the GVC perspective is primarily focused on inter-firm relations
within the chain and much less on governance exercised by institutions. Also, GVC studies
interpret governance as vertical linkages, where some firms work according to the parameters
set by others. Depending on the chain, the lead firms setting the parameters may be buyers or
producers. As mentioned, the type of customer – buyer or producer – is seen as the determining
factor, explaining the existence of various types of value chains. This indicates that the
governance exercised by these customers is believed to be tight enough to impact or even
determine the structure of the entire chain. The production parameters that are most
commonly subject to chain governance are the type of product to be made, the production
method to be applied, the time of production and the production volume. Finally, some
customers – especially large customers that compete on price – may be able to set the price for
the products to be produced (Humphrey & Schmitz, 2001).
One of the implications of governance in chain relations is that it is costly, as it requires
investing in the inter-firm relationship. Since these investments cannot be recovered upon
termination of the relationship, they need to be seen as a ‘sunk cost’. Such unrecoverable sunk
costs may serve as an incentive to maintain more stable, long-term relationships with a smaller
number of suppliers (see also section 1.1.6). Sunk cost and the interpersonal aspect of these
relationships may be a reason to deviate from strict market behaviour.
2.2.2 Governance in global garment value chains
The work on economic governance is highly relevant to the garment industry, where
comparatively close, ‘quasi-hierarchical’ (Humphrey & Schmitz, 2000) governance forms, most
notably subcontracting, dominate. Moreover, compared to subcontracting in other industries,
the international subcontracting relations in garment production networks involve tight
governance. Amongst other things, such tight governance is based on a few of the industry’s
characteristics discussed in the previous chapter.
In international subcontracting arrangements, LMIC suppliers are dislocated – in terms of
geographical distance, as well as with regard to knowledge and capabilities – from the market
they supply (Hobday, 1995). In such a situation, where buyers have a better understanding of
the market than their suppliers, buyers generally engage in tight governance in the area of
product development. Rapidly changing consumer demand, progressive segmentation and
fashionisation are making it particularly difficult for suppliers to understand and predict the
clothing market.
With regard to production processes, the main reason for governance or specification to occur
is risk minimisation on the part of the buyer. The most important risk is that of suppliers not
providing products on time or providing bad-quality products. In general, buyers that do not
compete on price are vulnerable to delivery and quality risks (Humphrey & Schmitz, 2000). As
already discussed, in the garment industry non-price elements such as branding and style are
an integral part of new retailing strategies, thereby heightening the vulnerability of garment
buyers. Garment brands need to maintain a good reputation in order to secure consumer
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loyalty. They risk losing that reputation if shortcomings are found at suppliers. Shortcomings
are especially likely to occur when latecomer LMIC suppliers are involved because often there is
a large gap between the requirements of their domestic market and those of their export
market (Keesing & Lall, 1992; Humphrey & Schmitz, 2000). In the garment industry gaps exist
in particular with regard to labour conditions and environmental standards. Increased
consumer awareness in Western markets with respect to labour and environmental misconduct
has led to a tightening of governance in international subcontracting relations in the garment
industry (see Annex 2).
Besides prescribing what needs to be produced in which way and at what time, garment
buyers determine the volume to be produced. Also, within the national institutional
boundaries as reflected in national wage rates and productivity, garment buyers tend to set
prices. In sum, garment buyers increasingly need to act as true lead firms, steering or exercising
tight command and control over their large sourcing networks. This implies a qualitative
change in garment subcontracting relations towards closer coordination between buyer and
suppliers, especially in the case of new and inexperienced LMIC suppliers. International
production networks and subcontracting arrangements in the garment industry are
increasingly characterised by tight governance.
Buyers’ ability to coordinate and control the value chain is based on their power over other
actors in the chain. In GVC studies, power is not defined but instead it is directly related to the
structure of the value chain. The various phases of the production process, which constitute the
nodes of the value chain, are highly diverse in terms of capital-labour ratio, skill levels of the
workers and other characteristics. The nodes at the extremes of the chain – viz. design,
marketing and, to a lesser extent, distribution – are the most knowledge-intensive. They
require skilled and highly educated specialists as well as proximity to and affinity with
(certainly in the case of design) the final market. In general, very large sums of money are
involved in the marketing of clothes, especially in the case of branded or designer label, high-
end wearing apparel. Using Gereffi’s world systems terminology, these are the ‘core nodes’ of
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Table 2.1: US and EU chain governance structures
US buyers EU buyers
Level of externalisation of Lower Higher
functions to suppliers
Basis of supplier certification Process + product Functional + product
Nature of product specification Detailed, specified unilaterally Less detailed, negotiated
Quality auditing system Quality control by buyers, Quality control in-house and/or
out-stationed employees contracted out to third parties
Nature of critical path reporting Frequent and detailed Less frequent, less detailed
Procedure of resolving Legalistic Informal
contractual differences
Level of suppliers’ capacity 30-100% 10-15%
typically required by individual
buyers
Source: Gibbon, 2000, 2002
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the chain. In them, most of the value added or profits accrue while the knowledge- and capital-
intensive nature of these activities give rise to relatively high barriers to entry. The position of
retailers, brand-named marketers and branded manufacturers that govern buyer-driven
garment chains is based principally on their control over the design and marketing nodes and
on the rents they extract from this position (Scheffer, 1992; Gibbon, 2000). In the garment
industry, relational rents, earned through effective governance of inter-firm production
networks, play an important role. In most GVC studies, limited attention is paid to the content
of governance (Gibbon, 2000). Table 2.1 illustrates how in the garment industry content of
governance in GVCs may differ between GVCs feeding into the US and the EU market,
governed by US and EU buyers, respectively.
Based on Gibbon’s (2000, 2002) study of the Mauritian garment industry, the table shows that
there are considerable differences between the garment chain of US and that of European
buyers. On the whole and compared to EU buyers, US buyers appear to assign less
responsibilities to their suppliers and to exercise tighter, more formalistic governance over
their suppliers, to whom the relationship on the whole is fairly distant and ‘strictly business’.
The implications of the noted differences may vary, but this is a topic that remains under-
examined. With the exception of Gibbon’s study (2002), little attention has been paid to the
interplay between culture and the structure and functioning within value chains. This applies
to buyers, but even more so to suppliers. Even less attention is paid to the role, background and
cultural or social embeddedness of LMIC suppliers in the GVC perspective of upgrading, which
is the subject of the following section, and will be visited again in later chapters.
2.2.3 The GVC and upgrading in LMICs
Gereffi’s publications on GVCs are optimistic in their discussion of the possibilities for LMICs
and LMIC firms to upgrade. Gereffi (1996) asserts the central role of GVCs for upgrading by
stating ‘participation in global commodity chains is a necessary step for industrial upgrading
because it puts firms and economies on potentially dynamic learning curves’. Once
incorporated into GVCs, the challenge to (suppliers in) LMICs is to upgrade and improve their
position within those chains (ILO, 1998; Gereffi, 1999). Humphrey and Schmitz distinguish
three general types of upgrading: product, process and functional upgrading. In short, these
refer to a greater sophistication of products, of processes and to an extension of command over
new nodes in the value chain, respectively. One of the most salient results of recent studies of
upgrading dynamics is an apparently dynamic relationship between governance and
upgrading (Fleury & Fleury, 2001; Dolan & Tewari, 2001; Humphrey & Schmitz, 2000).
Especially in process and product upgrading, governance by buyers is believed to be highly
important. The communication and enforcement of export standards with regard to quality,
consistency and response time by buyers to their suppliers is especially important to new
suppliers in LMICs (Egan & Mody, 1992; Tewari, 1999; Piore & Ruiz Durán, 1998). For more
experienced suppliers that are already incorporated into GVCs, a switch from one buyer to a
more demanding, higher end buyer (‘organisational succession’) is presented as ‘one of the
critical mechanisms by which firms can improve or consolidate their positions within the value
chain’ (Gereffi, 1999). For LMIC suppliers it entails switching to a new, more
demanding/sophisticated chain. The upgrading that results from organisational succession is
mostly product or process upgrading. However, Humphrey and Schmitz (2000) point out how
unrecoverable sunk costs may cause buyers to prevent their suppliers from switching to
another buyer8.
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The role of buyers with regard to the functional upgrading of their garment producers is also
ambiguous. Gereffi (1999) proposes an evolutionary process through which producers are able
to change from ‘mere’ assemblers into full-package suppliers – or even, as explained in Chapter
1, into a ODM or OBM role. Thereafter, suppliers may develop design capabilities so that they
can design products sold under the brand name of their buyer (‘original design
manufacturing’, ODM). Finally, suppliers may be able to market their own branded
merchandise9. Contrary to Gereffi’s optimistic scenario, Schmitz and Knorringa (2000) argue
that buyers in the shoe industry discourage or even bar their suppliers from developing the
design and marketing capabilities necessary for attaining an ODM or OBM role. Buyers may
feel threatened if suppliers encroach on their core competencies and may try to prevent them
from doing so.
With such emphasis on the need to engage in upgrading mechanisms and processes, it is
surprising to find that in many GVC studies the aim of upgrading remains somewhat obscured.
What then is the aim of upgrading processes? According to Gereffi (1999), upgrading ‘involves
organisational learning to improve the position of firms or nations in international trade
networks’. As such, industrial upgrading is seen not only as a process, but also as an aim or a
result (Fleury & Fleury, 2001). The latter aspect remains rather implicit because not much
attention is paid to the relative nature of upgrading vis-à-vis peers. Fleury and Fleury (ibid.) do
stress, however, the fact that the resulting enhanced competitive position of the firm implies
that it has to learn or improve faster than other competing firms. If there is no improvement of
the relative position of a firm vis-à-vis its peers, the firm is in fact ‘running to stand still’.
Furthermore, the firm’s competences have to improve as a result of a self-reliant and
purposeful attitude with regards to its upgrading process (ibid.), which is a significant
departure from the vertical, top-down perspective employed in most GVC studies. Purposeful
strategies need to promote competence building, while on the other hand increased
competence should support the company’s competitive strategy. In this dynamic, bidirectional
process, learning is seen as the essential link. Fleury and Fleury’s perspective bears some
resemblance to Porter’s (1990) treatment of operational effectiveness and strategy. According to
Porter (ibid.) operational effectiveness entails performing similar activities better than peers do.
All firms need to achieve operational effectiveness to stay in the market. In striving for
operational effectiveness, management tools and techniques such as benchmarking, total
quality control and partnering, are applied widely, and the measures applied by one firm are
quickly adopted by others. Consequently, companies look more alike, as do their activities.
Whereas many authors (cf. Lundvall, 1988, 1993; Camagni, 1991; Gereffi, 1999) see in this
learning and adopting by interacting an important route to competitiveness, Porter envisages a
rat race without winners: ‘competition becomes a series of races down identical paths that no-
one can win’ (Porter, as quoted by Meyer-Stamer, 2002). This competitive trap can be avoided
by performing activities that rivals do not perform or by performing the same activities
differently; Porter calls this ‘strategy’. His focus on strategy thus turns the upgrading
discussion away from the ‘upward trajectory’ or ‘linear improvement process’ thinking that has
become part and parcel of the upgrading debate10.
Once the overwhelming dominance of intra-chain upgrading stimuli emanating for foreign
buyers is put into perspective, this becomes just one (though a highly important one) of the
many relevant factors. As mentioned, the significance of the active and independent upgrading
strategies of suppliers has received little attention or has been downplayed and deserves
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academic attention (see Smakman, forthcoming). Moreover, in a wider approach to upgrading
of LMIC suppliers, extra-chain aspects need to be taken into consideration. Relevant here is
Dolan and Tewari’s (2001, p. 100) observation:
‘Upgrading of firms ultimately is a historical process influenced by several extra value chain issues in ongoing ways.
Local practices, political arrangements, physical and human resources, infrastructure, extra chain investment
decisions and the larger business environment all affect the capacity and desire of firms involved in value chains to
upgrade.’
Not only do they draw attention to the fact that upgrading, and the will to engage in it, cannot
be taken for granted – as is often done in academic development studies. Once more the
importance of combining value chain with extra-value chain aspects is confirmed (cf. Whitley,
1994). One of the ways to achieve this, certainly for the garment industry where localisation
tendencies are strong, is to combine GVC with insights from cluster studies, especially since it
has become clear over the past decade that collective learning and innovation are most
effectively undertaken at the regional level, most notably in specialist clusters with dedicated
local institutions (Helmsing, 2000; Malecki, 1994).
2.3 Clusters
In the globalising world, almost all industries are in one way or another organised through
globalised value chains. However, they are also typically anchored within agglomerated
production complexes, or clusters, in developed countries and in LMICs (Porter, 1990; Scott,
1996). These tendencies are receiving much attention in academic literature on the interplay
between economic activity at the global and at the local level (Amin & Thrift, 1992; Storper &
Scott, 1992; Humphrey & Schmitz, 2001). Where vertical linkages are a basic element in GVC
studies, horizontal network linkages generally play an important role in literature on the
clustering of firms (Lambooy, 2002).
The agglomeration of economic activity is not a new phenomenon; it has a long history which
from different perspectives sparked an academic interest several decades ago. Since the early
days, the economic benefits of clustering for individual firms has been the principal focus. So
much so that by now ‘the idea that there are gains in clustering is old hat in economics’
(Schmitz, as quoted in Visser, 1999, p. 1553). Marshall (1961) is commonly credited for the
‘discovery’ of clusters and the benefits of clustering for individual firms. He proposed that
firms benefit from geographical agglomeration through ‘economic externalities’ (i.e.
unintended spill-over effects). Positive external economies – viz. increasing returns or
productivity-boosting relationships that are internal to the economy as a whole but external to
the individual production unit – derive from various processes or circumstances. They still play
an important role in modern cluster studies.
Based on slightly different emphases with regards to the origins of economic externalities, two
different strands of literature on regional economic development can be distinguished in
modern cluster literature. The one represented in new economic geography and endogenous
growth theory places great emphasis on static economic externalities and increasing returns to
scale that result from spatial clustering and specialisation (Vasquez Barquero, 2002; Krugman,
1995; Porter, 1990). It largely follows the accounts of successful industrial districts in the ‘Third
Italy’, where flexible specialisation allowed clustered small firms to compete successfully in
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international markets (Piore & Sabel; 1984; Becattini, 1990). Within a static framework, reduced
transaction costs and the benefits of scale and scope economies receive much attention. Also,
two types of agglomeration economies are distinguished: localisation economies and
urbanisation economies. The former are benefits such as the spatial clustering of economic
externalities based on skilled labour, technological know-how and specific (supply)
infrastructure, which result from the concentration of enterprises belonging to the same
industry (van Dijk & Rabellotti, 1997). Urbanisation economies are more general benefits
associated with an urban location, such as generic infrastructure, labour market and
information.
The other perspective on regional economic development combines insights from economic
geography, institutional and evolutionary economics and relates regional economic success to
the prevailing social, institutional and cultural conditions in the region. Well known in this
dynamic, socialised view of the regional context are Storper’s (1997) ‘untraded
interdependencies’, which include different types of non-market interaction, based on trust,
shared values or experiences. Such interaction is thought to contribute to the formation of a
distinctive industrial, entrepreneurial culture that may further enhance local efficiency and
competitiveness. A central notion in this context is ‘tacit’ knowledge, viz. knowledge that
cannot be bought on the market, but is embodied in skills and practices. This type of
knowledge is virtually inseparable from its social, sectoral and territorial context (Storper, 1997;
Vargas, 2001). Dynamic benefits of tacit knowledge and the free flow of information within
clusters foster the diffusion of local knowledge and standards, and may support growth and
innovation. As will be discussed in a later section, tacit knowledge is the crux to understanding
dynamic cluster effects that sustain the competitive position of clusters.
While the benefits of clustering are widely known and accepted, a variety of cluster definitions
have been used in cluster research. So, what constitutes a cluster? The literature includes
studies of regions as diverse as Silicon Valley, the City of London, Modena (Italy), Agra (India)
and Lima (Peru). The common denominator shared by these regions is the fact that they all
house a geographical and sectoral concentration of firms – i.e. the definition of a cluster used in
this study. Even though inter-firm linkages clearly need not be a presupposed ingredient of
clusters11, in general, different types of interaction and networking, including inter-firm
linkages, are common ingredients of clusters. In fact, a comparison of case studies led to the
discovery of almost unbounded variety in the internal structures of clusters in developed and
developing countries. In response to this variety, several authors have constructed cluster
typologies (Storper & Harrison, 1991; Park, 1996; Markusen, 1996). The most well-known
cluster types besides the Marshallian district, which is made up of interlinked, specialist small
firms, are the hub-and-spoke cluster and the satellite platform (see Figure 2.2 a-c).
As illustrated in Figure 2.2 b, in hub-and-spoke clusters a large local firm is the central node
in the local network as well as its gateway to the outside world. Satellite platforms are made up
of branch plants of TNCs that do not or only sporadically maintain productive linkages to each
other and the local business environment.
In recent years, two new turns have been given to the subject of clustering. First, there is now a
body of literature concerned specifically with LMIC clusters. The observed advantages of
flexible specialisation within European clusters spurred a whole new research and policy
agenda for LMICs (Schmitz & Musyck, 1994). In LMICs there had been considerable concern
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with the weak competitive position of SMEs12, and the experiences of SME industrial districts
in Europe gave industrial development research in LMICs a new impetus (Schmitz, 1989).
Several case studies carried out during the 1990s confirmed both the existence of clustering in
LMICs and its significance for enhancing the competitive position of SMEs (Schmitz, 1995;
Rabellotti, 1997; Visser, 1996, 1999; Knorringa, 1999). Second, in the LMIC context new benefits
of clustering, namely those resulting from collective action, are receiving increasing attention
in cluster analysis. Firms in LMIC clusters benefit from what is called collective efficiency,
which, as is the case with the Western clusters, is derived from Marshall’s unintentional, or
passive, external economies, but they are complemented by purposeful joint action (Schmitz &
Nadvi, 1999). Later work on clusters, especially on LMIC clusters, showed the significance of
deliberate cooperation of clustered firms. Several forms of joint action within LMIC clusters
have been observed:
• ‘bilateral horizontal cooperation’: cooperation between competing firms in the cluster;
• ‘multilateral horizontal cooperation’: horizontal cooperation between various cluster
members, for example in the form of business associations or joint venture activities; and
• ‘vertical cooperation’: cooperation between local clustered firms and buyers, suppliers or
subcontractors.
Within LMIC environments, the cluster types illustrated above have been interpreted not as
static models, but as phases in trajectories (Schmitz & Nadvi, 1999; Knorringa, 2001). One of the
main contentions of the cluster trajectory research is that as the cluster develops – from
incipient to a mature cluster – over time, its internal structure as well as its dynamics change13.
Emerging or incipient clusters are believed to consist primarily of small firms that are seen to
benefit from intra-cluster specialisation as it allows them to spread risks and to invest in
‘riskable steps’ (Schmitz, 1997). However, not all participant firms benefit equally. As a
consequence, mature clusters may display greater internal differentiation: medium-sized and
large firms emerge, grow and come to play a dominant role as clusters mature (Scott, 1992;
Schmitz, 1995; Nadvi, 1999; Knorringa, 2001). Thus, over the course of their development
trajectory, LMIC clusters evolve from what Markusen has called Marshallian clusters to
structures that resemble that of hub-and-spoke clusters.
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Figure 2.2: Cluster typologies
A - Marshallian cluster B - Hub-and-spoke cluster C - Satellite platform cluster
6099Source: Markusen (1996), Atzema & Boschma (2002)
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Several cluster studies note that in the face of new competitive pressures and crises, often
closely associated with the ongoing economic globalisation process, the need for cooperation in
mature clusters is heightened (Meyer-Stamer, 1998; Schmitz & Nadvi, 1999). In their revision of
several case studies, Schmitz and Nadvi (1999) point to the diverging evidence on the type and
effectiveness of various types of cooperation. Multilateral horizontal cooperation in
institutions such as business associations or other private or public organisations is important
in a few clusters. In contrast, vertical cooperation was either high or increasing in all clusters.
Visser (1996, p. 55) refers to vertical producer-supplier linkages when he states that ‘vertical
cooperation thus gives specialists more grip on a complex and changing environment, which is
probably the most important ‘economy’ one can obtain in modern economies’. It is not hard to
see that the same applies, possibly even more so, to vertical cooperation with buyers, including
those outside the cluster. In fact, the work of Knorringa (1999), Rabellotti (1999, 2001) and
Schmitz and Knorringa (2000), amongst others, shows that especially in the more demanding
marketing channels close cooperation between buyers and suppliers is important. The most
demanding marketing channels are often but not always the export channels that are managed
by global buyers. It is this latter insight that led Schmitz and Knorringa (2000) to investigate
‘learning from global buyers’ issues, and that sparked a general greater emphasis on external
linkages of clusters (Varaldo & Ferrucci, 1996; Schmitz & Nadvi, 1999). A better understanding
of the nature of these linkages is necessary if one is to address the upgrading potential and
stimuli for LMIC garment firms that service global markets. Park (1996) and Weijland (1999)
emphasised the fact that strong external linkages have to go hand in hand with collective
efficiency based on trust and a positive local institutional environment that pushes the cluster
forward.
Thus, cluster studies tend to view regional agglomerations of industrial activity from a network
perspective. In this perspective, local firms and their interrelations are taken as the point of
departure. With regards to intra-cluster relations, the literature stresses the importance of a
combination of competition and cooperation. With respect to network participants, the
attention is focused mostly on firms. However, an institutional environment of effective meso-
level institutions as well as other non-market aspects, most notably tacit knowledge, are highly
important for sustaining the long-term competitive position of clusters. In the following
sections, localised non-market coordination mechanisms are discussed, as is their potential
developmental impact on clusters.
2.3.1 The fuzzy notion of embeddedness
There is a large and growing body of literature on embeddedness14 as there is little doubt about
the economic relevance of the embeddedness of economic actors in their sociocultural
environment. Many different interpretations have been given to the meaning of embeddedness
with regard to economic relations. One of the most narrow interpretations is commonly used
by economic geographers and planners who interpret local embeddedness as the integration of
business into the local economy in terms of backward and forward linkages (van Westen, 2001;
Boschma et al., 2001). Traditionally, this discussion has focused on the position of FDI facilities
in local economies. Recent studies of the embeddedness of TNCs and their networks stress the
point that embedding at the local level should not be interpreted as a one-way street, where
FDI by TNCs takes root in passive localities. Based on the social process involved in network
formation, Dicken and Hassler (2000) envision: ‘the precise nature and articulation of such
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firm-centred networks are deeply influenced by the concrete socio-political, institutional, and
cultural contexts within which they are embedded, produced and reproduced.’
Another approach sees the time-space context of businesses as a determining influence on a
firm’s underlying logic or ‘mode of rationality’ (Scheffer 1992; Yeung, 1998; Whitley, 1994, 1996;
Ruigrok & van Tulder, 1995; Dicken et al., 2001). Sociocultural aspects have an impact on the
way business and the economy are organised. From a development perspective the main
preoccupation is not with this link itself, but with the possibility to link the sociocultural
environment to economic performance, viz. success or failure. In this context Fukuyama (1995)
asserts the importance of trust (see also Schmitz, 1999; Maskell & Malmberg, 1999). Schmitz
(1999, p. 141) defines trust as ‘the willingness to expose oneself to the possibility of
opportunistic behaviour by others’. Fukuyama (1995) distinguishes between low-trust and
high-trust societies. In the former, kinship rather than voluntary association is the backbone of
economic organisation. High-trust societies on the other hand build on ‘the ability of people to
work together for common purposes in groups and organisations’ outside kinship, an ability
which Fukuyama has termed ‘social capital’. Social capital is seen to function as the ‘glue’ for
collective action (see section 2.3), and embeddedness in a social capital-rich environment may
stimulate success and economic development. The social capital concept is also useful because
it bridges the gap between the macro-level sociocultural environment and the social
embedding of micro-level relationships (Boschma et al., 2001)15. With regard to the micro-level
economic relations, Granovetter’s (1985) interpretation of embeddedness serves to point out
the impact and relevance of the social, interpersonal aspect of business relations (see also Uzzi,
1997).
2.3.2 Clusters, path dependence and lock-in
There is little doubt that LMIC clusters generally are both spatially and socially embedded.
Varaldo and Ferrucci (1996) point to the ‘local rootedness’ of clusters, which means that the
relationship of the district (firm) with the territory is based on the entrepreneur’s social
network and not only on localised economic advantages. Others also assert that clusters do not
just ‘sit’ on an isotropic plain, but that their existence, dynamic and, indeed, failure or success
are inseparable from the local or regional institutional setting. Following Ménard (1995), Visser
(1996, p. 53) defines the institutional environment as: ‘a long-standing historically determined
set of stable, abstract and impersonal rules, crystallised in traditions, customs or laws, so as to
implement and enforce patterns of behaviour governing the relationships between separate
social constituencies.’ Defined in this way, institutional environments are time- and space-
specific and give a cluster its ‘local flavour’. They are the result of local, long-term collective
learning and development. ‘Milieu’, a term coined by the GREMI group in Florence, covers a
similar concept, as does Vellinga’s (2000, p. 284) ‘regional identity’:
‘Regions are historical constructs, projects arising from interaction and negotiation between the various local actors.
In the case of industrial regions, industrialisation will contribute the material base for the interests that struggle and
negotiate while establishing the region’s sphere of influence and in the course of these processes forge a regional
identity. These identities are strong and persistent and may condition firm decision making beyond the logic of a
flow-substitution economy. The various factor complexes involved in the formation of regional production systems –
the economic, the social, the political and the cultural – tend to reinforce each other and cast this system in a
particular mould that may be hard to change.’
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While incremental learning may set a cluster on a highly successful path to competitiveness,
path dependence may prevent the path from being changed or adapted to fit new competitive
needs. Vellinga’s observation also points to the danger of lock-in that has been seen to hamper
the dynamic development of some clusters (Meyer-Stamer, 1998; Visser, 1996, 1999;
McCormick, 1998; see also Maskell & Malmberg, 1999). To combat inertia or conservatism once
a cluster’s spontaneous growth phase is over, support from local and regional institutions
appears to be required to stimulate innovation and expansion (Brusco, 1990; Schmitz, 1992;
Helmsing, 2000). However, evidence concerning the effectiveness of policy networks with
regard to upgrading remains scarce (Humphrey & Schmitz, 2000) and even negative (Grabher,
1993; Atzema & Boschma, 2002).
Bell and Albu (1999) distinguish between disruptive innovation and incremental knowledge
diffusion. Clustering facilitates the local diffusion of knowledge. However, in order to
understand a cluster’s competitive dynamic they propose that a more specific focus on its
knowledge-generating capabilities is needed as well as on its openness to external information
and knowledge. Bell and Albu (ibid.) believe that much of the impetus for upgrading is
transmitted to the cluster via its external linkages. On the other hand (as will be discussed in
the next section), there is a body of recent literature asserting the potential of regions to
function as innovation incubators and to stimulate local learning, growth and innovation.
2.3.3 Clusters, learning and upgrading
Much of the literature on GVCs, production networks and clusters is concerned with the
development and upgrading of business firms, especially those in LMICs. These dynamic
improvement processes are presented as competitive alternatives to price- and cost-based
competition, also called the ‘low-road’ competitive strategy (Pyke & Sengenberger, 1990)16. The
‘high-road’ alternatives are closely associated with dynamic improvements in products and
processes. They are believed to be induced by competitive and changing markets. For example,
in the garment industry, which is notorious for cost-based competition, new retailing
strategies and faster-paced fashion changes may shift competitive strategies from the low to the
high road. In fact, Maskell and Malmberg (1999, p. 167) envision this shift to apply to industrial
competitiveness in general.
The recognition of learning and innovation processes as the bases for competitiveness and
development is not novel but dates back to Marx and Schumpeter. However, currently the tone
of the debate surrounding these issues is becoming more urgent: knowledge, learning,
upgrading, and innovation processes are all seen as essential elements contributing to the
further development of firms, regions and nations. The globalised economy has been
characterised as a learning economy, in which knowledge is a principal asset and learning the
most important driving process (Lundvall, 1988). The generation of knowledge and learning is
seen as the route to corporate and regional economic success, and sources of knowledge,
learning, upgrading and innovation are at centre stage of the academic debate (see Storper,
1997; Camagni, 1991; Lundvall, 1988, 1993; Gereffi, 1999; Bosch et al., 2002). Rather than
Schumpeterian innovative breakthroughs, incremental change and knowledge-building
processes are the main concern of the current learning debate.
Several authors on learning and innovation systems have stressed the localised nature of
learning. Based on industrial and institutional specialisation, geographical and cultural
nearness – which facilitates the exchange of both codifiable and especially tacit knowledge –
firms in clusters are able to learn better than isolated firms are (Porter, 1990; Atzema &
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Boschma, 2002; Maskell & Malmberg, 1999; Helmsing, 2000). Furthermore, globalisation
appears to heighten the importance of localised, tacit knowledge. Maskell and Malmberg (1999,
p. 172) point out that:
‘... one effect of the ongoing globalisation is that many previously localised capabilities and production factors
become ubiquities. What is not ubiquified, however, is the non-tradable/non-codified result of knowledge creation –
the embedded tacit knowledge – that at a given time can only be produced in practice. The fundamental exchange
inability of this type of knowledge increases its importance as the internationalisation of markets proceeds.’
Overall, the current research preoccupation with learning and upgrading paints a positive
picture with regard to learning and developmental prospects, also for LMICs and their firms.
Firms are widely assumed to strive for upgrading and to be open to learning. A general recipe
for securing and even improving one’s position in the global economy, its value chains and
production networks, may not have been agreed upon yet, but appears to be well on its way.
However, there is still limited empirical evidence with regard to these processes in concrete
LMIC contexts.
Furthermore, there is great academic interest in the success stories of upgrading, but
comparatively limited attention has been paid to exclusion and the failure to upgrade. This
carries the risk of oversimplification and overestimation of the prevalence of upgrading
processes. Again, this may apply most directly to upgrading processes in LMIC environments
that rely on vertical chain-based linkages for upgrading stimuli. Gibbon (2000) and Hudson
(1999), for example, stress that upgrading and the success of certain suppliers is accompanied by
the exclusion and failure of others. Schmitz and Humphrey (2000) acknowledge the difficulties
and limitations of upgrading when they ask: ‘if upgrading is so easy, why is it not more
pervasive in LDCs?’ While noting the discrepancy between the academic discussion and LMIC
reality, they do not go into it in depth.
A more extensive critique of the ‘learning paradigm’ has been developed by Hudson (1999),
who argues that inequality is inherent to the capitalist system: capitalist development is driven
by competition and the search for profit, and must remain uneven. As a consequence, not all
firms or regions can be successful learners:
‘... a post-mass production, post-Fordist world of specialized regional economies, all on their own successful learning
trajectories, and all winning, is not a feasible option within the social relations of capitalism. Equally, a post-mass
production, post-Fordist world of product-specialized high volume production regional complexes, all producing
just-in-time and in one place in their unique niche in the global market-place, is not a feasible option. There may be
some cases in which some regions ‘win’ by following one or other of these strategies, but there will be many more that
‘lose’, either failing in the attempt or doomed to failure by the success of others.’ (Hudson, 1999, p. 70).
2.4 Conclusion
This chapter presented a number of different network-based approaches that can be used for
the analysis of industrial development processes at various levels of scale. The main concern of
the GVC approach is with processes at higher (global or national) levels of scale, and places great
emphasis on governance mechanisms transmitted through vertical, inter-firm linkages.
Cluster studies, on the other hand, tend to focus on horizontal inter-firm linkages at the local
or regional level that are characterized by a beneficial combination of competition and
cooperation.
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Rather than summarising the main attributes, merits and problems of these approaches, this
last section emphasises that both perspectives offer valuable contributions for the study of
clustered LMIC firms wanting to operate or already operating in export markets, through their
incorporation into GVCs. For an understanding of how clustered firms in GVCs may engage
most effectively in upgrading processes in order to enhance their competitive position, insights
from both approaches need to be combined. The crux of this type of study appears to lie in
achieving a greater understanding of the interplay between intra-chain governance and the
local or regional institutional environment’s ability to diffuse and generate relevant
knowledge. So far, there is limited empirical evidence with regard to the interplay between
these processes in exporting LMIC clusters.
Humphrey and Schmitz (2000) have set out the principal aims for this kind of research by
highlighting the most relevant questions and hypotheses. In proposing general patterns with
regard to the penetration of or repositioning in export markets by LMIC clusters, Humphrey
and Schmitz (ibid.) revisit the cluster typology put forward above (see Figure 2.2). They propose
that product and process upgrading as well as marketing upgrading (i.e. improving the
position in the (export) market) in SME or ‘Marshallian’ clusters require joint action.
Institutions such as a local technology institute or an export consortium for example need to be
actively involved for upgrading to occur (ibid., pp. 20-21). In hub-and-spoke clusters,
dominant large firms generally take on the role of upgrading pioneers, by undertaking in-
house R&D activities or by penetrating new export markets.
Furthermore, irrespective of their internal structure, LMIC clusters are mostly incorporated
into quasi-hierarchical chains, characterised by tight governance exercised by buyers over their
suppliers. Based on evidence from the shoe cluster in the Brazilian Sinos Valley, Humphrey and
Schmitz conclude that governance in quasi-hierarchical chains is most effective with regard to
product and process upgrading. However, their main hypothesis (ibid., p. 23) is that functional
upgrading may be limited. Suppliers in LMICs incorporated into such chains may move into
new, non-strategic functions, but fail to occupy the strategic functions at the extremes of the
chain, viz. product development and marketing. In other words, it may well be very difficult for
LMIC suppliers to assume an ODM or OBM export role. This heightens their risk of being
replaced by other suppliers who are striving to appear on the ‘radar screens’ of global buyers,
especially because these buyers continuously scout for better or cheaper suppliers.
With regard to firms in LMICs, the critical questions concern which local advantages,
peculiarities or specialisations will allow them to compete successfully, and how their success
can be prolonged and sustained through learning and upgrading processes. For the regions
that house these firms and clusters, the critical question is how they can use their incorporation
into GVCs as a lever for regional economic development (ILO, 1998; van Dooren & Smakman,
2001).
Later chapters of this study will address these issues for the case of the Laguna cluster. In the
analysis of production networks, the attention will be focused primarily on participant firms,
their roles and their economic relations (both vertical and horizontal) with other firms in the
network. Where relevant and possible, intra- and extra-firm network relations will also be
included. [ 79 ]
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Notes
1 R&D efforts aimed at the further automation of garment production have, however, not been abandoned. On the
contrary, Audet (1996) finds that the USA, Japan and the EU are engaged in a competitive race, aimed at developing
applied automated assembly systems for the garment industry. He also notes, however, that even if a breakthrough
were to be achieved, application of new technologies would most probably be limited, due to the decline in batch
sizes and the prevalence of small garment factories.
2 Production networks occupy a fairly prominent position in GCC/GVC literature. In fact, GVCs are seen as ‘sets of
interorganizational networks clustered around one commodity or product...’ (Gereffi, 1994, p. 2). The GVC approach
can be seen as a network approach (Dicken et al., 2001). However, in the development of the GVC perspective all
attention has been focused on governance, and many of the social and spatial embeddedness nuances of the
network perspective have remained underdeveloped.
3 Essentially these ‘new’ approaches represent a revival – and adaptation – of the filière concept applied by French
economists during the 1960s. In the Dutch economic literature of the same era, the filière also figured fairly
prominently but was referred to as ‘produktiekolom’. The concept assigned a central role to the material aspect of
production and remained mainly neutral and descriptive. The filière was not strictly defined, but filière studies
share the use of a chain of production activities as a tool and delimitation of the scope of their study (Raikes et al.,
2000; Lenz, 1997).
4 With regard to the geography of GCCs, criticism has centred on two issues. Firstly, GCC studies focus
overwhelmingly on nations within the mental framework of industrialised countries versus LDCs, and pay no or
only limited attention to the dynamics at intermediate levels of geographical scale. In most studies, the GCC hardly
ever touches down to examine the dynamics in and its interaction with its local footholds. Secondly, the connection
between geography and GCCs remains underdeveloped. Lenz (1997, p. 29) aptly explains the complex relationship
between geography and the filière: ‘das Filière-Konzept ist dabei ohne expliziten Raumbezug, d.h. räumlichen Aspekte sind kein
ausdrücklicher Gegenstand des Ansatzes...Eine Gleichsetzung der Begriffsinhalte von ‘Segment’ bzw. ‘Standort’ is nicht möglich. Dennoch hat
jede Filière gewissermassen ‘automatisch’ auch eine räumliche Struktur, da die Segmente bzw. die Elemente, die die Segmente ausmachen im
Raum, d.h. an einem Standort vorhanden sind.’ Similar observations apply to the territoriality of GVCs.
5 Several authors resist the presumed dual structure of chain governance consisting of two exhaustive ideal-types,
representative of capital- and labour-intensive industries in general and indeed, of all industries (Dicken et al., 2001;
Gibbon, 2001; Sverisson, 2001; Raikes et al., 2000). They call for theoretical underpinnings that will help explain the
differences more systematically, and point to national variation in governance of the same sector (Smith et al., 2002;
Gibbon, 2000) as well as to industries lacking strong control by a dominant firm or for industries with a different
governance structure (Gibbon, 2001). Others feel the definition of governance applied in most GCC to be too
narrow, as extra-chain governance, or ‘regulation’, should be taken into consideration in GCC analyses (Smith et al.,
2002; Vargas, 2001; Whitley, 1994, 1996; McCormick, 2001).
6 Several scholars of economic and industrial development issues have recently joined forces in an attempt to further
the theoretical advancement of the GCC (see Gereffi et al., 2001, for their research agenda). Through the use of the
new value chain terminology they set themselves apart from the theoretical problems associated with the GCC (see
Leslie & Reimer, 1999; Raikes et al., 2000; Dicken et al., 2001) whilst paving the way for its further academic
development (Gereffi et al., 2001; see also Smith et al., 2002). Kaplinsky (2000, p. 9) gives another reason for his
preference for the term ‘value chain’ when addressing economic development issues: ‘... ‘global commodity chain’
suffers because the word commodity implies the production of undifferentiated products in processes with low
barriers to entry. The problem with this [...] is that the search for sustainable income growth requires producers to
position themselves precisely in non-commodity, high barriers to entry activities in the value chain.’
7 The meaning given to the term governance in this context may cause some confusion. In studies – such as the one at
hand here – focusing on industrial economics or industrial development, governance generally refers to the way in
which industrial production is organised and controlled. In development studies in general, governance and
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especially ‘good governance’ are central notions. In the latter strand of literature, they refer more specifically to
political processes and the way in which they are organised and carried out (Nijenhuis, 2002).
8 In this situation, buyers’ segmentation strategies may still give rise to (or allow) upgrading in suppliers, by
switching from producing a brand in the lower-end market segments to a higher-end brand or label, owned by the
same buyer.
9 Lall (1991) has shown that this upgrading sequence may not be as straightforward as is often believed. LMIC
manufacturers encounter great difficulties, especially in marketing.
10 This breakaway is particularly informative in relation to evidence on downgrading processes taking place in clusters
that are becoming incorporated into the value chains of global buyers. Amin and Thift first noted the early stages of
such a process in the Sta. Croce shoe cluster in Italy. Recently, Rabellotti’s study of the Brenta shoe district has also
shown that ‘side-stepping’ or even downgrading may be a viable strategic option (Rabellotti, 2001).
11 This point has been stressed by Visser (1996) as well as Atzema and Boschma (2002), amongst others. As Visser points
out, in much of the industrial district literature, the research objects are presupposed from the outset of the
research. This appears in some cases to defy the purpose of the research.
12 For decades now, SMEs in developing countries have been recognised as the main employment creators, but
oftentimes their competitiveness, especially outside local markets, and growth was observed to be limited. Visser
(1996) provides an extensive overview of both internal and external factors that constrain the competitiveness of
small firms. He stresses the particularly detrimental impact of external constraints based on, amongst other things,
biased policies, limited access to markets and financial resources (ibid., pp. 36-37; see also Verkoren, 1990). As a
result of these constraints, SMEs in developing countries appeared stagnant, displaying limited growth potential.
13 It is important to note that advancing from an incipient to a mature cluster status cannot be taken for granted. Not
all clusters necessarily progress and enhance their capabilities sufficiently to ‘mature’. Altenburg and Meyer-Stamer
(1999) point to the large number of stagnant ‘survival clusters’ of struggling micro- and small-scale firms in LMICs,
and Park (1996, p. 487) has pointed to the disappearance or decline of many clusters in traditional industries in
LMICs.
14 See van Westen (2001) for an overview of the origin and development of the embeddedness concept.
15 Thus sociocultural environments rich in social capital and concomitant trust, norms and values stimulate the social
embedding of inter-firm and other relationships.
16 Low-road strategies are focused on price reductions and based primarily on the squeezing of labour cost. Labour-
intensive industries such as the garment industry are particularly notorious for their low-road competitive
tendencies, but in other industries in mature stages of the product lifecycle, pressures to lower costs in order to
retain market share also commonly culminate in low-road strategies.
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3 The US-Mexico garment connection
The discussion of geographical trends in the garment industry in Chapter 1 briefly touched on
the unique position of the US and Mexico in global garment trade flows. The US occupies an
all-round central position in the global garment arena: it is the largest single-nation market,
the largest producer and the largest importer. Mexico is a remarkable rising star in garment
exports: from a position in the bottom ranks of LMIC garment exporters, it rose to become the
main supplier country for the US market, displacing established suppliers such as Hong Kong
and South Korea.
This chapter focuses on the background, main features and integration of the garment
industries in the US and Mexico, and sketches the concrete industrial context within which the
garment industry in La Laguna operates. After a brief presentation of geographical shifts in
garment employment in both nations in section 3.1, section 3.2 presents the historical
developments in the US garment industry during the twentieth century. Then, trade
regulations – which enhance the competitiveness of US garment manufacturers through the
apparently contradictory measure of allowing them to shift manufacturing activities to low-
wage locations – are examined. The Texan border city El Paso is also introduced. This city was
an important concentration area for garment manufacturing in the southern US and a typical
representative of the US manufacturing scene in basic, standardised garment production.
Moreover, recently is has become an important connecting hub between garment production
in Mexico and the US market and its buyers. Section 3.3 presents the main geographical,
historical and regulatory trends in the Mexican garment industry over the past decades. Section
3.4 examines how the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) liberalisation may
impact the US-Mexico division of labour in the garment industry.
3.1 Overture: shifts in garment employment in North America
Over the past decades, Mexico has changed from being an inward-oriented country, to being a
hesitant and partial exporter to the US, to becoming a major supplier of the US garment
industry under NAFTA. Mexico’s current position is built on two pillars. First, it owes its
unique position largely to production-sharing arrangements between US and Mexican
garment manufacturers. This pattern has been shaped over decades but has intensified
dramatically since 1994, when NAFTA granted Mexico preferential status above all other
supplier countries with regards to exports to the US. NAFTA liberalisation affected the entire
manufacturing sector but its effects were immediate and dramatic in the case of garments:
garment exports from Mexico to the US skyrocketed. Because of this, the industry has been
presented as a showcase of the impact of NAFTA by its supporters but also by sceptics on both
sides of the border. Lending an ear to former presidential candidate Ross Perot’s ‘sucking sound
from the border’, US manufacturers, politicians and especially labour representatives have
accused NAFTA and its negotiators of allowing Mexico to steal jobs from the US economy. In
Mexico, NAFTA is accused of enabling US TNCs to take advantage of the existing wage level
differential to pay Mexican workers a fragment of the wages of their US colleagues.
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Figure 3.1: Garment employment in the US and Mexico, mid 1960s and late 1990s
Source: USITC (2000 and personal
communication) and INEGI (1966, 2000)
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Furthermore, the profits made through this arrangement are exported and the impact on local
economic development in Mexico is minimal for lack of local linkages of these firms. Ironically,
business analysts – especially in the US – side-step such antagonistic accusations and foresee a
fruitful ‘Western hemisphere’ partnership that is necessary to curtail or counter the common
threat of Asian imports and industrial success.
Second, from an industrial perspective, the global industry trends as outlined in Chapter 1
are also seen to support the strong position of Mexican garment exports. Current market trends
and retailing strategies are intended to shorten lead times throughout the supply chain and
put a potential premium on geographical proximity. Latin America – most specifically the
Caribbean Basin and Mexico – has benefited from this trend and is now the second most
important wearing apparel supplier region to the US market.
The materialisation of both pillars relies on and points to a tight functional integration of
the US and Mexican garment industries. The dramatic impact of these processes on the
geography of the industry in both nations over the last decades of the twentieth century is
illustrated in Figure 3.1.
A comparison of both maps in Figure 3.1 provides a dramatic illustration of the contrary
developments of the US and Mexican garment industry: overall, garment employment in the
US has shrunk while it has boomed in Mexico. Furthermore, the geographical shift of garment
employment in the US towards the southern states and a concentration in northern Mexico
illustrates the growing importance of a bi-national division of labour between these industries.
In the 1960s there was little or no linkage between the industries in the two countries, but in
the 1990s this changed. Behind the map image of the situation in the late 1990s lies not only a
quantitative increase of garment assembly in Mexico but also – as will be elaborated later in this
chapter and in Chapter 7 – a qualitative shift in the bi-national value chain towards greater
integration of the production process in Mexico.
Using Figure 3.1 as a pivotal point of reference, the following sections will examine changes in
the US and Mexican garment industries.
3.2 Historical developments in the US garment industry
Though recent changes have had a profound impact, the current structure and interrelations
between the industries in North America1 cannot be fully understood in isolation from former
structures and trends. In fact in some ways, and certainly with regard to the industry in the US,
current patterns appear to be an extension – in intensified form – of pre-existing patterns
(Taplin, 1997; Glasmeier et al., 1993). A number of historical trends and traits in US garment
production deserve mention here as they appear to still have an impact on organisational and
spatial strategies.
Originally, the garment industry in the US was concentrated around the main markets,
especially New York. This began to change with the emergence of jobbers. Their emergence at
the beginning of the twentieth century (see section 1.1) is significant not only because it
initiated a process of vertical disintegration of US garment firms2. More important is the fact
that when some jobbers replaced their northern-based assembly contractors with cheaper
contractors in the South, they initiated a national relocation process that resulted in what
could be called a new national division of labour in the US clothing industry. Marketing and
design activities remained confined to the head offices of jobbers in the North, and
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manufacturing activities were shifted to subcontractors/ contractors in the southern states. The
first map of Figure 3.1 illustrates garment employment in the US for the mid 1960s, when the
shift of manufacturing to states such as North and South Carolina and Tennessee was already
well on its way.
The underlying logic of this geographical shift is rooted in labour cost differences and price
competition3. Existing large differences in labour cost and availability within the US made
domestic cost-based relocation a viable option for the US garment industry. This appears to
have had two important implications. Firstly, the emerging national division of labour
between the North and South may have set the tone for the narrow, cost-based competitive
strategies the US apparel industry was diagnosed as having several decades later (Bailey, 1993;
Glasmeier et al., 1993; Taplin, 1997). Taplin (1997, p. 90) is most explicit with regard to this
point:
‘Earlier strategies, with a focus on ‘cost-driven’ competition, led to investment choices (particularly location and the
organisation of production) that were predicated on wage lowering principles. The managerial orientation towards
workers was to see the labour force as a disposable entity rather than as a resource to be developed. Subsequent
strategies were constrained by these earlier structures which limited managerial choice in an industry that was and
remains volatile, highly competitive and with short-term profit horizons.’
Extending this line of thought, it could be argued that the low wages and large reserves of
immigrant labour in the southern US greatly reduced the incentive for modernisation and
technological and managerial innovation, processes that were given much emphasis in other
high cost garment producing countries such as Germany and Japan (Bailey, 1993; Glasmeier et
al., 1993; Taplin, 1997).
Above all, however, the emergence of jobbers appears to have set in motion a process leading to
dualism in the US garment industry. This dualism runs along geographical as well as product
specialisation and organisational lines. Over the course of the twentieth century, the US
garment industry was increasingly split into a northern, metropolitan and a southern segment,
or a modern and a conservative segment, a retail-minded and a manufacturing-minded
segment, respectively4. The garment industry in the south-eastern states – such as Texas,
Georgia, Tennessee and South Carolina – was and still is geared towards the manufacturing of
standardised, mass-produced ‘commodity’ garments, such as jeans and tee-shirts in the ‘Men’s
and Boys’ segments’ of the market (Taplin, 1997; Green, 1998). The cost efficiencies of most
southern factories are based on economies of scale. Most businesses are family-owned and
managed, and a conservative business attitude predominates (Bailey, 1993; van Dooren & van
der Waerden, 1997; van Dooren & Verkoren, 2003). Also, many southern factories are
contractors with only a limited command over the manufacturing process (van Dooren, 2002).
Except for a few large branded manufacturers, marketing has become one of the main
problems of US apparel manufacturers and contractors in general. This applies especially to
southern contractors, as they are both organisationally and geographically divorced from the
main markets and marketing channels. Nevertheless, throughout the 1980s and part of the
1990s garment production in the South showed considerable dynamism, when at the national
level the industry was shrinking. Especially noteworthy is the growth of apparel complexes
along the US-Mexico border, in El Paso and McAllen, Texas for example (van Dooren, 2002).
The apparel cities along the border depend heavily on commuters and immigrant labour from
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Mexico (Spener, 2002; van Dooren & van der Waerden, 1997). The exception to the noted
southern pattern based on the large-scale production of standardised wearing apparel, is the
area of Los Angeles. There, small-scale, flexible, sweatshop-like contractors produce mostly
California-style sportswear or casual wear, mostly for women or girls (Taplin, 1997; Kessler,
2002).
The current pattern is an extension of these trends. Within the context of national decline, the
concentration of garment manufacturing close to the US-Mexico border remained stable or
grew until the mid 1990s and garment employment in the traditional north-eastern garment
states has shrunk. Meanwhile, globalisation underpins the position of global metropolises
such as New York and especially Los Angeles (Sassen, 1991). These metropolises and their
immediate surrounding areas still stand firm as fashion centres based on an edge in fashion-
oriented women’s wear and sportswear (see Figure 3.1; Taplin, 1997; Palpacuer, 2002; Kessler,
2002). However, Palpacuer (ibid.) and Kessler (ibid.) show that globalisation also poses
significant challenges, transforming the structures of the metropolitan garment industries
since the 1970s. Casual wear for women has remained the principal niche product of the two
areas. Production has always been concentrated in small and labour-intensive factories; owners
as well as employees are commonly immigrants (Taplin, 1997; Dicken, 1998). Both cities have
also retained strong positions in the core nodes of the GVC, in design, fashion and marketing,
but they also – against the national trend – retain a manufacturing base (Palpacuer, 2002;
Kessler, 2002). These strengths are based on and reinforced by the presence of the head offices of
large retailers and designer label and private label marketers and by smaller independent
manufacturers. These buyers are driving the globalisation process in the garment industry by
sourcing from contractors and suppliers in numerous countries across the globe. Even as the
sourcing networks of US metropolitan-based buyers have expanded to truly global dimensions,
many buyers still retain a small, local contracting base (see Figure 3.1). Most of the
manufacturing in these areas is based on relatively stable contracting relations with large
buyers who place relatively small batch and quick response orders with local contractors
(Palpacuer, 2002).
The contrast with Southern contractors is clear. Irrespective of their location, US contractors are
captive to the product development and marketing decisions of their larger customers
(Glasmeier et al., 1993). Whereas the metropolitan garment manufacturing bases were able to
find stability based on close cooperation between contractors and buyers, high responsiveness
and flexibility, large numbers of garment factories in the South found themselves in a hard
spot. Decades of relying on low-wage labour and large-scale, standardised mass-production
appear to have led to unresponsiveness to buyers’ demands, a problem that has become more
acute now that fashion trends change more rapidly. Southern strategies have been principally
aimed at de-skilling and automation, thus jeopardising flexibility. In recent years, the
relationship between US buyers and apparel contractors in the South appears to have become
more distant and strained.
Meanwhile, the globalised world economy has opened up numerous options for US buyers
to organise and structure their networks in search of the perfect balance of cost, flexibility and
turn around times. In global networks, US contractors have become less important: Palpacuer
(2002) estimates that on average only 15% of the total production of buyers based in New York is
produced in the US, almost entirely by local, New York-based contractors. Thus US contractors
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in the South are increasingly excluded from the networks of the major US buyers that prefer
the service, flexibility and low prices offered by offshore suppliers.
Rather than accepting the erosion of the domestic garment manufacturing base, the US
government devised protectionist (see Chapter 1) as well as restructuring measures. The latter
are the most relevant here. Restructuring measures were formulated to allow US manufacturers
to counteract the import threat by ‘doing battle against Asia’ (Business Week, 1998; Twin Plant News,
1999; López Navarrete, 1997). Based on the doctrine of ‘If you can’t beat ‘em, join ‘em’, they
encouraged the internationalisation of production, mostly through production-sharing
arrangements as a means to enhance the cost competitiveness of domestic manufacturers. In
practice, these production-sharing arrangements cemented a strong link between the US,
Mexico and various Caribbean countries.
3.2.1 Offshore production
Protectionist trade measures were devised soon after the appearance of Japanese garments in US
stores in the 1950s set the alarm bells ringing in the domestic garment industry. Then,
restructuring of the domestic industry, with the aim of confronting and beating imports, was
beginning to be stimulated. The US production-sharing trade regulations designed for this
purpose had separate rules for the pre-assembly, assembly and post-assembly manufacturing
nodes of the value chain (see Figure 1.2). The most important program of this kind – the 807
Program – shaped the division of labour patterns between the US and Mexico and other nearby
LMICs for several decades. The strict rules and limitations on production sharing between the
US and Mexico were liberalised by the passage of NAFTA in the mid 1990s.
The 807/807A Program
The most important policy designed to improve the competitive position of US garment
manufacturing is the 807 or ‘Production Sharing’ Program of 1964. It encouraged the relocation
of labour-intensive, low-value-added production activities (usually assembly) to low-wage
countries, by exempting duty on the value of the US-manufactured components assembled
abroad that are part of the imported article. Upon re-entry to the US, duties thus needed to be
paid only on the value added abroad in the assembly process. The 807 Program allowed US
manufacturers to take advantage of low wages in foreign countries without being subjected to
high import duties. Depending on the program used, US or foreign fabric can be used: for the
807 Program fabric has to be formed and cut in the US; for the 807A Program, fabric could be
formed elsewhere as long as it was cut in the US. Especially Mexico and the Caribbean countries
became involved in production-sharing arrangements with the US (Dussel Peters, 1997a, 1997b;
Spener, 2002; Dickerson, 1995; USITC, 1997 Rees et al., 1997; Green, 1998): Mexico mostly used
807, the Caribbean countries – because of the use of large volumes of Asian fabric – mostly 807A.
In order to fully exploit production-sharing opportunities based on the 807 Program or, as it
was later known, Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) 9802, most Caribbean and Latin American
countries created export processing zones (EPZs) or arrangements similar to EPZs.
Arrangements may vary, but usually include total tax exemption for imports of inputs and for
exports of final products. As such they serve as the counterpart to HTS 9802. They provide
additional incentive for US apparel firms to use assembly operations in Mexico and CBI. In
1996, 59% of garment exports from the Dominican Republic to the US entered under 807,
compared to 55% for Honduras and 62% for El Salvador, for example (USITC, 1997). In practical
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terms of garment production this means that garment pieces have to be cut in the US,
assembled in Mexico or the Caribbean, and finished in either the US or Mexico or the
Caribbean country in question. Cutting rooms had to remain in the US, because cutting would
disqualify the finished garments from duty exemption upon re-entering the US. For finishing,
the situation was a bit more ambiguous. Finishing, when limited to finishing activities that are
‘incidental to the assembly process itself’ (i.e. re-screening or trimming) could be done
‘offshore’. For jeans, for which laundering forms an integral part of the finishing process
however, finishing had to be done in the US, because showerproving, permapressing,
sanforizing, dying or bleaching of textiles would disqualify garments from 807 exemption.
Thus, for several decades US production-sharing regulations effectively limited the Mexican
and Caribbean side of production-sharing to assembly only, and simultaneously kept the
higher value-added production activities in the US. For the CBI countries and Mexico, these
provisions created employment and attracted foreign investment, but the impact on their local
industrialisation process has been limited. In fact, rather than stimulating or deepening a local
industrialisation process, they have truncated it (Mortimore, 1999).
NAFTA
Trade liberalisation between Mexico and the US undertaken as part of NAFTA represents a
qualitative change in this arrangement. First of all, under NAFTA, the production-sharing
arrangement as described above fell under the HTS 9802 provision. Immediately after the
passage of NAFTA, products under this provision became completely freed of duties. Thus after
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Table 3.2: Relative importance HTS 9802 garment imports into the US (customs value, US$ millions)
World Mexico
Total Total 9802 trade Total Total 9802 trade 
apparel 9802 as % total apparel 9802 as % total 
import trade trade import trade trade
1994 36,878 5,707 15 1,889 1,470 78
1996 41,679 8,719 21 3,850 2,967 77
1998 53,874 12,791 24 6,812 5,102 75
2000 64,181 12,953 20 8,730 5,071 58
Source: USITC, 2002
Table 3.1: Shifts in the top-10 garment exporters to the US (in US$ 1,000)
Country 1996 Country 1998 Country 2000
China 6,770,240 China 7,785,471 Mexico 9,777,083
Mexico 4,670,307 Mexico 7,687,945 China 9,564,344
Hong Kong 4,008,782 Hong Kong 4,497,007 Hong Kong 4,597,523
Taiwan 2,177,001 Taiwan 2,372,313 India 2,504,975
Dominican Republic 1,789,602 Dominican Republic 2,336,316 Honduras 2,406,094
Source: US Major Shippers Report, 2002
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1994, Mexican garments were allowed into the US without any duties at all (see also Box 3.1). As
illustrated in Table 3.1, it caused Mexico’s garment exports to the US to soar.
Initially, NAFTA liberalisation provided a strong impetus for the growth of the US-Mexico
garment trade based on production-sharing principles. In 1995, a year after the passage of
NAFTA, 80% of total garment exports from Mexico to the US were covered by HTS 9802 (Dussel
Peters, 1997b). In fact even in 2000, US-Mexican production sharing still accounted for a large
share of Mexico’s exports to the US, but its relative importance had diminished significantly
(see Table 3.2).
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Box 3.1: Explaining the dramatic impact of NAFTA on garments in North America
On the surface, NAFTA appears to have been little more than a continuation or intensification of
already existing programs. Yet, as shown, since the coming into force of NAFTA garment exports from
Mexico to the US have skyrocketed as production formerly undertaken in the southern US, the CBI
region and even Asia was relocated to Mexico.
Two aspects of NAFTA help explain the landslide it caused. First, the abolition of duties on garments
assembled in Mexico represented a very real and significant change in the cost structure of producing
in Mexico. Before NAFTA – when exported garments carried duties on the value added in Mexico – ,
growth of the industry in Mexico had been hampered by the country’s slightly higher wages and
lagging efficiency compared to its Caribbean and Central American competitors that competed under
the same conditions. When NAFTA came into effect the sudden abolition of duties (which could
range between 15% and 20%) on Mexican assembly exports to the US turned the tables as the duty
advantages more than offset the slightly higher Mexican labour cost (USITC, 1997). From one day to
the other, Mexico became a cheaper production location for garments than other countries in the
‘Western Hemisphere’.
Second, NAFTA entailed a phased but complete liberalisation of all hitherto existing rules and
regulations that penalized the performance of pre- or post-assembly activities on garments for export
in Mexico. In other words, NAFTA paved the road for integration of the garment production process
in Mexico. This latter consideration is very important as it attracted new types of buyers to Mexico:
the retailers and marketers. Their involvement in Mexico before NAFTA had been minimal due to the
fact that these buyers want to buy finished products, or ‘full packages’. They could not and would not
deal with the logistical and organisational complications of doing just assembly in Mexico, as
branded manufacturers and contractors with their Mexican maquiladoras had done. Thus, with the
prospect of integration of the production process within its borders, Mexico began to attract a large
number of new and important buyers and Mexican garment factories could become engaged in new
types of export networks (see also section 3.4).
Mexico has the inherent advantage of sharing a long land border with the US. The possibilities this
opens up for cheap truck transport, short transportation time and thus quick response and flexible
production are important. The increasing importance of these factors is emphasised in much of the
literature on the Mexican garment industry that deals with regionalisation of sourcing patterns.
However, it is important to emphasise that these advantages were not large enough to cause a
relocation to Mexico prior to NAFTA.
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This shift is stimulated by the benefits of NAFTA: since 1994 the production-sharing
conditions on duty elimination have gradually been lifted. This provides a strong impetus for
further integration of the Mexican and US garment industries. For example, soon after the
passage of NAFTA the finishing of garments was liberalised, followed by cutting in January
1999 (Spener, 2002). These liberalisation measures have paved the way for increased integration
of the garment production process within Mexico5. This development is reflected in Table 3.2
in the decreasing relative importance of HTS 9802 trade as part of total Mexican garment
exports to the US.
The (potential) integration of the production process in Mexico attracted new types of buyers,
most notably retailers and designers, to the country. With regard to US manufacturers and
contractors, NAFTA represents both opportunities and threats. HTS 9802 encouraged mostly
large, branded manufacturers to set up FDI facilities in Mexico and the CBI. The impact on US
garment SMEs remained relatively limited. By comparison, the impact of NAFTA has been
more powerful, leaving certain segments – most notably domestic US contractors and SMEs in
the mass-standardised garments – with little choice but to participate or to go out of business
(van Dooren & van der Waerden, 1997). The southern US states suffered the consequences of
relocation under NAFTA. The impact has been especially dramatic on local economies that had
specialised in garment production, such as El Paso.
3.2.2 Garment production in El Paso: just a fleeting phase?
El Paso – formerly nicknamed the ‘Jeans Capital of the World’ – is illustrative of the structure,
development and recent demise of standardised garment manufacturing in the US. For
decades, it was firmly entrenched in the national division of labour as the national stronghold
of jeans manufacturing. This narrow product specialisation created a local growth spurt when
in the 1980s stone-washing boosted and sustained the sales of jeans (van Dooren & van der
Waerden, 1997). However, far-reaching product specialisation also explains the collapse of the
local industry in the late 1990s.
El Paso was one of the main domestic destination areas for relocated garment production in the
US; the first garment factory in the city dates back to the late nineteenth century. After that,
WWII and the concomitant demand for uniforms boosted the local industry, so that by the
time the relocation of production from the Northeast to the South accelerated, El Paso was
already an attractive destination (McIntyre Mitchel, 1955). The industry could draw from a
virtually inexhaustible and low-cost labour force from Cd. Juárez, just across the border. On
top of that, part of this labour force had sewing experience and the region had a humble
industry-specific infrastructure.
From the early years on, garment factories in El Paso specialised in the mass production of
standardised garments (see McIntyre Mitchel (ibid.) for a detailed discussion of the city’s
historical development). Jeans, overalls and shirts were the city’s main garment products.
Already during the 1950s blue jeans accounted for the major part of total garment production
in El Paso (García Fernandéz, 1995).
Apparel manufacturing was highly important to the local economy: by the early 1960s over 40%
of the working population in El Paso worked in the garment industry. A small number of large
factories, employing several hundred and sometimes a few thousand persons, dominated the
local industry from the early years onwards, and the average size of the factories was far greater
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than the national average (van Dooren & van der Waerden, 1997; van Dooren, 2002). Their
dominance increased over the course of the decades, when local companies such as Farah and
Mann were joined by branch plants of Levi Strauss, Lee and Wrangler. In the heydays of the
Jeans Capital, there were eight large Levi Strauss branch plants in the city. El Paso and the mass
production of jeans made a near perfect match and the local industry proved resilient and
remained largely unaffected by the national downturn in the industry in the second half of the
century. Between 1962 and 1989 national garment employment shrunk by over 14% and
garment employment in El Paso grew by 202% (Simcox, 1993). El Paso benefited from an
increased emphasis on cost competition, caused by cheap imports and from production-
sharing provisions stipulated by the US government that stimulated the establishment of
cutting rooms and laundries in the border region (van Dooren & Verkoren, 2003). The local
industry continued to thrive on the manufacturing of jeans.
Over the course of the decades, however, overall dependency on outside customers increased.
Irrespective of their size, almost all local manufacturers served as assembly or cut-and-sew
contractors, depending on one or only a few large customers for their orders. Most were
medium-sized factories, using standard machinery and production methods, based on sewing
lines. In line with the typical pattern of southern contractors outlined above, local factories did
not have a say nor, in most cases, capabilities in product development and marketing. In many
cases they also did not buy denim or accessories. Essentially a similar pattern applies to the
branch plants of the branded manufacturers. They were dedicated to cutting, sewing or
finishing, and depended on their headquarters outside El Paso for the shipment of inputs,
product development and marketing decisions. Finishers were highly important in the local
industry. Although their cooperation with their customers seemed closer and they were highly
innovative, their dependency on their clients was as high as was the case for local sewing
contractors. Several laundries dedicated all or the majority of their capacity to the laundering
and finishing of Levi’s jeans. Only very few factories escaped this overall dependency pattern by
serving a niche market such as sportswear or original design Western-style clothing (van
Dooren & van der Waerden, 1997).
Only twenty years ago, El Paso was seen as ‘the cheapest, most efficient place in the world to
make blue jeans’ (Berman & Mack, 1980). Nowadays little of this fame remains as the city is
believed to be one of the US cities most hard hit by NAFTA (The Economist, 2001). NAFTA’s pull
of labour intensive work to the Mexican side of the border has most negatively affected the
garment industry in El Paso, effectively leaving it in ruins. The bitter fact is that its narrow
product specialisation may have contributed to its fate: the local industry had not diversified
out of jeans nor had it claimed independence through own branding or marketing strategies.
Over the decades it remained a collection of branch plants and local contractors specialised in
the manufacturing of jeans. The continued narrow product focus and cost competition explain
why El Paso was also impacted by the sharp decline in demand for basic five-pocket jeans, the
speciality of the city. While design efforts were being put into denim products in order to
counteract plummeting jeans sales, several of El Paso’s major clients, especially the branded
manufacturers, were slow to jump on the fashion bandwagon. Levi Strauss is the most notable
example of this fact. The sales of this company, which used to rule the jeans segment of the
garment market, plummeted between 1996 and 1999. This loss in sales translated almost
directly into a sharp reduction in the number of Levi’s domestic plants and employees. In El
Paso, seven of Levi’s eight plants were closed and the number of employees was reduced from
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approximately 5,000 in 1996 to 800 in 2000 (van Dooren & Verkoren, 2003). The resulting ripple
effect hit laundries, local contractors and cutting rooms, as well as those working in these
businesses. The collapse of garment production and employment has had a devastating effect
on very particular segment of the local labour market: almost 99% of all manual garment
workers in El Paso were Hispanic. In addition, most of these garment workers were women,
most had less than high school education and spoke English poorly or not at all (Spener, 2002).
Clearly, the garment workers were a very vulnerable part of the economically active population
of El Paso with limited prospects for employment in other sectors of the local economy because
of their bad command of the English language and their low education levels. Thousands of
workers have lost their jobs, and most have not been able to find alternative employment.
3.3 The effects of liberalisation on the Mexican garment industry
Although there may not always be a direct connection between plant closures in El Paso and in
other parts of the southern US on the one hand, and successful garment exports from Mexico
on the other, in many cases Mexican contractors are replacing their US and possibly also their
Asian competitors. This is remarkable, especially given the relatively short history of export-
oriented growth and capabilities in the Mexican garment industry.
The first map in Figure 3.1 reflects the situation for the Mexican garment industry at a time
when the country’s economic development strategies were based on import substitution
industrialisation (ISI). Garment production was oriented towards the domestic market and was
concentrated in and around the main market in Mexico City, in states such as Guanajuato,
Mexico and Puebla. Small factories, ‘mom-and-pop’ shops and home workers predominated
(Peña St. Martin & Gamboa, 1991; Vangstrup, 2002; Benería & Roldán, 1987; Smith, 1988) and
half of the factories operated in the informal sector, serving local or regional markets. Overall,
the garment industry was not a particularly important industry or employment creator.
Several decades later the pattern has changed completely (see Figure 3.1): the pattern of the
small-scale, semi-informal, domestic market segment has been overlaid with a more dynamic,
large-scale export segment centred on the maquiladoras (export factories commonly run by a
foreign company and limited to assembly activities). This shift is largely due to the contrary
impact of Mexican liberalisation policy (see section 3.2.1) on both these segments. Firstly, since
Mexico joined GATT in 1986, a very large influx of cheap Asian garments has flooded the
domestic market, wiping out a large part of the domestic garment industry6 (Chinchilla &
Hamilton, 1994; Dussel Peters et al., 1997; Dussel Peters, 1997a; Barrón & Hernandez, 1996).
Second and more importantly in this context, export-oriented production grew and more than
compensated for the losses in the domestic market segment. Export opportunities were opened
up by the combination of the US 807 Program and the Mexican maquiladora provisions in the
1960s, and such opportunities continue to exist and have in fact expanded over the course of
time. In the beginning export production was mostly undertaken by newly established
garment maquiladoras in the border region, which emerged in isolation from – in terms of
geographical location as well as business linkages – the domestic market manufacturers.
Despite efforts to stimulate cooperation between domestic market SMEs to jointly engage in
export in the form of empresas integradoras, only a small part of the domestic-oriented industry
switched to export (Barrón & Hernandez, 1996; Ramirez, 1997). Starting in the mid 1980s, new
garment maquiladoras began to be established also in central and southern Mexican states.
Between 1986 and 1991, employment in garment maquiladoras grew from 25,300 to 45,000
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workers (OTA, 1992). But the real growth spurt came after the passage of NAFTA: in 2000 there
were 286,600 apparel workers employed in 1,120 apparel maquiladoras, up from 66,000 in 400 in
1993 (INEGI, 2001). Garment employment in domestic factories, not operating under the
maquiladora program overtook maquiladora employment, leading to a impressive overall growth
in garment employment in Mexico (see Figure 3.2).
Some of the more dramatic changes to have affected the Mexican garment industry have
occurred since 1994. In that year, NAFTA liberalisation and the sharp devaluation of the
Mexican peso further benefited the Mexican export sector by liberalising Mexico’s access to the
US market and lowering the cost of Mexican export goods. Export-oriented growth of the
Mexican manufacturing sector accelerated (see Figure 3.2 and Table 3.3) as both domestic firms
and FDI, from within and outside the NAFTA area, expanded.
NAFTA boosted Mexico’s industrial sector, but strictly along the lines of the main features of
the export sector and quite separately from domestic market production. FDI remains highly
important, and instead of exporting finished goods, Mexico exports remain linked into intra-
industry trade flows (Dussel Peters, 1995; WTO, 2000; see also section 1.2). For the garment
industry, this is shown in the growth of maquiladora production in Table 3.3. Also, the country’s
orientation towards the US is great and has remained highly concentrated in only a few sectors,
of which garments, electronics and the automotive sectors are the most important ones. The
garment industry’s narrow orientation towards the US market has diminished somewhat but
remains extremely high – so much so that within a very short period of time Mexico displaced
Hong Kong and caught up with China as important supplier to the US (US Major Shippers Report,
2002; see also Table 3.1). This is a remarkable achievement, especially because Mexico only
competes in the US market in a narrow range of product segments. Like a few Central American
and CBI countries, Mexico chiefly produces garments in the mass-produced, standardised
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segment of the market, its main export products being cotton trousers, knit tee-shirts and
sweaters (Ram Khanna, 1996; Ram Khanna et al., 1997; Dussel Peters, 1997b; US Major Shippers
Report, 2002).
The second map in Figure 3.1 illustrates the overall growth of employment in wearing apparel
and its locational pattern for the mid 1990s, when export production was on the rise. Domestic
market production had declined but what remains was still concentrated in the central states
and still revolved largely around piratería (cheap brand rip-offs), tianguis (street markets) and
informal retailing channels. Export production has dispersed from the major border cities in
the northern states, where it was concentrated during the 1980s, to more central and even
southern locations. The state-level data used in Figure 3.1 obscures the industry’s localisation
or geographical concentration tendency. Nowadays, several sizeable garment clusters are
scattered throughout Mexico and most of these clusters have specialised in one of a few specific
types of garments. Examples of large Mexican garment clusters include:
• Aguascalientes, that has a long tradition in sewing apparel. In former days, household linens
and embroidered apparel for the domestic market were its main products, but nowadays
clothing like uniforms, jeans and tee-shirts is also produced for the domestic as well as the
export market.
• The garment cluster in and around Mérida in the state of Yucatán is one of the fastest
growing clusters of Mexico. It has attracted much foreign investment of factories that
produce a wide variety of garments for export to the US.
• The development of the garment clusters in Puebla/Tehuacan, just south-east of Mexico
City, was initially closely linked to the textile industry in Puebla. Most garments were
destined for the domestic market. In recent years, nearby Tehuacan has displayed a
particularly dynamic development, based on the production of jeans for export to the US.
• The garment cluster in La Laguna, that is object of this study, has a similar orientation: it has
produced pants for several decades, but its recent boom is based on the production of jeans
for the US. Of all these garment clusters, La Laguna has grown particularly fast; its proximity
to the US-Mexico border, among other factors, appears have stimulated its extraordinary
growth (see Chapter 4 and onwards). [ 95 ]
Table 3.3: Basic indicators of the Mexican garment industry, 1994-2000
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 94-00 %
VA 1993* 7,569,954 7,103,426 8,294,690 8,964,343 9,371,015 9,921,480 10,431,389 138
maquila 829,927 1,156,361 1,666,881 2,112,052 2,478,465 2,970,709 3,385,745 408
Output* 20,574,385 20,486,101 24,619,379 27,597,017 30,574,267 33,388,792 35,889,028 174
maquila 3,765,157 5,807,071 8,198,436 10,519,556 13,331,487 15,945,777 18,140,497 482
Export* 3,692,271 10,283,057 17,352,967 26,810,244 36,672,922 42,851,644 48,957,852 1,326
(incl. maquila)
% total exp. 5.3 6.2 6.6 8.0 8.4 8.2 – –
% total exp. to US 98.5 98.1 97.5 97.0 97.4 96.9 96.5 –
Source: INEGI, 2000, 2001
* Values are in Mx. Pesos x 1,000 and in constant 1993 prices.
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All the booming garment regions are located in the wage zone C, the lowest wage zone in
Mexico7 – which demonstrates the continuing relevance of NIDL consideration in the
relocation process in garments. Interestingly, the frequent, detailed and direct involvement of
the Mexican state in the national wage rate system is an exception in an otherwise largely
liberalised policy environment with little or no state interference.
3.3.1 The Mexican liberalisation model
During the second half of the twentieth century, economic policy in Mexico underwent some
far-reaching shifts, changing it from one of the most protected into one of the most open
economies (Dussel Peters, 2000; Bair & Gereffi, 2002). For three decades, from 1940 to 1970, the
Mexican economy achieved high economic growth rates based on import substitution
industrialisation (ISI) policies and closing off its large domestic market to imports. Within this
ISI policy environment, the initiation in 1964 of the Programa de Industrialización Fronteriza (PIF)
may appear somewhat odd, as it aimed to stimulate export industrialisation. Through PIF the
Mexican government aimed to fight unemployment and stimulate the industrialisation of the
northern border region through FDI in the form of the maquiladoras. Under this program,
maquiladoras paid no duties on imported components under the condition that products were
exported after assembly and not sold on the Mexican market. As mentioned, PIF tied in directly
with the US 807/807A Programs. Within the ISI policy environment the assembly maquila plants
in the northern Mexican border region where an isolated exception.
While isolated maquiladoras thrived on export assembly, the Mexican economy as a whole began
to stagnate during the 1970 as the limitations of ISI-based growth were reached (Valdes-Ugalde,
1995; Chinchilla & Hamilton, 1994; Dussel Peters, 1997a, 2000). Under ISI, for decades the
private sector had relied heavily on support, subsidies and imported intermediate and capital
goods, and this had resulted in large trade deficits. The stagnation of the economy provoked a
radical shift in policy perspective and a new period of export-oriented industrialisation (EOI)
set in. Notwithstanding the maquila experiment with exports, the EOI and liberalisation
policies that have taken shape since the second half of the 1980s constitute a near 180 degree
policy change. Whereas the export-oriented maquiladoras had long operated in isolation from
the rest of the economy, they now became the role model for the new liberalised Mexican
economy. Pressured by international institutions such as IMF and the World Bank and driven
by personal and scholarly conviction8, President Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988) initiated the
drastic restructuring of the economy, the final contours of which were drawn by Salinas de
Gortari (1988-1994). This model was continued by Zedillo (1994-2000), and still continues
today. The success of the East Asian NICs was commonly quoted as evidence for the rationale
behind EOI. While, as discussed in Box 1.1, EOI in most East Asian countries involved highly
interventionist states (Dussel Peters, 2000; Smakman, forthcoming), its implementation in
Latin America prescribed a retreat of the state. The Mexican case is no exception: in Mexico, EOI
implied far-reaching liberalisation, calling for a radical remodelling of the relationship
between the state and the market. In essence, the role of the Mexican state was to take care of
stable and beneficial macro-economic conditions. State interventions through industrial or
social policies were abandoned. The traditionally strong position of labour in Mexico has
become eroded under liberalisation (Valdes-Ugalde, 1995; Chinchilla & Hamilton, 1994; Dussel
Peters, 2000).[ 96 ]
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In the liberalisation model the world market is taken as a point of reference for firms,
industries and other economic units. The main trading partner and market for Mexico was
(and still is) the US, which accounted for two-thirds of Mexico’s imports and exports. By
extension, the foreseen growth in export activities was to be destined to the US. Therefore,
President Salinas de Gortari pushed the negotiations for Mexico’s participation in NAFTA as a
means to consolidate the liberalisation reforms and cement a strong link between the Mexican
and the US economy.
The Mexican liberalisation model assumes a causal relationship between macro-economic
stability, export growth and economic development (Dussel Peters, 2000). Issues such as
employment, real wages, income distribution, savings and investment are placed outside the
brackets of this model. With regard to the industrial sector there has been little aid or support
for companies or industries that have to compete on the open market. Industrial policy is either
non-existent or neutral and horizontal, because perfect competition and market forces are
believed to automatically lead to industrial development. Interestingly, in this liberalised
environment a few exemption programs for temporary imports and subsequent export
remained (see Box 3.1). However, most other firm- and sector-level industrial policies were
abolished. The traditional development banks Banco de Comercio Exterior (Bancomext) and
Nacional Financiera (NAFIN), that used to finance firm and sector projects according to
strategic government plans, started to offer financing under market conditions, viz.
commercial interest rates (Dussel Peters, 2000; Bancomext, 1999). By the turn of the century,
most remaining federal programs were providing information or matchmaking services to
potential foreign investors and aiming at attracting FDI and other business opportunities.
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Box 3.2: Export promotion programs
1. The Program of Export Maquilas (Programa de Maquila de Exportación) was initiated in 1965. It
allowed exporters to temporarily import goods (material inputs, components, machinery)
necessary for the alteration or repair of products, as well as for services required for the export
process. Such goods could enter free of duty and no value-added taxes were levied. By the end of
the 1990s, nearly 50% of all Mexican exports were exported under this program.
In order to allow Mexican companies to compete under the same conditions as the maquiladoras –
that were mostly foreign-owned – , two additional programs were developed when export oriented
industrialisation became the new model for economic growth in Mexico in the late 1980s:
2. The Program for Temporary Imports to Produce Export Products (Programa de Importación
Temporal para Producir Artículos de Exportación, PITEX) was established in 1985. It allowed the
temporary import of different goods, free of tariffs and value-added taxes for the elaboration of
exports.
3. The Program for Firms Highly Involved in Exports (Empresas Altamente Exportadoras, ALTEX) was
established in 1986. It applied to firms that either exported directly $2 million or 40% of their total
sales or indirectly 50% of their total sales of Mexican products. The program provided fiscal and
administrative benefits such as the rapid repayment of value-added taxes (Dussel Peters, 2000).
In 2001, all three programs were ended and all Mexican companies now have to compete under the
same liberalised conditions.
49,B_TT van Dooren BW.job
With regard to the garment industry, the liberalised policy environment in Mexico has
generated a large influx of FDI. The largest investor by far is the US, but companies from Hong
Kong and especially South Korea also use investments in Mexico as a springboard to the US
market (INEGI, 2001; Green, 1998; Mandelbaum, 1992; Rees et al., 1997). Even EU companies
that want to secure their position in the US market are locating some production in Mexico
(Glasmeier et al., 1993). Others, such as C&A, are moving in to target the Mexican market.
Within the Mexican liberalisation model, the bi-national networks centred on these foreign
investors and other US buyers have become the main engine for enhancing the international
competitiveness of the Mexican garment industry. By extension, the scope for targeted state
policies and intervention is greatly reduced as garment buyers and their networks are allowed
great freedom of operation in Mexico but are no longer contained within the country. The
concrete developmental outcome of Mexico’s industrialisation process depends on local,
endogenous conditions and capabilities (see Chapter 6), but also – and maybe especially so – on
the competitiveness and organisation of bi-national production networks and the position of
Mexican firms and workers therein. In fact, as pointed out by Woodruff (1998) for the case of
shoe manufacturing, the enhanced power of buyers in the liberalised environment may weaken
the position of local Mexican manufacturers. General hypotheses with regard to bi-national
networks of buyers and shifts in the bi-national value chain will be discussed in the following
sections (see also Gereffi et al., 2002a).
3.4 Towards a US-Mexican division of labour
The development of the garment industry in the US and Mexico over the last decades of the
twentieth century shows more than decline in the US and growth in Mexico. Potential
complementarities can also be identified, on the basis of which the integration of the two
national industries may be shaped. The growth of US-Mexico garment trade flows and the
geographical patterns of garment production in both countries are illustrative of a tightening
US-Mexico wearing apparel connection. The image that emerges from books and articles in
industrial magazines on US-Mexico garment relations is one of a united Western hemisphere
front (Twin Plant News, 1999; Gereffi et al., 2002a). The pivotal role of Mexico within this Western
hemisphere division of labour is hardly contested. As will be shown in this section, through
progressive reconfiguration of the US garment value chain, a US-Mexican bi-national division
of labour has effectively come into existence (see also van Dooren & Verkoren, 1998). In it,
Mexico’s role is extending, especially since NAFTA liberalisation set in. In other words, initially
Mexico took care of the assembly activities that were also undertaken in the southern US
including El Paso, but increasingly it is moving beyond pure assembly to CMT or even more
production activities. To a large extent the consecutive reconfiguration phases were based on
regulative steering on behalf of US policy makers. However, US buyers in their role as lead firms
coordinate and control the value chain, making their strategies of decisive importance for the
materialisation of actual patterns. In the last section of this chapter, the structure of their
production networks that underpin the bi-national division of labour, and shifts therein, will
be examined.
3.4.1 US-Mexican garment networks
NAFTA was designed to create a Western hemisphere garment production front and indeed
many US buyers have seized the opportunity to annexe their Mexican contractors to their
competitive strategies. In doing so they build on the history of US-Mexican intra-industry or
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production-sharing trade outlined in sections 3.2 and 3.3, and exploit the complementarities of
the two national industries along the value chain.
Table 3.4 provides an overview of the various responsibilities or roles played by different types
of actors in garment production networks. In the table, the most important types of firms are
linked to the productive activities commonly undertaken by them, in order to position them
within the value chain. As the nomenclature used in garment studies varies considerably, other
names are included as are concrete examples of the various types of firms relevant to the US-
Mexico case. The scale of operation of firms decreases and fragmentation, competition and
subordination increase as one moves down Table 3.4. As US buyers manage massive volumes of
garments of all sorts, their production networks are very large and often also diverse in
structure. They may or may not include all actors in the table. Table 3.4 distinguishes between
buyers whose roots and competitive strength lie in retailing and buyers with a manufacturing
background, since these roots are thought to still be reflected in the productive role they
assume in US-Mexican networks (Gereffi, 1997; see Chapter 7). At the same time, hybridisation
(see section 1.1.2) and strategic convergence are recognised. The Arrow indicates the
convergence between these two in terms of their roles: manufacturers are becoming more
involved in retailing, while many retailers are increasingly engaging themselves with product
strategy and definition. Similar processes apply to the other types of garment firms. In general,
extending the command over the value chain is commonly seen as a viable way to improve a
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Table 3.4: Roles of garment actors in US-Mexican garment production networks
Firm type Example Other names Scope of activities/roles
Buyer-retailer Retailer Sales Marketing
• Department store JC Penney
• Discounter Target, WalMart
• Marketer Gap, The Limited
• Catalogue Delia
Buyer-branded Levi Strauss Product strategy
manufacturer VF Corporation Product definition
Sara Lee Product design
Phillips-van Heusen Manufacturing
(coordination)
End user marketing
End user sales
Trading agent Li & Fung Supply chain integrator Coordination of all
Mast Industries Buying office supply chain activities
Aztex Broker Administrative red tape
Kellwood Vendors Logistics
Full-package supplier Flynn Jobber Product manufacturing
Sun Apparel OEM supplier (coordination)
Frederick Atkins Core supplier Process R&D
Aalfs Favoured supplier
Manufacturer
Subcontractor Second-tier supplier Discrete elements of
Assembler production process
Source: adapted from Sturgeon (2001, p. 16)
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manufacturer’s competitive position. As a consequence, productive responsibilities or
command over individual nodes of the value chain is not a static given nor can it be taken for
granted. For example, highly capable suppliers may want to take logistics and administration
into their own hands, trading agents may be tempted to invest in manufacturing capabilities,
and assemblers may push to become CMT or even full-package suppliers. Moreover, firms may
be incorporated into various production networks at the same time and they can occupy
different positions or perform different functions in each network.
The various types of actors as well as their role – or, in other words, their position within the
value chain – may affect not only the structure of the production network, but also the nature
of the network relations and even the upgrading potential for local manufacturers. In this
respect, most recent literature on US-Mexican garment networks has used the Asian success
stories of sustained export positions to compare and contrast the insertion of Mexican and
Asian suppliers in export networks. A point emphasised in this literature is the fact that for
decades Mexican garment exports have been channelled through manufacturer-centred
networks, whereas Asian participation in garment export has always been mostly associated
with sourcing strategies of Western retailers and marketers. The significance of the distinction
between the two is based on the general differences between their networks and the role
typically played by LMIC suppliers incorporated in them (Gereffi, 1999; Bair & Gereffi, 2002). In
this view, branded manufacturers are associated with production-sharing arrangements in
which the Mexican maquiladoras play a central, assembly role. Retailers source full packages,
mostly from Asia and are only just beginning to become involved in Mexico. A shift from
manufacturer-centred to retailer-centred networks may be vital for the upgrading of the
Mexican garment industry to upgrade from a pure assembly role to full-package/OEM
production (see also Table 3.4 and Chapter 1).
Manufacturer-centred networks
The internationalisation strategies of branded manufacturers may be two-pronged: FDI
facilities as well as international sourcing arrangements may play important and
complementary roles. In the Mexican context, garment FDI facilities traditionally followed the
typical maquiladora model: the wholly-owned maquiladora’s sole responsibility is assembly, it is
firmly embedded and subordinated to corporate strategies, and linkages to the local Mexican
economy are limited. In these arrangements, manufacturers commonly supply their maquila
facility with the material inputs – including, in many cases, cut fabric – needed for the assembly
of their garments. Global garment manufacturers such as the VF Corporation, Fruit of the
Loom and Sara Lee as well as large textile mills including Cone Mills, Guilford and Burlington
have built FDI or joint-venture facilities in Mexico.
Alternatively – but in most cases complementary to FDI – Western manufacturers engage in
globalisation through sourcing networks based on production-sharing arrangements with
contractors in nearby LMICs (Scheffer, 1992; Bair & Gereffi, 2002). In Mexico, local contractors
commonly work also under the maquila or similar programs and their activities for US
manufacturers are limited to assembly. In manufacturer-centred networks, local factories most
commonly engage in industrial subcontracting (see section 1.1.2). Large branded
manufacturers use industrial subcontracting as a strategy to complement FDI, but smaller
manufacturers have also developed industrial subcontracting linkages to contractors in
Mexico. Manufacturers require only limited, assembly expertise from their suppliers.
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Box 3.3: The strategies of branded manufacturers: the all-American blue jeans
Jeans being ‘quintessentially American’, it may hardly be a surprise that until recently the bulk of basic
5-pocket jeans were still being produced in the US. Especially traditional branded manufacturers such
as Levi Strauss, the former Blue Bell Manufacturing and the VF Corporation had their production
base in US states such as Oklahoma, Alabama, Virginia and Texas. Most of these jeans had ‘Made in
America’ labels and this was worth something. It was literally worth something: in certain markets –
most notably Japan – ‘Made in America’ jeans retailed at a higher price than the same jeans
manufactured elsewhere. In addition, since the mid 1980s and sparked by Wal-Mart’s ‘Buy American’
program, in the US market ‘Made in America’ also began to be valued by the public, though it was
not rewarded with higher prices.
This trend gave traditional jeans-cities such as El Paso hope for survival (van Dooren & van der
Waerden, 1997; Spener, 2002). If nationalist sentiments had an impact on consumption patterns,
competition in jeans would not only depend on production cost. A market niche for American jeans
could remain and this could be filled by manufacturers in El Paso. However, during the second half of
the 1990s an entirely different scenario developed: new players, especially retailers and marketers,
were entering the jeans scene and fashion elements were being introduced. As a result, standardised
5-pocket jeans, and the branded manufacturers behind them, lost market share and the latter were
forced to reorient their business strategies. Generally, they began to place greater emphasis on
retailing rather than on manufacturing. Also, an increase in offshore production is evident in the
strategies of jeans firms. The latter happened at the expense of the traditional production locations in
the US. For example, in April 2002, Levi Strauss announced the closure of six of its remaining eight
US-based production facilities. The company’s CEO Philip Marineau explained the business strategy
behind this decision:
‘This is a painful but necessary decision. There is no question we must move away from owned-and-
operated plants in the US to remain competitive in our industry [...] Outsourcing production supports a
more variable cost structure, helps us maintain strong margins and enables us to invest more resources in
product, marketing and retail initiatives.’ (Company Press Release, April 8, 2002).
Similar considerations may explain the recent announcement by VF Corporation that after a
comparatively long and stable presence in El Paso the company is closing several plants in the border
city and laying off approximately 1,200 workers (El Paso Times, 2002). Rather than shifting production
to offshore contractors as Levi Strauss does, VF Corporation has relocated its production to offshore
owned-and-operated factories as well as to contractors, many of which are located in Mexico.
These are just two examples of a more general shift of the garment production base of US
manufacturers out of the US to offshore production locations. Though a wide range of relocation
options exists (see section 1.2), since the passage of NAFTA, relocation – certainly in the jeans
segment – is commonly contained within the NAFTA area and entails a build-up of sewing capacity in
Mexico. As an illustration of the patterns discussed above, Figure 3 contrasts the North American
production base of a large US jeans manufacturer in the early 1990s with the situation after the turn
of the century.
The maps clearly provide a dramatic illustration of plant closures in the US and new establishments
in Mexico. A more detailed look also reveals the importance of production-sharing arrangements
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Figure 3.3: The production locations of a branded jeans manufacturer, 1990 and 2003
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Conversely, knowledge transmitted from manufacturers to suppliers is largely limited to
manufacturing processes.
Though NAFTA liberalisation has removed all pre-existing disincentives working against
integration of the production process in Mexico, production-sharing arrangements remain
important. Mexico still is a large CMT base reliant on US and other imported apparel (Speer,
2001b; see also Table 3.2). The continuing importance of production sharing is also illustrated
by the rapid growth of garment production on the Yucatán peninsula and in other southern
states such as Oaxaca and Campeche. There, garment maquiladoras are responsible for a
significant share of total garment production. They operate largely in isolation from their local
business environments and their success appears primarily based on their low labour costs, and
in the case of Yucatán their proximity to the US. The centre of gravity of garment production as
well as of maquiladoras is shifting to the southern states of Mexico, where labour reserves are
larger but above all, cheaper.
As a complement to Box 1.1 on the sales and marketing strategies of blue jeans manufacturers,
Box 3.2 deals with the production and relocation strategies of the main blue-jeans
manufacturers in the US and Mexico.
Retailer-centred networks
Traditionally, retailers and marketers have sourced full packages – through commercial
subcontracting arrangements- from Asian suppliers (Gereffi, 1999), mainly because the cost but
also the service suited their needs. With no or only very limited manufacturing capabilities,
they relied on suppliers to take care of the entire manufacturing process. Recently, NAFTA
paved the way for a more all-round involvement of Mexican manufacturers in the production
process of garments for export to the US. As Mexican suppliers are trying to ‘bring the package
together’ and are developing the necessary logistical know-how, they are increasingly able to
supply retailers. For US retailers, sourcing from Mexico is attractive: it is more expensive than
many Asian sources, but lead times can be much shorter – and this is an important
consideration in today’s garment market (see Chapter 1).
For Mexican garment contractors it may be of vital importance to be able to supply retailers:
not only has the retailing revolution made them very powerful lead firms, they also put
particular emphasis on streamlining and shortening the supply chain through the application
of electronic data interchange (EDI) technology as well as relocating production in an effort to
reduce transportation time. The shift from manufacturer-centred to retailer-centred networks
is thought to provide a strong and essential upgrading stimulus for the Mexican garment
industry. Mexican manufacturers need to develop strong capabilities in non-assembly nodes of
the garment value chain; they also need to develop the logistical know-how to fully exploit
their geographical proximity to the US by guaranteeing flexibility and short lead times.
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between Mexico and the US. While many sewing plants in the US were closed down, almost all
laundries are still in operation. This appears to indicate that some of the garments sewn in Mexico
are being laundered in the US.
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The power of US retailers over Mexican manufacturers reaches beyond their dominant position
on the US market: US buyers are also getting involved in the development of marketing
channels to market their products in Mexico. The Mexican domestic market remains highly
fragmented and the purchasing power of large parts of the populations is limited. The retail
channels catering to middle and higher incomes were for a long time underdeveloped, but are
now being strengthened by US chains and strategic alliances with US retailers and US-Mexican
joint ventures (Harris, 1995; Mendoza et al., 2002). Many flourishing large-scale retail chains in
Mexico have a US component. The strong position of Wal-Mart in Mexico is a clear example of
this trend: it has over 600 stores in Mexico. Many Dillards and JC Penney stores are also being
opened. Consequently, Mexican manufacturers wanting to sell quality garments on the
Mexican markets may also increasingly have to deal with US retailers and their standards.
Figure 3.4 provides a schematic illustration of US-Mexican garment production networks,
centred on branded manufacturers and retailers.
Upgrading
In GVC terms, industrial upgrading in local or national economies requires a shift from the
simple assembly of imported inputs to full-package production. In fact, based primarily on
developments in the Asian electronics and automotive industries, Gereffi (1999) suggests that
upgrading in the garment industry may even lead to original brand production (OBM) by
LMIC firms.
Currently, Mexico is in a unique position in the early stages of the upgrading pathway that
was all of a sudden opened by NAFTA. Also, this process is sparked and driven by the
involvement of new types of lead firms in the Mexican garment scene. Thus, full-package
production in Mexico is seen as an almost inevitable outcome of the combination of trade
liberalisation under NAFTA and the rise of US retailer-centred production networks.
[ 104 ]
branded
manufacturer
retailers
(mass merchandiser,
dept. store & designers)
FDI facility/
maquiladora
Mexican apparel
producer
subsidiary
(manufacturing plant)
subsidiary
(manufacturing plant)
United States
Mexico
6099
ownership linkage
subcontracting
relation
subcontractor
Figure 3.4: US-Mexican garment production networks
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According to Gereffi (2000):
‘In this buyer-driven commodity chain, local firms develop the commercial ties with foreign buyers needed to move
from the maquiladora system of low-wage assembly based in imported inputs to the ‘package supplier’, specification
contracting role typical of the East Asian apparel exporters.’
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Figure 3.5: Reconfiguration phases in the US-Mexico garment value chain
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In assigning a determinant role to vertical linkages with foreign buyers and the strategies of
these buyers, the GVC perspective appears to downplay the role of local contractors and the
local business environment in the upgrading process. This appears to be a somewhat simplified
picture of a one-way, top-down process, an issue that will be further examined in Chapter 8.
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Many questions with regard to the incentives, driving forces and dynamics behind this
transition as well as the underlying upgrading process remain unanswered. One of the most
interesting questions is related to the origins and aim of the transition: is the upgrading
process part of the strategic vision of Mexican entrepreneurs, or is it steered or even forced by
US buyers? Especially issues with regard to the interplay between local industry dynamics and
industrial trends at higher levels of scale need to be investigated.
3.4.2 Reconfiguring the bi-national value chain
NAFTA phased out pre-existing trade restrictions and first eliminated penalties on finishing
and later also on cutting in Mexico. For the garment industry NAFTA gradually opened up
opportunities for more all-round and even full-package apparel production in Mexico for the
US market. This has created opportunities for a step-by-step reconfiguration of the bi-national
value chain, broadly along the lines as proposed by van Dooren and Verkoren (1998; see Figures
3.5). Alternatively, Gereffi and Martínez (2000) have argued that the shifting bi-national
division of labour in garment production is largely based on the different competences of the
two nations in the garment value chain9. Figures 3.5a-d combines a simplified version of the
production column as introduced in Chapter 1 and projects it on the US and Mexico in order to
sketch the gradual geographical reconfiguring process of the value chain. Figure 3.5a depicts
the situation in the early twentieth century, when garment manufacturing was still
concentrated in the Northeast of the US. In Figure 3.5b shows the national division of labour in
the mid twentieth century, when in jeans production the assembly and finishing/laundry had
been shifted to the southern states. The shift to Mexico at the time of the passage of NAFTA to
illustrated in 3.5c. With the complete liberalisation of US-Mexican garment trade, the entire
manufacturing process may be shifted from the US to Mexico, as depicted in Figure 3.5d.
There is much recent literature on Mexico’s potential to produce full packages for the US
market. This development is widely applauded because the potential benefits of full-package
production may include a higher degree of integration between production activities within
the local economies of the Mexican production clusters, an increase in the local value added
and potentially a more potent lever for further economic development (Gereffi & Bair, 1998,
2001; Gereffi & Martínez, 2000).
3.5 Conclusion
There is an increasingly strong link between the US and the Mexican garment industries. This
link and its impact on the Mexican garment industry cannot be understood in isolation from
policy changes – most notably those in the direction of free trade between the two countries as
well as the so-called liberalisation of the Mexican economy – that have taken effect since the
late 1980s. This chapter considered the development of both industries and the way they have
become functionally linked. This conclusion concentrates primarily on the Mexican side of the
bi-national linkages between the two industries.
Until a decade ago, linkages between the US and Mexican garment industries were built on
production sharing principles, as regulated by the 807 Program. Within this framework, the
historically grown national division of labour in the standardised mass-produced segment of
the US garment industry internationalised by shifting assembly activities to Mexico and the
CBI. Production sharing gave the standardised segment of the US industry breathing space by
allowing it to capitalise on the low wages in the CBI and Mexico to improve the efficiency of its
[ 107 ]
54,B_TT van Dooren BW.job
international system of integrated production. For Mexico and the Caribbean countries, where
garment assembly was carried out, the arrangement had the effect of truncating the
industrialisation process. The assembly factories in these countries were firmly embedded in
the corporate competitive strategies of US garment firms, but did not have linkages to the local
industry nor did they otherwise stimulate the local industrialisation process. This is also noted
by Chinchilla and Hamilton (1994, p. 293):
‘... global changes in the garment industry, economic crisis and restructuring have combined to increase the
international integration of Mexico’s garment industry, to weaken its domestic integration, and to deepen the
division between those sectors linked to international markets and inputs and those dependent on domestic textiles
and consumers.’
While this pattern remains unchanged for the US-CBI connection – until now they have only
obtained a weak version of NAFTA-like trade liberalisation (see also Mortimore, 1999, 2002;
Mathews, 2002) – the tables have turned for the US and Mexican garment industries with the
passage of NAFTA.
As NAFTA eliminated all pre-existing trade limitations, a dramatic boom in Mexican garment
production for export was matched by a collapse of the US manufacturing base, especially in
the southern US. The impact of NAFTA was all the more dramatic because it was paralleled by
far-reaching liberalisation of the Mexican economy, aimed at optimizing growth through
export-oriented industrialisation. Initially, the opening up of the Mexican economy and the
subsequent sudden confrontation with highly competitive Asian imports during the late 1980s
largely reduced domestic market production to counterfeits and cheap, low-quality garments.
It almost completely eliminated domestic market production as a viable alternative to export
production. On the other hand, trade liberalisation did have the hoped for effect of attracting
FDI and bringing new buyers and their networks to Mexico, which caused a huge export-based
boom in the industry.
What does this mean for Mexico in terms of development and strategies? Undoubtedly, NAFTA
represents a significant improvement over the former pure-assembly-based pattern by paving
the road for local integration of the manufacturing process. This is necessary for the
development of full-package capabilities. However, the severing of the link with the traditional
domestic market and its producers have made Mexican exporters highly dependent on US
buyers for practical and strategic know-how. Instead of the external projection of a successful
bottom-up industrialisation process Mexico’s current development is an extension and
broadening of the externally driven production-sharing model. Evidence for this is that the
garment export sector in Mexico displays many of the characteristics of the southern US
standardised, mass-production model.
Gaps in the Mexican garment value chain – especially in high value-added, capital-intensive
retailing and textiles, the filling of which was discouraged in the production-sharing era – are
now being filled by US TNCs. Such complementarity in the US and Mexican value chains may
be a solid basis for the formation of a competitive front against Asian import penetration.
However, the terms for this development are set by US TNCs and the effects on the Mexican
garment industry are unclear. It may cause, as is suggested by some strands of literature on
economic integration and trade blocks (Cable & Henderson, 1994), a lock-in, in a subordinate
position, of Mexican producers, industries and the Mexican economy in general. In the context
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of the liberalised Mexican economy the course of the industry is now being shaped by US
buyers and their bi-national networks. As there is minimal or no strategic steering or other
direct involvement of the Mexican government through industrial policy, such potentially
unwanted developmental outcomes are not being corrected.
On the other hand, linkages to new types of US buyers introduce important upgrading stimuli
and learning opportunities, knowledge and information. These opportunities need to be
seized in order to avoid a fate such as that encountered by El Pasoan manufacturers. El Paso and
the dramatic crumbling of its status as Jeans Capital of the World illustrate the potential
detrimental effects of depending on the vicissitudes of the global strategies of US buyers. It also
shows the problems of predicting the outcomes of industrial processes. Not long ago, the
southern US and northern Mexico were predicted to benefit from a tightening garment
connection based on Mexican full-package production under NAFTA. Southern Mexico was
though to be left out (Gereffi, 2000, 1997). In actual fact, a large part of the southern
manufacturing base in the US has disappeared, while Yucatán and Campeche are amongst the
most dynamic states in terms of employment creation in garment production. The fact that the
latter is largely based on pure assembly within production-sharing arrangements illustrates
that upgrading and full-package production in Mexico is not inevitable, certainly not in the
short term. Also, in the NAFTA area, part of the industry is taking the low road to
competitiveness based on lowering labour cost.
Recent analyses of the US-Mexican garment connection and bi-national production networks
have departed mostly from a GVC perspective, emphasising the vertical linkages between US
buyers and Mexican garment contractors and the upgrading impetus that emanates from such
linkages. Ultimately the results of the tightening garment connection between the US and
Mexico will also depend on the business climate and attitude and on the local economy of the
regions in Mexico where garment production is concentrated. Chapter 6 will deal with these
aspects for the Laguna region.
Notes
1 Canada is also part of NAFTA. The Canadian garment industry will not be analysed in detail here. Canada exports
apparel and especially textiles (for household and industrial products) to the US, but is not in direct competition
with Mexico as its exports are not concentrated in the product niche ‘basic wearing apparel’, as is the case for
Mexico.
2 Early disintegration is reflected in a predominance of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in apparel
manufacturing in the US. The relatively small size of US apparel firms has hampered their modernisation
(Glasmeier et al., 1993). This has come clearly to the fore in recent years as innovations in the apparel industry are
increasingly high tech and capital-intensive and beyond the reach of US apparel SMEs.
3 Not only low cost, non-unionised female labour in the South, but also pro-business state government attitudes –
and thus favourable tax conditions, an improved transportation system, cheap land and the southward shift of the
textile industry – exerted a southward pull on garment production during the mid twentieth century (Taplin, 1997;
see also Wheeler, 1998).
4 Glasmeier et al. (1992) and Taplin (1997) note this dichotomy for the garment industry in the US. Massey (1984)
points to a similar pattern in the UK, where family-owned and managed, conservative firms, often with strong local
roots exist next to new and often larger garment businesses under modern management that operate unhindered
by national borders, driving the globalisation of the industry. She appears to find this pattern characteristic of the
garment industry in Europe and the US.
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5 In all these measures, the ‘fibre-forward’ and ‘yarn-forward’ considerations apply. The main aim behind these
measures is to prevent transhipment of Asian garments to the US through Mexico.
6 The Asian flood wave of cheap imports hit the Mexican market through direct imports from the Asian region but
also through unexpected channels. For example, some of the clothing imports from the US were first imported
from Asia, especially China, to be subsequently shipped to Mexico. In addition, traders in the informal market
channels of tianguis and street vendors began to distribute Asian clothing bought principally in Los Angeles
(Chinchilla & Hamilton, 1994).
7 The Mexican wage system stipulates the legal minimum wages per occupation for three geographically defined
wage zones – A, B and C. The highest wages rates are set for zone A and the lowest for C. For example, in 2001 the
minimum wage for a sewing operator was set at 52.05 pesos in zone A, compared to 46.30 pesos in zone C (INEGI,
2001).
8 Since the end of the 1960s the number of politicians with a background in economics has increased. For example, in
the Salinas de Gortari government, the president himself and nine out of nineteen secretaries were economists; five
of the latter had earned their degree in US institutions where export-orientated industrialisation was the
conceptual mainstream (Dussel Peters, 2000).
9 Mexico’s competences are seen to be concentrated in the production of man-made fibres and in apparel
manufacturing. The country’s retail sector is relatively weak and splintered, and the production of high-quality
textiles in Mexico leaves much to be desired (Gereffi, 2000). By contrast, the US is believed to have competences all
along the chain, but specifically in textiles and retailing. Thus the competence of the US and Mexico garment
industries are complementary.
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4 La Laguna: from growing cotton to
producing jeans
The Laguna region1 – which is commonly referred to as La Comarca Lagunera or simply La
Laguna – is widely known throughout Mexico. Historically, La Laguna has served an important
role: the approach to land reform developed there in 1936 under President Cardenas served as a
model for land reform in other parts of Mexico (Mazcorro Velarde et al., 1991). However, the
region’s fame is largely based on its agricultural importance. For most of its history the regional
economy was centred on agriculture. La Laguna was even nicknamed the ‘breadbasket of
Mexico’ (Dunigan, 1969) in honour of its sizeable wheat production. Subsequently, it gained
the position of national cotton producer, producing up to 90% of the cotton input for the
national textile industry – some of which was then used in the first garment factories in the
region. Nowadays agriculture is less important. In fact, employment in the agricultural sector
has plummeted, especially since the collapse of the predominant crop – cotton – in the late
1980s. Although the region is now associated with dairy products, it is especially known for its
garment production for export.
Most rural aspects of the history of La Laguna are well documented (see Dunigan, 1969;
Marroni de Velázquez, 1992; Rello, 1987; Puig, 1992; Parra, 1996; Ahlers & Fortis, 1999; Steffen
Riedeman, 1996; Mazcorro Velarde et al., 1991; Meyers, 1998; Plana, 1991). However, the
regional transformation in the late twentieth century from an agricultural region to an
industrial export centre has not been the subject of much academic research. This chapter
examines this recent economic transformation and its geographical characteristics and
reflections. Within the study at large, this chapter serves to root the various aspects of the
development of the local garment industry – the subject of following chapters – within the
concrete regional context of La Laguna. More importantly, it uncovers those aspects of the
region and its economy that laid the basis for La Laguna’s rise as jeans export centre.
Section 4.1 introduces the region, its geographical location, delimitation, main characteristics
and recent historical development. This first section provides the geographical and historical
background for the more recent changes that will be discussed in the following sections.
Section 4.2 examines the regional economy and recent shifts and changes therein. The image
that emerges is of a booming industrial urban area surrounded by an impoverished rural
hinterland. Section 4.3 deals with the regional population and demographic trends over the
last decades of the twentieth century. The final section examines the potential of the garment
industry to serve as a bridge between the urban node and the surrounding rural area.
4.1 The setting
The Laguna region is situated in North-Central Mexico and straddles the two states of Durango
and Coahuila (see Figure 4.1). The region extends over an area of roughly of 4,800,000 ha
(Mazcorro Velarde et al., 1996, p. 2). It is situated on the northern Mexican plateau that lies at an
average elevation of 1,100 metres, but is broken by numerous hills and mountains. One of the
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most characteristic features of the urban landscape is the statue of Christo Rey that looks out
over the area from a top of the Sierra de las Noas. From Christo Rey’s viewpoint, what does one
see? What does the Laguna region look like?
First of all, standing on the edge of Torreón, a very large urban area stretches out in front. A few
broad boulevards can be discerned, as can the dry riverbed that runs right through the urban
area (see Figure 4.2). There are only a few high-rise buildings in the cities, along with some
hotels and some very large silos of industrial companies in Gómez Palacio. The few green
patches in the conurbation are concentrated in Cd. Lerdo. Beyond the city limits a rather
monotonous desert landscape begins, hot and very dry, filled with dust, yellow desert soils and
mostly dried-out, brown mesquite plants. Mountains are also part of the desert scenery and are
in view in almost all directions in the region. As in New Mexico, Arizona and most regions
along the US-Mexican border, they are barren and reflect against the desert in a characteristic
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Figure 4.1: The Laguna region, infrastructure and administrative structure
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shade of purplish blue. Within this dusty landscape it is surprising to see patches of green
agricultural land. Though most of the region appears to be very dry and unfit for agricultural
purposes, irrigated, green fields of cotton, alfalfa and sorghum dot the landscape. These
patches, and the pecan orchards spread over the region, stand out in stark contrast to the
surrounding area.
Just beyond the limits of the region lies Cuatrocienegas, a green oasis surrounding a number
of ancient, clear, freshwater lakes. In the region itself, arroyos, dry riverbeds and lakeshores are
reminders of the natural water that used to flow in La Laguna but has largely dried up. For
many years now, La Laguna has lacked natural surface water during most of the year. Only in
March when the water reservoir is opened and water flows through the web of irrigation canals
for a few weeks, does water become a visible part of the region’s landscape.
There are various definitions of the Laguna region. Since irrigated agriculture was and still is so
important to the region, the definition most commonly used – including in this study2 – is
based on the delimitation of irrigation district number 17, as defined by the Mexican
agricultural ministry. As such, the region encompasses the fifteen municipios (municipalities)
that made use of the water of the Rio Nazas or Aguanaval. The focus on the functional
integration of constituent municipios means that the region’s delimitations have been drawn
irrespective of state lines and other administrative inconveniences. Hence the fact that the
Laguna region straddles two neighbouring states.
The administrative structure that divides the region over the two states of Durango and
Coahuila and both state-sides into the previously mentioned municipios is illustrated in Figure
4.1. In the figure, the most important cities and towns in the region are named. The caberceras
municipales are the municipal towns that serve as political and administrative centres for the
municipios. They generally also give the municipios their name and in most cases concentrate a
large percentage of the municipal population within their confines. Naturally, smaller villages
and settlements are also part of the region; however, they are not illustrated on the map. La
Laguna’s municipios are highly differentiated: Torreón, Gómez Palacio and Cd. Lerdo have a large
concentration of population and effectively form a single urban node or conurbación. The
contrast with the surrounding municipios and their cabeceras is dramatic: the rural towns,
especially those further removed from the urban node, are much smaller.
The conurbation of Torreón (Coahuila), Gómez Palacio (Durango) and Cd. Lerdo (Durango)
forms the urban core of the Laguna region (see Figure 4.2). Almost all economic and social
activity in the region is concentrated in this urban node.
Significant differences exist between the three cities. Torreón occupies a dominant position
within the urban core and the region as a whole. It is a relatively modern city with a number of
wide boulevards and some modern buildings. The old city centre is somewhat chaotic and
bustles with life, thanks to the presence of innumerable small independent merchants and
service agencies. The more modern, large-scale retail sector – including the two modern malls
completed in 2001 – is located along the main infrastructure axes and on the outskirts of town.
A similar locational pattern is displayed by the industrial sector, which is concentrated in
industrial parks away from the city centre (see Figure 4.2). In the last decade of the twentieth
century, the city landscape was impacted by the establishment of US multinationals such as
WalMart, Office Depot, Burger King, McDonald’s, Appelbee’s and Chili’s at prominent
locations – and with prominent signs – throughout the city.
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Gómez Palacio is much smaller and does not have such a modern appearance: it lacks high-
rise buildings and a large, modern service sector. Gómez Palacio has the appearance of a typical
medium-sized northern Mexican industrial city, with a rather disorganised city centre and a
clear separation of high-income residential areas and low-income areas. A vast and rather
cramped industrial park is located on the outskirts of the city, between the city centre and the
riverbank. The state border that divides Durango and Coahuila runs through the centre of the
urban node and separates Gómez Palacio from Torreón. Since the border is formed by the dry
riverbed of the Rio Nazas, the division is clearly visible and in fact accentuates the differences
between the two cities. The differences between Gómez Palacio and Torreón are further
emphasised by the fact that middle- to high-income residential areas and the city centre of
Torreón border on the industrial park of Gómez Palacio, providing a stark contrast between the
two.
The third of the three cities, Cd. Lerdo, is a green and quiet garden city – a characterisation
which is the pride of its inhabitants, as evidenced by the inscription on the arches at the
entrance of the city (‘Cd. Lerdo. Ciudad Jardin’). The city is small and peaceful; most industrial
activity is located outside the centre, along the ring-road. Small independent retailers and
many market gardens are located in the centre, but for large retailing as well as services, the
cities’ inhabitants rely mostly on Torreón.[ 114 ]
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Despite the fact that the cities are different in character, physically separated by the riverbed
and administratively separated by a state border, to most intents and purposes they function as
one urban node. The fact that they are largely complementary in character and the limited
travelling distances involved in going from one to the other, appear to be the basic factors
behind this functional unison that is expressed in constant flows of goods and people within
the node. Physically, the smooth integration is facilitated by the periférico, the ring-road that
circles the urban node.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the function of the urban node as a hub in the transportation system in
northern Mexico. First of all, at the end of the nineteenth century Torreón became an
important node in the railway system (Reza Garcia, 1998) and nowadays the region still has one
of the few railway stations in northern Mexico. The arrival of the railway – El Ferrocarril – in 1883
served as a powerful impetus for the development of Torreón, and indirectly for the attainment
of its city status in 1907 (Puig, 1992)3. This early connection to modern transport infrastructure
turned Torreón into the symbol of modernity for the state of Coahuila and led to the
substantial demographic and economic growth of the city. It is no coincidence that in this same
period the first signs of industrialisation in the region – through the establishment of yarn,
textile, soaps, flour and metal processing plants – occurred. The railway connection facilitated
and stimulated the early development and industrialisation of the Laguna region and also
underpinned an early urban-rural division of labour within the region: the rural areas were
geared to agricultural production and served as a hinterland for the urban core where
industrial production was concentrated, agricultural produce was processed and sold or
shipped.
Although the railway station has always been very important, nowadays its significance is
surpassed by La Laguna’s central position within the highway system of northern Mexico. On
the north-south axis, the region is situated halfway between El Paso/Cd. Juárez on the US-
Mexican border (825 kilometres) and Mexico City, on the Pan-American Highway
(Panamericana). Furthermore, it lies about 360 kilometres west of Monterrey, the biggest
industrial city in northern Mexico, and is centrally located on the federal Inter-oceanic
Highway (Interoceanica), connecting the Pacific Ocean (Mazatlan) to the Gulf of Mexico
(Matamoros, Tamps.).
The connection to multiple transportation systems was an important basis for the early
industrial development of the region and its acceleration since the mid 1960s (Wenzens, 1974;
Twin Plant News, 1999). Unsurprisingly, infrastructure and central location are stressed in almost
every recent source of information, especially those aimed at attracting potential investors to
the region (Twin Plant News, ibid.). The modern infrastructure in the region is extensive,
encompassing various modes of transportation and routes, and connecting the main towns in
the rural hinterland to the cities (see Figure 4.1).
Besides the extension of highways into or through the rural area, the most dramatic changes in
the rural municipios during the twentieth century concerned shifts in land ownership and
production structures. Traditionally, dating back to the midst of the nineteenth century, the
region was characterised by the presence of a few very large estates (haciendas), many of them
owned by foreign, mainly Spanish, hacendados. This ownership structure changed radically with
the social movement at the beginning of the twentieth century, which resulted in the land
reform of 1936. In this process, haciendas were expropriated, turning hacendados into pequeños
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proprietarios4, and redistributed, turning landless day labourers and farmers into small-holders,
the ejidatarios (Friedrich, 1969; Wenzens, 1974). These ejidatarios became members of one of the
ejidos in the region. Generally, ejido land in the Laguna region has been divided into small,
individually exploited plots, in some cases complemented by a larger communal plot (Steffen
Riedemann, 1996). Until the reform of Article 27 of the Constitution in 19925, ejidatarios had
‘usus fructus’ based on a combination of common property and private appropriation (Gordillo
et al., 1998). The ejido was the physical resource that people had access to and the organisation of
rights-holders, but not the property of the ejidatarios (Goldring, 1996). Since the reform, the sale
of ejido land has become legalised and pressures on the smallholders have mounted. As
smallholder agriculture became increasingly less viable, the rural population was faced with
un- and underemployment and the need to search for work and income outside the
countryside and sometimes even the region.
As a result, during the 1990s demographic census data for La Laguna show for the first time an
absolute decline in the rural population. Rural depopulation generally occurs during the
transition from an agricultural to urban-industrial economy; this is also the case in La Laguna.
The following sections discuss the main features and recent trends in the regional economy,
followed by a presentation of basic demographic data. They will demonstrate that
industrialisation and urbanisation (and rural depopulation) have been parallel processes in La
Laguna.
4.2 The regional economy
Economic development over the past four decades in La Laguna has been marked by a
decreasing importance of the primary sector and an increasing importance of the secondary
and tertiary sectors (see Table 4.1). There have been important shifts in the production profile
of the region, both through the diversification of agricultural production and through the
increasing importance of urban and – to a limited extent – rural, industrial activities.
Notwithstanding its lingering agricultural image, the regional economy of La Laguna is
increasingly built on manufacturing. A shift from the rural to a growing importance of the
urban areas matches this sectoral shift: industrial activity has been concentrated in the cities
and industrialisation and urbanisation have gone hand in hand in the region. In November
1999, 42% of employees in the formal sector, as registered by the Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social
(IMSS), were employed in the Industria de la Transformación (manufacturing industries of which the
export-oriented maquiladoras form an important subgroup), followed at some distance by
Comercio (14%). The Industria de la Transformación is also one of the fastest growing sectors. The same
statistics also show the diminishing importance of the agricultural sector: though still the fifth
most important employer in the region, the sector is shrinking and the number of people
formally employed in it is diminishing.
No separate employment data are available for the urban and the rural area: data are published
either for Torreón and Gómez Palacio separately or for the region as a whole. However, from
observation in the region it is clear that with the obvious exception of agricultural
employment, employment in most sectors is concentrated in the conurbation.
4.2.1 The urban economy
The data in Table 4.1 show a vigorous growth of the number of formally employed people in
the urban node between 1994 and 1999. Most new employment was generated by the
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manufacturing industries: almost half of the formal, urban workforce in 1999 was employed in
the industrial sector. The industrial sector is highly diverse in nature and is largely confined to
Torreón and Gómez Palacio; Cd. Lerdo accommodates few industrial enterprises. The first
industrial companies in the area were established at the beginning of the twentieth century.
The industrialisation process received impetus during the mid 1970s but accelerated
significantly in the 1990s after the passage of NAFTA. Especially since this last period the region
has been transformed from an agricultural into an industrialised region, shifting the economic
basis from the rural to the urban area. The extensive infrastructure of toll roads, highways and
secondary roads and the railway, coupled with the international airport and the intermodal
cargo handling, storage and customs inspection facilities at the Ferropuerto, has facilitated the
region’s transformation. Another important factor in the industrial development of the cities
and of the region in general is specific policy formulated by the governments of Durango and
especially Coahuila (see Box 4.1).
Most urban industrial development is concentrated in vast industrial parks (see Table 4.2 and
Figure 4.2). There are eight industrial parks in Torreón, scattered over the city. Gómez Palacio
has only two industrial parks, but they are very large; one of them, the Parque Industrial (P.I.)
Lagunero, is the fourth largest in Mexico. Cd. Lerdo will have two industrial parks, which are to
be located on a strip alongside the periférico. Companies in many different sectors are located in
the parks; most of them are large-scale facilities and many are oriented towards export. The
recent growth of the industrial sector is spurred by and has given rise to the preparation of
large areas of new industrial park space. Six of the industrial parks in the conurbation (La
Laguna Amistad, Ferropuerto Laguna, Jumbo Plaza, Lajat Industrial, Las Americas, P.I. 4a Etapa)
were built in 1994-1997. Occupation levels and industrial growth projections were such that a
number of new parks were under construction in 2000.
One of the industries the region is known for nationally, and which is clearly rooted in the
agricultural history of the region, is food processing. The main food products processed in the
region are poultry, beef, milk and dairy products, and beer. Especially the dairy industry –
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Table 4.1: The regional economy: employment structure and changes, 1994-1999
Sector No. employees, No. employees, % change, % La Laguna,
1994 1999 1994-1999 1999
Manufacturing industry 55,569 114,890 106 42
Commerce 31,292 36,199 16 14
Domestic services 22,177 29,220 32 13
Construction/building 7,375 18,605 152 7
Agricultural sector 18,907 16,759 -11 6
Other services 23,948 16,353 -32 6
Social & community services 13,191 14,960 13 6
Transportation & communication 8,064 9,425 17 3
Mining 4,085 4,867 19 2
Electric industry 2,393 1,305 -45 1
Total 187,001 264,397 41 100
Source: IMSS, subdelegacies Torreón and Gómez Palacio, as published in Siglo de Torreón, 1 January 2000
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Box 4.1: State government industrial policy: the case of Coahuila
In Mexico, the responsibility local and regional economic development, within the liberalised
framework set by the federal government, has been decentralized to state and local governments.
During the last three decades of the twentieth century, the insertion of regions into the global
economy was increasingly seen as a necessary condition for their (further) development. The
importance of being connected to the global economy has also been recognised by state
governments in Mexico. Many have sought to build such a connection by stimulation export activities
and/or by attracting FDI.
The state of Coahuila has been a forerunner in Mexico: the attraction of FDI to the state has been
high on its government’s agenda for several decades. Governor Flores Tapia was the one to initiate
the attraction of FDI and the promotion of export production in Coahuila during the 1970s. This
policy was continued and applied to the entire state – rather than merely Saltillo, as was the case
under Flores Tapia – by his successors. A slight shift in perspective was introduced by Rogelio
Montemayor, the 1993-1999 governor of Coahuila. His economic development strategy was to make
use of the opportunities provided by NAFTA. It built on the state’s strategic location in relation to the
national as well as the US market, on its abundant skilled labour reserves and industrial competence,
and stepped up efforts to attract FDI and thus generate employment opportunities. Inspired by
cluster theory, he also steered state policy so as to aim for greater specialisation of the state’s
subregions. ‘His’ Secretaria de Fomento Económico del Estado de Coahuila (SEFOMEC) identified four
separate subregions in the state, and developed a slightly differentiated policy for each one. While
initially state policy targeted investments in the garment, electronics and automobile industries, over
time the emphasis on specific sectors varied according to the opportunities offered by and the
specific needs of the subregion in question.
Throughout most of the 1990s, industrial policy for La Laguna-Coahuila targeted the garment
industry. In the early years, no or only a very slight distinction was made between investment in urban
and in rural areas. However since 1997 the focus of state industrial policy has shifted away from the
urban area towards rural locations in La Laguna-Coahuila. The garment industry plays a pivotal role in
the rural industrialisation efforts of the state of Coahuila. The industry is considered especially
suitable for rural locations, because of its minimal infrastructural requirements, the non-polluting
nature of the garment production process and its intensive use of non- or low-skilled female labour.
The state actively pursues the mostly foreign-owned ‘big players’ in the industry, since many of these
companies invest large sums of money in modern large-scale facilities that provide a great number of
people with employment. Examples of foreign-owned companies that have rural factories in Coahuila
are Red Kap Industries and Wrangler (both of which are part of VF Corporation) and Hanes (a Sara
Lee division). Besides promotional activities, the state offers full compensation for the training of
personnel, as well as fiscal and other incentives to investors on a case-to-case basis. The state
provides basic infrastructure ‘from the nearest main road up to the factory gate’ for investors in the
rural areas, where infrastructure is either lacking or of inferior quality.
During the 1990s and especially since the passage of NAFTA, FDI in Coahuila has soared and the
state has been earmarked as a success-story state. Within Coahuila, La Laguna is one of the most
successful subregions. Industrial employment and foreign investment have been booming – local
investment in the rural areas has also grown, but mostly without support from the state government.
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Table 4.2: Industrial parks in La Laguna, 2000
Park No. of firms Total surface Occupation level (%)
area (m2)
P.I. Laguna Gómez Palacio 588 4,213,842 100%
P.I. Ferropuerto Laguna 17 1,710,600 45%
Ciudad Industrial Torreón 167 1,201,939 100%
P.I. Lajat 40 450,000 64%
P.I. Amistad Torreón 1 438,000 11%
P.I. Las Americas Torreón 5 400,000 71%
P.I. Oriente 31 381,549 100%
P.I. Matamoros 1 328,600 41%
P.I. San Pedro 3 225,000 69%
P.I. Las Americas Gómez Palacio 1 170,000 24%
P.I. Jumbo Plaza 4 165,000 66%
P.I. Nueva Laguna 12 116,200 N/A
Park under construction/just completed
P.I. Lerdo II N/A 2,400,000 90%
P.I. Lerdo I 0 1,000,000 0%
P.I. Amistad F.I. Madero 0 221,900 0%
P.I. Amistad San Pedro 0 108,100 0%
P.I. Bugambilias 0 0 0%
P.I. Vergel 0 0 0%
Total 848 11,170,730 76%
N.B. Parks in italic are located in the urban core of La Laguna.
Source: El Siglo de Torreón, 1 January 2001
Policy as developed by the state secretariat is mirrored by the municipal industrial development
programs. Besides state government and the separate municipalities, the tripartite Fomento
Económico Laguna Coahuila (FOMEC) is also involved in the economic development of La Laguna-
Coahuila. In many respects FOMEC’s activities mirror those undertaken by SEFOMEC at the state
level. FOMEC, however, is uniquely concerned with the development of La Laguna and not with the
rest of the state. Also, its tripartite structure allows it to maintain closer contact with the local
business community.
The industrial policy for the development of La Laguna-Coahuila has a facilitating character. Its
priority is to attract industrial investment and to create more employment opportunities in the
region. Less attention is paid to the kind of investment and the quality of jobs created in the new
factories. Though aware of the potential risks of a one-sided structure of the local economy, long-term
strategic planning is piecemeal. Overall, industrial policy does not appear to be backed up by an
overarching, strategic master plan. In part this is due to the large number of parties involved and to
the limited cooperation between them (see Chapter 6).
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mainly through the cooperative giant ‘LaLa’, but also through large producers such as
Chilchota and La Risueña – is an important factor in the urban economy. Its importance is
fittingly symbolised by the prominent presence of the LaLa towers in the skyline of the Gómez
Palacio industrial park. The main poultry processor is the large plant of Tyson located in the
industrial park of Gómez Palacio. Coca-Cola has three bottling plants in the region; in 1999, it
employed just over 1,700 persons. Another well-known name with a large presence in the
region is the Corona beer brewery. It has a few bottling plants in Torreón and Gómez Palacio
which employ a total of 1,400 employees for the production of both Corona and Modelo beer in
the area. Metal processing is another important industrial activity: Torreón accommodates one
of the largest metal smelting operations in Latin America, Met-Mex Peñoles. The plant’s main
products are silver, zinc, gold and lead, which are sold on the national market, but are mostly
exported to the US and Latin America. A relatively new industry in the urban economy is the
automotive industry. The best known presence in this sector is that of Delphi and
Linamar/Renault. The latter did not stay long in La Laguna; its facilities are now being used by a
LG-Philips tube factory. There is also a large plant of tractor producer John Deere and an
assembly plant of Caterpillar in Torreón.
Within the large and relatively modern industrial sector, the garment industry occupies an
exceptional position. It is not as modern as some of the other industries but in terms of
employment creation it is one of the most important, if not the most important industry in the
region. According to local estimates, more than half of the industrial workforce are sewing
operators or other garment industry personnel. A few large international TNCs (e.g. VF
Corporation and Sara Lee) have established factories in La Laguna. However, local ownership in
the industry is dominant and numerous locally-owned factories of various sizes are responsible
for the bulk of local garment production.
The industrial sector is the main source of employment for the urban area by a narrow margin:
the tertiary sector is almost equally important. Commercial services form the biggest subsector
of the services. Retailing – ranging from very large supermarkets (e.g. Gigante, WalMart,
Soriana) that sell food, clothing, electronic equipment, medicines, etc. to small, pavement
shops – is the most important commercial service activity. Within the urban node, retailing is
more important for Torreón than for the other cities: a great number of large retail chains are
concentrated in Torreón. Other important service activities are health care and education. All
hospitals and most institutions of higher education are located in the urban node and serve
both the urban and the rural population of the region.
Especially in the services sector, many activities are of an informal or semi-informal nature,
leading to likely sizeable underestimate of urban employment. The Alianza – a large daily
market located on the outskirts of the old city centre of Torreón, where food stuffs, toys,
clothing and many other types of product are sold – illustrates the significance of informal and
semi-informal urban activities, as does the Pulga in Gómez Palacio. Many stalls in these markets
sell cheap and mediocre consumer goods – many of which are counterfeits of global brands,
such as Nike, Reebok and Tommy Hilfiger – to the low-income strata of the market. Another
clear example of informality is provided by the innumerable street-corner food stalls selling
hamburgers, hotdogs, fish cocktails and tacos. The sheer number and variety of these stalls
suggest that the official estimates of the service sector underestimate actual employment
figures for this sector.[ 120 ]
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4.2.2 The rural economy
The rural economy is much more limited than the urban economy. Especially in the smaller
villages the economic basis is very narrow: industries are lacking and the service sector does not
extend far beyond the village limits and the local grocery shop. The rural economy centres on
agriculture This is somewhat surprising because already by the early 1970s four serious
problems had arisen in agriculture in the region (Wenzens, 1974).
Firstly, agriculture in La Laguna was in large part monoculture, dedicated overwhelmingly to
the growing of cotton. Unstable world market prices and national and international
competition in the production of cotton posed a serious threat to the La Laguna rural areas
(Wenzens, 1974; see also Box 4.2). Another problem was the fact that the small parcels assigned
to each ejidatario were an insufficient basis for the generation of family income. Thirdly, the
large group of landless rural dwellers – the avecindados (by that time estimated to have reached a
total number of 50,000) – could only be employed seasonally in agriculture during the
harvesting of the cotton. Fourth, the resulting over-supply of agricultural labour had pushed
the minimum wage in the region to the lowest level in the country. All these problems were
especially serious because of the lack of non-agricultural employment alternatives in the rural
area: neither forestry nor mining offered any viable economic perspectives.
During the second half of the twentieth century, two policy efforts were made to revitalise
agriculture and thus the rural areas of La Laguna. The first intervention in the rural areas of La
Laguna was the rehabilitation plan for the region articulated in the early 1970s (Amaya Brondo,
1970; Arvizu, 1996a). Its main aim was to diversify agricultural production in the Laguna region.
On its own terms it has been fairly successful: the production of wheat and especially cotton
has declined (see Box 4.2), a larger number of crops – including fodder crops and fruits and
vegetables for human consumption – are now grown and distribution is much less lopsided in
favour of a single or a limited number of crops. Within the agricultural sector, cattle farming
(especially dairy cattle farming) is becoming more important and has surpassed agriculture in
terms of the income generated (Mazcorro Velarde et al., 1991; El Siglo, 2001). The importance of
cattle farming is also reflected in the large and growing acreage of fodder crops. High profit
rates – based on large local demand and high yields per acre – are the reasons for cultivating the
crops (Jiménez et al., 1996; Ahlers & Fortis, 1999), despite their high demand for expensive and
scarce irrigation water (El Siglo, 2003).
A second, radical attempt to modernise the Mexican agricultural sector came in the form of
the Reform of Article 27 of the Constitution in 1992. Mexico’s economic liberalisation policies
(see section 3.3.1) extended into the agricultural sector with the express aim of restructuring it
and making it more economically viable. The general aim of the reform was to stimulate
market-oriented agricultural production, free of state regulation6 (Gordillo et al., 1998; Salinas
de Gortari & Solis Gonzalez, 1994). By reforming Article 27, which regulated the traditional ejido
smallholder sector, it has had a notable impact on the agricultural sector and the rural
economy in general in La Laguna. The practical result appears to be a renewed concentration of
access to land and water in the hands of a smaller number of larger farms (Ahlers & Fortis, 1999;
Jiménez et al., 1996; see also Gordillo et al., 1998). Marginalisation of the smallholder sector and
rural unemployment appear to have intensified as a result of these policy measures.
Parallel to the profound impact of plans, reforms and government policies, the soil, water and
climatic conditions also impose serious constraints on agriculture in La Laguna. The interplay
of these natural factors means that only a very small part of the land (a little over 5%) of the
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region is effectively used for agricultural purposes. This tendency was aggravated during the
1990s as agricultural activity was increasingly confined to compact areas (areas compactadas),
which were most efficient for agricultural production due to their soil fertility and especially
access to the irrigation infrastructure. The water situation in the region has always been
precarious; however, the situation has recently worsened as a result of a serious drought that
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Box 4.2: Cotton in La Laguna
For a long time cotton was the main product of the region. At the beginning of the twentieth century,
the region produced up to 90% of the national cotton consumption (Marroni de Velazquez, 1992).
Cotton production in the region was characterised by high yields per acre, and the cotton produced
was of good quality. However, over the course of time and especially during the last two decades of
the twentieth century, cotton production began to be associated with a number of different problems
and controversies.
Some of the problems concern state agricultural policy, specifically the state controlled credit
institution (the later Banrural), which proved a dubious factor in the development of the ejido sector,
due to the bureaucracy involved, its politicised operations and the nature of the credit system itself
(see Rello (1987) for a detailed account of the role of credit institutions in cotton production in La
Laguna). For decades, the bank stimulated the cultivation of cotton and controlled the crop’s entire
production and marketing process.
Also, over the past decades the prices of cotton on the world market have gone down. For the
producers in La Laguna the low price their cotton earns on the world market has become a serious
problem. For years in a row, local newspapers report full cotton warehouses, where stacks of cotton
are waiting for prices to go up. Better or more efficient or subsidised producers, such as Egypt and
the US, have squeezed the market share and price of Mexican cotton (Mandelbaum, 1992).
Meanwhile, Banrural – because of its interest in foreign currency generating export products –
ignored these problems and continued to stimulate the single-crop system. The single-crop system
was based on advances, which were paid per unit of agricultural work required by the product
concerned irrespective of profits earned. This system perverted the ejidatarios in the sense that it
became economically logical to cultivate highly labour intensive crops, such as cotton, even if these
are not profitable overall. As a consequence, despite limited profitability as well as quality and
subsequent marketing problems, cotton remained the dominant crop in the ejidos of La Laguna until
the late 1980s (Rello, 1987).
Besides ineffective management of the cotton credits, the quality of the cotton from La Laguna and
the reliability of its supply appear to have deteriorated over the past years. The textile companies in
Parras that use cotton as their main input complain about a presumed high sugar content of the
cotton (which damages the machines), short staple and undependable sorting of quality. Especially
the availability of better quality, long-staple import cotton has harmed the market position of La
Laguna’s cotton.
Finally, the supply has also been erratic and unreliable, displaying large shifts in volumes harvested
from year to year (Mandelbaum, 1992). After a dramatic decrease in cultivation of the crop – which
reached an historic low in 1992 following the virtual abolishment of credit programs – cotton
cultivation was again actively stimulated by the state government of Coahuila (Montemayor, 1996).
Once again the warehouses are filled and the nearby denim mills still do not buy local cotton.
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began in the early 1990s. As a consequence, the surface of rain-fed land has decreased
dramatically. Subterranean water reservoir wells in the region are another important source of
water, but over the past decade these have increasingly been associated with overexploitation
and subsequent salination and even arsenic contamination (Jiménez et al., 1996; Ahlers &
Fortis, 1999; Mazcorro Velarde et al., 1991). Moreover, wells are relatively expensive sources of
irrigation water – especially with rising electricity charges and the costs associated with the use
of the pumps.
Agriculture in La Laguna is very different from what it used to be. Cultivation and land
ownership patterns, agricultural productivity and access to water are inseparable in the region.
The mentioned changes have important consequences in the area of employment
opportunities. One of the most prominent changes since the late 1980s is that eijdatarios have
had little choice but to change their cultivation pattern – from cotton to beans and maize for
auto-consumption or sale at guaranteed prices (Gordillo et al., 1998) – but also to complement
agricultural production for auto-consumption with alternative sources of income (Steffen
Riedemann, 1996). This used to be at least partially solved through (seasonal) employment of
ejidatarios and the rural population on the larger farms. However, larger farms have become
more mechanised and now require less labour input. Whereas initially ejidatarios and avecindados
worked as agricultural day-labourers, now only a small number of them find agricultural
sources of income. Overall, employment in the agricultural sector is shrinking (see Table 4.1)
and under- or effective unemployment in the countryside has grown, depressing the wage level
in the rural areas.
Thus, since the late 1980s there has been a growing need for non-agricultural sources of
income. In the rural areas, certainly outside the larger towns, industries and services are of
limited importance. There were two industrial parks in operation in 2000 in the rural area of La
Laguna-Coahuila and a few other rural parks were under construction or being planned (see
Table 4.2). Nevertheless, most rural inhabitants still had to leave the rural areas of La Laguna to
find non-agricultural sources of income. As will be shown in the following sections, daily
commuting or permanent migration to the urban node or to the border region have become an
integral part of life in the region.
4.3 Population and demographics
As mentioned, La Laguna is an important region in Mexico, and this is also reflected in the size
of the regional population: the Laguna region had over 1.2 million inhabitants in 2000 and the
urban municipios together housed over 70% of the regional population (see Table 4.3). The
conurbation as a whole ranks amongst the largest urban areas of Mexico. Within the urban
node, Torreón is the largest city by far: 42% of all laguneros live in Torreón. By contrast, some of
the cabeceras municipales in Durango accommodate much less than 1% of the total regional
population. In general the rural population is thinly scattered over the rural municipios. In fact
this is more dramatically so than the mentioned figure suggest: in many rural municipios, large
parts of the population live in the cabeceras, leaving the remainder largely unpopulated.
Concentration of population in the municipal cabeceras may be as high as 51% in F.I. Madero and
73.3% in San Luis del Cordero (INEGI, 1990).
As can be expected based on the contrary urban-rural economic developments discussed above,
in the 1990s the relative demographic importance of Torreón and the conurbation as a whole
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Box 4.3: Demographic changes in F.I. Madero
The municipio F.I. Madero is situated in the north of La Laguna-Coahuila and borders the Torreón
municipio. Over half of its population is concentrated in the cabercera municipal, which is a fairly
spread out, dusty town filled with small shops, street vendors and houses built of cement blocks or
adobe. While the town is a regional service centre, the economy of the municipio is very much centred
on agriculture, especially on the production of cotton and on cattle farming. Though the municipio is
Figure 4.3: Population pyramids F.I. Madero, 1970-2000
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increased. Torreón and the conurbation have consolidated their dominant position within the
region. On closer inspection, Table 4.3 reveals that the dynamic development of Torreón and
the rest of the conurbation carries such weight in the regional data as to mask a deep urban-
rural division that runs through the Laguna region. On the one hand there is a fairly dynamic
urban core, displaying moderate population growth; on the other hand, almost all rural
municipios show absolute and significant population decline. After decades of ‘merely’ declining
population growth in rural municipios, this is a noteworthy phenomenon. Various demographic
dynamics, shaped over decades, coincide to result in the observed pattern. Box 4.3 presents an
overview of the population development of a rural municipio over the past decades and describes
the changes.
Migration plays an important role in the demographic patterns in La Laguna. The state of
Durango has a history wrought by migration; in 1990-2000, it had an overwhelmingly negative
migration balance of -19.8%. Inhabitants of the state traditionally make up a large share of
migrants on and just across the US-Mexican border. Coahuila also has a negative, but smaller,
migration balance of -4.7%. Little information is available with regard to the destination of out-
migration from the region. However, local sources in the Laguna as well as in Cd. Juárez concur
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not far away from the large conurbation of La Laguna, F.I. Madero is very much part of the rural area
of the region; its population dynamics are highly characteristic of rural municipios in the region. Figure
4.3 illustrates the population pyramids of F.I. Madero for the last three decades of the twentieth
century.
The first pyramid (1970) has a broad base and narrow top . This is the shape typical of populations in
the early stages of development. Life expectancy at birth was still not very high (at that time it was 59
years for the state of Coahuila), although it had increased dramatically over the previous decade with
the decrease of the death rate. The birth rate was still high; consequently the population was growing
quickly with a large share of the population below the age of 15. In the 1970s, agriculture was still a
good source of income and there was no strong migration push. Migration appears to have been
limited and mainly seasonal and it has no visible impact on the pyramid.
The second pyramid (1980) clearly shows the impact of demographic modernisation in F.I. Madero.
The decline of the death rate continued and at the same time fertility, or the birth rate, went down,
diminishing the number of newborns. These trends continue in the following decades – though it
becomes less visible in the 2000 pyramid. Few permanent migrants left F.I. Madero and migration is
barely visible in the pyramid.
In the third pyramid (1990), the demographic modernisation process continued. At the same time,
prompted by the downturn in agriculture in the region, the population was beginning to be impacted
by out-migration. Sex ratio calculations show that for the age group 20-54 there were more women
than men in the municipio. This points to a sex-specific labour migration pattern: slightly more men
then women left F.I. Madero.
In the 1990-2000 period out migration continued forcefully. So much so, that the 2000 pyramid is
‘flattened’ as large shares of both men and women at working ages leave the municipio. On the whole,
outmigration is eating away an ever-growing part of natural population growth, in fact leading to net
decline of the population as illustrated in Table 4.3.
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on the existence and importance of migration from the Laguna region to Cd. Juárez on the US-
Mexican border. Many inhabitants of the conurbation, and especially of the poorer rural areas,
opt to migrate to – and in numerous cases, eventually cross – the border. A small survey held in
a village in Durango confirmed the importance of migration to the North. Several respondents
had one or more family members who lived in the US, or on the Mexican side of the US-
Mexican border. The rural areas of the region have become expulsion areas of migrants going to
Cd. Juárez or the US, or to the urban area of the region (Arvizu 1996b; Ahlers & Fortis, 1999). No
data are available on intra-regional migratory flows. Local media point to sizeable rural to
urban migration (Arvizu, 1996b; Ahlers & Fortis, 1999). However, these flows are not recorded
in official INEGI data and cannot accurately be inferred from data on the population growth
rates. However, as a result of varied migration flows and changes in the economic structure of
the region, the rural areas of La Laguna have been impacted by depopulation and detachment
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of the rural population from the land (Arvizu 1996a, 1996b). These processes show parallels to
the ‘de-agrarianisation’ process in sub-Saharan Africa described by Bryceson (1993). In La
Laguna, the general effect has been termed descampesinización. The significance and geographical
pattern of descampesinización processes for La Laguna’s rural area is shown in Figure 4.4.
In light of the rural exodus as illustrated in Figure 4.4 and the importance of intra-regional
migration flows, the growth in urban population is unsurprising. The urban core as a whole
grew by 11% in 1990-2000, and growth was especially concentrated in Torreón. The interplay of
complex and differentiated demographic developments across the region evens out to an
average annual population growth for the region as a whole of 0.6% (see Table 4.3). This growth
is significantly below the national average of 1.9% and the 1.4% yearly average of Coahuila, but
above the 0.3% annual population increase for Durango. This confirms La Laguna’s status as a
net out-migration region7.
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Table 4.3: Population data La Laguna, 1990-2000
Population Regional Participation Illiteracy
population in labour rate
force
1990 2000 1990-2000 2000 2000 (%) 2000
Municipio Var. % (%) (%) (%)
Urban area
Torreón (C) 464,825 529,512 14 42 53 3.7
Gómez Palacio 256,983 273,315 6 21 51 4.6
Cd. Lerdo 105,372 112,435 7 9 48 6.1
Total conurbation 827,180 915,262 11
Rural area
F.I. Madero (C) 50,981 46,452 -9 4 45 8.9
Matamoros (C) 86,398 92,029 7 7 49 9.0
San Pedro (C) 99,165 88,343 -11 7 41 9.9
Viesca (C) 21,238 18,969 -11 2 41 11.9
Mapimi 24,006 22,367 -7 2 40 9.5
Tlahualilo 22,877 19,918 -13 2 41 7.1
Rodeo 13,555 12,497 -8 1 34 7.8
Nazas 12,834 12,467 -3 1 36 8.1
Simón Bolivar 12,415 10,644 -14 1 33 9.0
Sn. Juan de Guadelupe 7,267 6,548 -10 1 33 10.9
Sn. Luis del Cordero 2,364 2,070 -12 – 28 9.4
Sn. Pedro del Gallo 2,143 1,876 -12 – 36 6.4
Total La Laguna-Coahuila 722,607 775,305 7.3 62 – 5.5
Total La Laguna-Durango 459,816 474,137 3.1 38 – 7.0
Total La Laguna 1,182,423 1,249,442 5.4 100 – –
Total/Average Mexico 81.2 million 97.5 million 20.0 – – 9.5
N.B. Shaded municipios belong to the urban core of La Laguna. (C) indicates the municipios of La Laguna-
Coahuila; all others are located in Durango.
Source: INEGI: Resultados Definitivos de Conteo de Población y Vivienda (1990, 2000); INEGI Perfil
Sociodemográfico Coahuila & Durango (1991)
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Table 4.3 also illustrates the differences between Coahuila and Durango: in general, rural towns
are larger and better off, economic participation overall is larger and education levels are higher
on the Coahuila-side compared to La Laguna-Durango. This difference is not confined to the
Laguna region: overall, the standard of living in the state of Coahuila lies somewhat above that
of Durango.
The table indicates the reasons behind the scarce population of the rural area: educational
opportunities and economic participation are limited in the rural areas. In only a few rural
municipios does the illiteracy rate exceed the national average: the very basics are taken care of
throughout the region. However, rural municipios lag behind the conurbation with respect to
higher education. La Laguna boasts educational levels and opportunities above the national
average, but the seventeen institutions of higher education, universities and tecnológicos are
concentrated in the cities. Unbalanced educational opportunities are matched by the earlier
mentioned lopsided distribution of economic opportunities in the region, leading to both
rural un- and underemployment. Economic participation rates for the rural municipios are very
low, certainly when one bears in mind than any economic activity for even the most minimal
amount of time is counted and included in the figures. Within the rural area, the situation
differs considerably: not only are the economic participation levels of the municipios in Coahuila
higher than those in Durango, but the smallest and most remote municipios are the worst off.
The narrow economic basis and changes in the agricultural sector discussed in the previous
section have had a negative impact on employment in the rural areas, while Torreón, Gómez
Palacio and to a lesser extent Cd. Lerdo are booming industrial cities. The high economic
participation in Torreón – and in the urban core in general – is also reflected in a low open
unemployment rate of 2.6% for 19998.
The disparity in economic opportunities between the urban node and the rural hinterland
caused sizeable rural-to-urban migration and commuter flows. Many urban to rural
commuters and migrants have been absorbed by the garment industry in the cities. In fact, for
the garment industry, the presence of the large, relatively low-cost labour reserve was one of the
region’s main assets. Starting in the early 1990s the labour reserve and the presence of some
industrial bases, including in garments, were important impetuses for the growth of the
industry. Until almost a decade later, employment in the garment industry was concentrated
in the cities. Commuting and urbanisation continued unfettered, but this did not prevent the
urban labour supply from becoming exhausted. Companies began to engage in competition
for labour and a few firms began to build factories in the rural areas.
For the rural areas, the recent dispersal of garment factories into the countryside may offer
some relief. It creates employment opportunities in the towns, villages and even ejidos, and it is
hoped that it may spark a rural industrialisation process. Rural industrialisation as a potential
way to revitalise La Laguna’s rural areas is discussed in the following section.
4.4 Booming garment production: bridging the urban-rural divide?
The previous sections have made it clear that the Laguna region in fact consists of two very
different regions – the conurbation and the rural hinterland – that are experiencing (and have
experienced) not ‘only’ different transformations, but also to a large extent contrary
developments. The urban core has been and is booming and the rural areas have remained
dependent on an ailing agricultural sector. The results for the rural areas have been an
expulsion of rural workers from the agricultural sector, unemployment as well as rural
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depopulation. Though industrial activity in the rural area is minimal, a few industrial parks are
under construction in the towns of three rural municipios in La Laguna-Coahuila (see Table 4.2).
The first factories have already moved in. Most of them are garment factories. After decades of
concentration in the cities, the garment industry has recently accelerated its dispersal to the
rural municipios. The rural garment factories represent a completely novel development in these
areas, which for a long time had been geared exclusively towards agriculture (van Dooren &
Verkoren, 2002; van Dooren & Zarate Hoyos, 2003; see Chapter 7 for a more detailed analysis of
the process of rural transformation). The boom of the local garment industry and its dispersal
into the rural areas appear to offer some relief for the rural population.
The garment industry is one of the oldest local industries and has its roots in the last decades of
the nineteenth century, when the first cotton textile company (Fabrica de Hilados y Tejidos La
Constancia) was opened alongside the railway in Torreón (Reza Garcia, 1998; Puig, 1996). The
more modern garment industry began in the mid twentieth century. The industry developed
steadily until the early 1990s, when a remarkable growth spurt began. Since the passage of
NAFTA, the growth of the industry has accelerated enormously. As a result, by the late 1990s
the region was believed to be the largest garment export cluster for jeans in Mexico and,
somewhat boastfully, even in the world. Employment creation in the industry has been large
and rapid: from just over 16,000 employees in 1993 (INEGI, 1994), the industry was estimated to
employ around 75,000 people in 1999 and close to 80.000 a year later9. These garment workers
are employed by over 200 garment companies owning a total of over 450 plants in the region (El
Siglo, 1998). Towards the turn of the century, total maximum production capacity of the
regional cluster was estimated to lie around 6.5 million garments a week.
The very large employment creation in the garment industry was and still is mostly
concentrated in factories in the cities. The resulting large demand for factory workers could not
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be satisfied by the urban labour force alone, a problem that was soon reflected in a tightening
urban labour market and high turnover rates of personnel. Meanwhile, some rural laguneros
migrated to Torreón, Gómez Palacio or Cd. Lerdo in search of jobs; many more have opted to
commute daily between their village and the city. Commuting has become a common and
almost institutionalised feature of urban life. Some commuters provide their own
transportation, but most of the daily in- and outflow is coordinated by the companies that
employ workers from outside the city. Buses formerly used as school buses in the US are now
used for the daily transportation of personnel. Since many of the urban factories employ great
numbers of rural laguneros, most factories rely on a large number of buses that cover very
extensive routes. Evidence of the prevalence of rural-urban commuting is the geographically
concentrated traffic congestion in and around the industrial parks early in the morning and
late in the afternoon. The large commuter flows connect rural inhabitants faced with limited
employment opportunities in their rural communities to the urban industrialists that have to
deal with a tight urban labour market. In the context of a immense and continuous growth of
the industry, however, commuting has not solved the problems of tightness in the urban
labour market, rising turnover rates and wages.
Therefore, a de-concentration of garment production out of the cities became almost
inevitable. Rural garment factories did not have to deal with the labour problems associated
with an urban location and were also seen as a potential way to begin to close the urban-rural
divide in La Laguna. Some garment factories already existed in the rural municipios, but since
the late 1980s and especially the 1990s a few urban garment companies have been especially
proactive in the establishment of rural factories at various locations in the region. As a
consequence, the number of garment factories in the rural towns, villages and ejidos grew
rapidly in the 1990s and spread over large parts of the region (see Figures 4.5 and 4.7).
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Figure 4.5 illustrates the establishment of rural and urban factories over time in La Laguna. The
majority of the rural factories were built during the late 1990s when the industry in the urban
area was booming and pressures on the urban labour market were driving up wages and
turnover rates in the cities. At that point, the interests of garment entrepreneurs (a stable
labour force for the factories) coincided with those of both the rural population (employment
in the rural areas) and the state governments (solving rural unemployment and dampening
migration flows) to create a fruitful base for the dispersal of the industry. Figure 4.6 illustrates
the geographical patterns in establishment of new factories as well as in employment creation.
While there were no dramatic shifts between the cities and the countryside with regard to the
establishment of new garment factories, a notable large share of employment creation was
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located in the rural area in the late 1990s. This points to the large scale of operation of several
newly established rural factories – many of which are FDI facilities.
The resulting dramatic effect on the average factory size is also illustrated; in 1998 rural
garment factories were on average larger than the urban factories (while they had been much
smaller only a few years before). This is not to say that by the end of the 1990s all rural factories
were large; besides the relatively large FDI facilities and subsidiaries of urban-based garment
companies, there were also small cooperative factories. Promotional activities undertaken by
the state government of Coahuila have been instrumental in the establishment of large-scale
FDI facilities, while several local companies have independently set up much smaller rural
factories on both state sides of La Laguna.
Most large-scale FDI facilities are located in or close to the larger rural towns with a reasonably
large labour force and a good connection to the main roads. Figure 4.7 illustrates that
employment in rural garment factories is concentrated in these towns. Rural garment
employment is a significant factor in the rural economy that otherwise remains dependent on a
shrinking agricultural sector; by the late 1990s approximately 10,000 rural laguneros in Durango
and Coahuila were estimated to work in close to eighty rural factories (see Figure 4.7).
The establishment of a large and steadily increasing number of factories in the rural area
appears to have strengthened intra-regional linkages as the rural area is being drawn into the
regional garment production system. Moreover, the state government of Coahuila hopes that
the rural garment factories will spark a rural industrialisation process. However, so far there is
little evidence pointing to the materialisation of a wider rural industrialisation process.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter has introduced the Laguna region in northern Mexico as a dynamic region that
has undergone a number of significant changes in both its recent and less recent history. The
region, which straddles the two states of Coahuila and Durango and whose traditional
economy was built on agriculture, is now marked by a deep development differential between a
successful, industrial urban area – consisting of three cities – and a poor, stagnant rural
hinterland dependent on dwindling agriculture. The development of the regional economy
over the past decades and its current structure appear to lie at the base of this dichotomy.
The urban core of La Laguna was one of the first medium-sized urban areas in Mexico to began
to industrialise in the 1970s. Since then, the industrial sector in the cities has expanded and
diversified. Various food processing industries with a domestic market orientation are present
in the region, while manufacturing for export is also highly important. In the latter activity, the
garment industry is one of the largest and most dynamic industries and employment creators.
However, other industrial sectors such as the automotive and electronics industries are present
as well. A large and diversified service sector is another important part of the urban economy.
This concentration of economic activity and wealth in the urban node has made it the regional
centre of gravitation.
In contrast to the dynamic and diversified development of the urban economy, the rural
economy is characterised by its narrow agricultural base which, to make matters worse, has
faced a number of difficulties over the past decades. Limited access to credit, serious droughts,
marketing problems for cotton and inefficient production methods led to a crisis in the
agricultural sector, most dramatically in the smallholder segment. The resulting un- and
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underemployment and effective expulsion of the rural labour force was aggravated when neo-
liberal reform (Article 27 of the Constitution) of the agricultural sector took effect in the early
1990s. This reform put pressure on the smallholder segment and resulted in a concentration of
access to land and to water in large farms. Because of the lack of non-agricultural employment
and income alternatives in the rural areas, the rural population has become increasingly
oriented towards the urban node for jobs.
The most recent demographic figures reflect this dichotomy in economic opportunities
between the urban and rural areas. While the urban population is growing modestly, the rural
population is marked by absolute decline. The result is a progressive urbanisation process, as
the population concentrates in the cities, where higher economic participation rates indicate
better job opportunities and where educational opportunities as well as wealth and health care
are concentrated.
The examination of the Laguna region, its development and main features sheds light on its
recent boom as the ‘New Jeans Capital’. La Laguna unites some of the most basic requirements
for such a development: a strategic geographical location with regard to the US market and its
Jeans Capital predecessor El Paso, good quality and a quite extensive though basic physical
infrastructure, as well as a relatively large young and well-educated population, part of which is
under- or unemployed. On top of that, the industrialisation process that transformed it from
an agricultural into an industrial region set in several decades ago. This industrialisation
process included a garment industry that was humble, mostly small-scale and oriented on the
domestic market. This modest local garment industry transformed during the 1990s, when the
region experienced a post-NAFTA garment boom.
In a recent response to the urban-rural gap in employment opportunities and labour market
conditions, the post-NAFTA expansion of the garment industry may spark a transformation
process based on rural industrialisation. Garment factories have been established in towns,
small villages and ejidos of La Laguna. The establishment of rural garment factories provides the
local population with a much needed source of employment and income alternative to
dwindling agricultural activities. Supported and even stimulated by state governments, the
garment entrepreneurs who invest in the rural areas find an almost ideal labour supply
situation there. Rural labour reserves are large and – in the absence of local economic
alternatives to agriculture – in dire need of employment opportunities.
Notes
1 The literal meaning of laguna is lake. This refers to the playa lakes, such as laguna Mayran, which occurred until
irrigation systems – and in particular the large dam and reservoir about 150 miles upstream on the Rio Nazas – were
developed and the water was diverted away from these lakes (Dunigan, 1969).
2 The use of various definitions gives rise to confusion. A common definition (Dunigan, 1969; Wenzens, 1974, p. 13)
encompasses ‘only’ ten municipios: Torreón, Matamoros, San Pedro, F.I. Madero, Viesca, Parras, Gómez Palacio, Cd.
Lerdo, Mapimi and Tlahualilo. The term La Laguna is also employed when just referring to the urban node and both
state-sides of La Laguna also sometimes refer to ‘their’ side as La Laguna. The definition adhered to in this study is
the one used by Secretaria de Agricultura, Ganaderia y Desarrollo Rural, SAGAR. In it, the Laguna region consists of fifteen
municipios – five in Coahuila and ten in Durango (see Figure 4.1).
3 Torreón forms the hub between the Central Mexicano and the Ferrocarril Internacional. The fact that a positive spin-off
would result from this position was clear even at the time of construction, as evidenced by a conflict between
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Coahuila and Durango over the location of the railway (Puig, 1992). Eventually, the international investors in the
railway gave preference to Torreón, because the route through that city was the most direct one between the border
and Mexico City.
4 The literal translation of this term is ‘small owners’. This is a rather cynical choice of words, especially in light of the
fact that they were and still are the farms with the largest land holdings in the region and generally also with the
most fertile lands.
5 Salinas de Gortari and Solis Gonzalez (1994) performed a case study of the background and impact of the Reform in
La Laguna. Unsurprisingly – bearing in mind the family tie between one of the authors and the then Mexican
President Salinas de Gortari – they viewed the reforms favourably. They explain the background and aims of the
Reform as follows (ibid., p. 6): ‘Faced with the acute and chronic crisis of Mexican agriculture and the need to revive
it in the current context of globalization and regional integration, the reform aims to achieve higher levels of
production and productivity, to open the countryside to domestic and foreign private investment, to orient the
agricultural productive apparatus towards the open and competitive markets to raise income and welfare levels of
the rural society, and to reduce and make more selective the intervention by state agencies in rural development’.
6 Three key changes related to small-scale land ownership were devised to achieve this goal (Goldring, 1996; Gordillo
et al., 1998). Firstly, certification and thus the potential privatisation of ejido land was started. Even though the
reform entailed a formalisation of existing practises (Steffen Riedemann, 1996; see also Goldring, 1996), more
ejidatarios in La Laguna have opted to rent out their land and water rights, and some have even decided to sell. Since
the buyers – commercial farms and pequeños proprietarios – are mostly interested in the water, this sometimes leads to
the abandonment of the land. Secondly, ejidos are allowed to enter into joint ventures with larger farms or
companies. These joint ventures were promoted by the state governments of both Coahuila and Durango (Parra,
1996, p. 9), but had limited success due to an unequal distribution of benefits in favour of the large farms. Finally,
further land distribution is ended to put an end to ‘excessive growth of small-sized farms’ (Salinas de Gortari & Solis
Gonzalez, 1994).
7 There are no other data that point to other circumstances that might explain the figures. The fertility rate in the
region is not significantly below the national average and no disasters have taken place in the region.
8 These data are difficult to interpret, due to the very broad and constantly changing definitions used by INEGI.
Rather than slack in the labour market which can be solved through continued growth of the industrial sector, the
hovering of unemployment around the 2-3% mark appears to indicate the presence of a stable, persistent mismatch
in the local employment opportunities and the labour market: an oversupply of well-educated laguneros combined
with a large demand on the labour market – coming from, for example, garment factories – for people with low
educational levels and industrial skills.
9 There is some confusion about the total number of garment workers in La Laguna. INEGI counted ‘only’ 36,000
garment workers in 1998. Local representatives of the Camera Nacional de la Industria del Vestido (CNIV) believe the
official figures to be a gross underestimate. Their estimate of total employment in the garment industry was 70,000
employees for 1997 and over 80,000 by the year 2000. A calculation on the basis of firm employment figures as
retrieved from the baseline survey for this study, suggest that the CNIV estimates are more accurate than the INEGI
data (the 73 companies included in the baseline survey alone employed already around 42,000 employees), and will
therefore be used in this study.
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5 Overview of the Laguna garment
cluster
In the previous chapter, the garment industry in La Laguna was introduced as an important
industry and local employment creator, initially in the urban core but increasingly also in the
region’s rural municipios. This chapter builds on that introduction and examines in greater
detail the structural characteristics of the garment industry in the region. Data obtained
through the baseline survey, complemented by observation and interviews, is used to present a
factual outline of the structure of the garment cluster and its individual firms. This is done
from a comparative perspective so as to be able to position the Laguna cluster in relation to
other garment clusters, and to see whether and – if so – in which ways La Laguna is a typical
garment cluster. Also, some basic insights are provided with regard to its approximate position
within the post-NAFTA US-Mexico context.
Section 5.1 starts off the examination of the Laguna cluster by scrutinising its self-proclaimed
‘Jeans Capital’ status through a focus on the cluster’s product orientation. Section 5.2
investigates the cluster’s market orientation and sheds light on the relative importance of the
export and the domestic market as destinations for the garments produced in the region. The
attention will then be turned to the cluster’s key players. Section 5.3 deals with the structure of
the regional industry in terms of company characteristics such as size, ownership and location.
Section 5.4 digs further into the garment firms and deals with their single- versus multi-plant
company structure, dissecting them to the level of individual factories or production units.
Section 5.5 explores the position of labour within the garment industry in the Laguna region,
followed by a brief overview of garment clusters in India, Peru and Mexico in Section 5.6. The
insight into the characteristics of comparable clusters will show whether it is possible to distil
the structural elements of a ‘typical’ garment cluster and whether La Laguna contains these
elements. The conclusion at the end of the chapter summarises the main findings and seeks the
essential connections to the literature on garment clusters.
5.1 Introducing the new ‘Jeans Capital’
How new is the ‘new’ Jeans Capital of northern Mexico? The first textile and apparel-related
industrial activity in the region can be traced back to the late nineteenth century. However,
modern, factory-based apparel production in the region has its roots in the late 1940s. At that
time, the first apparel factory started to produce jeans under its own brand (El Venado) for sale in
northern Mexico and later the US. Within a couple of years a few other local factories were
established, and they too specialised in the production of what in the industry is referred to as
‘bottoms’ (i.e. various types of pants, dress slacks and especially jeans) for the market in
northern Mexico. Several garment pioneers in the region are Lebanese immigrants; many are
still in the business or have been succeeded by their children. [ 135 ]
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During those early days, the jeans industry was directly linked to the cotton produced in the
region. Local garment factories used primarily local cotton. In fact, some of the industrial
pioneers in the region started their business as a means of adding value to the cotton produced
on their own land1. From then on, the local industry expanded steadily. By the early 1990s the
local production base was considerable and according to official data local garment factories
employed over 16,000 employees (INEGI, 1995; see also Chapter 4). The bulk of garments
produced in La Laguna was sold in the local or regional market. When Mexico joined GATT in
1986 and the Mexican market opened up to imports, La Laguna suffered, as did other garment
producing regions in Mexico (see Chapter 3). The domestic market was swamped with cheap
imports from Asia and the sales of La Laguna’s companies in the domestic market plummeted.
As a consequence many local garment factories went out of business. In search of an alternative,
some local companies sought and found entrance into the US export market. This shift in
market orientation also entailed a conversion from integrated garment manufacturers to pure
assembly maquiladoras2. Export to the US essentially meant entering into production-sharing
arrangements in which La Laguna garment companies assembled pre-cut fabric and used trim
items shipped from the US. What remained was the region’s product specialisation: blue jeans.
The connection with locally produced cotton was severed, as the use of imported denim from
US denim mills was imperative due to the duties levied on the use of Mexican fabric. The
disconnection between local cotton and locally produced denim trousers still exists today (see
also Box 4.2).
Since then, and based on the assembly of jeans for export, La Laguna’s garment industry has
boomed: in the early 1990s ‘only’ 500,000 garments were produced each week, whereas at the
end of the decade production capacity had reached 6.5 million a week. Especially since the
coming into effect of NAFTA, production volumes have grown very rapidly. Throughout this
dramatic expansion the original product orientation has been retained. Hence the region’s self-
proclaimed status of ‘New Jeans Capital of the World’. In adopting this title, the local industry
assumed the status that, as mentioned in Chapter 3, until recently had belonged to El Paso,
Texas. ‘Jeans Capital’ may sound overly boastful, but almost all companies in the region
dedicate part if not all of their production capacity to the production of blue jeans. Among
garment companies in the region, 81% cite a denim garment as its main product3. Figure 5.1
illustrates the dominant position of jeans as the main product of the Laguna garment cluster.
Only a few companies produce casual pants, and men’s shirts and knitwear (tee-shirts, jogging
slacks or sweatshirts) are also produced. Interestingly, most knitwear is produced by a few
foreign-owned production facilities, making these facilities exceptions within La Laguna’s jeans
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Figure 5.1: Product composition of the Laguna garment cluster
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bulwark. Other exceptional cases are a specialist contractor that produced backpacks and
another that produced only men’s dress shirts.
Complete specialisation in non-denim garments is rare. It is slightly more common to combine
jeans with other types of garments. The most common combination is jeans and casual pants.
Other secondary products are men’s shirts, jackets, sports shorts, sweaters and hospital
garments. These products generally make up only a small percentage of total production.
Clearly, even the complementary garments produced in La Laguna are mostly basic,
standardised garments. The Laguna cluster is firmly positioned in the mass-produced,
standardised segment of the market. By the end of the 1990s overall product diversification out
of the jeans segment was very limited. However, some shifts within the denim segment can be
noted, as will be discussed further in Chapter 7.
Production in the Laguna region also illustrates the pervasiveness of segmentation based on
price and quality and of branding. At the end of the 1990s, locally produced jeans ranged from
cheap, relatively standard and low quality to more sophisticated and high quality: clients
ranged from Kmart and Wal-Mart to Tommy Hilfiger and The Limited. However, the centre of
gravity of local production lies in the low- to mid-market range. In relation to the general
sourcing and upgrading pattern outlined in Chapter 2 this confirms La Laguna position as a
newcomer exporter that starts in the low-quality, low-price ranges of the market and may
gradually shift to higher-end products and market ranges. Chapters 7 and 8 will deal with
upgrading and buyer succession in La Laguna in greater detail.
5.2 Market orientation
The conversion from locally integrated domestic market production to production sharing for
export discussed above has been almost complete: virtually all jeans produced in La Laguna are
destined for markets outside Mexico. Moreover, export from La Laguna is almost a synonym for
export to the US: an estimated 90-95% of local production is destined for the US market. With
the exception of one company that occasionally exports small volumes to Europe and Japan, all
export production is destined for the US market. Thus, the Laguna cluster reflects the patterns
outlined for the Mexican garment industry in general in Chapter 3 (see Table 3.3). Within the
national boom in garment production for export to the US, La Laguna is one of the
concentration areas in Mexico. The expansion and conversion of existing companies as well as
the establishment of many new firms characterise the development of the cluster throughout
the 1990s. The sudden and vigorous growth is the result of the very large demand coming from
the US; it also explains the cluster’s narrow orientation towards the US market. Between the
passage of NAFTA and 2001, demand mostly exceeded local production capacity and as a
consequence garment exports to the US expanded almost effortlessly. The market orientation
of the cluster appears to be not so much a result of strategic decisions taken by individual firms
as the logical and comfortable outcome of an overwhelming, geographically concentrated
demand surge. This market orientation and particular growth pattern is reflected in the
position of the Laguna cluster as a contracting cluster. Most companies function as contractors
for US buyers and produce exclusively for export. Many do so through a direct sourcing relation
with a global buyer, while others are subcontractors that export indirectly and rely on the
mediation of another firm. La Laguna is best characterised as an export bulwark. [ 137 ]
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The narrow focus on contracting for the US market can partly be explained by the nature of the
domestic market. The dual structure of Mexico’s domestic market plays a role in pushing local
producers to engage in exports. As the high-end Mexican market is served by large, mainly US-
based buyers while the much larger but unstable low-end segment is flooded with cheap Asian
goods and domestic counterfeits, it offers limited opportunities for domestic companies.
Positioning a company on this market is a difficult and risky task. This, combined with the
huge pull exerted by US garment buyers, has lead to the virtual abandonment of the domestic
market.
Still, some domestic production does take place and, though it is of limited importance, it
can not be ignored. A few export companies in the region also serve the domestic market and
most leave only a small part (2-10%) of total production in Mexico. In these cases domestic
market production is generally seen as a way of balancing the ups and downs in the export
market or as a means to gain experience in the management of full-package production. For
efficiency reasons, the type(s) of products produced for the domestic market often are the same
as those produced for export4. In fact many companies used to use the inputs provided by their
US clients for their own brand production, since clients often make overgenerous estimates of
necessary amounts of trim items as well as fabric. Domestic market garments often bear the
label of the local company. Only one company in the region attaches its own label to a specific
and separate product type, namely children’s wear.
Not only is the combination of export with domestic market rare in La Laguna, but domestic
market production in general is of limited importance. Only two sample companies dedicate
all of their production to the domestic market. Both companies produce a wider array of
products, including not only men’s and women’s denim bottoms, but also men’s shirts and
women’s blouses. In general, domestic market production is of a more run-down, small-scale
sweatshop nature, but it is registered: close scrutiny and digging beyond the official industry
listings revealed only a few hidden, semi-clandestine domestic market factories. As will be
discussed in Chapter 7, some linkages may occasionally exist between the export factories and
the domestic market sweatshops. In general however linkages between formal and informal
companies are limited, not in the least because informality in this industry in La Laguna is
limited. This may be due to crowding out by the export factories.
5.3 Firm characteristics
How is the cluster’s specialisation in the production of mass-produced, basic garments for the
US market reflected in the structure of the industry and the characteristics of local firms?
Though local export production for the US market pre-dates NAFTA, the cluster’s export
orientation became much more pronounced after the trade agreement came into effect.
Similarly, NAFTA and the post-NAFTA growth spurt have underscored the region’s
specialisation in jeans. What are the most important changes to have affected the structure of
the local industry over the last decade? With regard to the composition of the cluster, it is no
exaggeration to say that the passage of NAFTA has had a dramatic impact. For example, the
number of garment export firms in the cluster more than doubled in just four years following
the passage of NAFTA.
In this section, three firm characteristics will be further looked into: ownership, firm size and
locational patterns.
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Ownership
During the second half of the 1990s foreign garment firms began to invest in the region5. Most
of the FDI in the region comes from the US; only one Asian garment firm has established a
factory in the region. Some foreign-owned factories are facilities of US TNCs, such as VF
Corporation and Sara Lee; others belong to large US contractors or intermediaries. Most FDI
facilities are 100% foreign-owned. Mexican-foreign joint ventures are rare in the Laguna cluster.
Though the arrival of FDI facilities and their increasing numbers in the years following NAFTA
constitute a significant change, overall FDI is of comparatively limited importance in the
region. At the end of the 1990s the vast majority of garment companies in the Laguna is in full
local ownership and is owned and managed by laguneros.
Firm size
The significance of FDI facilities in the Laguna region lies in their very large scale of operation,
rather than in their numerical importance. The number of employees of most FDI facilities
exceeds a few hundred; spread over several factories, some even employ a few thousand
operators. With the size of their factories, they underscore the on average large-scale nature of
garment production in La Laguna. Several locally owned firms also have a production capacity
of over 100,000 pairs of jeans a week and a workforce of over 1,000. Some of these locally owned
giants were amongst the region’s pioneers. Most started out as small- or medium-sized
factories and expanded little during much of their existence. This changed in the 1990s when
these traditional garment producers went through an impressive growth spurt. Some more
than quadrupled their production volumes in 1994-1999. Together with the newly established
FDI facilities and a few successful local newcomers6, they increase the average scale of operation
of garment companies in the region. The mean size of the garment companies in the region is
very large: 578 employees per firm (see Table 5.1). This scale of operation is much larger than
one would expect in a generally fragmented industry of small-scale factories (see Chapter 1).
The cluster’s specialisation in mass-produced garments and its narrow orientation towards the
US market help explain this extraordinary size structure. Mass-produced garments are
generally produced in comparatively large factories, and the US market is the largest garment
importer in the world. Furthermore, the volume requirements of US buyers are generally very
large (cf. Gibbon, 2002; see Chapter 8).
Table 5.1 gives an overview of the firm size structure of the cluster. It shows considerable
variance in size. There are hardly any micro-enterprises, and even small companies are of
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Table 5.1: Firm size distribution, La Laguna
Company size Absolute % Size class mean Statistics
number (no. employees)
Micro (1-15) 1 1 13 Minimum firm size: 13
Small (16-100) 12 16 63.4 Maximum firm size: 5,680
Medium (101-250) 32 44 144.2 Skewness: 3.2
Large (251-500) 8 11 400.1
Very large (over 500) 20 28 1,751.6
Total 73 100 578.0
Source: Baseline survey, 1998-1999
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comparatively limited importance in La Laguna. Few companies fall into these categories and
the ones that do are, on average, on the upper side of their category7. Most companies in the
region are medium sized and have 101-250 employees. Most of the micro, small and medium-
sized companies in La Laguna were set up after the passage of NAFTA; those that did not start
out as medium sized, have rapidly become such. By comparison, the group of large companies
is surprisingly small.
The most notable phenomenon revealed by the table is the overshadowing of the cluster by a
number of local industrial giants. There is an enormous gap between these giants and the other
firms in the cluster. In fact, the true scale of operation of these giants is obscured in the
classification, but clear from their mean size of over 1,750 employees. Also the skewness
measure indicates a large number of large-scale outliers – for all classes, but also for the very
large companies.
Locational patterns
Urbanisation benefits and the size of the workforce of many companies explain the locational
preference for the cities and the resulting urban concentration of the garment industry, as
discussed in Chapter 4. The dominance of the urban core and especially Torreón is such that US
garment buyers, as well as journalists and academics, commonly refer to the garment cluster in
La Laguna as ‘Torreón’. Strictly speaking they are selling the garment cluster short. Durango
and especially Gómez Palacio play a leading role in the industry. Just over half (54%) of the total
number of urban companies are located in Gómez Palacio. Torreón and Cd. Lerdo
accommodate 40% and 6% of the urban companies, respectively. The structure of the industries
in Torreón and in Gómez Palacio in terms of company size is similar. In both cities, the
medium-sized companies make up the bulk of the businesses. Cd. Lerdo’s garment industry is
not only more humble in size but its structure is somewhat off-balance. It accommodates many
comparatively small factories, many of which have a domestic market orientation, but these are
overshadowed by the large factories of two very large garment companies.
The development of the industry over time differs somewhat between the cities. For several
decades Torreón and Gómez Palacio experienced an equally slow growth of their garment
industries. But during the 1980s, it became more pronounced in Gómez Palacio than in
Torreón. By 1993, approximately two-thirds of the garment producers in the region were
located in Gómez Palacio. The post-NAFTA demand surge and differences in industrial and
regional development and tax policies of the state governments of Durango and Coahuila,
appear to have shifted the balance. In the second half of the 1990s, the growth dynamics within
the urban core changed. A roughly equal number of producers established themselves in
Torreón and in Gómez Palacio. However, the sizes of the new companies in both cities differ
considerably, a fact confirmed by the difference in employment creation. In Torreón in 1994-
1998, just fewer than 4,200 jobs were created, which means that the new companies averaged
244 employees each. In Gómez Palacio ‘only’ about 2,700 jobs were created, an average of 156
employees per establishment. Some new companies were established in Cd. Lerdo in the post-
NAFTA period as well, but recent growth there is mostly due to the sizeable expansion of the
two largest companies there.
The noted shift can to some extent be attributed to the establishment of FDI facilities in La
Laguna-Coahuila. Most large-scale, foreign-owned subsidiaries are located in La Laguna-
Coahuila, divided about equally between Torreón and the rural areas. This positions Torreón
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way ahead of Gómez Palacio and Cd. Lerdo in terms of foreign investment and average plant
size. In fact, the difference applies to La Laguna-Coahuila and La Laguna-Durango: FDI in the
rural areas of Durango has remained scarce over the past years certainly in comparison to
investment growth in the Coahuila side of the region (see also Figure 8.6). Though the pattern
is no doubt a result of many coinciding factors, differences in the effectiveness of state
government efforts to attract foreign investment, and to promote the regional development of
their part of the Comarca, appear to play a role. The preference of FDI investments for Coahuila
may well be closely linked to the effective promotional activities performed by the state
government of Coahuila, as discussed in Box 4.1.
5.4 Company structure
The previous section indicated the wide variety in company sizes and pointed out the
importance of exceptionally large garment companies in La Laguna. The large scale of operation
of local companies is reflected in the prevalence of multi-plant companies. Companies in the
Laguna garment cluster are split almost equally into single-plant versus multi-plant
companies; single-plant companies are only slightly more common. These companies have
concentrated all their business functions in one production facility. Most consist primarily of a
shop floor with one or more sewing lines and only one small office for administrative purposes.
Some do not have an office. Many single-plant companies are medium sized and the majority
are Mexican-owned. It will be no surprise that micro companies and almost all small garment
producers in the region are single-plant companies.
Multi-plant companies are an important group in the local garment cluster. Most of these
companies have 200 or more employees. Overall they form a multifaceted group. For example, a
company with a relatively small sewing facility and equally humble laundry falls into this
category. So does a locally owned giant that has five sewing factories, a laundry and cutting
room in the region. Finally, a subsidiary of a TNC with two factories in the region and a great
number of subsidiaries in other regions or countries also falls into this category.
A subdivision of the multi-plant group into ‘simple multi-plant companies’ and corporate
companies (see Table 5.2) renders a more detailed understanding of prevalent company
structures in La Laguna. Simple multi-plant companies are the most common type in La
Laguna. They have various production units, which in most cases are used as a way of physically
separating the various stages of the production process. New plants have usually been added
over time, as expansion was needed but impossible within the existing production facilities.
Most commonly, offices of management and administration are integrated into one of the
production facilities. Many of these companies are family businesses. None is embedded in a
hierarchical, corporate structure, with headquarters, formal divisions and several management
layers. Most simple multi-plant companies are locally owned; the majority are large and very
large companies. A large number of the medium-sized companies and a few foreign-owned
businesses also fall into this category. The FDI facilities that are part of a simple multi-plant
company are US-based contractors that may have one or two production facilities and their
headquarters in the US. The prevalence of the simple multi-plant structure in the region
appears to be the result of the rapid and unplanned or ‘organic’ growth of garment firms trying
to fully exploit the large and growing demand by adding new sewing lines, factories and more
personnel. Figures 5.2 and 5.3 illustrate the structure of two very different simple multi-plant
garment companies in the region.
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Casolco USA
location: El Paso, Texas
employees: 30
activity: distribution
Casolco
location: Gómez Palacio
employees: 355
activity: headquarters,
administrative offices,
assembly
Casolco El Huarache
location: Cd.Lerdo
employees: 220
activity: assembly
Casolco Durango
location: Durango
employees: 175
activity: assembly
Casolco Corte
location: Villa Juárez
employees: 125
activity: cutting
Casolco Finish
location: Villa Juárez
employees: 400
activity: laundry and finish
Casolco Villa Juárez
location: Villa Juárez
employees: 125
activity: cutting
United States
Mexico
Source: Baseline survey, 1998-1999
Figure 5.3: Casolco: a simple multi-plant company in La Laguna
Roman
location: Gómez Palacio
employees: 50
activity: sorting of batches
Roman
location: Gómez Palacio
employees: 50
activity: rescreening
Roman
location: Torreón
employees: 1,050
activity: assembly, laundry
and finishing
6099
Source: Baseline survey, 1998-1999
Figure 5.2: Roman: a simple multi-plant company in La Laguna
Table 5.2: Company structure of garment companies in La Laguna
Ownership
Mexican Foreign Joint venture Total
Single plant 39 1 – 40
Multi plant 21 3 – 24
Corporate multi-plant 2 6 1 9
Total 62 10 1 73
Source: Baseline survey, 1998-1999
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Multi-plant company Roman (see Figure 5.2) has concentrated almost all production activities
in one large facility beside the ring-road in Torreón. Even though everything could be
concentrated in this one facility, this is not done because, as the owner says ‘we already owned
the other two properties’.
At the time of the survey, Casolco (see Figure 5.3) still had its headquarters in Gómez Palacio,
but was in the process of moving it out of the urban area to Villa Juárez – a small village just
outside Cd. Lerdo – where it already had several factories, including the cutting room and
finishing facility.
By comparison, the structure of corporate companies is more complex. It commonly
incorporates several business or product departments in a strictly defined, hierarchical business
structure. Generally, local FDI facilities of brand-name TNCs are part of such a structure, in
which they are subordinated to corporate headquarters outside the region. Six such facilities
are present in La Laguna sample (see Table 5.2). Besides these foreign-owned subsidiaries of
branded US manufacturers, a US-Mexican joint venture and two large locally owned companies
can be classified as corporate multi-plant companies.
The two corporate locally owned companies are exceptional in the region. Not insignificantly,
they are subsidiaries of locally owned, diversified companies for which apparel production is
but one of their many activities. In both cases apparel is a relatively recent diversification
outside the main activity of the group. One is the apparel division of a nation-wide
supermarket chain, the other is the apparel division of a company that also produces food
products and natural gas, and has a transportation division and several other divisions.
Figure 5.4 illustrates the structure of this latter locally owned corporate company, called
Lajat, for whom apparel (and later textile production) were completely new activities when it
first factory was opened in the late 1980s. After a few years the company gave up its ambitions to
be vertically integrated and sold its textile division, but in apparel it had become one of the
largest companies in the region by the end of the 1990s.
Many garment companies in the region consist of several production facilities. Disentangling
firm-level data to arrive at the factory level provides valuable and more detailed information on
the structure of the cluster. To this effect, the location of all production plants that form part of
the sample will be briefly examined (see Table 5.3)8. This will give an indication of the true
sphere of influence of garment companies in La Laguna.
The plant-level data confirm the central position of the urban area within the garment cluster:
78% of the garment factories in the region are located in Torreón, Gómez Palacio or Cd. Lerdo.
On the other hand, the rural area of La Laguna is clearly a popular site for the establishment of
garment factories as well. A total of 31 plants are located in the rural areas. Five of these plants
are foreign-owned subsidiaries of US manufacturers; the others are recently established
factories owned by companies based in the urban node of La Laguna.
Site selection for factories seems to depend on both the size and the ownership of the company.
Plants belonging to smaller companies are generally located in the vicinity of the other plant(s),
often in the same city and sometimes even in the same neighbourhood or street. Similarly,
several foreign-owned multi-plant companies in La Laguna also selected a location in the
region, either urban or rural, for the establishment of various plants. Cd. Lerdo is a case in
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point: five of the largest factories located in this city are owned by one very large US-owned
company. Wrangler can serve as an example of company strategy in this respect; it has chosen to
concentrate the laundry, cutting room and small parts assembly within one industrial park in
Torreón. In addition, two of Wrangler’s assembly plants are located at a short distance from
each other in the municipio of San Pedro.
The local giants mentioned in the previous section have many production facilities. In
addition, they are the only ones to spread their plants over different locations in the urban and
rural areas of La Laguna. Several have even invested in factories outside the Laguna, in other
parts of Mexico or in the US border region. Some of their factories are located in the rural area
surrounding the Laguna region, viz. in the states of Durango and Coahuila or in the
neighbouring states, Tamaulipas and Zacatecas. An equal number of plants have been
established in locations further away from La Laguna, in San Luis Potosí and even as far away as
Michoacan and Oaxaca. The result is a scattering of factories over sometimes quite extensive
geographical areas. All the factories in Mexico outside La Laguna included in Table 5.4 are
owned by just six large, locally owned garment producers in La Laguna. Not only are they more
active in terms of the number of new factories they have established, but they also invest in
places far away from their region and their other factories. The number of garment factories
outside La Laguna is quite impressive, especially bearing in mind that most of these facilities
started operations during the late 1990s. All have been set up within a short time span as a way
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Lajat Lavanderia
location: Gómez Palacio
employees: 250
activity: laundry
K-Lajat
location: Cd. Mante
employees: 500
activity: assembly
K-Lajat
location: Gómez Palacio
employees: 250
activity: assembly
(Kentucky) Lajat
location: Torreón
employees: 1,000
activity: headquarters, laundry
cutting, administration offices
K-Lajat
location: Nazareno (1)
employees: 250
activity: assembly
K-Lajat
location: Nazareno (2)
employees: 450
activity: assembly
K-Lajat
location: Nazareno (3)
employees: 500
activity: assembly
K-Lajat
location: Gpe. Victoria
employees: 600
activity: assembly
K-Lajat
location: Cuencamé (2)
employees: 500
activity: assembly
K-Lajat
location: Cuencamé (1)
employees: 500
activity: assembly
gas apparel transport food preparation cement textile
Source: Baseline survey, 1998-1999
Figure 5.4: Lajat: a corporate multi-plant company in La Laguna
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to avoid the tightening urban labour market by tapping into captive, cheaper rural labour
reserves. This behaviour distinguishes the local giants from other more conservative companies
in the region and explains why they are locally referred to as ‘leaders’. The apparent low-road
component or focus of their labour strategy will be discussed in Chapter 8.
Several of these large Mexican companies as well as a few other, smaller companies own
production facilities in the US, most notably in the border city of El Paso. The facilities in El
Paso are mostly offices dedicated to buyer service, logistics and customs procedures. Some are
warehouses and a few have a cutting room. Through production facilities in El Paso, companies
in La Laguna can tap into the remnants of local expertise and industry-specific infrastructure.
The facilities elsewhere in the US are not concentrated in a particular city, but are scattered
throughout the Northeast. Most are headquarters of the FDI factories in the region; only one is
a sales office of a very large Mexican-owned garment company in La Laguna.
5.5 Factory labour force
The tremendous growth of the garment industry and individual garment companies in La
Laguna has been paralleled by a possibly even more impressive growth in the garment labour
force. As mentioned, in the early 1990s the garment industry in the region is estimated to have
employed just over 16,000 people. The years after NAFTA are marked by accelerated job
creation in the garment industry so that by the end of the 1990s, garment employment was
close to 80,000 people. The vast majority of garment employees are factory workers, mostly
sewing operators or costureras, as well as supervisors, bundle boys, cutting room and laundry
personnel. No evidence was found of the involvement of homeworkers in export production,
nor in the domestic market segment of the industry9.
In the local companies over 90% of employees are shop-floor operators. This ties in with
expectations based on the labour-intensive nature of the garment production process as
discussed in Chapter 1 and with the national pattern (INEGI, 2000). The remaining percentage
can be subdivided into administrative personnel and technicians (8%) and management (2%).
Traditionally, the garment industry in the region employed a very high percentage of women.
The reason for this was women’s perceived dexterity and home-experience with sewing, as well
as a culture that made it hard for men to sit at a sewing machine without being the laughing
stock of their macho peers. Many female garment workers are young, unmarried and have no
children, but madres solteras (single mothers) also work in the factories.
Following a pattern noted for the Mexican maquiladora sector at large (van Dooren &
Verkoren, 2000; MacLachlan & Aguilar, 1993), by the end of the 1990s the employment pattern
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Table 5.3: Number and location of production facilities directly linked to companies in La Laguna
Torreón Gómez Cd. Rural Rural Vicinity Mex. El Paso US Total
Palacio Lerdo L-Dgo. L-Coah. Laguna elsew. elsew.
(rural)
Production facilities 42 59 10 15 16 8 8 9 5 200
owned by companies
in La Laguna
Source: Baseline survey, 1998-1999
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in the region had changed significantly. Women were still in the majority in many of the local
garment factories, but as rapid growth of the industry increased the demand for sewing
operators, many local factories started to hire men. The share of male garment operators has
risen considerably. By the end of the 1990s, on average 36% of the factory workers are men and
in some factories male operators constitute the majority. This is a break from the pattern
typically associated with the garment industry and from the status of the Mexican export sector
as an employer of women.
However, these data hide considerable stratification by gender at the shop-floor level (see also
Bair & Gereffi, 2001). Generally, the better paying jobs in the sewing lines are held by men. The
more sophisticated machines are operated by men, and laundries and cutting rooms are also
dominated by men. In some cases this is validated by the strenuous nature of the jobs – viz.
sewing inseams, handling large volumes of wet jeans – while in others it seems to have become
an undisputed fact of factory life10. From the perspective of the factories the expectation that
women will leave after a couple of years, when they get married or have children, justifies their
reluctance to invest in their training – which is necessary to get a better job11. Gender
stratification extends also into higher levels in the employment hierarchy, into the offices of
the factories. At the intermediate level of administrative and technical personnel, shares of
males and females are roughly equal. However, offices are almost uniformly the domain of
women, while technicians are men. Also in management, traditional gender stratifications
seem hardly to have changed: 78% of the managers are male. Women commonly head the
human resources or sometimes the financial departments, while almost all general managers
are men.
A significant shift in the age of factory workers has been reported by many local manufacturers.
No accurate information on the ages of employees could be collected from the factories, but
observation on the shop floor quickly reveals the young age of many garment workers. Most
companies in La Laguna appear to honour the legal minimum age: no children were seen in the
factories. However, a high percentage of shop-floor workers are aged between sixteen and
eighteen. Local manufacturers estimate the average age of garment employees in the cities to
have come down over the past years to an average of just below twenty years. For many of the
younger employees, work in the garment factory is their first job. Some consider it a good
alternative to schooling and have left middle-school (prepa) to earn money in the garment
industry.
In line with general practice in the garment industry, wages in the Laguna region are generally
based on the piece-rate system. They consist of a base wage, which is determined by the type of
operation. This base rate is commonly supplemented by a certain payment per garment or a
productivity bonus. Added to the wages are a number of legally set benefits, including
contributions to Mexico’s social security system (IMSS) and a minimum number of official
holidays. In La Laguna the base rate paid in most garment factories (i.e. around 200 pesos a
week) is somewhat higher than the legal minimum wage. When the piece rates are added,
garment workers in the region in 1998 earned on average 409 pesos a week. This average
conceals considerable disparities, however: a few companies reported an average wage of just
above 200 pesos, while others paid an average of 750 pesos. Wage differences may be large also
between operators of the same company, depending on the operation and productivity. During
the late 1990s the urban labour market for sewing operators tightened due to the explosive
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growth of the industry, and upward pressures on wages were evident. In response to these
pressures many companies in the region began to offer additional benefits or services. A
company canteen that sells food at subsidised prices, and the provision of free transportation,
sports activities, etc. are commonly found in La Laguna, certainly in the larger companies.
These types of benefits may differ greatly from one company to another, and are used as a
means to compete for labour (see section 8.5.1).
When relating types of companies to intra-company labour patterns in general as discussed
above no overall clear patterns emerge. The patterns sketched above apply in general terms to
the local industry as a whole. Significant differences between companies may exist, but cannot
be generalised for types of companies.
As indicated in Table 5.4, weekly salaries vary with company size. The figures indicate no linear
connection between company size and wage level. Somewhat surprisingly, medium- and large-
sized companies pay below average wages, lower even than the micro and small companies. The
observed wage pattern may be explained by relating it to the provision of fringe benefits. On
the whole, many of the smaller companies are unable to provide a wide array of fringe benefits.
For example, the provision of transportation and a canteen is not common for these smaller
companies, which do not have sufficiently large workforces to justify the required expenses.
Within the tight urban labour market, these companies appear to compensate for their
minimal fringe benefits by paying relatively high wages. In the medium- and large-sized
companies, the balance between fringe benefits and wages is the opposite: the range of benefits
offered is extensive, alleviating the wage-increase pressures. On average the very large
companies in the region offer the highest wages as well as an extensive package of benefits.
However, as indicated by the standard deviation (S.D.) value, considerable differences do exist
between these companies.
5.6 La Laguna: typical garment cluster or a deviant case?
The previous sections sketched the basic outlines of the Laguna garment cluster. Though La
Laguna has been involved in garment production for the domestic market for several decades,
its current structure reflects its recent rise as an export cluster. The Laguna cluster is narrowly
specialised in the production of blue jeans for export to the US. The average scale of production
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Table 5.4: Labour force characteristics and wage levels per company size
Size Mean % Mean % male Mean wage
production workers production workers (Mex. pesos)
Micro 92.3 16.7 400
Small 88.8 32.6 423 S.D. 69.9
Medium 90.4 36.8 383 S.D. 64.7
Large 93.0 49.8 365 S.D. 105.9
Very large 89.8 32.4 464 S.D. 126.2
Total 90.2 36.0 409
N.B. The legal minimal daily wage in 1999 for the region was 38.35 pesos (INEGI, 2000c); the working week
generally is 6 days. On average the wages paid in La Laguna are significantly above the legal minimum.
Source: Baseline survey, 1998-1999
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of local factories is large and the cluster is dominated by a few giant companies. Most garment
companies are located in the urban area. However, as a way to avoid the tight urban labour
market and the upward pressure on wages, garment factories are also being established in the
rural areas of the region. On the whole, wages and conditions in the local industry are above
those legally required in Mexico. Sweatshops were not encountered in the export segment and
informality is limited. Rapid growth in export opportunities has led to a partial crowding out
of domestic market production.
Compared to the discussion of the garment industry in Chapter 1, certain elements of the
Laguna cluster appear to deviate from general patterns in the industry and well from patterns
typically associated with clusters. This prompts a comparison of Laguna with other garment
clusters recently discussed in the literature. This section presents a brief overview of a few of
such garment clusters. It examines the structure and characteristics of these clusters, including
cluster size and firm size, product and market orientation and workforce, so that these can be
compared to the characteristics of the Laguna cluster that were described in the previous
sections.
A recent World Development Special Issue on industrial clusters in LMICs presents the case of the
Ludhiana knitwear cluster in India (Tewari, 1999). Ludhiana has a very long history in knitwear
production, and over the course of several decades has developed backward linkages to local
yarn production as well as the machinery producing sector. It is the main source for woollen
and acrylic knitwear and hosiery for India, but it also has a strong exporting position. For a long
time the Soviet Union was the main export market for Ludhiana’s garments. After the collapse
of the Soviet economy, the industry in Ludhiana recovered relatively quickly and managed to
penetrate the US and European markets. Locally produced garments include scarves, sweaters,
slacks, vests and socks. There are companies of all sizes in Ludhiana, but the majority fall into
the SME category. Most companies are in local ownership, though immigrants play an active
role in the industry.
Cawthorne (1995) recorded the case of another very large garment cluster in India: Tiruppur.
The Tiruppur cluster produces a diversified range of cotton knitwear products for markets in
India, and increasingly also for Western Europe and the US. Originally made up of very small-
scale enterprises, the cluster now includes medium- and large-sized companies and is an
important element in the local economy. Furthermore, the cluster maintains backward
linkages to local weavers and spinning mills. A dense web of local inter-firm linkages based on
tightly organised divisions of labour supports the competitive position of Tiruppur. After a
long history as a domestic market cluster, export production is now providing a strong impetus
for dynamic growth and upgrading, especially for the larger factories in the cluster. However,
the ‘sweating’ of labour (including young children) remains an important pillar of Tiruppur’s
success.
Another garment cluster in the World Development issue on clusters is that of Gamarra, in Lima,
Peru (Visser, 1999; see also Visser, 1996). In fact, the garment industry in Lima has been studied
by Visser (ibid.) and Ypeij (1995). Though each study has its own focus, they concur on the
structural characteristics of the local garment industry. With some variation between different
parts of the city (Visser, 1996), small-scale clothing firms make up the lion’s share of Lima’s
garment industry – so much so that the majority of Lima’s garment companies have fewer than
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ten employees. Many firms are home based and rely extensively on family labour. The Gamarra
cluster studied by Visser accommodates a very large number of small garment firms. Most of
the clothing produced in Lima is destined for the Peruvian market. Local firms are actively
engaged in the marketing of their products and often have a booth or small shop where traders
and wholesalers can buy the clothing directly. Different types of cheap fashion garments are
produced, including shirts, children’s wear and sportswear.
Several other garment producing regions in Latin America are located in Mexico. Peña
St.Martin (1994) studied the garment industry in Yucatán, a state in the south-east of Mexico
widely known for the production of guayaberas (traditional, embroidered men’s shirts).
Guayaberas were still an important local product during the late 1980s when Peña St.Martin
carried out her research. But the industry had diversified and was producing casual wear –
mostly pants and shirts – for the south-east of Mexico; some local garment companies were also
exploring export opportunities. Concentrating on the state capital, Mérida, and its immediate
surroundings, Peña St.Martin found that in the context of product diversification and changes
in market orientation, the traditional organisation of production based on an extensive system
of subcontracting relations persisted. Mérida’s garment industry includes companies of all
sizes but consists for the most part of small factories. Local garment production was found to
rely extensively on linkages between formal and informal segments of the industry. Peña
St.Martin describes the ‘diffuse factory’ system, predominant in the local industry, which
allows formal garment factories to maintain flexibility through subcontracting linkages to
clandestine factories and sweatshops. This system is so pervasive that Peña St.Martin concurs
with the estimate of local experts that in the area there are three clandestine garment workers
for every formal factory employee. Furthermore, the tentacles of the diffuse factory system
reach directly into local households, through the widespread and institutionalised
incorporation of homeworkers in the rural areas into the production process. All homeworkers
and most factory garment workers in Mérida are women. Middlemen serve as intermediaries
between urban factories and homeworkers; they distribute the materials, collect the garments
and pay the homeworkers.
Smith (1988) and Vangstrup (2002) both studied garment clusters in Central Mexico that
specialise in the production of knitwear. Smith’s very detailed study deals with a cluster in
Aguascalientes that is known nationally for intricate embroidery and other artisanal textile
work (deshilados). However, the local garment industry produces a much wider range of
garments, mostly outerwear, including jeans and other types of pants, women’s blouses, skirts,
dresses, sports caps and even household goods such as bedcovers. The garments made in
Aguascalientes are sold on the national market, principally in surrounding states and in Mexico
City. Export was found to be virtually negligible. The Aguascalientes cluster consists
overwhelmingly of small-scale factories: more than 45% of the local factories had five or fewer
employees, while fewer than 7% had more than 100. Similar to Peña St. Martin’s findings in
Mérida, Smith’s study points to a direct link between the garment industry and local
households in Aguascalientes. Homeworkers are incorporated into the local production
system, though apparently in a less extensive and institutionalised manner than they are in
Yucatán. Furthermore, small garment producers in this city were mostly family businesses
where the most important labour input was provided by family members. [ 149 ]
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Table 5.5: Basic characteristics of La Laguna and other garment clusters
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Table 5.5 summarises the basic characteristics of the above-mentioned Indian and Latin
American garment clusters as well as those of the Laguna cluster.
The table shows the Laguna cluster to be a deviant case and confirms the idea that Laguna’s
distinctive features are indeed distinctive. The other garment clusters consist of a large number
of small production units, including in several cases, homeworkers. Most produce a relatively
broad range of garments for the domestic market. Clearly, La Laguna is different. More
interesting than this observation in itself, are the questions regarding how this may affect
intra-cluster (inter-firm) competition and cooperation dynamics (see Chapter 6). Similarly it
raises questions on the functioning of the cluster within international value chains and
networks (subjects of Chapter 7).
5.7 Summary and conclusion
Though the Laguna region has a history in garment manufacturing, the post-NAFTA boom has
been very impressive and has profoundly transformed the local industry. From a humble,
locally integrated industry, it became one of the largest export bulwarks in Mexico that
produces jeans for the US. Based on the findings in this chapter and in reference to the title of
Chapter 4, it is important to emphasise that the recent export orientation has entailed a
severing of the link between the jeans produced locally and local cotton production.
Based on the export-induced demand growth, the number of garment factories has more than
doubled and garment employment grew even more vigorously in the four years following the
passage of NAFTA. The post-NAFTA upsurge is a decisive factor in the current structure and
characteristics of the Laguna garment cluster. This chapter has shown that the garment
industry in La Laguna is characterised by a very narrow product and market orientation: it
overwhelmingly produces jeans – typically classified as basic, commodity garments – for export
to the US. Production for the domestic market is largely neglected, as a result of the crowding
out by and the subordination to export opportunities. A number of large FDI facilities have
been established in the post-NAFTA period, but local-ownership predominates in the local
garment industry. The scale of operation of garment firms in the region varies from small to
very large, but the average size is large – larger than expected on the basis of the literature.
Important in this respect is the presence of a number of very large or giant firms that employ
several thousand workers. Business structures are fairly rudimentary: even many of the very
large companies in the region can be characterised as simple multi-plant companies that do
not have a well-developed corporate structure. Garment production is concentrated in the
urban area, but some FDI facilities as well as a number of production units of urban-based
firms have been established in the rural area. Though fairly evenly distributed over the states of
Coahuila and Durango, recently growth in Coahuila – actively stimulated by the state
government – has been more dynamic. Finally, the rapid growth of the industry and the great
demand for sewing operators has, despite the incorporation of more men, youngsters and
rural-urban commuters, resulted in a tight labour market and rising labour cost. Based on
these characteristics and compared to other garment clusters, La Laguna can be seen as a deviant
case.
How can the distinguishing features of the Laguna cluster be understood, or indeed explained?
What are their implications? To a large extent the differences illustrated in Table 5.5 may be
explained by differences between the other clusters and La Laguna with regard to their entry
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(point) into the globalisation process. The clusters presented in the table were either still
shielded or excluded from globalisation or – in the case of Ludhiana – were able to build on
steady endogenous growth, local know-how and extensive experience in the domestic market
to participate in global garment markets. By contrast, this chapter has confirmed that the
recent passage of NAFTA has played a determinant role in making garment production in the
Laguna region a ‘booming business’. In fact, it has done more than that: when the NAFTA
liberalisation took effect, the then humble local garment industry was faced with a huge, in fact
virtually indefinite demand surge from the US. The disproportionate relation between demand
and supply and the business opportunities this represented caused a tremendous growth spurt
of the industry in La Laguna, especially because the generally low barriers to entry in garment
production were lowered further in La Laguna by the fact that production was limited to the
assembly of provided fabric and trim items. Hence, people with little or no previous experience
in garment production opened garment factories. It would not be too far-fetched to believe
that in this spurt, exogenous demand – rather than endogenous capabilities, know-how and
strategies – played a determining role. The homogeneity with regard to products, labour and
markets found in this chapter indirectly confirms this idea. Rather than the result of a high
degree of unison in business orientations and strategies, it points to the fact that the large
demand for blue jeans from US buyers may have taken away any incentives for local
entrepreneurs to consider alternative products or markets.
Empirical findings with regard to the structure of the Laguna cluster raise questions
concerning both extra-regional and intra-regional linkages and their relative importance for
the functioning of the cluster. Does the apparent importance of exogenous forces in the recent
shaping of the Laguna cluster mean that in the day-to-day functioning of the cluster and its
individual firms, vertical network relations with buyers prevail over horizontal cluster
relations?
It has been shown that the industry consists overwhelmingly of local contractors and
subcontractors, complemented by a limited number of very large-scale production facilities of
US-owned branded manufacturers. This raises questions about the position of an export
cluster such as La Laguna vis-à-vis its US buyers. The narrow focus on blue jeans for export to
the US underlines this important question of dependency and vulnerability. Therefore, extra-
regional buyers, network relations with such buyers and different strategies for management of
such relations will be the focus of Chapter 7.
First however, intra-regional linkages need to be examined, as will be done in Chapter 6. The
structure of La Laguna, with a few dominant, large firms as outlined in this chapter, has traits of
mature clusters in LMICs (see Chapter 2). The question to be answered is whether intra-cluster
linkages display a hub-and-spoke pattern. In other words, do large local companies function as
a spider in a web of local linkages and as a link to the market and its buyers? The following
chapter focuses on the prevalence and strength of local linkages, the influence of local
embeddedness of such linkages, and other cluster dynamics in the Laguna garment industry.
Notes
1 Interviews with Sr. José Iza (sr.) and Sr. Roberto Tohmé (sr.) in 1999.
2 Various forms of domestic market production appear to have been effectively displaced by export production. This
may have entailed the abolition of the production of garments under own design and brand for the local, regional
and national markets because ‘export production is more profitable and easier’ (cf. Rabellotti, 2001 for a similar
downgrading process in Brenta, Italy).
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3 This serves as a conservative estimate of the relative share of denim products within the total production volume.
For a more accurate estimate, a correction would need to be made for the relative importance of the main product as
well as for the relative importance of the sample companies within the industry in the region. This would probably
lead to higher estimates: up to 90% of the total garment production volume for La Laguna consists of denim
garments.
4 In fact some companies use the inputs provided by their US clients for their own brand production, since clients
often make overgenerous estimates of necessary amounts of trim items as well as fabric.
5 Preceding the passage of NAFTA, one US garment firm had already established factories in the region. However, the
remaining FDI facilities in the region are the result of post-NAFTA investment.
6 Some of these new local giants, have expanded their businesses exceptionally fast, apparently without doing
anything extraordinary at all. All throughout the fieldworks, the researcher was told there was ‘something fishy’
about these companies, that – it was felt – made the other companies look like fools for not growing so fast and
effortlessly. Though this talk could be discarded as jealousy and gossip (see also Chapter 6), it is not unlikely money
laundering played a role in certain companies (see also Proceso, 2003).
7 The size classes used here are adapted to fit the research population and are larger than in most other studies. For
example, the largest size class in Visser’s (1996) study of the Gamarra cluster was 20-99 employees.
8 Those plants that are indirectly linked to companies in the region will not be taken into consideration. Production
facilities of TNCs that do not maintain linkages to local facilities are not included. Rural cooperatives are also not
included.
9 Homeworkers are not incorporated into the production process. The nature of the dominant product and process
almost prohibits the use of homeworkers. Moreover, the quest of most of the cluster’s US buyers for more control
over their networks has in many cases led to the formal prohibition of the incorporation of homeworkers.
According to sources in the region, the involvement of homeworkers was quite common until the 1960s. Then, the
volumes involved were still much smaller and homeworkers mostly did pressing of the pants.
10 There is considerable sex-related tension in many factories in the region. Not only does an obvious macho
atmosphere dominate certain departments of some local garment companies, but the researcher has witnessed
several cases of sexual harassment (and allegations thereof) and has heard several complaints about the impact of
gender tensions on the working atmosphere. This has caused some companies in the region to take strict measures
such as prohibiting ‘flirtatious behaviour’ and holding hands on the factory premises. Others maintain existing
gender divisions within the factories.
11 In an industrial environment plagued by very high turnover rates for the overall labour force (see Chapters 6 and 7),
this argument may no longer be very convincing.
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6 Intra-cluster linkages and
embeddedness in La Laguna
The previous chapter examined the structure and characteristics of the Laguna garment cluster
and found, amongst other things, an exceptionally strong orientation towards producing jeans
for export to the US. It also showed a generally large scale of operation and the presence of very
large garment companies in the cluster. These unique features of the Laguna cluster and its
explosive growth during the late 1990s prompt questions regarding the significance of intra-
cluster linkages, localisation economies and local embeddedness for the competitiveness of
individual firms and the cluster. These questions are the subject of this chapter.
The aim of this chapter is two-pronged. First, the prevalence and role of intra-cluster
linkages in supporting the position of local companies is discussed. Second, the nature of the
economic and sociocultural environment will be examined in order to shed light on their
potential contribution to the competitive position of local garment companies. In other words,
are the cluster, its firms and linkages embedded in an environment conducive to the
construction of trust-based social capital, which – along the lines proposed by Fukuyama (1995)
and Schmitz (1999) – may stimulate local development?
This chapter begins by examining intra-cluster relationships between different types of
companies, and between companies, public and private meso-level organisations and labour.
The final section explores the embeddedness of the cluster. The economic and sociocultural
environment in which La Laguna’s cluster is embedded will be examined, as will the way it may
impact intra-cluster linkages and ties1, the competitive position of the cluster and its
individual firms.
6.1 Supply linkages: subcontracting
Many studies of industrial districts and clusters, including those of garment clusters, note the
presence and benefits of dense, localised supply linkages in regional agglomerations of
industrial activity (cf. Visser, 1996; Cawthorne, 1995). In this section, linkages with suppliers of
material inputs (mainly fabric and trim items) and intra-chain supply linkages with other
producers or manufacturers (in a subcontractor’s role) will be discussed separately. Intra-chain
supply linkages with subcontractors will be discussed first.
Subcontracting is common practice in the Laguna region: 40% of the garment manufacturers in
the region indicate the use of subcontractors. Insufficient production capacity to deal with
large orders in the high seasons is the main reason to contract out work: 60% of local
manufacturers that put out work to subcontractors indicated this as the reason for doing so
(see Figure 6.1). Other and less important reasons cited were: increase of production flexibility
(20%), tapping into specialised skills of the subcontractor (14%) and lowering of production cost
(3%). In other words, subcontracting in La Laguna is overwhelmingly of the complementary
industrial type; speciality and cost-saving subcontracting are of limited importance.
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Subcontracting arrangements in La Laguna are also highly localised. Based on the ease of
control and logistics that comes with short distances between contractor and subcontractor,
subcontracting is primarily a local affair.
With the exception of a few specialised embroiderers, subcontractors in La Laguna are
responsible for at least one entire stage or node of the value chain, such as assembly, laundry or
transportation. By far most common is the subcontracting of pure assembly work (65% of the
cases). The assembly process sub-phases or sub-activities – such as the insertion of buttonholes
and the attachment of waistbands and belt loops – are not spread over various subcontractors,
but are automated by the contractor or performed in-house by one single subcontractor.
While insufficient in-house production capacity is the main motivation for the contracting out
of work, the very largest companies with the largest production capacities are the most
extensively involved in subcontracting: 75% of these companies use subcontractors. Fewer large,
medium and small companies contract out work, and subcontracting becomes increasingly less
common the smaller the size of the company. Table 6.1 illustrates some basic patterns in
subcontracting in La Laguna.
For smaller companies that use subcontractors, a large share of their total production is
produced through subcontracting linkages2. In general, as in-house capacity increases, the
relative importance of subcontracting decreases. Again, however, the very large companies
deviate from the pattern. They contract out a large share (almost a quarter) of their total
production. They also maintain links with a large number of subcontractors.
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Table 6.1: Features of subcontracting relations, La Laguna
Company size % companies that use Mean % of total Average no. of 
subcontractors production capacity subcontractors
subcontracted
Micro 0 0 0
Small 17 55 3
Medium 27 21 5
Large 29 7 2
Very large 75 24 15
Source: Baseline survey, 1998-1999
lowering of cost
insufficient in-house capacity
flexibility
specialist skills of subcontractor
other
6099
Source: Baseline survey, 1998-1999
3
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3
Figure 6.1: Subcontracting motivations, La Laguna
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Emerging pattern
Most subcontractors in La Laguna are SMEs. Overall, subcontracting in La Laguna occurs
predominantly between very large contracting companies and small- or medium-sized
subcontractors. This pattern is typical of Markusen’s (1996) ‘hub-and-spoke’ cluster model as
discussed in Chapter 2. Many very large companies have integrated vertically and have cutting
and laundry facilities that are highly modern, automated and large: capacity in these activities
generally exceeds their in-house assembly capacity. Thus when Christmas and ‘back-to-school’
orders flood these factories with work, their cutting room and laundry are used to their full
capacity and subcontractors are hired to do some of the assembly work. Subcontracting is
embedded in the structure of the local giants through a structural mismatch between
maximum in-house assembly capacity and cutting and laundry capacities.
This mismatch concerns large volumes: even when on average ‘only’ 24% of their total
production capacity is subcontracted, this may still be more than 50,000 garments on a weekly
basis. In the management of their local subcontracting network, very large companies spread
their risk and limit their dependence on individual subcontractors. Subcontractors seldom
carry a responsibility for more than 5% of the total production capacity of their client, which
means that contracting firms rely on a large number of mostly SME subcontractors. On
average, fifteen subcontractors work for one very large company, but several very large
companies have much larger subcontracting networks (the largest at the time of the survey had
fifty-eight subcontractors).
Conversely, many subcontractors rely on only one local client. Only a small minority are able to
work for various local clients at the same time. It is even rarer for subcontractors to be able to
combine subcontracting with working for US buyers. This is because local contractors often
monopolise the limited production capacity of their subcontractors. Only in some cases is this a
matter of strategy; it usually reflects the wide gap in production capacity between local
principal firms (i.e. local giants) and their subcontractors. This general pattern is also followed
by large- and medium-sized contracting companies: they assign small orders to each of their
individual subcontractors. However, the subcontracting strategies of large companies are
different in that they only subcontract a very small part of their total production (see Table 6.1).
While network linkages with buyers will be further discussed in Chapter 8, suffice it to note
here that inspection of the survey data reveals that most large firms produce directly for a
comparatively small US buyer, and that often their entire production capacity is dedicated to
just this one buyer. Even though they are not formally captive in the relationship, they have
comparatively limited room to manoeuvre. The buyers generally do not issue orders that
exceed the production capacities of large companies.
Not immediately evident, but to some extent indirectly deducible from Table 6.1 and
illustrated in Figures I.1 to I.3 (Appendix I), is that in general subcontracting within the cluster
is confined to one single tier of subcontractors3. The limited degree of specialisation in the
cluster is one obvious reason for limited tiering. Also, the Laguna cluster is small enough for
local contractors to be aware of the production capacity of subcontractors. They distribute
production accordingly and avoid contracting out volumes that exceed the production capacity
of a subcontractor at any given time. This allows more control and limits non-compliance risks
with regard to delivery time and quality. The limited depth of the subcontracting networks
results from the nature of the product (which leaves little room for advanced specialisation) and
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from the increasing concern of US buyers and their local contractors with control over the
subcontractors in their networks.
Local subcontracting patterns have been stable in recent years: fewer than 25% of the
subcontracting companies indicated that they had changed their subcontracting strategies. A
few companies noted a slight increase in both the number of subcontractors used and the
production volumes contracted out. This is hardly surprising bearing in mind the post-NAFTA
production boom. In general, however, production growth has been achieved through
company expansion, rather than an explosive growth of local subcontracting.
Implications
What are the implications of the above-mentioned features of subcontracting in La Laguna?
What may the consequences be of observed local interdependency patterns for the various types
of local companies, their competitive position and development or growth potential?
The pattern that emerges is one of a largely dual structure of the local industry, in line with
findings in the previous chapter. A relatively small group of principally large and very large
manufacturers effectively controls local subcontracting networks. The large army of local
subcontracting SMEs functions primarily as a permanent pool of reserve labour for the local
giants and is engaged and disengaged as needed. Subcontracting is standard practice but
fluctuates with ups and downs in predicted sales in the US. In the slow season, when there is
less work, these companies are the ones that may be subject to a shake-out. As a consequence of
fluctuations and the absence of formal contracts, subcontracting relationships are insecure and
short term, though such relationships are frequently renewed.
Until the turn of the century growth was large and continuous and no massive closure of
subcontractors had occurred, but the general vulnerable position of smaller companies is clear.
It is also clear that the bargaining position of local subcontractors vis-à-vis the large
contracting companies is relatively weak. Thus, rather than interdependent network relations
between more or less equal partners, quasi-hierarchical features predominate in local
subcontracting in La Laguna. La Laguna’s specialisation in relatively standardised products and
the large number of fiercely competing non-specialist subcontractors in the region are reflected
in a bias of power relations in favour of the larger contracting companies. No widespread
pattern of exploitation through subcontracting linkages has been observed, though. Price
differences between assembly contracting and subcontracting are not very large and most
subcontractors seem to be doing reasonably well. A cause for concern however, is the apparent
lack of investment in subcontracting relationships. As will be examined in greater detail in
Chapter 8, subcontracting relations may contribute very little to the upgrading of garment
SMEs in La Laguna.
Not all garment SMEs rely fully on subcontracting. A few SMEs combine subcontracting with
direct contract work for US buyers or domestic market production. However as will be further
discussed in the following chapter, it appears to be increasingly difficult for SMEs to work
directly for a buyer outside the region or to otherwise escape the pure subcontractor’s role.
Appendix I illustrates the local subcontracting linkage patterns of the companies introduced
in the previous chapter.[ 158 ]
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6.2 Material inputs
The linkages between producers and suppliers of material inputs receive much attention in the
cluster literature. The presence of suppliers within the cluster is seen to contribute to the
cementing of the cluster, while a tightening of supplier-producer relations at the cluster level is
common in maturing clusters and in clusters facing a crisis (Visser, 1999; Knorringa, 1999;
Schmitz & Nadvi, 1999). In La Laguna, supply linkages with suppliers of material inputs have
been restricted by production sharing arrangements for decades, but were rapidly built up in
the late 1990s.
By contrast, in most GVC-based studies on the garment industry (including those on the
Mexican garment industry), no or only limited attention is paid to trim items, shifting
procurement patterns or producer-material input supplier linkages.
In La Laguna, these issues have been at the forefront of local developments. To a large extent
this initial local preoccupation with the shift of material input procurement patterns results
from the restrictive trade regulations that used to govern the US-Mexican garment trade. These
regulations meant that for several decades export garment companies in La Laguna had to rely
fully on imported trim and fabric from the US. At the time, the local supply infrastructure was
limited, of inferior quality and largely isolated from the exporting garment producers. The
liberalisation of input procurement under NAFTA led to an improvement of this lagging
supply infrastructure, and it rapidly caught up with both the capacity and the quality
requirements of the export sector. Since then, the number of garment suppliers located in the
region has grown rapidly, as has their diversity in terms of the types of goods, trim and/or
services they supply. Virtually all necessary inputs and services can now be obtained locally, and
suppliers range from thread and trim to machines and machine part suppliers. Currently, the
region accommodates sales offices of a large number of global players in the garment supply
business, such as Coats Timón (the local branch of the Coats Viyella thread company), American
& Efird (thread), Callaway (laundry chemicals), Groz Beckert (needles) and Scovill (accessories).
Besides these large global players there are numerous Mexican-owned sewing supply stores of
varying size. They range from very large machinery stores (e.g. Indire and Pafer Huichita),
which have licences to sell or are formal representatives of global machine producers, to small
stores with an almost informal appearance. Textile production in and close to the region also
received a significant boost. The company Fabrica La Estrella S.A. (also known as FLESA), which
has a long history in nearby Parras de la Fuente, expanded production and improved quality to
export standards. In addition, a joint venture mill between Compania Industrial Parras S.A. (the
mother company of FLESA) and US-based Cone Mills opened there in 1994. One of the largest
garment manufacturers in Torreón (depicted in Figure 5.4) also opened a textile mill, Lajat-
Textil, which became part of the Parras textile group in 1999.
With greater local supply availability, the procurement pattern – especially with regard to
trim items – became more localised. This trend is very pronounced, especially in thread, where
by the end of the 1990s most ordering was done locally. Intra-cluster supplier-producers
linkages in La Laguna have been rapidly built up since the cluster’s boom in the 1990s. Non-
critical supplies – viz. supply goods that do not go directly or visibly into garments, such as
office supplies – have always been procured locally. Likewise, producer services, including
catering and security guards are also contracted within the region.
There are two exceptions to this general pattern: fabric and, to a lesser extent, machinery. In
fabric (a garment’s principal and most expensive material input), the shift of responsibility
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from buyer to manufacturer is progressing slowly and is still not so pronounced. Many local
companies still receive fabric from their US buyers or, in the case of subcontractors, from their
local client (see also Chapter 7). Many local contractors do not have a sufficient cash flow to pre-
finance fabric.
Other exceptions, also because of the high cost involved, are machinery and machine parts.
Because of the fiscal benefits under the maquiladora program (as well as PITEX and ALTEX), it
used to be common for local export companies to buy machinery in the US4. Now, however,
there is no longer a clear pattern to the buying of machinery: machines are bought mostly on a
case-to-case basis and decisions are based on prices, special offers, credit facilities, urgency and
transportation possibilities. The main consideration in the purchasing of machinery and parts
is the price and credit differential that exists between the US and Mexico. Generally, machines
are somewhat cheaper in the US, but credit facilities are limited. In Mexico credit facilities are
more readily available. Over all, many informants report a slight tendency towards the
increased use of local machinery suppliers.
Emerging pattern
Since the late 1990s, most companies engaged in a direct exporting relationship with US buyers
have started to buy their trim for the majority of their export production, some also buy the
fabric. Most of the procurement of these items is concentrated within the cluster; only fabric is
also commonly bought at denim mills in the US.
The procurement of material inputs is concentrated in the hands of locally owned companies
that maintain a direct export linkage with US buyers. These companies place bulk orders with
suppliers and then distribute apportioned amounts of trim items and fabric to their
subcontractors. Therefore, subcontractors in the SME sector generally do not buy trim or
fabric. Also, few FDI facilities in the region carry direct responsibility for the acquisition of
inputs. Several foreign-owned companies receive fabric, sometimes already cut, and all the
necessary trim from other facilities in the US. Others receive trim from suppliers in the region,
according to orders issued by their US headquarters.
A caveat needs to be inserted here: the localisation of the procurement pattern should not be
interpreted as a sign of limited buyer governance and true local decision-making in this area.
Local decision-making in the choice of suppliers and supplies is limited. Almost all buyers
specify which types of trim are to be used and from which suppliers these can be bought. In
thread, for example, the local producer generally receives details from the buyer concerning the
type and colour of thread to be used. Often the brand of thread is also specified, or a choice
between a limited number of suppliers is given. Producers then order directly from one of the
specified suppliers and payments are made directly between producer and supplier. In other
cases the procurement is dealt with through the headquarters of the US clients and the
headquarters of the global supplier in the US. If the procurement is handled through the
headquarters, usually the financial transactions involved are also handled at the headquarter
level; all the local manufacturer does is pick up the trim items earmarked for him. In still fewer
cases, the producers in La Laguna buy as needed and specified by the clients, while the US
customers receive the bill. Over the past years there has been a clear trend towards shifting
practical responsibility for procurement of the right types, brand, colour and quantity of
inputs to the contractor, including the financial negotiations and administration. Noted
trends are similar for other types of trim, where developments may be a little slower but are
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headed in the same direction5. Only the shift of responsibility for fabric procurement is
progressing more slowly than that for trim items, and is also more problematic. Over all, local
input procurement by producers in La Laguna is on the rise, but is driven and specified by their
clients outside the cluster.
6.3 Meso-level (support) organisations
The presence of effective support organisations may be highly important to the functioning of
a cluster or a region, and especially to the improvement or upgrading of its competitive
position (Helmsing, 2001; Park, 1996; Weijland, 1999). Here, the presence and functioning of
the various meso-level organisations involved in industrial and regional development in La
Laguna or specifically with the garment industry are discussed. The institutional context in its
broad, sociocultural sense (see Chapter 2) will be examined in the last part of this chapter.
As illustrated in Table 6.2, and in line with the situation for Mexico as a whole, a considerable
number of institutions and organisations are concerned with regional and industrial
development issues, especially because many of the public, federal government institutions are
present on both state-sides of the region. For example, both Torreón and Gómez Palacio
accommodate offices of the secretariat for commercial and economic development (Secretaría de
Comercio y Fomento Economico (SECOFI)) and the industrialists’ chamber CANACINTRA.
Government institutions predominate but there are also two public-private institutions that
are relevant in this context.
The public-private organisation most directly concerned with local garment companies is the
national chamber for the garment industry, la Camera Nacional de la Industria del Vestido (CNIV or
CANAIVE). This organisation of employers in the garment business has branches in various
cities in Mexico. One of these branches was established on the outskirts of the industrial park
in Gómez Palacio in 1994 and serves the garment industry in the entire Laguna region. CNIV is
run by a board composed of elected local entrepreneurs. Membership of the chamber is
voluntary and requires a yearly contribution based on the number of employees.
Approximately 60% of all garment companies in the region are a member of the chamber.
Mexican-owned companies that work directly for US buyers are especially well represented.
In general, the presence of a CNIV in itself is important: it serves as a first point of contact for
foreign buyers and underscores La Laguna’s export cluster status. The main function of the
chamber is to promote the local garment cluster both within and outside Mexico. Most notable
in this respect is the ‘Expo Laguna 807/Private Label’-fair that the chamber organises every
October. At this three-day trade fair, every company in the region has the opportunity to
present itself and its work to buyers and potential clients. The Expo was most effective in the
early days of the cluster, when few US buyers had knowledge of the region, its companies and
their capabilities. During the 1990s buyers became more and more familiar with the companies
in La Laguna, and the companies in the region found out to whom to turn in search of work. By
the end of the 1990s, the Expo had largely outserved much of its original purpose.
Besides promotional activities, CNIV provides training and courses for personnel and
organises specialist lectures or social events for its members. It also publishes a small monthly
newsletter (Entre Puntadas), which contains announcements and the bolsa de trabajo, which
announces business opportunities. Finally, the chamber maintains contact with SECOFI,
Bancomext and other pertinent government institutions, in order to communicate relevant
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policy changes to its members. CNIV also actively lobbies on behalf of local manufacturers vis-
à-vis government institutions and policymakers. While generally the interest and the
participation in CNIVs activities are limited, in this latter role, as a forum through which local
garment exporters express their common interests with regard to industrial policy or regional
development policy, it appears most effective. Overall, the chamber is highly focused on
defending the interests of its members. The relatively high membership reflects general
support of many local companies for this role of the CNIV. On the other hand, the lobbyist
nature and overall defensive attitude of the chamber has not always promoted good relations
between CNIV and other local government organisations. For some companies this is reason
not to join the chamber. As one manager of a very large foreign-owned company in the region
explained:
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Table 6.2: Organisations involved in industrial/regional economic development, La Laguna
Organisation Location Main function(s) Relationship with garment 
companies
CNIV • Gómez Palacio Representing and defending Often one-sided, though
the interests of local comparatively frequent,
garment entrepreneurs. involving a large share of local
garment companies.
CANACINTRA • Torreón Representation of and Minimal; most garment
• Gómez Palacio meeting grounds for the companies are a member of
entire local industrial sector. CNIV.
SECOFI/SE • Torreón Registration of companies Minimal; generally unilaterally
• Gómez Palacio in the region and of their initiated by SECOFI.
activities. Communication
and implementation of
legislation formulated by
federal government.
IMSS • Torreón Collection of employers’ Antagonistic but frequent.
• Gómez Palacio share of contribution to Payments to IMSS are
social security per worker; compulsory for all companies;
IMSS collects and publishes changes in workforce need to
employment data. be communicated to IMSS.
Bancomext • Gómez Palacio Facilitation of credits to Provision of credit limited to
export companies (at already successful, large and
commercial rates), very large companies.
promotion of the region Relations between Bancomext
and its firms and general and the garment industry are
support for export sector. largely limited to this group.
Local economic • Torreón Monitoring, promoting and Minimal; main focus is on
development • Gómez Palacio supporting local economic monitoring and public
secretariats • Cd. Lerdo development and industrial relations.
investment.
FOMEC • Torreón Promotion of La Laguna- Minimal; mostly limited to
Coahuila. foreign investors in La Laguna-
Coahuila.
Source: Interviews, 1998-2000
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‘We are not a member. We choose not to be because we don’t believe we will benefit from it. All they [at CNIV – its
members] do is nag and complain. There is no positive, proactive attitude there... instead of developing strategies and
looking for opportunities, they just feel threatened all the time.’
The dissatisfaction expressed by the manager quoted above indicates the limited effectiveness
of CNIV as a platform for inter-firm cooperation, or for stimulating strategic thinking and
action. One of the clearest examples of this is the anti-poaching agreement initiated by CNIV
and ratified by a large number of its members in 1997. Basically, the agreement formalised the
intention expressed by companies in the region to no longer engage in labour poaching.
Despite general consensus on the detrimental effects of poaching and the bidding up of wages,
the agreement was not respected; in fact, it was broken just a few weeks after it was signed. This
failure points to one of the main weaknesses of CNIV: it has no power to enforce measures or
codes of conduct at the cluster level. Another problem is that not all companies are members of
the chamber and non-member companies are not bound by any CNIV agreements. At the same
time, the chamber can only be as strong and proactive as its members want it to be. The
ineffectiveness of the chamber with regard to stimulating cooperation within the cluster also
reflects the non-cooperative spirit of it members – an issue to be further discussed later in this
chapter. Despite the fact that CNIV does not serve as a proactive, strategic think-tank, a large
share of the local garment companies are a member of the chamber. Only FDI facilities appear
to be under represented6.
CANACINTRA has a similar position and function, although it has a broader base that
encompasses the entire industrial sector. Except for a few foreign or very large companies, few
garment companies are a member of CANACINTRA. Most garment companies do not see any
additional advantages in membership of this larger industrial chamber.
FOMEC, which was briefly introduced in Chapter 4, is a uniquely local, public-private
partnership aimed at the development of the Coahuila side of the Laguna region. It focuses
specifically on the promotion of La Laguna-Coahuila as a place for foreign investment. It has
aided the establishment of several of the foreign-owned companies in the region, by finding a
suitable location and getting through the administrative red tape. Many local garment
companies regard FOMEC as somewhat of a mixed blessing, since local manufacturers would
prefer it to effectively support existing companies rather than attract new companies7. Only
garment companies that came to La Laguna with help from FOMEC maintain relations to it;
most local garment companies do not.
SECOFI (now Secretaría de Economia (SE)) has local branches in many cities throughout Mexico,
including Torreón and Gómez Palacio. These local branches are in charge of the official
registration of all commercial and industrial activity undertaken on their side of the region and
serve to implement policies designed at the national level. Registration with SECOFI is
obligatory for all companies in the region. The relations between garment companies and
SECOFI seem to be largely limited to the required official legal registration and other
paperwork. Any additional government information that is of interest to specific groups of
companies or specific industrial sectors is often communicated through the branch
institutions. In the case of the garment industry, specific policies, programs and opportunities
are communicated through CNIV. SECOFI places great emphasis on registration, monitoring
and the communication of regulations, though it also plays a role in support programs such as
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the much publicised COMPITE program, which is aimed at increasing the competitiveness of
Mexican industrial SMEs (see also Chapter 8).
The other public institution that is important to exporting garment companies in La Laguna is
the nation-wide credit institution Bancomext, which was briefly introduced in Chapter 3.
Within the liberalised Mexican economy it now operates under commercial conditions. Its
main aim continues to be to support and stimulate industrial export activity. It does so
through promotional activities, specific publications on export opportunities and courses
aimed at improving marketing strategies. According to the director, the interest of garment
companies in these activities is minimal, in spite of the fact that Bancomext widely publicises
the possibilities offered. In line with the adaptation of the role of Bancomext to liberalisation of
the Mexican economy mentioned in Chapter 3, the position of Bancomext in relation to the
Laguna garment cluster has changed. The bank supports local export companies through the
granting of credits for investments less than it did in the past. Most specifically, during the late
1990s the local Bancomext branch had to write off a considerable fraction of its loans to the
local garment industry as carta vencida (unrecoverable). In order to avoid problems in the future,
in La Laguna over the course of the 1990s Bancomext increasingly confined its credits to the
larger, already successful and thus creditworthy companies, in most cases the local giants.
Clearly, local bureaucracy is extensive: there are many organisations in La Laguna that local
garment companies have to deal with or can recur to. While they appear to have had a more
active role in industrial policy-making and support in the pre-liberalisation years, nowadays
few of these organisations directly support local garment companies. No organisations
resembling the ‘policy and planning’ institutions found elsewhere (see Helmsing, 2001) are
present in the region. Policy-making and planning are carried out by the state governments of
Durango and Coahuila (see also Box 4.1). Only in the case of FOMEC is there a linkage between
the state, a local organisation and local entrepreneurs. On the whole, there does not appear to
be a clear, direct connection between state government planning and local organisations. The
limited strategic vision and lack of communication of a clear policy direction to the region’s
inhabitants and entrepreneurs – as well as the lack of involvement of entrepreneurs – appears
to have harmed the relations between them and the local organisations.
On the whole, linkages between garment entrepreneurs and local organisations are both
minimal and frictional (see Table 6.2). In fact, many local entrepreneurs have a low opinion of
government institutions; some even see a direct threat in their policies. The most frequently
heard complaint concerns ‘excessive’ taxes and payments made to IMSS. However, the adverse
attitude extends beyond IMSS to include all government organisations. The owner of one of the
garment giants was especially clear on his view of the government:
‘El gobierno no está para ayudar a las empresas’: they [the government] don’t support us. They never have –
not in good times, not in bad times. Do you know how much we have to pay to the IMSS? It’s outrageous. And it
wouldn’t be so bad if it was worth it. But have you been to an IMSS clinic? Go! So you can see the lines, the lack of
good doctors and medicines [...] And what if things go wrong? We will have to pay our workers immense
compensations. In fact, the workers are more protected then we are. I tell you: el gobierno está contra nosotros
[the government is against us].’[ 164 ]
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Most local entrepreneurs are not so outspoken as that, but there is a general negative opinion
of ‘the government’ that is projected onto local organisations. This worsened when around the
turn of the century the peso increased in value against the dollar. Most local garment
entrepreneurs felt the peso was maintained at an overvalue for political reasons despite the fact
that this posed a direct threat to the position of the Mexican export sector.
The position of local government organisations is a reflection of the liberalisation of the
Mexican economy carried out in the 1990s (see Chapter 3), and the frustration of local
entrepreneurs needs to be placed in this general context. Most organisations in the cluster are
not or are no longer directly involved in policy-making or support for local businesses, and
have seen their task reduced to administration and/or attracting and facilitating investment in
the region. This has resulted in many officials of several organisations focusing on the same or
similar activities. New investors are brought into the region and new employment
opportunities are created to benefit the development of the region, but this does not benefit
the local entrepreneurs, nor does it support local industrial development or upgrading.
6.4 The position of labour
In many studies of industrial regions and districts, the important and positive role of skilled
labour is stressed. In fact, skilled labour in such districts is seen to be appreciated and rewarded
accordingly. In contrast, in industrial clusters in LMIC environments, while the presence and
important role of skilled labour has been noted, rewards do not always reflect its importance
(Tewari, 1999; Cawthorne, 1995). Experienced or skilled personnel occupy centre stage of the
development of the Laguna cluster, but – in extension of the pattern discussed in Chapter 3
with regard to the US – are generally regarded as a troublesome production factor.
Over the course of the years, job creation and training have resulted in a large army of skilled
sewing-operators in the Laguna cluster. Whereas in the early years companies were able to
restrict hiring policies to operators with sewing skills acquired at home or in other factories, in
later years in-house training became a must. Most sewing operators need specific skills for the
operation they perform. Currently, with the exception of the ‘bundle boys’, who take care of
the physical flow of carts with bundles of trousers from one worker to the next, all beginning
operators need and receive on-the-job training. Generally, operators start producing soon after
they have been hired, but it may take anywhere from three to eight weeks of training,
depending on the operation, before a new operator achieves full efficiency. Operators receive a
basic wage of around 200 pesos per week during the training period, which is complemented
through piece rates as soon as a satisfactory efficiency level is achieved. Training represents an
expense to companies and they try to limit it as much as possible. A garment worker performs
one specific operation and, to avoid bottlenecks in the production flow due to the absence of
individual workers, some workers are trained to perform a task normally performed by a
colleague. This cross-training is commonly done for key operations in the sewing lines.
What are the prospects for garment workers in La Laguna? As mentioned in the previous
chapter, on average sewing wages in the region are around 410 pesos, with significant
differentiation based on the type of operation and between companies. For individual
operators, however, the wage depends exclusively on their own efficiency. As soon as an
operator reaches full efficiency, she or he also earns the maximum wage attainable for that
operation in that particular company.
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Legal increases in the minimum wage are set by the central government, but hardly affect
garment workers in La Laguna who are already earning above minimum wage. There is no
effective system of collective wage bargaining. Garment workers in La Laguna lack meaningful,
formal representation of their rights through unions. Mirroring the situation at the national
level (Carrillo, 1994; Williams & Passé Smith, 1992), companies in the region maintain collective
contracts with pro-industry and pro-government unions. In the Laguna region, most
companies have a contract with the Confederación de Trabajadores Mexicanos (CTM). The collective
protection contracts between garment companies and the CTM prevent genuine unions from
coming in. Operators’ attempts to organise themselves and form a company or local union have
so far been frustrated8. The current arrangement allows the region to present itself as having a
friendly investment climate, free of labour union trouble and effectively bars collective
bargaining by operators. All in all, intra-firm upward mobility of garment workers in La
Laguna is limited to the small number of operators who become supervisors and a few workers
who can shift to better paying operations for which they have been cross-trained.
Despite the fact that specialisation on assembly activities has lowered barriers to entry with
regard to expertise (see Chapter 5) upward mobility opportunities through the establishment
of own businesses appear equally limited. The large scale of operation in the local garment
industry limits opportunities for garment employees to start their own garment business, as
they would need a minimum of twenty to thirty sewing machines. Many new garment
businesses were established during the late 1990s, but few are owned by former garment
workers. Instead, owners of new businesses in the region are related to garment entrepreneurs,
or their families have been in businesses other then garments for a long time. In other words,
they already belonged to the middle or entrepreneurial class. Employees typically do not have
the capital, access to credit facilities or the contacts required to start a garment business in La
Laguna.
The absence of collective bargaining power, limited upward mobility and highly monotonous
job routines, frustrate individual operators who want to improve their situation and/or
maximise their earning capacity. In this situation, factory workers themselves must capitalise
on their skills, for which there is a large demand in the cluster. For skilled operators in La
Laguna, it is not hard to find a job. Rather than waiting for minimal raises within their
company, they may take advantage of the current market forces to change employers in order
to obtain a higher wage or improved fringe benefits. Approximately 25% of the local garment
workers regularly switch jobs. This causes unrest in the industry. Most companies in La Laguna
report that their turnover is caused by a small share of their operators that constantly rotates,
while the remaining share remains comparatively stable. Nevertheless, the average weekly
turnover rate for the industry is 14%, and gives cause for great concern.
Frustration and limited job satisfaction are also reflected in the generally high rates of
absenteeism in the region. It is quite common for operators not to go to work for a day or even a
couple of days. Throughout the cluster, Monday is an especially notorious day for empty seats
in the factory sewing lines. The average weekly absenteeism rate in La Laguna is 9% and appears
to be caused by a constant weighing of work and its rewards against other responsibilities or
opportunities.[ 166 ]
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By the end of the 1990s, the tight urban labour market, which is seen as the cause of high
absenteeism and turnover rates, was the main preoccupation amongst manufacturers in the
region. Even some of the buyers outside the region mention it as one of their main doubts
regarding the future development of the region. Indeed, the relationship between the garment
companies in La Laguna and the regional labour force has been a much debated issue for the
past couple of years and especially so in the cities. The labour market dynamic as sketched
above has harmed company-labour relations in the region. When discussing absenteeism and
turnover rate problems, manufacturers frequently refer to a general falta de cultura or falta de
disciplina (lack of moral values/ethics or a lack of discipline) amongst operators as the cause of
the troubles. The general attitude can be characterised as slightly condescending, departing
from the premise ‘these employees do not appreciate how well off they are’. This attitude is
reflected in the strategies of individual companies aimed at retaining their personnel and
disciplining it. More than 50% of the garment companies in La Laguna indicate that over the
past years they have started to pay higher wages and to offer better benefits in an effort to gain
employees’ loyalty. Several managers indicated that in their view local wages no longer reflect
the value of workers to the company, but are based purely on intra-cluster competition for
labour. They shift the emphasis to inventive but largely insignificant fringe benefits – such as
televisions and stereos being raffled among loyal employees – and bonuses for punctual
operators. On the other hand, many companies still accept skilled operators trained by other
companies in the region, thereby stimulating the inter-company mobility of operators9. Urban
manufacturers constantly stress the need to formulate more effective reactions in order to curb
turnover rates; some of their strategies will be discussed in Chapter 8.
6.5 Embeddedness and its impact on local business
Spatial but also social and cultural proximity within the cluster has resulted in a strong
identification of most companies with La Laguna, especially with its status as the ‘New Jeans
Capital’10. Above, various types of actors, including firms, organisations and labour, have been
introduced. The presence and nature of network relations between them have also been
examined. This last section sheds light on the broad institutional environment or regional
identity of the Laguna region and the way embeddedness in it may affect the functioning of the
garment cluster and its participants. Finally, the cooperation or competition impetuses that
may emanate from the economic environment are briefly explored.
Firms and entrepreneurs: are they locally embedded?
Most garment firms and suppliers in La Laguna are owned and/or managed by entrepreneurs
who were born and bred in the Laguna region. Few have been educated outside the region or
have left the region for other reasons. They have a common history through attending the same
schools, sport clubs and social gatherings. Even now, many local entrepreneurs, especially those
running larger firms, move in relatively small circles and meet each other regularly at social and
business events11. Many manufacturers maintain social and personal linkages with a number of
their local peers, resulting in a close-knit garment circle.
Within the Laguna cluster as a whole, it is not hard to identify subgroups with especially dense
social networks. Notable in this respect are the influential companies owned by Mexicans of
Lebanese descent (see also Figure 6.2). But other subgroups are based on long-lasting
friendships or membership of the same campestre (country club) or business association. Many of
these groups are horizontal in structure: the managers of large local firms are linked to each
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other, while foreign-owned companies and SMEs have local linkage networks confined to their
own groups. In this respect, the density of family links between leaders within the regional
industry is especially noteworthy (see Figure 6.2). The owners of several of the region’s largest
and leading garment companies are brothers or first cousins and descendants of pioneers in the
local garment industry. Owners of other large companies are related to them through marriage.
[ 168 ]
6099
Roberto Jaidar Veloz
3 factories/1 laundry
Roberto Jaidar Ramón
5 factories
Hugo Jaidar Ramón
3 factories
Luís Jaidar Ramón
2 factories
Abraham Jaidar Veloz
1 factory
Manuel Jaidar Veloz
2 factories
Manuel Jaidar Castro
1 factory
Carlos Jaidar Castro
3 factories
Laura Jaidar Castro
1 laundry
Antonio Juan Marcos
2 factories/1 laundry
Salomón Juan Marcos Issa
2 factories
Jose Juan Marcos Issa
1 factory
Fernando Juan Marcos Issa
1 factory
Luís Juan Marcos Issa
1 factory
Salomón Juan Marcos Villareal
4 factories
Emilio Marcos
Ricardo Marcos Touché
4 factories (26 co-operatives)
Jaime Marcos Touché
1 factory
Antonio Fahur Armador
2 factories
Elias Fahur Armador
1 factory
Jorge Fahur Armador
1 factory
Carlos Fahur Armador
1 factory
Salim Fahur Subealdea
1 factory
Antonio Fahur Subealdea
1 laundry
Jorge Fahur Perez
1 factory
Source: Baseline survey, 1998-1999
N.B. All families included in the figure are of Lebanese descent.
Figure 6.2: Family ties in the garment industry, La Laguna
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Most garment families in the region operate medium to very large companies. They are in a
unique position since they control the first-hand knowledge and information obtained from
their buyers. Furthermore, in a few cases the sphere of influence of this business elite is not
confined to industry but extends into the sphere of local and regional politics and policy-
making12.
The individual embeddedness of a firm’s key-decision makers in the cluster is a determinant
factor in the embeddedness of the firm (see Oinas, 1997; Boschma et al., 2001). One does not
need to spend much time in La Laguna to notice that social, interpersonal aspects of business
relations carry great weight. This stimulates localisation of business relations within the
cluster, because such relations are facilitated by short distance, face-to-face contact and the
shared history and values of entrepreneurs. The importance of social relations is revealed by the
way the cluster functions: many of the intra-cluster productive arrangements are arranged
through word of mouth and personal recommendation. For example, subcontracting
arrangements – and sometimes the sale of second-hand machinery – help in filling rush orders,
and recommending local companies to clients is often dealt with on the basis of such
informally gathered information. The reputation of almost every company, including the
smaller ones, in La Laguna is common knowledge or is easily verified. On the whole, most firms
are well connected within the cluster and firmly embedded through the local roots of their
management as well as through intra-cluster linkages.
Embedded in what? The local sociocultural environment
The Laguna region is recognised as a region with its own character by its inhabitants as well as
by outsiders. The precise nature of the local sociocultural environment and its impact on the
way business is conducted in La Laguna is not so clear and is hard to uncover. While it would be
going beyond the scope of this study to look at these issues in great depth, a number of general
observations and characteristics stand out and are relevant here.
As mentioned in Chapter 4, history marks La Laguna as a comparatively prosperous and
dynamic region: it had a head start in the industrialisation process and is amongst the largest
metropolitan areas in Mexico with a relatively broad industrial base. Local sources attribute this
dynamism to the prevailing social values that are conducive to entrepreneurial spirit, hard
work and perseverance. Indeed, most entrepreneurs in the region exhibit a dynamic
entrepreneurial attitude built on such values. In La Laguna, the ‘selection environment’ –
which selects which initiatives, new ideas or new firms will be sustained (Boschma et al., 2001) –
is a liberal one. This is also illustrated by the rapid expansion of the garment industry in the
post-NAFTA years and the readiness of people with no or only limited prior experience in the
industry to start garment factories. In La Laguna, business initiatives are broadly appreciated.
On the other hand, the social culture in the region is not perceived to facilitate trust and
cooperation. In fact, it could be argued that it promotes widespread mistrust, suspicion and
secrecy. In reference to their sewing operators, local garment entrepreneurs often characterised
their culture as ‘prohibitive to teamwork’. These cultural values affect business linkages and
interpersonal relationships throughout the industry. Highly illustrative is the tale that several
respondents, independent of each other, offered as an illustration of the local business culture: [ 169 ]
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‘Once there was a fisherman fishing for crabs in Mexico. He’d been at it for quite a while and had caught a great
number of crabs, which he’d put in an uncovered bucket. A passer-by looked at the man and his bucket for a while,
and then said to the fisherman: ‘Why don’t you put a lid on your bucket? If you don’t, the crabs will escape and your
work will have been for nothing.’ The fisherman smiled vaguely and said: ‘Well, you see, these are Mexican crabs.’
The passer-by didn’t understand, so the fisherman continued: ‘You see, anywhere else, in Japan for example, you’d be
right: I’d need to put a heavy lid on the bucket. Otherwise the crabs would team up and they’d climb on top of each
other until one reached the edge of the bucket, and that one would help pull the other crabs out, and soon they’d all be
gone. But with Mexican crabs I don’t need a lid to prevent them from climbing out. You see, even if one crab were able
to climb on top of the others, as soon as he approached the edge, all the other crabs would pull him back in.’
While it is hard to put one’s finger on the day-to-day cluster reality that most likely also
includes interpersonal relations, cooperation initiatives and information sharing, it is clear
how local entrepreneurs perceive these issues. For example, one local entrepreneur explained:
‘One of the most serious defects of Mexican society is that we’re not united but we are very envious. Everyone wants to
copy the business tactics and strategies of the one who’s doing well, but in a destructive way, not in a healthy manner.
Here, in our industry, we started to grow too fast, we became too large and we lack a vision.’
It is hard to determine precisely how these perceptions of the local sociocultural environment
affect the reality of competition and cooperation within the cluster. However, the following
section will show that formal cooperation between garment firms or entrepreneurs is
uncommon in La Laguna. The general attitude towards cooperation is negative. This is further
underscored by the tremendous amount of gossip. There is a lot of jealousy and there are a lot
of misgivings, and many industrialists eagerly report another’s supposed misfortune, flaws and
mistakes. Local entrepreneurs often spontaneously engage in this type of gossip13, while they
are much more reluctant to discuss their own alliances, friendship or cooperation with other
local manufacturers. Though innocent in itself, the amount of gossip is an indication of the
general atmosphere of mistrust and animosity that predominates in La Laguna. When asked for
an explanation for this apparent general attitude, most entrepreneurs point to their cultural
background: ‘That’s just how we Mexicans are’ was the most commonly offered explanation.
The result: embedded local supply linkages and cooperation?
Despite the local embeddedness of entrepreneurs and firms in La Laguna, quasi-hierarchical
aspects dominate in local subcontracting networks centred on very large local companies. True
interdependence is limited and there is little evidence of trust and reciprocity in
subcontracting relations. Several respondents who worked as subcontractors for one of the
local giants, complained that it was very hard to discuss, let alone solve, their problems with
their clients. One subcontractor complained about his relationship with his local client:
‘Whenever I phone, he’s never there, or he’s in a meeting. I get put on hold and when I leave a message he never calls
back. I don’t like that. It’s not polite. I just want to talk and all I get is a formal, impersonal fax message.’
The general managers or owners of the local giants are largely inaccessible to their smaller
subcontractors, who deal primarily with production managers. Also, the presence of many
subcontractors with similar capabilities within the cluster makes it easy for local contracting
firms to discontinue the subcontracting relationship. Although this mainly happens when
work is slow, it also happens when a relationship is unsatisfactory.
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In general, cooperative linkages14 between garment firms are limited: only 15% of the sample
firms maintain such linkages with other firms in the cluster. Bilateral cooperation within the
cluster is not common; the sociocultural environment as outlined above, does not facilitate
trust or positive cooperation. So much so that, akin to Fukuyama’s (1995) ‘low-trust societies’,
in La Laguna the mutual trust required for structural cooperative arrangements is confined to
family ties. Even then, the nature and extent of cooperation varies widely: in a few cases,
formally independent companies owned by family members are run as though they were a
family-owned industrial group. More commonly, family ties provide an apparently normal
subcontracting relationship with stability. On the whole, and even in the case of family
members, true cooperation between garment firms in La Laguna is limited.
Also with regard to information sharing or strategic consulting, both bilateral and
multilateral cooperation appear limited. The trust, confidence, solidarity and trustworthy
behaviour often associated with network relations in clusters are not characteristic of
communication within informal subgroups in La Laguna. Even amongst good friends,
information exchange does not generally extend beyond general indications of the state of the
business, company and clients. Truly strategic decisions are often not discussed or disclosed
until they have become definite. Even family ties do not generally appear to translate into
strategic cooperation. On the contrary, rather than a collaborative attitude there appears to be a
certain level of competition or even animosity between family members in the business
(certainly between owners of very large companies).
Thus the depth of the feedback network amongst peers in the local industry is more restricted
than one would expect based on the local embeddedness of most entrepreneurs. The role of
local embeddedness with regard to cooperative behaviour is largely limited to the solving of
practical matters. For example, a broken-down machine can be temporarily replaced easily and
rapidly through favours based on social relations within the cluster, as family, friends and
acquaintances are commonly willing to lend a hand. While this certainly helps, such supportive
behaviour is hardly ever structural in nature. The limited impact of embeddedness on local
supply linkages may in part be caused by the horizontal character of social subgroups within
the cluster, where contractors belong to a different group than their subcontractors. However,
on the whole the nature of the local sociocultural environment in La Laguna appears to hamper
the translation of local embeddedness into social capital that may support local business. A
shared inclination towards secrecy and mistrust has not supported the creation of stable, trust-
based, embedded local linkages in La Laguna.
Economic environment
The sociocultural environment appears to limit the role of cooperation in enhancing the
position of firms in the cluster. However, the role of the economic environment within which
the cluster operates should not be overlooked. In general, complexity and dynamism in the
economic environment are believed to stimulate trust-based, embedded linkages (Boschma et
al., 2001). Chapter 1 discussed the main features and trends in the global garment industry and
showed it to be highly dynamic and complex. This was certainly the case during the early
export years when local garment companies were unfamiliar with their market, its standards,
trends and main buyers. It has hardly diminished in recent years because jeans producers have
been increasingly impacted by fashionisation and retailing strategies based on flexibility and
rapid response (see also Chapter 7). In order to operate in such an environment, local garment
firms can be expected to rely on embedded, trust-based relations.
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In La Laguna, increased embeddedness is sought in vertical linkages with buyers, rather than in
horizontal intra-cluster linkages. The interplay, or indeed mismatch, between a complex and
dynamic, far-away market and the strong local orientation and frame of reference of local
entrepreneurs appears to have caused local producers to focus primarily on linkages with their
buyers. Strengthening their vertical linkages with buyers gives producers a better grip on the
trends and demands of their export markets (see also Chapter 7). Horizontal intra-cluster
linkages receive little attention and have not become closer or more embedded. An important
reason for this is the narrow orientation of the cluster as a whole, as outlined in Chapter 5.
Cooperation is hampered by the fact that garment producers in La Laguna operate in the same
market segment and compete for work from buyers that may not always be loyal. The fact that
they are direct competitors explains their drive to secure a close linkage with their buyer. It
appears also to cause reluctance to cooperate with other local producers (that are seen primarily
as competitors) and even hostility between local producers.
6.6 Conclusion
This chapter examined the internal relationship structure of the Laguna cluster. The first
important observation was that the localisation of network linkages is strong: the local supply
infrastructure is extensive and subcontracting and material input linkages are concentrated
within the cluster. There is a dense local bureaucracy allowing firms to maintain the necessary
linkages with government institutions and other organisations within the cluster. The region
also has a skilled workforce that companies, though with some difficulty, can tap into. The
regional agglomeration of an extensive industry-specific infrastructure allows local firms,
through the localisation of network linkages, to benefit from localisation economies along the
lines as suggested by van Dijk and Rabellotti (1997).
With regard to the various types of intra-cluster linkages a number of aspects are noteworthy.
First of all, in local supply linkages very large local companies hold a dominant position. So
much so that the intra-cluster linkage pattern in La Laguna is best typified in terms of
Markusen’s hub-and-spoke structure. Local giants, in their position as the hubs in the hub-
and-spoke linkage pattern, coordinate and control the production undertaken by their
subcontractors. Commonly, their local subcontracting networks comprise a comparatively
large number of small- and medium-sized subcontractors, each of which takes care of a
minimal share of the total production of the principal firm. For the local giants in general,
subcontracting allows for the flexible expansion of production capacity necessary in peak
seasons and represents only a small percentage of total production. While not exploitative in
terms of payments, subcontracting linkages are unstable and function for the local giants as
buffers against market fluctuations. The resulting pattern is highly biased in favour of the local
giants, and the existing power imbalance characterises local subcontracting as quasi-
hierarchical. Interdependent network relations, described in both the business network and
the cluster literature, were not found in local supply linkages in La Laguna. Instead, similar to
the pattern found by Kragten (2000) in rural Java, relations are skewed in favour of the
contracting firm, and while both contractor and subcontractor benefit from the arrangement,
the former benefits more.
During the 1990s an extensive local supply infrastructure was built up. By the turn of the
century, trim items were predominantly being procured locally. Subcontractors generally
receive trim from their local principal firm but most other firms are now directly responsible
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for supply procurement. This represents a significant break from pre-NAFTA times, when US
buyers shipped in all material inputs from the US. At the same time, tight governance exercised
by buyers limits true responsibility of local firms, as detailed buyers’ specifications with regard
to exact items and their suppliers need to be adhered to.
Local garment firms maintain relations with a number of local organisations. Several
government or semi-government organisations are concerned with the economic development
of the region in general and focus primarily on the attraction of foreign investment and
employment creation, while others regulate or support local businesses selectively. In general,
the relations between local garment entrepreneurs and these organisations are kept to the
minimum required, and are distant and sometimes tense as they appear to do little to support
the local industry. The garment industry chamber represents and defends the interests of the
cluster’s garment entrepreneurs vis-à-vis these organisations. While it is the only platform for
multilateral cooperation, it has remained ineffective as a platform for cluster-wide
consultation, cooperation, strategic planning and other ways of pushing the cluster forward.
Intra-cluster labour relations are a hot issue on the agenda of local entrepreneurs. With the
growth of the cluster, the tightening of the local labour market and high labour turnover rates,
labour is increasingly viewed as a subordinate, troublesome factor rather than as a valuable
resource – mirroring a pattern noted for the US garment industry in Chapter 3. The build-up of
expertise in the local labour force was not reflected in a high incidence of small garment
business start-ups by former factory workers. Limited opportunities in this respect coupled
with the high demand for skilled garment operators is causing some workers to move from one
company to another in order to improve their wages and benefits. The resulting intra-cluster
competition for labour not only puts upward pressure on wages and fringe benefits, but it also
pitches garment companies against each other.
In several ways the local embeddedness of garment entrepreneurs and firms is strong. Most
local entrepreneurs are embedded socially and culturally in the region and in the cluster, and
this facilitates the flow of information as well as incidental practical support amongst
industrialists. However, local firms reap few direct benefits beyond passive external economies
from being part of the New Jeans Capital.
In general, the local sociocultural environment is marked by a pronounced go-getters’,
entrepreneurial mentality as well as by suspicion, mistrust and secrecy. Intra-cluster linkages
appear to mirror the local culture. Local social capital based on embedded relations
characterised by trust and cooperation was not found to support the Laguna cluster. In fact, La
Laguna displays features of the low-trust societies discussed by Fukuyama (1995), most notably
a reliance on family ties in cooperative business relations. As a consequence, despite the
common cultural background of entrepreneurs, subcontracting relations, for example, are not
characterised by stability, cooperation or the open sharing of knowledge and information.
Instead they predominantly take the shape of traditional subcontracting linkages: governance
is highly formalised and relations are dependent, unstable and relatively distant. Local
embeddedness has also not contributed to the development of joint, proactive action or
cooperation between firms in the cluster.
On the whole therefore, while few cooperative linkages within the cluster exist in La Laguna,
more emphasis has been placed on the embedding and tightening of vertical, intra-chain
relations with buyers. These findings stand in contrast to a large part of the local
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embeddedness literature. However, some parallels may be drawn with the situation in Fiji,
where Taylor (2002) found garment companies to be socially and culturally embedded in their
local environment, but structurally embedded in the highly competitive GVC.
The previous chapter already marked La Laguna as a deviant garment cluster and this chapter
underlines that characterisation. Unlike in many other clusters that thrive on a positive mix of
competition and cooperation between local firms, in La Laguna, competitive forces between
local firms far outweigh cooperation impetuses. As a result garment firms in the region benefit
from external economies, but not from collective efficiency, that also requires proactive joint
action on the part of local firms. These findings need to be related to the structure and the
history of the Laguna cluster. La Laguna displays the physiological hub-and-spoke
characteristics of the late, mature stages of LMIC cluster trajectories. However, the relatively
short history of the cluster casts doubt on the maturation process that lead to this structure. In
La Laguna the endogenous base of this development was relatively small: while a large part of
the cluster, most notably the SMEs, were just being established, the existing large companies
were already supplying the US market. The cluster largely appears to have come into existence
based on the achievements of the first successful pioneers. The success of these pioneers was
built on their incorporation into the production networks of US buyers and not so much on
the collective efficiency of intra-cluster linkages. This contrasts with the traditional cluster
development path that deals primarily with SME clusters within which some firms have
exploited the years of collective efficiency more successfully than others and have grown and
acquired a lead position.
This peculiar and short history of the Laguna cluster and the dramatic impact of its insertion
into the GVC appear to have contributed to the direct competition between local firms and
their focus on vertical extra-regional linkages rather than intra-cluster linkages. As such, La
Laguna may be illustrative of current and future LMIC clusters that grow out of the interaction
between globalisation processes and industrialising regions in ever-new tiers of LMICs.
Notes
1 This research focuses on the economic geography interpretation of local embeddedness (see Chapter 2), viz. the
presence and nature of backward and forward linkages. The nature of the research and its methodology do not allow
for a detailed, systematic analysis of the sociological or ‘ties’ aspects of networking in the (local) garment industry.
However, the significance of these aspects is recognized and therefore the general issues that affect network ties
(such as the socio-cultural environment, a reliance on family ties and existing prejudices) are discussed in section 6.5
of this chapter and are briefly revisited in section 7.3 of the following chapter.
2 The pattern of a small number of subcontractors that take care of a large share of total production of small principal
firms in La Laguna may give the impression of a more equal, interdependent subcontracting relation. This, however,
is not the case. Smaller companies that subcontract out the work maintain distant and formal client-contractor
relationships.
3 Personal observation in the region established that sub-subcontracting, although not reflected in the survey data
and not at all common in the region, does happen but is a largely secret matter. The two cases found of
subcontractors who in turn contracted out serve to illustrate the fact that it is generally ‘not done’. In both cases, the
managers were unwilling to provide the name of or any other information about their subcontractors and the work
contracted out to them. This may be evidence of very tight governance by buyers with respect to the subcontracting
of their work.
4 The maquiladora and PITEX/ALTEX regulations allowed for the duty-free import of machinery used for the
production of goods destined for export markets. Since there were still only a few sewing machine suppliers in
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Mexico and prices were generally somewhat higher, many producers bought their machines at one of the numerous
suppliers in El Paso. However, as the availability of machinery in La Laguna increased, the number of suppliers in El
Paso declined due to the collapse of the garment industry in that city. Stimulated by the peso devaluation of 1994,
investment in machinery has increased. The extra profits accruing to local companies as a result of the devaluation,
and the need to invest them (for tax reasons) greatly stimulated investment in the industry.
5 The most important exception in this respect is the printing of labels. The caution on the part of buyers is related to
the fact that the label can be seen as the embodiment of the brand and brand reputation: faulty labels directly affect
the sales of the garments. Furthermore, the label is so tightly connected with the brand that on the basis of good
label copies counterfeits would hardly be recognisable. High levels of trust need to exist between buyers and
producers for producers to be allowed to produce labels to the exact standard specified by the buyer. Commonly,
therefore, labels are shipped from the US or even attached in the US.
6 Since many of the services rendered by the chamber are not directly relevant to the foreign-owned companies, they
see little benefit in membership. Indirectly, the limited presence of foreigners in the chamber affirms their isolated
position within the local garment industry which in some cases is also caused by their physical isolation through
their rural locations. It is quite common to hear a Mexican industrialist complain about the business tactics of
‘those Americans’ and, vice versa, to hear foreign representatives of foreign-owned companies complain about the
conditions at and practises of some local companies.
7 An example is the conflict of interest between CNIV and FOMEC, as voiced by a number of the chamber’s
prominent members. In a protest letter, they expressed their concern about the further tightening of the local
labour market as a consequence of FOMEC’s promotional activities and success in attracting new industrial
investors.
8 A recent example of employees insisting on their rights is the hunger strike organised by eleven employees of a very
large company in the region. The hunger strikers were part of a larger group of employees who were fired after
attempting to organise an independent labour union. The direct reason for the strike, however, was the fact that
they were not given the minimal legal compensation (El Siglo de Torreón, 2000) after they were fired.
9 There is a general atmosphere of secrecy surrounding the solution to turnover and absenteeism within La Laguna.
The researcher at one point was shown a report based on inter-company espionage aimed specifically at wages and
benefits offered by the largest companies in the region.
10 This status has aided in the construction of a certain level of common identity, especially since in 1999 it was
advertised nation-wide as ‘the garment exporting cluster in Mexico’. To the outside world, industrialists in La
Laguna clearly project a strong sense of what Crewe (1996) has called ‘shared identity based on collective association’.
11 Linkages are not limited to business owners or managers. In La Laguna, linkages and their impact cut through the
business hierarchy as, especially in the case of the large companies, not only do owners know each other, but so do
management, administrative and especially the human resources personnel. Also at these levels information
regarding wages, systems/administrative systems, clients, the general state of affairs in the company, etc., are
exchanged (see also Box 8.4).
12 For example, one of the owners of a very large garment company became mayor of Torreón in 1999, his son became
president of the garment chamber in 2002 and other family members have been involved in state politics.
13 The researcher was often, and without asking, updated on the ‘local news’. During the survey, when asking for
general opinions about the local business environment and climate, it was quite common to be given a rather
detailed expose of the ‘bad and evil’ aspects of certain companies or types of companies in the region. Amongst
manufacturers such novelties are also readily exchanged as the talk of the town.
14 In the present examination, bilateral, cooperative linkages are broadly defined as those relationships that lack a
contractual basis, but are relatively stable and long term and work to smoothen the workings of the local cluster and
participating firms. Cooperative linkages may take the form of the joint exploitation of facilities or a stable or
preferential subcontractor status, in which cases it is tangible. Alternatively, cooperation may be more informal and
intangible, for example when it concentrates on the exchange of information or of knowledge.
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Appendix I
Illustrations of local production networks
In this appendix the local multi-plant companies introduced in Chapter 5 are used to illustrate
the structure of the local production networks centred on very large garment companies in La
Laguna.
Roman produces primarily casual pants and occasionally small volumes of jeans. The company
doubled its production capacity in 1996-1997. In 1998 its main factory moved to a large and
new facility that has room for further expansion (approximately 30%). Even when expansion
will be completed, Roman wants to continue to work with subcontractors for flexibility
reasons.
The total volume of subcontracted work generally does not exceed 20% of the company’s total
production capacity and is spread evenly over five to six subcontractors. Only pure assembly
work is subcontracted. Its subcontracting linkages change with fluctuations in demand and are
temporarily suspended in times of low demand. The majority of its subcontractors are small
factories that dedicated 100% of their capacity to Roman; they are so called ‘captive’
subcontractors.
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Figure I.1: Local production network, Roman
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Casolco produces jeans, primarily basic 5-pocket models but also increasingly large volumes of
more fashionable styles. The company was established in 1986 and remained comparatively
small until the coming into effect of NAFTA after which it expanded rapidly. Since 1994 four
new facilities have been opened, including the distribution centre in El Paso and the cutting
room in Villa Juárez. In time, the urban factories will also be moved to Villa Juárez – a village
just outside Cd. Lerdo where the labour force is more stable and wages and benefits are slightly
lower.
Despite its expansion, demand often exceeds Casolco’s in-house production capacity and
therefore Casolco engages subcontractors. The total volume of subcontracted work is
approximately 15% of the company’s total production capacity and is spread over six or seven
subcontractors. The owner of Basic Jeans is related to the owner of Casolco: Basic Jeans does up
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Figure I.2: Local production network, Casolco
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to 4% of Casolco’s production volume, other subcontractors do slightly less. Only pure
assembly work – preferably of the more difficult fashion styles – is subcontracted. Though the
relationships with Basic Jeans and Alaska Jeans (whose owner is also related to the owner of
Casolco) are fairly stable, subcontracting linkages do fluctuate and may be temporarily
suspended in times of low demand. Casolco has worked with a large number of subcontractors
over the course of the years and tries to work with those subcontractors it has had the best
experiences with. The majority of its subcontractors are ‘captive’ subcontractors.
Grupo Lajat started to produce jeans in 1988. As it was an entirely new activity for the
diversified Grupo Lajat, the garment division was a joint venture with US-owned Kentucky
Apparel. Lajat learned and expanded very fast, a process that lead to the acquisition (and
closure) of Kentucky Apparel by Lajat. Before the turn of the century Lajat was already leading
the ranks of the local garment giants.
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Figure I.3: Local production network, Lajat
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To avoid tightening of and rising wages in the urban labour market, Lajat has located its
assembly facilities in the rural areas of La Laguna and even outside the region. It was one of the
first companies to invest in rural factories. Its very large cutting room and laundry facility are
located in the industrial park Lajat – built and owned by Grupo Lajat.
Together, Lajat’s subcontractors take care of approximately 20% of its total production
volume. In peak seasons, Lajat has had to work with subcontractors outside the region because
many of the local subcontractors were already filled with work of others. Lajat has worked with
a very large number of subcontractors over the course of the years. The precise configuration of
its network depends on volume requirements and availability of (preferred) subcontractors.
Somewhat surprising is the engagement of Comercial Waco as Lajat’s subcontractor; it belongs
to a very large garment company, that generally do not rely on subcontracting work, certainly
not in peak season.
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7 La Laguna and the ‘outside world’: 
bi-national export production networks
and the domestic market alternative
The preceding chapters have pointed to the exceptionally strong export orientation of the local
garment industry in La Laguna. During the 1990s the Laguna region became a major foothold
in US-Mexican production networks of blue jeans, orchestrated by US buyers.
In La Laguna there is cluster-wide resignation to the limited depth, stability and cooperation
in local intra-cluster linkages (see Chapter 6). By contrast, there is much more attention for the
linkages between local producers and US buyers. Garment producers in La Laguna emphasise
the importance of vertical linkages with their buyers and stress the need to cooperate more
closely with these buyers. Chapter 3 discussed how US branded manufacturers and retailers,
and the differences between their sourcing strategies and networks, occupy centre stage in the
current literature on the Mexican garment export industry. Basically, the succession of branded
manufacturers by US retailers as main buyers of Mexican garment producers is thought to
reflect and/or stimulate the upgrading of these producers in the direction of full-package
production.
This chapter deals with the network links between garment firms in La Laguna and US
branded manufacturers, designers/marketers and retailers in the US. The aim is to uncover the
structure of different networks, the governance exercised through network links and the way a
position in these networks may influence the development of local firms. In export networks,
SMEs run the risk of becoming locked into the role of assembly subcontractor. Therefore, the
opportunities offered by the domestic market for SMEs are also briefly explored.
This chapter is divided into five sections. The first introduces the most important buyers for
the Laguna region. It sketches the expansion of the region’s buyers base over the 1990s. The
next section discusses the various types of buyers – branded manufacturers,
designers/marketers and retailers – and their sourcing and networking strategies in greater
detail. Differences in emphases and network structures are discussed; the most notable is the
role played by intermediary firms in retailer-centred networks. Attention will also be paid to
the contrasting perceptions local contractors and their buyers have of each other and their
business relationship. Though subjective in nature, these opinions are informative and may
affect the configuration of networks as well as the content of the sourcing linkages. The
position of local SMEs is discussed in section 7.4. As shown in the previous chapters, most SMEs
depend on subcontracting work. Only a few work directly for small US buyers, brokers or a
combination of both. The position of SME subcontractors is examined to see how local
subcontracting relations differ from the relations between buyers and local manufacturers. The
final section of this chapter shifts the attention to domestic market networks as a SME
alternative to exporting and contrasts their structure and governance with those of export
networks.
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7.1 General trends with regard to La Laguna’s buyers
NAFTA has impacted the geography of global garment trade and production as it caused many
US buyers to shift their attention from the East Asian apparel industry to Mexico as a nearby
and relatively cheap sourcing country. More than attention alone was shifted: the impact of
NAFTA is reflected in the increasing prominence of Mexico in the strategies of US fibre and
textile producers, apparel firms and retailers. The number of US-Mexican alliances in apparel
production has grown, a larger and increasing number of Mexican apparel producers are
incorporated into the production networks of US buyers and some of these Mexican producers
have replaced Asian or Caribbean producers (Gereffi & Bair, 1998; Gereffi, 1997; see Chapter 2).
From the perspective of La Laguna, the most notable changes since the passages of NAFTA are
the quantitative boom in production, an incremental change in the organisation of production
in the direction of full-package production (see Chapter 8) and the arrival of new US buyers. To
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Table 7.1: Main US clients of the Laguna garment cluster1
La Laguna early 1990s La Laguna 2000
Main clients Marketers/designers Marketers/designers
Old Navy/Gap Old Navy/Gap
Liz Claiborne
Tommy Hilfiger
Eddie Bauer
The Limited
Polo Jeans
Mudd
Branded manufacturers Branded manufacturers
VF** VF**
Levi Strauss Levi Strauss
Savane Savane
Sara Lee/Hanes**
Retailers Retailers
Kmart Kmart
Wal-Mart Wal-Mart
Target Target
JC Penney
Sears
Intermediaries Intermediaries
(brokers/vendors) (vendors/hybrid)
Sun Apparel Sun Apparel*/**
807 807*/**
Kellwood
Aalfs**
W. Stevens*
Easy Wear Group
A & A Consultants
Source: Baseline survey, 1998-1999
* These US intermediaries are also involved in retailing through licensing or own brand production.
** These US companies have FDI production facilities in the region.
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start with the latter development, Table 7.1 gives an overview of the main clients of the Laguna
garment cluster in the early 1990s and in 2000. During and before the early 1990s, La Laguna
was producing primarily standardised blue jeans for the low-end segment of the market
through mass merchandisers such as Kmart, Wal-Mart and Target, but also better positioned
branded manufacturers such as VF Corporation and Levi Strauss. A few intermediaries also
played a role; they channelled mostly work for department stores to the region. Over the course
of the 1990s new buyers entered the Laguna apparel arena, especially since the passage of
NAFTA (see also Gereffi & Martínez, 2000; Bair & Gereffi, 2001). The table also shows that the
new buyers have joined rather than replaced the cluster’s former buyers. As a consequence, the
buyer base of the region has expanded quite dramatically to include clients new to garment
production in the region, and even in Mexico.
Table 7.1 shows that on the whole, the cluster served the lower segments of the US market and
works for many lower-mid end clients. Illustrative is the sourcing pattern of Gap Inc., a highly
important buyer in La Laguna. Gap Inc. primarily sources garments under its Old Navy brand,
which is positioned in the low-end segment of the market, from La Laguna. Much smaller
volumes of the higher quality Gap-branded jeans are sourced from the region. Banana Republic
– Gap Inc.’s best positioned brand, in the mid- to high-market segment – is not sourced from
La Laguna at all.
The table also illustrates not only the growth in the number of clients of the cluster, but also
that new and different types of buyers have begun to source from La Laguna. A comparison of
the clients in Table 7.1 with the listing of garment buyers in Table 1.3 reveals that during the
1990s La Laguna’s production began to penetrate the mid- and the upper-mid-end market
segments. This is indicated by the increase in the number of designers at the top of Table 7.1. In
general, these new buyers are more demanding than clients such as Wal-Mart, Kmart and – in
some ways – Levi Strauss, which traditionally produced in the region. On the whole, however,
these designers still manage small volumes in La Laguna and deal with a more selective group
of local manufacturers than do the other buyers in the list. As will be further discussed later in
this chapter, designers deal only with the most capable, full-package local giants. The increase
in number and importance of higher-end retailers and designers causes a diminishing relative
importance of branded manufacturers. Though in itself hardly a surprising shift (see also the
discussion of industry trends in Chapter 1), this is thought to have great implications for the
development dynamic of the cluster (see Gereffi et al., 2002b). Also noteworthy is the
importance of intermediary firms, many of which channel the work of the lower-end retailers
to the cluster2. In most of the literature, limited attention is paid to intermediary firms in US-
Mexican garment production networks.
7.2 Buyers: sourcing and networking strategies
This section sets out to examine the bi-national production networks between La Laguna and
the US market in greater detail. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the garment industry has gone
through a process of hybridisation: retailers have gone vertical, manufacturers have diversified
into retailing, and some are even retreating from manufacturing in order to focus on
marketing. The different types of clients are becoming more and more alike, so much so that
the literature tends to group them together under the common denominator ‘buyers’. But are
they really so alike? Are their production networks and sourcing strategies identical? In some
ways they are: all types of buyers mention product quality, acceptable cost and punctual
delivery as prerequisites for a good sourcing relationship and most have codes of conduct or a
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contract of compliance specifying the minimal labour and facility conditions local contractors
have to provide (see Annex 2). On the other hand, recent literature on the development of the
Mexican garment industry also stresses the differences in sourcing strategies between branded
manufacturers and retailers and their impact on local upgrading processes (see Chapter 3). To a
large extent this was confirmed by interviews with different buyers which showed that their
practical involvement with these aspects as well as the structure of their networks can be
markedly different. Even if many buyers are doing something of everything, their background
as manufacturer or retailer appears to work through in the expertise and focus they bring into
their current network linkages, as well as in the structure of their networks. For this reason,
this section focuses on manufacturers, designers, retailers and intermediaries separately. It aims
to shed light on the structures of the production networks as shaped by the various types of
extra-regional buyers. Moreover, it seeks to highlight the varying strategies of these clients
with regard to their local manufacturers and contractors through a focus on the information
and knowledge content of production linkages.
7.2.1 Branded manufacturers
The main concern of many branded manufacturers in the face of the general shift of power to
retailers (see Chapter 1), is to maintain their market share. To do so, most have complemented
their traditional product lines of commodity jeans, tee-shirts or other basic garments, which
traditionally were the backbone of their business, with higher fashion content product lines.
Examples of such new product lines in pants/bottoms are the ‘Engineered Jeans’ and ‘Dockers’
by Levi’s, and Timbercreek casuals and camouflage combat-pants by Wrangler. This product
duality is also reflected in the production networks of these companies, in which FDI,
traditionally the main production vehicle for these companies, is now flanked by extensive
international sourcing. The production of basic commodity garments occurs in very large
volumes, is relatively stable and predictable, and can be highly automated. It is in this segment
where, through decades of production experience, specialisation and technological innovation,
branded manufacturers have built a competitive advantage. The FDI facilities of branded
manufacturers generally manufacture precisely these traditional, basic product lines. The more
changeable, fashion-sensitive and new product lines are primarily produced through sourcing
linkages. Sourcing is generally coordinated and controlled by a separate sourcing division
integrated into the corporate structure. Even though sourcing is becoming an integral part of
the production strategies and networks of branded manufacturers, their tradition of
manufacturing is still reflected in both the structure and the content of sourcing network
linkages.
Thus in relation to the Laguna region, branded manufacturers as a group play a double role: as
buyers they are external actors exercising control over local contractors through their sourcing
linkages, and as manufacturers they have a local presence through their FDI facilities. In
general the impact of their presence on the region should not be underestimated. Together
they are estimated to absorb approximately 15% of those employed in the industry in their FDI
factories; a further large number are indirectly employed through sourcing relationships with
local contractors. A few branded manufacturers combine both these functions in the region:
Wrangler and uniform manufacturers RKI and Aramark have contracting linkages and FDI
facilities in La Laguna. By contrast, Hanes, for example, has FDI facilities but no local
contractors, while Levi Strauss works with a few local contractors but does not have own
facilities in the region. Both the FDI and the sourcing sides of the production networks of
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branded manufacturers will be examined here, starting with strategies with regard to FDI
facilities in the region.
Intra-firm network linkages/strategies with regard to FDI facilities
In line with the general patterns described above, the FDI facilities of branded manufacturers
in La Laguna generally produce basic, standardised products that are produced in predictable,
large batches. In this way, applied technology developed in-house can be fully exploited to
reach very high production efficiencies.
In general, local subsidiaries are relatively tightly leashed to their US headquarters, where the
business strategies are formulated. Subsidiary guidelines and objectives are rooted in a strict
corporate framework. The overall corporate strategy of branded manufacturers with regards to
their FDI facilities is very much focused on production efficiency. Many cite ‘control’ – with
regard to quality but also production planning – as the reason for channelling a large part of
total production through FDI facilities. These considerations are reflected in the content of
linkages between US headquarters and FDI facilities in the region. Headquarters do not get
involved in local matters beyond the level of general guidelines, but are very much involved in
production planning and organisation. Local production has to fit within the overall corporate
production aims based on sales and market projections.
The management of several foreign-owned subsidiaries in La Laguna had been directly
responsible for the precise site selection within the region, and sometimes even for the
selection of the region as production location within Mexico. This great strategic involvement
in the pre-production stage stands in contrast to more limited local decision-making once local
subsidiaries were up and running (see also Figure 7.1). Essentially, the only area in which
subsidiaries are largely autonomous is the recruitment of personnel. Beyond that, decision-
making in most areas is concentrated in the hands of either divisional or corporate
headquarters.
However, there is more nuance to the actual situation than this short introduction suggests.
There are grey areas in decision-making – and shifts in and stretching of these areas. Also, the
sharing of responsibility and information differs from case to case and from company to
company, and even between divisions of the same corporate company. In many companies
there appears to be room for some strategic manoeuvring at the local level, certainly if a factory
has been running successfully for some time. Whether grey areas in decision-making are
exploited by local FDI subsidiaries depends on the local management of the facilities. Local
managers are the company’s experts on the local business environment and the business
opportunities embodied in it. For instance, investment and expansion decisions are ultimately
taken at the US headquarters, but information, advice and ideas are mostly provided by
subsidiary managers in the field. Several managers of FDI facilities in La Laguna indicated they
had been involved in the further expansion of their company’s interests in the region. Several
local managers also felt they were in a position to make recommendations in areas such as
domestic suppliers, while admitting little progress had been made in this field. Few had
successfully pushed for changes in the organisation of production or existing linkage patterns.
This may be explained by the fact that the development of productive linkages to the
surrounding cluster and local manufacturers or suppliers does not form part of the tasks of FDI
facilities: contracting as well as supply relations are controlled at higher levels of the corporate
hierarchy (see Figure 7.1).
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Formally, local decision-making is only significant with regard to purely local matters.
Informally decisions are ultimately taken at headquarters outside the region, but the decisions
can to a greater or lesser extent be ‘pre-cooked’ by local management.
In short: production linkages of FDI facilities are bi-directional and dense in information:
information on local business matters and opportunities is communicated from the region to
the headquarters, while information on business strategies, market developments, etc. is
communicated to the offshore FDI facilities. In addition, technological advances are
communicated to and implemented at the local level by (divisional) headquarters. Linkages
between the local subsidiaries and headquarters in the US are mostly of an immaterial nature.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, material flows to and from local FDI facilities are mostly
extra-regional and maintained with production facilities and distribution centres in the US.
Sourcing by branded manufacturers
How are the sourcing linkages between US branded manufacturers and local contractors in La
Laguna shaped? And, more importantly, what is the content of these linkages? Are they mere
flows of orders, material and finished garments, or is knowledge exchange and learning also
part of these sourcing networks, as is asserted by the literature?
Many branded manufacturers in the region still obtain a relatively small part of total
production through sourcing linkages. Sourcing networks for these companies may be
relatively small, not only in relation to total volume but also because of a preference for a small
number of contractors with relatively large capacities. Traditionally, as explained in Chapter 3,
branded manufacturers sourced mostly pure assembly work under production-sharing
provisions such as the 807/HTS 9802 Program. Their concern is principally with quality rather
than with factory size (see Figure 7.2). Currently, most branded manufacturers that source from
the Laguna region prefer to work with medium or large contractors who can do more than pure
assembly – preferably ‘CMT+laundry’ (cutting, assembly, finishing and laundry) – so that any
confusion about responsibility for mistakes or non-compliance can be avoided. For the same
reasons and as part of a general quest for greater control, branded manufacturers do not allow
subcontracting by local contractors. As the contractors of branded manufacturers become more
capable, they assume responsibility for the procurement of material inputs.
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Figure 7.1: Decision-making responsibilities for FDI facilities
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Several branded manufacturers indicated their general intention to have a long-term working
relationship with contractors because such a commitment is seen as a win-win situation, as it
leads to stability, mutual familiarity and trust. In effect, in La Laguna most branded
manufacturers have worked with the same contractors for a couple of years. Branded
manufacturers engage a large share of the production capacity of their local contractors. Many
are quite protective of their good contractors: if they are producing a style that is not selling as
projected, it may be replaced by basic garments. The focus on product quality and efficiency
evident in their FDI facilities is also reflected in their sourcing linkages: branded manufacturers
share knowledge that can lead to reductions in cost or increases in efficiency in their
contractors with these contractors. In most cases this concerns general adjustments to the
organisation of production on the shop floor, which can lead to considerable cost reductions in
plants in the region. In addition, some branded manufacturers apply their knowledge by
teaching contractors hands-on about the construction of new styles and the efficient and
[ 187 ]
ownership linkage
subcontracting relation
joint venture relation
Source: Interviews and Baseline survey, 1998-1999
100% ‘captive’ subcontractor
non-‘captive’ subcontractor
United States
Mexico
6099
Savane Sta. Teresa
distibution centre
broker El Paso
Tramex
employees: 1600
cutting and assembly
Siete Leguas
employees: 2500
cutting and assembly
Savane El Paso
cutting room
Savane El Paso
headquarters and
technical support
Arels de la Laguna
employees: 90
assembly
Manufacturas Roman
employees: 1150
cutting and assembly
Savane Cd. Juárez
design and samples
Libra
Laundry & Perm Press
employees: 250
Impecable
employees: 2060
assembly
Baher
employees: 120
assembly
Bull Denim
employees: 370
assembly
Figure 7.2: Production network of a branded manufacturer, Savane
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proper performance of certain operations. Sharing knowledge about technology and machinery
is much more restricted. Especially branded manufacturers with a R&D centre to develop new
production technology for their own plants are protective of their in-house technological
knowledge, which is the basis for their competitive advantage.
Information regarding market developments and business strategies, if shared with
contractors, is shared informally. There is no formalised, regular medium for the sharing of
such information, and it appears largely dependent on the interpersonal relationship between
sourcing managers and contractors.
7.2.2 Retailers
The general shift in market share and power from manufacturers to retailers in the garment
industry is reflected at the local level in an increasing importance of retailer-centred networks.
Many of them, especially the department stores, have a relatively short history of sourcing from
the Laguna region when compared to branded manufacturers. Yet they are rapidly gaining
ground on the manufacturers.
Mass merchandisers (e.g. Kmart, Wal-Mart, Target) and department stores (e.g. JC Penney,
Sears) are producing large volumes of their private label jeans in La Laguna. Mass merchandisers
were amongst the first retailers to source from the region and are still sourcing large volumes
there. The sourcing networks that connect these buyers to suppliers in La Laguna appear to be
two-pronged. On one hand, the bulk of their sourcing is carried out, coordinated and
controlled by US-based intermediary firms, such as Kellwood, W. Stevens, Flyn and Sun
Apparel. These firms bear full responsibility for all the planning, coordination and logistics of
the sourcing network, and network relations are centred around these intermediaries. To most
intents and purposes they function as the clients or buyers of local suppliers. On the other
hand, especially in the case of basic commodity items or collections, retailers may work directly
with very large local suppliers of full packages. In most cases local suppliers are allowed to
subcontract work to local subcontractors. This practice turns them into the central point of
local production networks and may be the first step in the direction of becoming a key or core
supplier.
It may hardly be a surprise that, compared to branded manufacturers and designers, retailers
have a more distant relationship with both their products and the firms that produce them.
Many do not have their own design department but rely on vendors or other types of
intermediary firms, to whom they also assign the responsibility for the actual production or the
coordination thereof. It is rare to find representatives of retailers in La Laguna. Thus hardly any
direct links of primary importance exist between department stores or mass merchandisers and
local contractors. In contrast to branded manufacturers and designers, retailers do not
maintain links with all their subcontractors/contractors. Instead, governance concerning codes
of conduct, specification of trim items and quality, cost and delivery is formalised and
communicated through the intermediaries or core suppliers. These intermediaries or core
suppliers bear responsibility for the structuring, control and coordination of the lower tier of
the production network and the network-wide implementation of the retailer’s code of
conduct.[ 188 ]
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The role of intermediaries in retailer-centred networks
Importers, vendors, brokers, supply chain managers – the diversity in nomenclature reflects the
diversity in the roles played by intermediary firms. Intermediary firms occupy a pivotal
position in the sourcing networks that connect many US garment retailers to producers in
Mexico. However, their position and responsibilities vary widely and may be contested by
different firms in the networks. One of the most obvious changes with regard to the position of
intermediaries in the 1990s was the virtual disappearance of the traditional brokers, many of
which were located in the US border region. Brokers owed their position to their extensive
knowledge of and connections with garment manufacturers (with access to quotas) in Mexico.
Their business was built on the ability to connect demand for garment production capacity to
available and suitable supply sources in Mexico. This was a unique and highly important asset,
certainly in the times when Mexican production capacity for export was tied to quota
bureaucracy. The opening up of Mexico has eroded the position of such traditional brokers, so
much so that brokers have been forced to consider a strategic reorientation of their business in
order to validate their continuing position within the bi-national production networks. Now
that bi-national trade is liberalised and the most competitive Mexican manufacturers are
striving to extend their command over the production chain (and are succeeding in doing so),
the functionality of brokers and other intermediaries in the bi-national production networks is
no longer a given. Many intermediary firms see themselves forced to secure their position by
either assuming the more strategic role of supply chain manager or by becoming a core
supplier through investing in in-house production capacity. The first option is relatively less
viable in Mexico than in Asia because of geographical proximity and the liberalisation under
NAFTA, which simplify logistics and administrative or customs management. The direct
involvement in garment manufacturing with the aim to become a core supplier with local
facilities has been a more common response, despite some hesitance and resistance on the part
of vendors. The increasing direct involvement of intermediary firms in production appears in
many cases to be the result of pressure to this effect from buyers. Behind this pressure lies the
need to justify the value added of intermediaries, as well as a search for increased and direct
control over delivery and quality.
Meanwhile, many intermediaries have acquired licenses for existing brands or have developed
own brands in an effort to also develop the retailing end of their business3. This allows
intermediaries to differentiate themselves from new core suppliers in LMICs and reduces their
dependency on their buyers. Repositioning and reorientation in this segment of the
production network has contributed to the general hybridisation trend noted in Chapter 1.
The number of intermediaries performing different combinations of activities in the logistics,
service, management, design and production segments of the production chain has grown.
Within different production networks, they may assume different roles.
Thus, even within the context of NAFTA liberalisation and the development of full-package
capabilities in the region, intermediary firms play a central role in retailer export networks in La
Laguna. Focus is on strong intermediaries that organise the entire production process/supply
chain.
Three configurations appear to be common. One is where US intermediaries coordinate the
supply chain without being directly involved in manufacturing. Local manufacturers are
usually involved on a CMT+laundry basis, while production planning, procurement of fabric,
import and distribution and sometimes design are done by the intermediary. On the other
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Box 7.1: El Paso and La Laguna: predecessor and heir?
Apart from New York, Los Angeles and San Francisco, where many buyers have headquarters or sales
offices, El Paso figures quite prominently in the production networks that connect La Laguna to the
US market. La Laguna can be seen as the inheritor of El Paso’s former position as ‘Jeans Capital of
the World’, and in many ways the existing links between El Paso and La Laguna appear to affirm this
status. El Pasoan garment entrepreneurs and other experts play varied and important roles in the
local garment industry in La Laguna and in the production networks that connect it to the US market.
This has especially been the case since the demise of the El Paso garment industry in the mid to late
1990s. Some of the city’s garment entrepreneurs still cling to their shrinking factories in El Paso
hoping to stay in business until retirement, but many have flocked out of El Paso in the footsteps of
‘their’ industry. As the garment industry boomed in Mexico, many went across the border to Mexico.
In doing so, they cemented a tight link between El Paso and Mexico, and especially with the Laguna
region – El Paso’s successor as Jeans Capital.
The El Paso-La Laguna link is based on a number of different strategies. Several of La Laguna’s large
and very large factories are owned by companies based in El Paso. Such companies as Border
Apparel, Onsite and Sun Apparel have shifted their entire production base from El Paso to La Laguna.
Other El Pasoan companies are sourcing from La Laguna, in a few cases as buyers, but most
commonly they have found a niche in the intermediary role. Especially in the early to mid 1990s a
disproportionate number of brokers from El Paso channelled work for US buyers to La Laguna.
Though in general the growth of El Paso-based brokers may have been short lived, a few built a steady
business on connecting mostly smaller buyers in the US to SME contractors in La Laguna.
Furthermore, companies in La Laguna have also built a direct link in the other direction, viz. from La
Laguna to El Paso (see also Chapter 5); this mainly occurred in the pre-NAFTA period. Many of the
large exporting companies have an office and a warehouse in El Paso. Finally, industry-specific
suppliers also downscaled their El Paso offices and complemented their El Paso business by opening
new offices and warehouses in La Laguna or by cementing supply linkages to La Laguna from El Paso.
Clearly, many garment companies in El Paso have seized the new business opportunities in La
Laguna, and vice versa. Many El Paso industry experts have found their way into La Laguna, either by
moving with their company or independently. Consequently, several managers of the foreign-owned
and locally owned companies in La Laguna, as well as sourcing directors and managers of
intermediaries or buyers sourcing in La Laguna, have previously worked in El Paso. The local
expertise in El Paso with regard to jeans production is applied in Mexico through independent
consultants and individual entrepreneurs who are no longer directly involved in production, but have
built a business on the wheeling and dealing surrounding it.
Especially at the time of the explosion of garment capacity in La Laguna during the mid 1990s, the
expertise coming from El Paso was highly valuable to the local industry. Many of the garment
entrepreneurs in El Paso grew up in the ‘needle trade’ and have extensive hands-on experience. They
started out as employees of one of the larger companies and pride themselves in the fact that the
garment industry is in their blood. They have the technical experience and know the US garment
industry and its key players. This is exactly the kind of experience that was needed in La Laguna,
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hand, it is very common for the central intermediary to have established production facilities of
its own (in the Laguna region, the US or elsewhere), in which it occupies a position similar to
what in Chapter 1 was called a ‘key supplier’. In La Laguna, approximately half of the FDI
facilities belong to such US intermediaries. In these cases, part of the production is carried out
in its own facilities, but the intermediary is also responsible for the contracting out of work to a
sourcing network. Local examples of such arrangements are the production of jeans for JC
Penney through the US-Mexican joint venture Aalfs-OMJC, and the production of Wal-Mart
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where few industrialists with limited experience in garment assembly for export were facing a large
demand surge and many new challenges (see Chapter 8). Certainly, in the initial stage of its
development, the infusion of the Laguna cluster with expertise from El Paso experts appears to have
been vital to its development.
By the turn of the century, El Paso’s expertise was proving footloose again or possibly even outdated.
First, as soon as the ice between US buyers and intermediaries and Mexican producers was broken, a
large part of the El Paso-based brokers disappeared. Later, many managers, consultants and other
experts from El Paso also moved away. This is not surprising: though numerous parallels between the
former and the current Jeans Capital can be drawn (see also Chapter 3), the market and the industry
as a whole have changed dramatically over recent decades. El Paso was able to build a large industry
on contracting work of standardised, mass production for mostly branded manufacturers (van
Dooren & van der Waerden, 1997, van Dooren & Verkoren, forthcoming). La Laguna faces a changed
business environment of different types of buyers with new strategies, and the concomitant
challenges and opportunities. Recent dynamics may create new and great opportunities for local
manufacturers. The most urgent question now concerns the local response needed to reap the full
benefits of these opportunities. The El Paso garment industry and its experts have provided La
Laguna with valuable practical expertise in the area of production. They may be less able to serve as
an example or guide for the increasingly urgent strategic response, especially with regard to increased
flexibility, local companies need to make to changes in market and industry.
Table 7.2: Mapping linkages between El Paso and La Laguna
Ownership linkages 7 Several of these companies are large or very large and have
large facilities in La Laguna. They are generally manufacturers
that have positioned themselves as intermediaries or core
suppliers in the networks of US buyers; they form the local
hub of their subcontracting network.
Managers 5 Most El Pasoan managers work in the FDI facilities of US
branded manufacturers; a few work for local giants.
Intermediaries/Brokers 6 El Paso-based intermediaries are involved with production in
La Laguna. In most cases they coordinate the production in
Mexico for smaller US buyers; in La Laguna they generally
work with SMEs.
Local companies with 14% Most offices in El Paso take care of customer relations and
offices in El Paso shipping of material inputs to factories in La Laguna, as well
as border-crossing procedures of finished garments into the
US; some also have/had a cutting room.
Source: Estimates based on interviews and Baseline survey, 1998-1999
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jeans by and through US-owned Sun Apparel, which has several production facilities in La
Laguna under the name of Pami. Finally, part of the local Old Navy/Gap production, mostly
children’s wear, is produced by and through the 807 Company, which is based in El Paso and
has a factory in Gómez Palacio.
Finally, direct sourcing linkages have developed between mass merchandisers and a few
department stores and very large, capable, locally-owned producers in La Laguna. However, by
the turn of the century very few local contractors had acquired a position of core supplier: most
still worked through US intermediaries. This limited direct involvement appears less a matter
of lagging capabilities of local producers as of the still limited ability of the US retailers to deal
directly with local suppliers. Especially department stores still have little know-how and an
infrastructure that is not well adapted to dealing directly with Mexican contractors.
Most intermediary firms active in La Laguna in retailer-centred networks are US owned and US
based. Many are based in or connected to traditional garment production regions in the South
and Northeast of the US and on the US-Mexico border. Though not a location for headquarters
of US buyers, many garment companies are in one way or another connected to El Paso. This is
partly based on the concentration of small intermediaries in that city. However, Box 7.1 shows
that building on El Paso’s unique position as former Jeans Capital, there are multiple linkages
between that city and La Laguna.
7.2.3 Marketers/designers
The newest buyers in La Laguna are the buyers/marketers of designer labels. In some ways, the
network strategies of designers and marketers are a mix of those of branded manufacturers and
retailers. Like branded manufacturers, they have direct and exclusive involvement with the
product at the pre-assembly stage of production. However, unlike branded manufacturers but
akin to retailers, their direct involvement stops after the design of the garment and
specification of trim and fabric: all productive activities beyond designing are sourced out. In
other words, designers and marketers depend fully on their sourcing network for actual
production as they have no production capacity of their own.
Designers such as Tommy Hilfiger, The Limited, Liz Claiborne and Eddie Bauer have a short
local sourcing history and maintain sourcing relationships with a few very large, full-package
suppliers. They generally do not work with less all-round, assembly or CMT contractors.
Besides (the potential to supply) large volumes and established full-package capabilities,
designers demand high quality from their suppliers4. The direct preoccupation of designers
with the final product, its appearance and quality and with corporate images comes to the fore
in overall tight governance of sourcing linkages. An example is the fact that all types of trim
items as well as their certified suppliers are specified, a practice also noted in relation to the
strategies of branded manufacturers. Designers source their basic bottoms from La Laguna. Yet,
on the whole these are more sophisticated than the bulk of other products produced locally as
more emphasis is placed on product quality. Emphasis on fashion also applies to their basics:
regular changes in styles are common. Like branded manufacturers, several designers have a
staff of industrial engineers who visit contractors’ factories to evaluate and improve production
efficiency and quality. Especially at the beginning of the relationship, links are dense with
information on production techniques and -organisation and a marketer’s engineers
commonly work with supervisors, auditors and shop-floor personnel. A technical director of
one of the designers that works in La Laguna observed:
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‘They [producers in La Laguna] are proud and tell us they’ve worked for Gap for a long time. To us that just means
there’s a lot of work to be done. We need to tell them Gap is not the best and that their standards may not be not good
enough for us. We need to work with them to make them lose their bad habits and teach them about our demands and
our ways.’
Furthermore, many designers are trying to streamline communication and data exchange so as
to have production respond to sales as closely as possible. Flexibility on their contractors’ shop
floors (in adapting sewing lines to shorter runs of garments with a higher fashion content) is
highly important. But this is not all: flexible management and an emphasis on service to the
buyers is of increasing importance. Many designers are quite vocal about the need for local
manufacturers to provide full packages and to improve their services if they want to secure a
future position within their international garment networks. Most designers involved in the
cluster have truly global sourcing networks and are constantly weighing the advantages and
disadvantages of sourcing locations. Benchmarking between their producers is sometimes
communicated to the local manufacturers in La Laguna, possibly to pressure them into a
certain direction. Information about market and industry trends appears to be shared quite
extensively. According to one designer, this was done to make local suppliers understand the
system they were feeding into and ‘to make them understand what they’re up against’.
Network relations between designers and local suppliers in Mexico are generally direct. Rather
than using an intermediary firm, several designers have a buying or support office in Mexico to
take care of emergencies, quality control, administration and logistics.
Buyer succession (see Chapter 2) and the active involvement of new, higher-end buyers with
new demands may be a highly important motor behind the upgrading of the cluster. Designers
may indeed push the cluster to close the gap between local capabilities in the mass production
of basic jeans and the new demands for smaller runs of more sophisticated jeans. This would
align the cluster with the general trends in the industry. However, while the involvement of
these new buyers is significant and challenging, it has been neither fast paced nor cluster-wide.
The volumes sourced by designers in La Laguna are considerably smaller than those sourced
by mass merchandisers and branded manufacturers. Most designers have only initiated small
pilot programs with local manufacturers and appeared to be testing the water. Over all, very
few local full-package giants had secured a stable relationship with designers: most designers
discontinued their sourcing from certain suppliers or from the entire region.
This may well be due to the immaterial demands of designers. Few problems appeared to
arise with regard to product quality. However, business mentality, service-mindedness and
management appear to be the main trouble areas, and the main upgrading challenges for local
entrepreneurs wanting to improve and deal with higher-end buyers appears to lie in these
areas. What is more, their higher demands are an important reason why work for designers is
only sparingly subcontracted in La Laguna. When it is, it is reserved for the best subcontractors.
The quality risks are higher and very few subcontractors live up to the standards of designers.
Most local giants are unable or unwilling to pass on the necessary know-how and skills. This is
significant because it means that the upgrading impetus that originates from the recent
involvement of designers benefits the cluster to a limited degree and in a highly selective
manner.
Figure 7.3 is a schematic representation of the network structures La Laguna is engaged in: it is
an adaptation of Figure 3.3 based on the findings outlined above. Figure 7.3 distinguishes not
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only between branded manufacturers and retailers but also presents marketers as a separate
group. Branded manufacturers work through FDI facilities as well as sourcing linkages. Several
branded manufacturers increasingly demand CMT or even full-package capabilities of their
contractors and as a consequence work with or are working with larger (and more capable)
contractors than before. In relation to retailers it is important to note the role of intermediaries,
which in La Laguna take much of the upgrading along the chain (in the direction of full-
package production) incentive away from local producers. The sourcing linkages of marketers,
especially designer label marketers closely resemble those of branded manufacturers. Designers
appear more demanding: they want full packages but also flexibility and service, which so far
few local manufacturers offer.
Appendix II provides illustrations of the position of local companies in bi-national production
networks.
7.3 Buyers and producers: contrasting perceptions
As mentioned in the introduction, most garment entrepreneurs assert the need for close
cooperation with their buyers. In general, strategic partnerships or joint ventures with US
buyers or branded manufacturers are seen as better options than local cooperation. Some form
of integration with US buyers is believed to help secure a future position within their
production networks. In the face of volatile markets and international competition, and
bearing in mind the important role of buyers noted in the previous chapter, this focus is
understandable. As noted in Chapter 1 and 2, from the perspective of buyers this may also be
desirable: the forging of tight links with a select group of large and capable ‘core suppliers’ is a
common element in buyers’ strategies. This is confirmed by several of La Laguna’s buyers who
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Figure 7.3: The structure of US-Mexico garment production networks, La Laguna
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express an interest in maintaining long-term linkages with their most capable core suppliers.
In practice, however, joint ventures and/or other types of formalised partnerships between
local producers and US partners are rare in the Laguna region. Buyers prefer and are able to
exert governance through subcontracting links. Diverging and sometimes conflicting interests
and even mutual antagonism appear to be the main reasons for the lack of formal cooperation.
From interviews with local contractors and US buyers it is clear that the expectations and
opinions that the two sides have of their sourcing relationship and their respective roles within
it often do not coincide. As a consequence, a fair amount of tension and friction may be part of
these relations.
Local producers most commonly complain about the prices they are being paid. Buyers tried to
maintain prices for particular products at ‘price point’ during the late 1990s. Worse than
virtually stagnant prices may be the buyers’ underlying attitude that the local manufacturers
perceived behind it. In reference to this, several local respondents mentioned how a number of
the cluster’s main buyers had teamed up just after a peso devaluation to apply downward
pressure on the prices. In doing so, they were able to appropriate the windfall profits that
resulted from exchange rate change, something that local manufacturers felt they had a right
to. From the local perspective, contractor’s margins were being squeezed by ‘inconsiderate,
greedy clients’. Worse still, local manufacturers felt they were being sandwiched as the tight
labour market, high turnover rates and inter-firm labour poaching exerted upward pressure on
wages throughout the late 1990s. In addition, there were sharp increases in electricity and
telecommunication costs. Thus, costs rose but as buyers were insensitive to the problems of
their suppliers, prices remained stagnant.
Also, initially the increasing fashion content of garments caused some tension in the buyer-
supplier relationship (see also Chapter 8). Many local producers have only limited awareness of
the features of and changes in the US market. This made it difficult for them to relate their
clients’ demands to larger trends in the market and hampered mutual understanding. While
limited market awareness persists in local subcontractors, it has diminished over time.
Buyers’ perceptions of their sourcing linkages to La Laguna vary somewhat according to the
type of buyer, but fall into a few general categories. Buyers complain about unsatisfactory
production planning and punctuality on the part of their contractors in La Laguna. Especially
for designers, for whom, based on the paramount importance of lead time considerations in
the configuration of their networks, the geographical proximity of the Laguna region
constitutes its main attraction. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the unnecessary
lengthening of lead times through the bad planning of and late deliveries by local contractors is
an important aggravation. Buyers commonly also point to the inefficiency of many local
suppliers. According to them, increasing production efficiency would allow contractors to deal
with cost pressures.
More importantly, local business mentality in La Laguna is perceived as passive and
unresponsive to market changes and buyers’ demands. Related to this, many buyers condemn
the lack of service offered by their contractors. In comparison to, for example, Asian
manufacturers, contractors in La Laguna are characterised as ‘arrogant’ and unwilling to think
with their clients or to see things from their clients’ perspective. Several buyers acknowledged
they might be spoilt by their Asian suppliers; indeed their opinions do appear slightly
prejudicial (see Egan & Mody (1992) for a discussion of opinion-making amongst buyers). In
reference to differences between Asia and Mexico, one buyer made the following observation:
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‘If, for example, you tell an Asian supplier he has to sew a pant, put on the button, dye the pant, take off the button,
wash it and then put the button back on, he will do as specified without questions or comments. The contractors in
Mexico will protest, will try to convince you that taking the button off makes no difference. Some may simply not do
it.’
A manager of a high-end buyer with recent contracting experience in various parts of Mexico,
including La Laguna, stated that the company was determined to take advantage of the
opportunities – of NAFTA, geographical proximity and potential reductions of turn-around
times – of sourcing in Mexico. Without going into great detail, he said:
‘We will work in a different way from what we had planned. After trying a great number of Mexican garment firms,
and asking for help and advice from institutions, agencies and consultants, we just had to give that up. Recently we
ended up asking one of our main Asian suppliers to come to Mexico and do it for us. He’s now in Yucatán, but we’re
trying to persuade some others to establish a factory in Mexico. It will allow them to continue to work for us and we
will benefit from the short distance and flexibility...’
A final concern for buyers with regard to the Laguna cluster, is one they share with their local
contractors. They are worried about the developments in the local labour market, turnover
rates, labour poaching and wage cost. Especially smaller buyers that have a direct relationship
with local producers and travel to the region expressed worries in this regard. A few buyers and
brokers in El Paso even mentioned these problems as the main reason for moving their
production from La Laguna to other regions in Mexico. Instead of blaming workers, most
buyers place the fault with local industrialists. In the words of an El Paso-based intermediary:
‘They [local industrialists and the chamber] need to get a handle on labour poaching. It has to stop. I know that the
chamber has tried but has been unsuccessful. Business will be hurt if prices go up and productivity and quality suffer.’
A sourcing director of a large manufacturer drew his conclusions in late 1999. The company
pulled all its work out of La Laguna and he explained the decision as follows:
‘We do not see any future in La Laguna anymore. We don’t think they can solve the labour market problems, and
ultimately prices will go up and quality is jeopardised. Central Mexico offers better opportunities, large firms are not
all packed together there.’
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Table 7.3: Insertion of local SMEs in export networks
Small Medium
Direct exports 1 6
Export through local intermediary 8 13
Export through non-local intermediary 0 6
Export through intermediary + direct exporting 1 5
Total 10 30
Purely domestic market 2 2
Source: Baseline survey, 1998-1999
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This latter observation points to one of the potential downsides of clustering that is a real
threat to the development of La Laguna where the disadvantages of an excessively tight labour
market outweigh the clustering advantages.
Despite their ultimately subjective nature, these general perceptions can be assumed to affect
business relations and the content of individual sourcing linkages. At a higher level of scale,
even the configuration of production networks may be impacted as perceptions of business in
La Laguna are juxtaposed with perceptions of other Mexican regions or even other countries.
7.4 Export networks and the insertion of SMEs
Notwithstanding their structural differences, the various types of networks discussed above
have one thing in common: buyer-producer linkages are concentrated in the large and very
large and only sometimes – in the case of branded manufacturers – medium-sized garment
companies in the region.
How and where do local SMEs fit into these export networks? Most networks outlined above
appear to offer limited (if any) opportunities for SMEs: the work of branded manufacturers and
designers, for example, is either not at all or only to a very limited extent subcontracted.
Through subcontracting linkages, retailer centred-networks do extend to include medium-
sized and small subcontractors in La Laguna. Does this mean SMEs rely fully on retailer-centred
networks and the intermediaries through which their work is distributed and controlled? Or
do SMEs also produce for smaller buyers in the US? Table 7.3 illustrates the insertion of local
SMEs into the export networks.
At first glance the table confirms the image created by the first sections of this chapter and by
previous chapters: very few SME have a direct link to the export market. Those that do export
directly, commonly work for branded manufacturers such as Savane and JanSport (part of the
VF Corp.) but also for smaller buyers. Generally in these networks SMEs perform a limited role
(assembly or CMT), while other production activities are subcontracted locally or performed or
coordinated by the buyer. The large majority of the local SMEs export indirectly; their
connection to US buyers is mediated through local contractors or non-local intermediaries. In
line with findings in the previous sections, most work that is channelled through
intermediaries to SMEs bears the private labels of large retailers. Route 66 and High Sierra by
Kmart, Faded Glory by Wal-Mart and Chic by His are examples of the labels produced in local
SMEs. These are the lower-end, bulk produced garments at the bottom of the local product
range. However, Table 7.3 also shows that some SMEs have room to manoeuvre in choosing
export channels and positioning themselves in the export networks. Several companies
combine a subcontracting role in retailer-centred networks with direct exports. Typically,
direct exports are for smaller, less well-known buyers such as Motherhood, which specialises in
maternity clothing, or Cavaritzzi, a Los Angeles-based fashion buyer.
Over all, medium-sized firms are in a better position to develop a direct exporting relationship.
Larger company size is an explanatory factor in itself, but machinery and facility conditions
may also play a role. Large production capacity allows some of the medium-sized companies to
work for up to three customers at one time. Small companies are unable to do that, as their
entire capacity is usually filled by one local client. In fact, small company size is a severe barrier
to direct export production, because the minimal production capacity that even smaller US
[ 197 ]
99,B_TT van Dooren BW.job
buyers require often exceed the capacity of small firms in the region. In addition, the facilities
of many small companies do not meet the standards of most buyers, who in turn do not want
to invest in upgrading these small companies. Finally, the perspective of most small companies
in the garment industry does not extend beyond the local cluster boundaries. In other words,
they work for one of the local giants and have little notion of the US or the domestic market,
the main buyers and their market position, how and where to contact them or the standards
they require from their contractors.
The companies in Table 7.3 that export directly stand out from the other SMEs in the region.
While many SMEs are managed on a day-to-day basis and appear to lack a well-defined,
articulated business strategy, these few more diversified companies are exceptional. Their
position is in most cases the result of a proactive attitude. Some of them have spread their risks
by broadening their buyer base and by producing for the domestic market as well. Others have
put particular emphasis on the quality of their products and/or the conditions of their
facilities. In general, the managers or owners of all of these more all-round companies have a
better understanding of their industrial environment and its trends than their local peers do.
In some cases they, or their family, have been in the business for a relatively long time.
Most but not all local SMEs function as subcontractors and depend on local contractors for
their insertion into export networks. The critical question with regard to local SMEs concerns
the differences and advantages/disadvantages of direct exporting compared to indirect
exporting, and vice versa. If, as is the case for several of the more diversified SMEs, their position
is the result of strategic decisions, what is the aim of such strategies? Diversification of the
buyer base or diminishing the dependence on one single client may be an aim in itself.
However, when asked to elaborate on any differences between local contractors and US buyers
as clients, a more subtle difference was also revealed. One respondent explained the difference
between the relationship with his US intermediary and that with his local contractor (through
both of which he worked for the same buyer):
‘After six years of working for our client, we had a relationship built on trust. Our factory was treated as a socio, a
partner. We were more strategically involved and we knew what was going on – with the intermediary, its clients and
in the market. On several issues, the buyer and our factory communicated directly, without interference from the
intermediary. We had our own responsibilities, including practical responsibilities; we bought all the trim and
printed the barcodes, for example. We did not have an auditor from the intermediary or buyer in our factory.’
This contrasts with the company’s relationship with a local contractor through which it
exports indirectly, which was described as follows:
‘[the local contractor] ... treats us like an employee. We are not involved, consulted or even informed on matters of
planning or organisation. We are like a babysitter; everything [trim and fabric] is delivered to us, we assemble and
deliver when we are told to. All contact with the buyer is through the local contractor, but all responsibility is also
theirs. Procedures and products are checked strictly by their auditors.’
Interviews suggest that this pattern can be generalised to a difference between a direct and an
indirect export position. Respondents indicated that when working for local intermediaries or
contractors, prices were reasonable and the products largely the same, but the responsibilities
of the subcontractor were very limited. Fluctuations in work were fairly frequent so it was hard
[ 198 ]
100,A_TT van Dooren BW.job
to build up a long-term relationship, especially because the business relationship in many cases
was rather distant and dispersed over several departments and personnel. This system of
fluctuating, unstable sourcing relationships requires tight governance but little investment in
the relationship and limited transfer of knowledge and information (see Chapter 8). This is
facilitated by subcontracting work of the lower-end buyers, who first of all, allow
subcontracting but also generally have lower quality standards. In the relationship with US
buyers the physical distance often meant more responsibility for the local firm and also more
learning because the responsibilities were broader and not always clearly defined.
For many local SMEs, positioning themselves in a direct exporting position may be
complicated and difficult because of the minimal capacity requirements and limited
knowledge of potential buyers. Furthermore, if standards and requirements increase, as is
suggested by the literature (see Chapter 1), then the window of opportunity for SMEs wanting
to break out of a pure subcontracting role is closing. On the other hand, the majority of local
SMEs appeared to be fairly content with their indirect insertion into export networks, which
implies a limited but straightforward, surveyable role as subcontractors. Only a few companies
broke away from the subcontractor role, by seeking access to direct export channels or by
getting more deeply or structurally involved in the domestic market.
7.5 Domestic market networks: an alternative for SMEs?
For a local garment SME that wants to break away from its pure subcontractor’s role,
production for the domestic market may be an easier option than entering into a direct
exporting relationship with a US buyer. As mentioned in Chapter 2, generally there is a large
capability gap between standards in domestic markets of LMICs and those in export markets.
By contrast, barriers to penetration of the Mexican domestic market are so low that some
companies occasionally do some domestic market work ‘on the side’ (see Chapter 4). This ease
of entry and exit is due to the fragmented nature of the Mexican domestic market (Mendoza et
al., 2002; see also Chapter 3). First, it is fragmented geographically: many domestic market
producers sell their products on the regional market. More importantly, the retailing of
clothing is fragmented organisationally, as formal large-scale, formal small-scale and informal
small-scale distribution channels each account for about one-third of total clothing sales in
Mexico (Mendoza et al., 2002). This contrasts with the situation in many Western countries,
where formal large-scale channels, most notably department stores, take up a relatively larger
share, while informal small-scale retailing is of more limited and declining importance. Other
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Table 7.4: Domestic market distribution channels of garment companies in La Laguna
Distribution channel No. of companies
Nation-wide department stores/ tiendas de autoservicio 6
Formal small shops:
• Own shops 3
• Wholesale 2
Informal: tianguis/aboneros 2
Total 13
Source: Baseline survey, 1998-1999
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key characteristics are of domestic production networks (formal as well as informal) are
variation and opportunities.
This section examines whether and if so how local producers in La Laguna feed into the
various domestic market distribution channels and how these channels are structured. Table
7.4 shows which distribution channels garment firms in La Laguna use to sell their garments on
the Mexican market.
Possibly the most surprising feature of Table 7.4 is the fact that few local producers sell their
products through informal channels of tianguis or street vendors who use vouchers, the aboneros.
One might expect such local markets to sell local products, but in La Laguna tianguis and
informal markets sell primarily garments from places in the centre of Mexico, such as León and
Irapuato, as well as cheap imports bought in the US. Although informal, small-scale channels
are of limited importance to local producers, the limited occurrence in the table may also
partially be due to the clandestine, hidden and/or possibly incidental nature of these activities.
However, as mentioned in Chapter 5, no evidence was found of sizeable underground garment
trade and production in the region, and therefore the general trend in the table seems fairly
accurate.
Thus, generally domestic market garment producers in La Laguna feed into formal distribution
channels. Their garments are sold through nation-wide buyers with stores throughout the
country or in small shops, in most cases in the region. In a few cases these shops are owned by
the producers; often, however, they are independent. The connection between local producers
and formal marketing differs in two ways from those in the export chains. First, garments are
designed and owned by the manufacturers and the relationship with buyers is mostly a market
or arms-length relationship. Generally, buyers, including the tiendas de autoservicio, are not
involved with product development or with production organisation. Most of these stores do
not have a focused private label line; in fact, in many cases the garments sold bear the label of
the producer, even if it is a small producer and the business relationship is temporary.
Governance is not part of domestic retailer-producer linkages and producers are the pivotal
point of the production network. In some cases, especially for companies that are
predominantly oriented towards the domestic market, fairly large numbers of subcontractors
are engaged. Since the retailer’s interference in and governance of product and production
matters is limited, facility and labour conditions are hardly a matter of their concern.
Commonly, conditions found in subcontractors of manufacturers that supply domestic large-
scale retailers approach sweatshop standards.
Secondly, the chain feeding into the formal channels is short. In the Laguna region most
producers produce autonomously and sell directly to the retailer or are themselves responsible
for retailing. Most export companies that produce for the domestic market sell their garments
through small shops. Their production is carried out in-house as a complement to or back-up
for export production (see Chapter 4). Though some have their own shops, only a few
companies in the region use domestic-market production to create a focused brand or label
image. The latter is a reflection of the Mexican market, where very few Mexican brands or labels
have established a strong market position for themselves.
In general the Mexican domestic/regional market is marked by instability and it offers plenty
of opportunities to adventurers, opportunists and fly-by-nights. The fairly large number of
small, specialists cutters, laundries, etc. in the region (see Box 7.2) are both evidence and
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Box 7.2: Bits and pieces of domestic market production
In La Laguna, domestic market garment production is dwarfed by the export-oriented segment. Yet it
can not be ignored. Within the region, the entire domestic market value chain is represented mostly
by comparatively small-scale, often somewhat run-down facilities with basic and sometimes truly
outdated technology. Barriers to entry are low and the presence of specialist cutters and laundries
allows for the occasional production of small batches, especially since fabric and trim leftovers of the
export segment may be obtained at much reduced prices. A number of representatives of this
domestic market chain are introduced below.
A shadow economy in fabric and trim supplies
Between calls on his cellphone – from managers who urgently need a certain type of thread or who
want to sell elastic or another kind of leftover – in his small ‘warehouse’ of which every millimetre
seems to be occupied by one type of trim or another, Sr. Pedro Gonzales explained his business.
Gonzales has made the trade in leftover trim and thread of the garment companies in the region his
main source of income.
After many years of performing different jobs in the garment industry, both on the border as well as in
the Laguna region, Gonzales set up shop in Torreón in 1998 and bought a small house in a hidden
corner in the centre of the city to serve as a warehouse. At that time, his business was relatively
straightforward and local: it consisted of the buying and selling of thread and trim leftovers of the
companies in the region. In the days when US buyers still sent the necessary trim for their garments to
their manufacturers, over-estimation of trim was such as to give rise to fairly extensive tradable
volumes of leftover zippers, thread, elastic, pocketing and buttons, et cetera. Since these leftovers
were a burden on the limited storage space of most of the companies and their future use mostly a
matter of coincidence, Gonzales could buy them at relatively low prices. On the other hand, there was
always a demand for these goods in the cluster (from exporting as well as domestic market producers)
and since Gonzales was a known figure in the business, he had no problem selling his goods.
Recently, however, since the establishment of a very wide array of suppliers in the region and the
increasing responsibility of local manufacturers for supply procurement, the amount of leftovers in
the factories has been pushed down to a bare minimum, forcing intermediate traders such as
Gonzales to travel extensively in search for cheap tradables. He now regularly travels throughout the
North of Mexico, covering the states of Chihuahua, Durango and Sonora. Local demand, as
evidenced by his constantly ringing phone, is still very high. Especially the domestic market producers
are good clients. Gonzales: ‘...acceptan todo, especialmente lo barato’ (‘... they’ll accept anything,
especially the cheap stuff’). Indeed, the warehouse did not show serious signs of a slowing supply:
there was barely any room to move between the ceiling-high piles of boxes of thread, elastic, zippers
and buttons.
While Gonzales’ business is well-known and formal, informal, underground trade often of stolen
fabric, trim items and other goods, has grown over the past years. Local sources reported informal
traders who turned up at factory gates trying to sell different sorts of trim and fabric at very low
prices. Generally the origin of these goods is ‘unknown’ and the sale is unregistered.
Second-hand machinery and parts
In the region is a lively business between local companies in second-hand supplies of machinery and
parts, as well as in machinery coming from auctions of closed down companies in the US. The latter
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may appear to be of a more ad hoc nature, though some people have made the contrary development
in the garment business between the US and Mexico their core business by trucking second-hand
machinery from the US to Mexico. This is Mr. Jones’ business: he buys equipment at auctions
throughout the US, loads it onto his truck and drives it to and through Mexico, where he sells
equipment to Mexican garment manufacturers. Generally, the Laguna region is his first stop in
Mexico.
Besides these specialist traders, local industrialists in La Laguna may from time to time also visit
auctions – which are advertised widely – in the US in search for good, cheap equipment. This applies
especially to automated or highly specialised sewing machines or cutting room or laundry equipment.
More ordinary second-hand machinery can quite readily be found in the region. Many machines are
‘handed down’ – at a fair price – from contractors to their subcontractors. This type of recycling of
machinery within the cluster is quite extensive and facilitates the establishment of small companies.
On the other hand, as noted by some US clients, quality may well be less consistent in companies
using what sometimes appears to be ‘pre-colonial’ machinery.
The cutting edge
A garage-type space, just outside the centre of Gómez Palacio, houses the cutting room of Sr. Palma:
on one side there are endless heaps of cut fabric and rolls of fabric, and on the other are Palma’s
cutting tables. The cutting room was established in 1996; until that time Sr. Palma had worked in
many different garment factories from Tijuana to La Laguna. Most importantly, he helped set up the
cutting room of a very large garment company in La Laguna in 1993. This cutting room was closed
soon after it was opened due to a lack of demand based on trade regulations that imposed duties on
garment cutting in Mexico. However, his involvement in the project gave Sr. Palma the necessary skill,
experience and contacts for the establishment of his own cutting business. Moreover, in the peak
export season, Sr. Palma is hired to cut all the domestic market production for this very large
company (that re-opened its cutting room as soon as duties on cutting were lifted). For this task,
which is an important (up to 70%) but fluctuating part of his business, he temporarily hires extra
personnel to work in the cutting room of his client.
Meanwhile, in his own cutting room he currently has several manual cutting machines and besides
Sr. Palma there are five full-time employees. In 1999 the cutting room had a maximum capacity of
15,000 garments a week, up from 5,000 three years earlier. It does work for various local companies
that find him through word of mouth. The lion’s share of his work is for the domestic market. The
domestic market business is informal in character: clients come and deliver the fabric and a pattern,
and arrange an approximate date for collection of the cut pieces. Generally, for domestic market
garments, markers are made in the cutting room on the basis of provided patterns and the
specification of the numbers and sized to be produced. Sr. Palma occasionally also has larger clients
that produce for export.
Ivan’s sewing shop
Ivan’s sewing business is located on the third floor of a five-storey building in the commercial centre
of Gómez Palacio; the business is unidentifiable from the street, other than from the small ‘Se solicita
costureras’ sign on the wall. These all but modern surroundings contrast sharply with the working
environment found in the better exporting companies: there is no marble and mirror covered
entrance hall, and the shop floor has few of the amenities commonly found in the export sector. There
is no air-conditioning – ‘fresh’ air enters through the windows on the street side of the building – or
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canteen, and the toilets are two floors down, but the music is loud and thirty sewing machines are
buzzing away.
The sewing business has a weekly production of 1,500-1,800 jeans or carpenter trousers, which are
destined for the local market. Ivan works for two large local-market clients and fills seasonal gaps in
demand with his own products – which just happen to be exactly the same models as the ones his
clients use. He intends to increase the volumes of his own products.
The business employs 35 people, most of whom are from the neighbourhood and who prefer to work
in this business because of the higher flexibility, more relaxed and less demanding atmosphere
compared to conditions in the exporting companies. However, just like the exporting companies, Ivan
has problems with high labour turnover and absenteeism rates.
A laundry in a garage
Laísa – a small industrial laundry working for both the export and the domestic market – is located
behind the petrol station at the entrance of Cd. Lerdo. Between one- and two-thirds of the 30,000
weekly capacity is destined for export (through an assembly factory owned by a family member of the
laundry-owners); the rest is filled with domestic-market production. Laísa has approximately seven
domestic-market clients, who deliver their orders (500-5,000 garments each) to the laundry during
the second half of the week and pick them up the following week.
The building is a large garage with hardly any laundry-specific infrastructure. Most of the very old, and
sometimes wooden, machinery is placed almost randomly in the space and in some cases the
discharge is an virtually ad-hoc arrangement of hoses and flumes. Containers filled with chlorine and
other chemicals are placed close to the equipment and the floor is wet with a blue liquid (the
discharge from the washing machines).
On one side of the existing laundry a new and more modern laundry building is being constructed. As
in the case of the existing laundry, most of the equipment for the new laundry has been bought
second-hand in the US or in the region. The new building will include a recycling installation – which
is now obligatory in Cd. Lerdo – and a finishing department. The present facility has neither of these.
Domestic ‘marketing’
Umberto Jaidar has an oversized and apparently luxurious factory in Gómez Palacio, in the vicinity of
a number of large exporting factories. This is Jaidar’s only production facility, although he controls a
fair share of the domestic market production of piratería jeans in the northern states of Mexico
through his subcontracting network. All Jaidar’s jeans bear the ‘Ranchero’ label, while the models
bear a striking resemblance to the basic models of VF’s Wrangler jeans. The labels, tags, buttons and
even rivets are attached in his own factory, all other production activities are organised through
subcontracting arrangements within the region. Jaidar works with a large number of subcontractors,
many of which are small sweatshops producing volumes from a few hundred to a few thousand jeans
a week. Many of his contractors are located in the small villages surrounding Cd. Lerdo.
Jaidar distributes his garments widely in North and Central Mexico and has managed to consolidate
his position over the years through a number of devaluations that put his less cash-rich competitors
out of business. The Ranchero jeans are sold through wholesalers, at ‘tianguis’ and in small
independent shops in cities in the north of the country. As the model is recognisable, cheap and
popular in this part of the country, no active promotion or marketing is required.
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facilitative of it. Their presence makes it possible for small producers to occasionally produce
small batches of own ‘private label’ garments, or counterfeits for the domestic market.
No data could be obtained on the financial situation of domestic market production, but with
the exception of subcontractors working for the large-scale tiendas de autoservicio, many domestic
market entrepreneurs were quick to state that they were doing well. This may well be the case:
Mendoza et al. (2002) for example, estimate the average mark-up over the entire chain feeding
into Guadalajara’s garment market at over 100%. In the short supply chains feeding into the
small shops that the local producers in La Laguna are involved in, much of this mark-up may
accrue to them. It is therefore somewhat surprising that so few export companies see in the
domestic market a worthwhile alternative to export. The limited interest in the domestic
market is surprising for a number of reasons: the production of finished products for the
domestic market can be done in small volumes against limited risk and with comparatively
large profits, involvement in the domestic market spreads risk as it diminishes the dependency
on the US market and, finally, it allows exporters to experiment with full package production5.
Similarly, there is little enthusiasm for export production amongst domestic market
producers. There have been attempts to incorporate domestic market producers as
subcontractors into export production networks. However, few domestic market
manufacturers are willing to accept export work. Prices for assembly differ little from one sector
to the other; however, timeliness and quality demands are much higher and stricter in the
export sector. Several domestic market assemblers reported that they do not believe they could
live up to export standards and that they know they would be penalised severely if they failed.
This can be understood in the light of the general capability gap between the Mexican
domestic market producers and export standards. Moreover, it confirms the limited role local
subcontracting linkages play in closing that gap. Since generally local export firms looking for
new subcontractors do not, or only to a limited degree, get involved in the upgrading of
domestic market producers to export standards, many domestic market manufacturers
consider export production too risky.
Nevertheless, some often somewhat hidden interrelations were found. As mentioned, prices
paid by US buyers have been stagnant and the profit margins of manufacturers in the region
have been negatively affected. Exporting companies are trying to bring down costs and some do
so by contracting domestic market cutting rooms and laundries, which charge rates
significantly below those of the export cutting rooms and laundries that are certified. In both
the cutting room and the laundry presented in the box in the previous section, export work was
being done for a local export company.
7.6 Conclusion
Over the past few years the buyer base of the Laguna garment cluster has broadened: besides
the branded manufacturers, which used to dominate the local industry, the number of retailers
and designers that source from La Laguna has increased since the passage of NAFTA. Different
types of buyers not only structure their networks differently, but their expectations of
participants and governance exercised over the network linkages may also differ.
One important observation in this regard is the fact that generally retailers are not replacing
branded manufacturers but are joining them: branded manufacturers have not left La Laguna
and their networks and strategies remain important elements in the cluster. Several US
branded manufacturers are directly involved in the cluster through local FDI facilities, which
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have limited linkages to the rest of the cluster. These and other branded manufacturers also
source from contractors in La Laguna; sourcing linkages run through international sourcing
departments in the US and operate largely in isolation from local FDI facilities of the same
companies. In La Laguna, several branded manufacturers have worked with a stable group of
contractors for several years. Most of their contractors are large- and medium-sized companies
that dedicate a large share of their total production to branded manufacturers. Much emphasis
is placed on product quality and production efficiency. Most branded manufacturers do not
allow the subcontracting of their work.
Mass merchandisers also have worked in La Laguna for a long time. They have been joined more
recently by department stores. Both types of retailers have started to develop direct linkages to
local giants, but the bulk of their work is still channelled to La Laguna through US-based
intermediaries. Several intermediaries have factories in the region. In most cases the
intermediaries supply their buyers with full packages by relying on a local subcontractor
network of mostly pure assemblers and by centralising either cutting, laundry, finishing
and/or other more specialist, higher value-added activities in their own production facilities. In
other words, the intermediaries orchestrate and govern the entire production process and are
headed for direct competition with local producers. In general, linkages between them and
local subcontractors appear distant and formal and transmit limited learning opportunities,
certainly with regard to extending capabilities along the chain. Upgrading of subcontractors by
extending their capabilities along the chain is not in the interest of intermediaries as it would
create competitors. Only a few local producers have bypassed intermediaries and established a
direct relationship with a retailer. The few local companies with a direct link to a retailer are
very large full-package suppliers.
Finally, marketers of designer labels have recently also started to source from the local full-
package giants in the region. So far, they are only working with a select group of the largest
local companies that can deliver high-quality full packages, potentially in large volumes.
Especially in the early stages of the sourcing relationship they are directly involved with their
suppliers and with communicating, teaching and enforcing their upgrading to the demanded
quality levels. They require flexibility and service from their suppliers. Designers have not
become firmly embedded in the cluster, but are still working with small volumes and pilot
programs and a select group of local giants. Several have already discontinued their sourcing
from their local suppliers or even the cluster at large, apparently because they were not satisfied
with the service and flexibility on offer.
In line with observations in the literature with regard to the role of buyers in upgrading LMIC
suppliers, buyers have played an important role in setting and improving the standards of local
contractors in La Laguna (Egan & Mody, 1992; Gereffi, 1999; see Chapter 2). In the case of La
Laguna it appears especially important because local experience with jeans production,
especially amongst the new companies, was limited and their frame of reference to the US
garment market was either very limited or non-existent. In this light, the assistance,
interference, support and other forms of involvement of US branded manufacturers and of
jeans manufacturing experts, many of which are from El Paso, have been very important. By the
end of the 1990s, the Laguna cluster was a firmly established source for large volumes of good
quality jeans sold by US branded manufacturers and retailers in the low and mid segments of
the US market. Upgrading impetuses appear to emanate from the arrival of new buyers to the
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cluster; the following chapter will examine whether this has resulted in an upgrading process,
which companies are engaged and with which aim.
One observation with regard to upgrading can already be made here: the findings presented
in this chapter suggest that the dependence on buyers for upgrading stimuli may be cause for
concern with regard to local SMEs. The large majority of SMEs does not maintain direct
network linkages with buyers. While in general subcontracting linkages have been found to
facilitate learning in SMEs (CEPAL, 1998), in La Laguna there are clear limits to learning
through subcontracting. The unstable nature of local subcontracting linkages based on pure
assembly may limit the knowledge and information transmitted down the subcontracting
networks and this in turn may hamper the upgrading of local SMEs. All the more so because
SMEs are mostly incorporated in the networks of mass merchandisers and department stores,
while the more sophisticated products of designers are only rarely subcontracted out.
The dependence or narrow focus on buyers as the main and often single source of market
information is also somewhat worrisome. Information on the market and on market
conditions is principally obtained through buyers: it is rare to see industry magazines in the
offices of local factories and few local entrepreneurs appeared to have a well-informed, broad
outlook on the industry or the US wearing apparel market and its principal buyers. At the turn
of the century, new challenges were facing the Laguna cluster. Increasingly, enhanced market
awareness, service, flexibility and a proactive business attitude are needed if local producers
want to be able to respond adequately to new challenges. In order for them to secure a future
for themselves, local producers will need to develop these qualities/attitudes independent of
their buyers and will need to base them on a solid understanding of the global garment market
and industry.
In this light, the virtual neglect of the domestic, regional market can be considered a missed
opportunity that represents valuable upgrading opportunities. Product quality may not be so
high on the agenda of the domestic market, but involvement in the domestic market may allow
exporters to spread risk while teaching them how to take risks and act on opportunities. In
short, the domestic market appears to be better at fostering entrepreneurial qualities than the
export market.
Notes
1 It is difficult to compile a detailed list of final clients of the complex for the beginning of the 1990s, because of the
dominance at the time of brokers and other types of intermediary firms. In many cases, there was no direct contact
between the final client and the local contractor, and in some cases this may have obscured the identity of the final
client.
2 In studying the impact of US buyer strategies and power shifts in retailing on manufacturers in Mexico, business
relationships are often simplified by putting aside the role played by intermediary companies. As will be discussed
in this chapter, this remains far removed from the experiences of garment producers in Mexico. The impact of shifts
in retailing are in practice often still indirectly passed on to them through intermediary firms. This chapter departs
from a functional division of downstream actors: branded manufacturers, retailers – including mass merchandisers,
department stores and designers – and intermediary firms.
3 A number of intermediaries involved in production in La Laguna have followed this strategy by either developing or
buying (a licence to) an existing label or brand. For example, the 807 Company based in El Paso has acquired the
Long Horn brand, W. Stevens has its Zena Di label and Sun Apparel (now part of the Jones Apparel Group) has the
exclusive rights to the Polo Jeans label.
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4 The most important marketer for La Laguna is Gap Inc., which has a sourcing strategy that differs from other
designers. Gap started sourcing in the region several years ago and mixes different kinds of sourcing strategies: part
of its production is channelled through intermediaries, and part is direct and in the form of full packages.
5 When asked about the opportunities in the domestic market, export producers in La Laguna mentioned a number
of problems. The comparatively large investment in fabric and the ownership of the garments is seen as both a risk
and a barrier. The instability of the market and the underground nature of parts of it were also mentioned. In
general, risk avoidance is highly prevalent among exporters. In contrast, many domestic market subcontractors
indicate their interests in operating directly (i.e. with full packages) on the domestic market. In many cases they are
barred from doing so on a structural basis by insufficient cash flow and access to credit, but may be quick to take
advantage of occasional opportunities.
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Appendix II
Illustrations of bi-national production
networks
In this appendix the structure of the local production networks of local multi-plant companies
that were illustrated in Appendix I are extended to show how the work of different US buyers is
contracted out to local subcontractors (through mediation of local contractors).
Roman works for four different clients: Duckhead, Chic by His, Savane and Wrangler. With the
exception of the relationship with Duckhead, that goes through a broker in El Paso, all
relationships with clients are direct. For Wrangler, Roman does only the laundering and perm
pressing of Wrangler’s Timbercreek casuals, for the other clients it does assembly and
laundering. The work for both Savane and Wrangler is done in Roman’s own facility; nothing is
subcontracted as Savane nor Wrangler allow subcontracting of their work.
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Figure II.1: The structure of the bi-national production network, Roman
100% ‘captive’ subcontractor client/subcontractor
relationnon-‘captive’ subcontractor
Roman
location: Gómez Palacio
employees: 50
activity: sorting of batches
Roman
location: Gómez Palacio
employees: 50
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Roman
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6099
ownership linkage
subcontracting relation
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assembly
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assembly
Maq. Creac. Crisma
assembly
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assembly
Maquilas Daro
assembly
Wrangler
Source: Baseline survey, 1998-1999
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Figure II.2: The structure of the bi-national production network, Casolco
100% ‘captive’ subcontractor client/subcontractor
relationnon-‘captive’ subcontractor
6099
ownership linkage
subcontracting relation
Casolco USA
location: El Paso, Texas
employees: 30
activity: distribution
Casolco
location: Gómez Palacio
employees: 355
activity: headquarters,
administrative offices,
assembly
Casolco El Huarache
location: Cd.Lerdo
employees: 220
activity: assembly
Casolco Durango
location: Durango
employees: 175
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By contrast, a large share of the casuals for Chic by His – which are sold in US mass
merchandisers such as Wal-Mart, Kmart and Target, under the Chic by His brand or the store’s
private label – are assembled by Roman’s subcontractors. Also, one subcontractor assembles
Duckhead casuals.
At the time of the survey, Casolco worked for three different clients; all three serve the low- to
mid-segment of the US market and work with very large volumes. The work for Kmart is
100% ‘captive’ subcontractor client/subcontractor
relationnon-‘captive’ subcontractor
6099
ownership linkage
subcontracting relation
Lajat Lavanderia
location: Gómez Palacio
employees: 250
activity: laundry
K-Lajat
location: Cd.  Mante
employees: 500
activity: assembly
K-Lajat
location: Gómez Palacio
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activity: assembly
(Kentucky) Lajat
location: Torreón
employees: 1,000
activity: headquarters, laundry
cutting, administration offices
K-Lajat
location: Nazareno (1)
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activity: assembly
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activity: assembly
K-Lajat
location: Nazareno (3)
employees: 500
activity: assembly
K-Lajat
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employees: 600
activity: assembly
K-Lajat
location: Cuencamé (2)
employees: 500
activity: assembly
K-Lajat
location: Cuencamé (1)
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Comercial
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subcontractor
Aguascalientes 1
subcontractor
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Source: Baseline survey, 1998-1999
Figure II.3: The structure of the bi-national production network, Lajat
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obtained through a US-based broker, who does cutting and finishing; Casolco (and four of its
subcontractors) does pure assembly.
For Chic by His Casolco does CMT. Finishing, including perm press, is done by Chic by His,
because Casolco does not have a perm press facility/oven. Three subcontractors also assemble
for Chic by His because subcontracting is allowed and quality requirements (and thus risks) are
comparatively low.
Finally, the work for department store corporation Dayton Hudson is full-package work that
is all done in Casolco’s own facilities.
In 1999, three clients were filling most of Lajat’s production capacity: Liz Claiborne, Gap Inc.
and Kmart, while a few smaller clients would come and go and change regularly. The
relationships with Liz Claiborne, Gap Inc. and Kmart are direct. Volumes of Gap Inc. and Kmart
are very large, but Liz Claiborne has just started to work with Lajat and works with smaller
volumes and pilot programs. Compared to Gap and Kmart, the quality standards set by Liz
Claiborne are high and this is why the work for Liz Claiborne was only subcontracted to
Maquilas Tauro – a subcontractor that could deliver the required quality. Tommy Hillfiger had
also worked with Lajat, but the relationship was terminated. The work of both Gap Inc. and
Kmart may be and is subcontracted, the precise mix at any point in time depends on order sizes
and production planning.
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8 The dynamics of the Laguna 
garment cluster
‘If localities are on the march, it is [...] to the tune of globalizing forces in the organization of production – a process in
which territorial integrity is far from guaranteed.’ (Amin & Thrift, 1992, p. 574)
Chapter 2 pointed out that entering into export markets may put firms, or indeed entire
clusters, in LMICs on dynamic learning curves. As was also explained, the ability to learn and
adapt and to develop effective and proactive business strategies is of decisive importance for
LMIC manufacturers who want to maintain or improve their position within international
export networks. These issues may be especially relevant to garment manufacturers in La
Laguna because they are feeding into the dynamic, volatile and fiercely competitive US garment
market.
This chapter explores the response of the Laguna cluster and its individual firms to the
window of opportunity embodied in the cluster’s recently developed export links to the US
garment market. In more practical terms, this chapter examines whether any upgrading has
taken or is currently taking place in La Laguna. It provides an insight into upgrading efforts
and their practical results and, thus, into the ability of garment firms in La Laguna to latch on
to the export market and evolve in accordance with the demands of that market.
The first section of this chapter presents a brief review of the strategic position of companies in
the region as perceived by local entrepreneurs. The subsequent sections explore changes in
products and processes, which are aspects of what Schmitz and Knorringa (2000) called
‘upgrading within production’. Section 8.4 shifts attention to the extension of company
capabilities along the chain. Here the focal point is on the efforts of local companies to evolve
from assemblers into full-package producers or even further, ‘beyond production’, into an
ODM or OBM role. Section 8.5 moves on to focus on labour strategies employed by local
garment companies. Faced with an increasingly tight urban labour market, firms’ strategies are
focused on securing a sufficiently large, affordable labour force in various ways. Section 8.6
synthesises the most important changes in the geography of garment production in La Laguna.
The last section deals with the most recent geographical reconfiguration phases in the GVC.
8.1 Dynamics and strategies
Learning and upgrading efforts and results will be the topic of subsequent sections. First,
though, this section presents the opinion of local entrepreneurs concerning the position of
their firms and the challenges facing them. How do local entrepreneurs evaluate the position of
their company against the background of a changing and dynamic industry? From their
viewpoint, what changes need to be made for local companies to secure a better position in the
future? The answers to these questions are summarised in Appendix III; the answers give an
indication of the entrepreneurs’ assessment of their company’s position in relation to the wider
competitive environment. Later, the assessment of local entrepreneurs will briefly be compared
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to actual changes in order to understand the influence of local entrepreneurs on actual changes
and to assess their market awareness.
At the time of the survey, garment firms had experienced years of rapid growth: on average,
firms indicated that they had grown by 35% since 1997; especially small and very large
companies indicated exceptionally explosive growth in both volume and value of sales. Though
most were positive about their future development and predicted that these growth rates
would continue, many also believed that at some point growth limits would be reached.
‘Where are we going the get the workers needed for continued growth?’ was a question that
appeared to be constantly on the mind of entrepreneurs. Also, there appeared to be an early
realisation that attention would have to be shifted to consolidation and to qualitative aspects
rather than quantitative growth. The first signs of a shift of attention to efficiency and the need
to increase efficiency became noticeable. They are hardly reflected in the trends presented here,
but became more clear after the turn of the century and especially after the downturn in local
production in 2001-2002 (see Appendix IV).
Even though many different perspectives and opinions come to the fore in this type of auto-
evaluation questions, the main trends are clear (see Appendix III). Noteworthy is that many
garment companies see labour as both the most important current weakness of their company
and a serious threat to its position in the future. It is likewise clear that many companies seek
their main competitive opportunity outside the cluster, in a direct and stable business
relationship with a buyer in the US (see also Chapter 7). Finally, most companies stress good
and consistent product quality as the current basis of the strong competitive position of their
firm and the cluster at large.
Between the different types of companies – foreign-owned, locally-owned and various size-
classes – few differences in self-diagnosed strategic positions can be identified. This is
somewhat surprising. It indicates the strange contrast between cluster-wide familiarity with
abstract industry trend terminology and the lack of translation or partial translation of these
trends into practical measures and strategies. This is most evident in the subcontracting
echelons of the cluster, where entrepreneurs are not directly exposed to market demands and
appear to have trouble in accurately positioning themselves in relation to these demands and
general shifts therein. For example, a number of local garment SMEs identified the
development of a company brand, the establishment of a direct business relationship with a US
buyer and engaging in full-package production as their company’s main business opportunity.
Although some SMEs may have a strategy aimed at achieving these goals, these ideas are mostly
an indication of a cluster-wide rhetoric of where the cluster as a whole should be headed and
bear little relation to the position, strategies and opportunities of SMEs. As will be discussed
later in this chapter, these challenges are confronting the largest companies in the region –
indeed, they indicate this to be the case – but for most SMEs they are at best a matter for the
very long term.
Despite an apparent tendency of a group of local companies to mirror popular local opinion or
rhetoric in their answers, rather than sticking to a strict and accurate assessment of their
company and its position in the industry, a few interesting patterns may be distilled. For
example, in relation to competitive strength, smaller companies refer overwhelmingly to the
quality of their products. By contrast, large and very large companies appear to take adequate
quality levels for granted and more frequently mention aspects such as punctual delivery,
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flexibility and human resource policy as their principal strengths. A similar difference can be
noted in the area of company weaknesses: smaller companies are preoccupied mostly with the
negative effect of high labour turnover rates, while several very large companies cite internal
organisational problems as their principal weakness. These differences appear to indicate that
larger companies are more aware of the demands of the market and may also be more
responsive to these demands.
Local entrepreneurs were also asked to rate their companies’ business relationships with a
number of broadly defined actors on the basis of their relative importance for the company and
its competitive position. Figure 8.1 presents the answers to this question: it shows that labour
and the company-labour relationship is perceived as highly important by most local
industrialists. It should be clear that the high ranking of labour is not based on positive
grounds; as noted above and in previous chapters, rising labour cost, limited availability and
high labour turnover rates worry garment entrepreneurs in La Laguna. In contrast to the
general concern about labour, ratings for the other relationships varied considerably from
company to company. In general – and confirming a pattern noted in Chapter 6 –, relationships
with government and public-private organisations and with financial institutions were
perceived as problematic and were rated on negative grounds. Linkages with suppliers of
material inputs and clients were rated because of their importance to the further development
of the firm.
Finally, one of the most striking general observations about the local entrepreneurs’
assessment of their own company is that many appeared to find these strategic questions
troublesome. A first indication of their doubts is the high non-response rate on these particular
questions. While this might be explained by the sensitive nature of the information, it
appeared more an indication of limited market awareness and limited ability to assess the
competitive position of the firm. This applies especially to the identification of opportunities
and threats, where as many as 25% of the respondents either gave no answer or gave an answer
that appeared highly unrealistic. The apparent limited strategic vision of a considerable
proportion of the local entrepreneurs may be explained by a number of factors, such as the
short history of many of the factories, the limited experience of their owners/managers and the
incessant wave of new challenges facing them1. As may be expected, this applies especially to
SMEs, which generally have only indirect access to the market and relevant information.
However, with the general exception of the managers of most very large companies, few
entrepreneurs communicated a clear strategic vision for their company and an understanding
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Box 8.1: A clash with fashion
Why are many local manufacturers hesitant with regard to fashion? Why did they initially try to avoid
producing fashion jeans?
To local manufacturers the production of fashion embodies much more than just the simple
attachment of a pocket over the side seam. Essentially, the introduction of fashion is a switch from
the long-time production of a single product – in which variation is limited to size, fabric types and
possibly the shape of the back pocket – to producing a constantly changing mix of smaller batches of
different types of bottoms. This means that the production process needs to be made more flexible
and some of the automated machinery can no longer be used as extensively and efficiently as before.
In fact, the entire company needs to be made more flexible: in some cases operators need to be
trained to do different operations, sewing lines need to be adapted to a new style and, not
unimportantly, owners and managers need to accept the fact that the days of predictability and long-
term planning are over. The production of garments with a higher fashion content may entail not only
an increase in the number and complexity of operations, but also changes in machinery, in
production planning and organisation and possibly also in business mentality. Especially this last
factor is difficult and until 1999 entrepreneurs commonly complained about clients who gave them
‘too much fashion’ or came up with styles that were ‘impossible to produce’. Many were not
immediately ready to accept the new rules of the game and some keep hoping for bulk orders of
standard jeans, even if for lower-end clients. Also, many try to hold on to a small volume of basics in
combination with more complicated styles. In the beginning, local manufacturers reacted to fashion
by over-charging. As a local industry watcher mockingly observed when carpenter jeans were
introduced in La Laguna: ‘they [local contractors] want US$1 for every extra operation’.
The local hesitance and inflexibility met with little understanding from US buyers, whose view was
summarised as follows by one of them: ‘a hem is still a hem, a waistband still a waistband. Believe
me, it doesn’t cost more to produce fashion pants. I don’t see the problem.’ This observation may be
correct from a strict production technical point of view, but this does not appear to be the root of the
problem in La Laguna. To understand the local attitude it needs to be viewed in relation to the short
history of the cluster, the limited experience of many local garment entrepreneurs, dependency on US
buyers and the resulting market unawareness. After the turn of the century it was clear that most local
contractors had adapted to the increased demand for fashion and have come to see it as an
inescapable fact of life. In fact, a few are quick to identify new trends in order to try to introduce them
under their own label onto the regional market. Some have done so with success.
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of their market. Most relevant in this respect is the question how this may impact the
developmental dynamic of the cluster as a whole. The following sections present changes in
products, processes, chain position and labour strategies during the late 1990s in La Laguna.
These changes are related to strategies of local firms and the role played by other actors.
8.2 Making better things
One of the most common ways in which a company or a cluster of companies can change or
improve its competitive position is to change its products. Unsurprisingly, making more
sophisticated products or product upgrading has received considerable attention in the
academic literature on learning and firm upgrading strategies (Egan & Mody, 1992; Gereffi,
1999; Humphrey & Schmitz, 2000). Product upgrading is generally reflected in increased unit
values. In the wearing apparel industry, the production of more complicated garments (i.e.
garments with a higher fashion content) may be an important product upgrading strategy.
Manufacturers can also produce higher quality garments or improve buyer service through
product diversification.
Types of products: fashion content
Chapter 1 discussed how, in line with changes in the clothing market at large, fashion invaded
the denim segment in the 1990s. Chapter 5 briefly mentioned that there have been shifts in the
types of jeans produced in La Laguna: fashionisation has been making inroads in the Laguna
jeans cluster since the late 1990s. Using 1998-1999 survey data, Figure 8.2 shows that
approximately 40% of locally produced garments are basic five-pocket jeans and the rest are a
combination of more fashion- and/or season-sensitive bottoms. The importance of these latter,
generally more complicated garments is the result of what is locally perceived as a small
product revolution involving especially the ‘carpenter jeans’ of the late 1990s. Fashion volumes
produced in the cluster have grown and most companies produce at least a combination of
basic and fashion jeans. While basic five-pocket jeans continue to be highly important,
sandblasted jeans, ‘whiskered’ jeans, low-waist jeans and many other popular models are now
being produced in La Laguna, and in increasingly large volumes.
As explained in Chapter 4, garment companies in the region are contractors: they produce what
is being demanded, according to the specifications of their US buyers. Most do not have any
design capability of their own. Thus, fashion trends are followed, not driven or even shaped, by
manufacturers in La Laguna. The main driver behind the increasing fashion content of locally
produced garments is the market, or the way in which US buyers interpret customer demand
and translate it into market trends. In fact, to some extent, the introduction of growing
volumes of fashion jeans initially took local entrepreneurs – many of whom had limited
experience in the industry and little understanding of the market – by surprise. Their
amazement at the new trends underlines distance to or follower position vis-à-vis the market.
This is also reflected in the initial local resistance to fashion (see Box 8.1). As a regretful, local
manager put it in 1999: ‘The days of the basic five-pocket jeans are over. Nobody can do just
five-pockets anymore.’ These regrets were widely shared throughout the cluster, but the
fashionisation trend was fairly quickly recognised as both inevitable and irreversible. Local
attitudes to fashion changed and since the turn of the century, local producers appear to take
pride in the complicated garments they make. [ 217 ]
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Notwithstanding progress in the area of fashion content, in a wider perspective changes in La
Laguna may be relatively small. No significant side-steps out of the narrow segment of denim
bottoms and casuals have been made; hardly any jackets, shirts or other types of tops are
produced in the Comarca, let alone such products as high fashion women’s wear. In general,
local entrepreneurs do not see product diversification as a viable strategic option to limit
vulnerability and strengthen the competitive position of local firms. In 2000 one of the board
members of CNIV pointed out that the ability to supply a collection of garments would greatly
enhance the cluster’s competitive position. So far, however, little concrete progress has been
made in this area. Product diversification out of blue jeans requires a more proactive, strategic
business attitude than merely responding to the changing demand of buyers for fashion jeans,
for example, which as discussed above is locally perceived as a very big change. Limited progress
in the area of product diversification may again point to local inability or unwillingness to
develop such an attitude – an inflexibility that is hard to understand in isolation from the
historically developed narrow orientation towards jeans.
Product quality
Garment quality is clearly an important issue for local entrepreneurs. As mentioned above (see
also Appendix III), many producers view product quality as the most important competitive
strength of their company. This does not mean product quality is taken for granted; in fact, it
features prominently in local business strategies. Almost 50% of local entrepreneurs stated that
the main focus of their company’s strategy was on product quality. When asked whether the
company had developed a strategy to improve quality levels, 97% answered that they had done
so. Figure 8.3 shows the concrete measures that local companies have taken with regard to
improvement of the quality of their products.
These data largely reflect the local quality improvement strategies implemented in the late
1990s. The local concern with quality is not surprising: quality is one of the main requirements
of garment buyers, and until the late 1990s the prevailing quality control measures in the
cluster were rudimentary. Most companies apply typically Taylorist processes and channel
production through traditional sewing lines of highly specialised sewing-machine operators.
This leads to inflexibility and high in-process inventories. Quality-related concerns are
assigned a place – physically as well as figuratively – at the end of the sewing lines, where
auditors inspect a random sample of finished garments. Before and after finishing, garments
are measured against the quality specifications issued by the buyer2. In Chapter 1 it was noted
how in this system defective work may accumulate in in-process inventory for a long time
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without being detected, and mistakes may affect a large number of garments. Clearly, this type
of post-production quality control system poses great risks. These risks are borne by the
contractor: enforcement of minimum quality standards by buyers is strict, and substandard or
inconsistent quality may be penalised severely. Faulty lots of garments can be rejected or only
accepted on the condition that the manufacturer will pay the ‘charge-backs’ or reductions in
price associated with the repair of the garments.
For the end of the 1990s the survey shows a clear local push for a change in the prevailing
quality control methods with the aim of improving product quality and reducing quality risks.
The two measures taken by most companies (training of personnel and increased supervision
in the lines) do not testify to a rigorous approach, however. Quality control is still integrated
into the production process in a rather haphazard way. There is talk in the cluster of total
quality management principles and even of Japanese management methods, but truly
integrated quality control throughout the process is seldom found in factories in the region. In
other words, control and supervision may be tightened but the process itself is not changed.
Nevertheless and despite the non-revolutionary natures of the measures, they are important.
Their results are hard to measure, but the continued sourcing from the region by a number of
important US buyers indirectly testifies to the fact that quality levels in La Laguna are
satisfactory. Indeed, improvements in quality levels have been inferred from the new buyers
that have started to source from La Laguna (see Bair & Gereffi, 2001); the previous chapter
showed these to be highly demanding, especially in terms of quality. However it was also noted
that they source from a select group of companies, so it appears overly hasty to infer cluster-
wide high-quality standards from their presence.
8.3 Making things better
Managing a giant
As mentioned earlier, several local giants identified the internal organisation of the company as
their principal weakness. Most of these companies have grown explosively since 1994 and as a
consequence at the turn of the century they were faced with urgent challenges in the area of
production organisation: accurate planning and logistical control. Their strategy of rapid
output growth through constant expansion of the company and its workforce put serious
strains on their internal planning and control departments. A manager of one of the largest
local companies illustrates the situation as follows:
‘[...] 1999 was the worst. We had accepted so many orders and we needed to involve so many local subcontractors that
we completely lost track. We did not know how far advanced some orders were, whether they were almost out of the
sewing lines or not... In fact, in some cases we did not know where batches had gone, to which subcontractor.’
She also mentioned the lessons learned from this episode:
‘This was really bad. We decided to no longer just accept all the orders. We cannot again exceed our own in-house
production capacity by such large margins. Thus, we intend to manage smaller volumes at peak times and at the
same time, continue to expand our business [by buying local factories and expanding capacity of some of our own
factories].’ [ 219 ]
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While this manager was referring to an extreme situation, around the turn of the century
several of the local giants were facing the challenge of retaining or even gaining control over
their production organisation. Until then, there had been an abundance of business
opportunities and these companies had been scrambling to expand business fast enough to
keep up with the demand growth. By the late 1990s, these companies needed to enhance their
internal organisation in order not only to improve their planning and logistics and to
safeguard their relationships with buyers, but also to improve efficiency, which until then had
received comparatively little attention. Several local giants expected continued capacity
expansion in coming years but indicated that they aimed for only minimal growth of their
workforce. To increase efficiency a few local companies, very large companies but also smaller
ones, began to experiment with changes on the shop floor.
Shop-floor production organisation
In general, one of the most striking features in the Laguna regions is the overall high standard
of the export facilities, especially those of the larger companies that export directly. There are
numerous horror stories concerning terrible, exploitative labour conditions in garment
sweatshops. Such conditions are not found in La Laguna3. Most export factories provide a clean
and safe working environment for their employees. As most factories started off as export
factories, they were built to provide sufficient light, air-conditioning, ventilation, toilets and
emergency exits. Factories that did not have these basic conditions have begun to provide
them. Many of the improvements in the facilities are instigated by the buyers who want to
enforce a minimum standard of working conditions throughout their networks (see Annex 2).
As control over the networks increased and more buyers are now insisting on the certification
of subcontractors in their networks, also subcontractors have had to adjust their facilities and
policies.
As mentioned, in La Laguna the most common way to organise the production process is
through traditional sewing lines. This is somewhat surprising since the disadvantages
associated with the sewing line system are common knowledge: high in-process inventories,
long throughput time, inflexibility and vulnerability to bottlenecks (Chapter 1; see also Bailey,
1993). Production in sewing lines is also directly affected by the absenteeism of operators or the
training associated with high turnover rates. Given the high labour turnover rates in the cluster
and the general push for quick response and flexibility in the industry, sewing lines are clearly
not an ideal production system for producers in La Laguna. As mentioned in Chapter 1, a more
suitable way to organise production has already been developed: production centred on
‘modules’ or ‘cells’. The advantages of reorganising production around smaller teams of
operators are generally accepted and information on the main characteristics and principles is
accessible. Yet, in the Laguna region in the late 1990s, traditional sewing lines were still by far
the most common way to channel production on the shop floor. This may be due to the fact
that many local entrepreneurs had until then been preoccupied with trying to keep up with,
for example, demand growth and quality standards. It may also be due to doubts regarding the
suitability to the local production environment, especially because of the perceived inability of
Mexican workers to engage in teamwork (see Chapter 6). Furthermore, in the new systems
sewing operators would be given more responsibility, thereby putting pressure on the
hierarchic, compartmentalised and sharply demarcated task division that exists in the Taylorist
sewing lines.
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Despite general doubts about changes in the production system on the shop floor, one
progressive company in the region was viewed with interest in the cluster: this very large
company had implemented a module-type system on its shop floor. It had redesigned the shop
floor in order to facilitate teamwork and to stimulate team spirit and work ethic among its
operators. The system seemed to be successful, partly because it allowed the company to
introduce a competitive element onto the shop floor; for example, the ‘lions’ module tried to
beat the productivity record set by the ‘bees’ module, as data on productivity, absenteeism and
faulty garments related to each module were pinned up on company notice boards. In addition,
wages were directly based on the number of finished garments and were above the average in
the region. The organisation of the shop floor was embedded in a company strategy which,
more than in other companies in the region, was centred on operators and labour conditions
(see Box 8.5).
Although industrialists in the region are aware of the existing alternatives and their advantages,
and have heard of the approach of the above-mentioned firm, few are willing to take the risk of
adopting them (and failing). Very few other local companies have adapted or modernised the
processes on the shop floor. Manufacturers that did make changes did so in a much more
limited way. Most had organised their finishing department around modules or cells and were
satisfied with the results, but uninterested in applying reorganisation elsewhere in their
factory.
In general, manufacturers are sceptical about the acclaimed results and fearful of the risks of
what they perceive as a radical change in the production process. Risks are commonly related to
the difficult labour situation in the region, where any change affecting the operators represents
a potential threat of unrest and loss of personnel. The perception of Mexican culture or
idiosyncrasy, which is believed to be unconducive to teamwork and team spirit, feeds the
scepticism of the results of these systems once they have been implemented. Risk avoidance is
the main obstacle for a thorough reorganisation of the garment production process in La
Laguna. The limited experience of many industrialists may be at the root of this behaviour.
It therefore is hardly surprising that buyers played an active role in the diffusion of the
module system in 1999. At that time this type of transformation was adopted by a small
number of local companies, on the express recommendation by buyers. In fact, one of the
buyers went as far as to make the rearrangement of the production process by its contractors a
prerequisite for the continuation of the business relationship (see Box 8.2). However, buyers are
not the only catalysts for reorganisation of the production process. The local offices of SECOFI
and Bancomext (through the local CNIV) were quite active in offering local SMEs, who as
discussed in the previous chapter often do not have a direct relationship with a US buyer, the
opportunity to hire industry consultants at a reduced fee, subsidised by Bancomext. Through
this program (called ‘COMPITE’), local garment contractors could have their facility and shop
floor evaluated and improved. Consultants suggest improvements and offer practical support
in their implementation. Although changes did not necessarily involve the introduction of
modules, in most cases they did entail a reshuffling of the shop floor in the direction of
teamwork and the reduction of throughput times and in-process inventories, all of which are
characteristic of the modular system. Only a small number of companies in the region took
advantage of the COMPITE offer. All of them enjoyed positive results in terms of productivity
and efficiency gains. [ 221 ]
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Besides changes in the production system on the shop floor, investment in new technology is
considerable in La Laguna. Although costs can be high, investment is seen as an easier and less
disruptive way to improve production efficiency compared to rearranging the shop floor.
Production technology
Over all, local entrepreneurs stress technological investment as a major ingredient of their
business strategy. When asked about the planned introduction of changes in the production
organisation or the introduction of new technology, 64% of the local companies expressed their
intention to introduce one or both such changes. When asked which measures would be taken,
55% prioritised investment in the automation of certain operations and 30% indicated that they
wanted to make changes on the shop floor; the remaining 15% had other intentions or did not
yet know what changes would be made. As indicated in Figure 8.4, the main aim of intended
changes was to increase efficiency.
The high priority assigned to investments in automatic machinery as a means to achieve
increased efficiency is somewhat surprising. Instead of a response to the challenges and
demands of the ‘new competition’ era of rapid response and flexibility (see Best, 1990; Malecki,
1994; Chapter 1), automation and the limited flexibility associated with it is to some extent
typical of the old, mass-production times. By the late 1990s already some of the most up-to-
date machinery was found in the region. Besides new individual sewing machines, very large
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Box 8.2: Practical guidance by a buyer
One of the companies most actively pushing its contractors for organisational change is El Paso-
based Savane, formerly Farah and since 2000 owned by Tropical Sportswear International (TSI) in
Tampa, Florida. Savane – which has ample contracting experience in the Dominican Republic with
contractors that used modules – pushed its contractors in La Laguna to switch from sewing lines to
the modular system. The company offered its contractors practical help and support during the
transition process. Two of Savane’s engineers were put at the full disposal of the contractors. For
several weeks these engineers studied the production organisation on the contractors’ shop floors
and then designed modules to suit the circumstances of each individual contractor, their machine
park and operators. In addition to the technical input, the engineers aided in the implementation
thereof by providing information to both management and workers and by supporting the practical
retraining of the employees. Since modular production has a significant impact on the position and
responsibilities of workers, all sewing operators were prepared for the coming changes. To this end,
videos of modules in action in the Dominican Republic were shown, and discussion meetings and
workshops with personnel were organised.
Despite the aid and expertise provided by the buyer, some of the local contractors displayed a passive
or even negative attitude towards the changes. This negatively affected the commitment of the
operators and hampered the transition. When Savane terminated the sourcing relationship with most
of its contractors, some immediately reverted to lines, others stuck with the modules. One contractor
stopped working for Savane and switched to another buyer as soon as the modules were up and
running.
112,A_TT van Dooren BW.job
and highly modern laser cutting machines, spreading machines, pocket-setters and even semi-
robotised washing departments had been bought.
Besides efficiency gains, contractors in the Laguna region appear to have an ulterior motive for
the introduction of new technology: reducing labour input, especially in certain critical
operations, is seen as a viable way to improve the quality and to maintain that quality. The
quality concern is of increasing importance as turmoil on the local labour market is translated
into high turnover rates, which have a negative effect on the consistency of product quality.
Thus some companies choose to invest in highly sophisticated sewing equipment as well as in
the automation of some of the operations to prevent quality problems4.
The acquisition of highly modern and very expensive machinery is an option only for the large
and very large companies in the region5. Even between the largest companies in the region
there is variation in the level of technological upgrading they engage in. Between medium-
sized companies there is an even larger variation in the priority assigned to, as well as in the
capital available for investment in technology. Small companies engage least in technological
upgrading. Not only is semi-automatic machinery beyond the reach of most SMEs, but even
the basic sewing machinery in smaller companies is often old and outdated. The cost of
investment in technology is the most important barrier, as access to credit is limited. This is
especially true for SMEs, which as a consequence have to rely on the intra-cluster, ‘hand-me-
down’ system. The sale of machinery from large to smaller companies through this mechanism
generally does not allow small companies to catch up with technology. However, it does appear
to prevent them from lagging behind even further over time.
Besides changes in the area of technology and shop-floor organisation of production, there are
other ways to improve the production processes. Implementation of general, internationally
standardised and certified procedural standards, such as ISO 9002, is one of the ways in which
companies in the region can try to ‘do the same things better’. In La Laguna very few local
manufacturers are certified under ISO 9002. There is no general interest amongst the
companies to strive for such certification and very few buyers require it.
8.4 Towards full-package production: local-level obstacles and success
Besides improvements in products and processes, Chapter 2 discussed an upgrading strategy
which features prominently in GVC studies: upgrading along the value chain, in the direction
of full-package production. Especially in studies of the Mexican garment industry, full-package
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production – or, more specifically, the transition from pure assembly work performed by
traditional maquiladoras to full-package production – is receiving much attention (see Chapter
3; Gereffi & Bair, 1998; Gereffi & Martínez, 2000; Bair & Gereffi, 2001; Gereffi et al., 2002b). The
development of full-package capabilities is seen as a potentially potent lever for regional
economic development. It is associated with capital investment, technological upgrading,
increase in domestic ownership, higher profits accruing to Mexican actors in the value chain
and favourable changes in the labour scene. In short, full package is believed to be the way to go
for local manufacturers as well as to provide a strong stimulus for local economic development.
This section aims to shed light on company strategies with regard to full-package production,
or upgrading based on a more limited extension of company capabilities along the value chain.
As mentioned earlier, all necessary ingredients for putting the package together are present in
or are close to La Laguna: there are denim mills in Parras and Torreón, suppliers of all sorts of
trim, an industry-specific infrastructure and a wide array of support services in La Laguna. As
NAFTA has eliminated pre-existing limitations on the local integration of the production
process, have production phases and activities shifted from the US to Mexico? And, who is the
local organising agent? Does a shift of production activities to La Laguna mean that specialist
cutting rooms and laundries are being set up, or are local companies moving from pure
assembly to a more all-round, possibly full-package position in production networks? Table 8.1
shows the command of local companies over the value chain in the late 1990s.
First and foremost, Table 8.1 reveals that the local capabilities of all exporting companies in the
region are limited strictly to manufacturing processes. This pattern directly confirms the noted
status of La Laguna as a contracting cluster. Non-manufacturing activities such as design and
marketing are undertaken outside the region.
With regard to the pattern of the various types of companies, it is clear that small garment
companies are most limited in their scope. As expected based on the subcontracting patterns
discussed in the previous chapter, they are almost without exception pure assemblers. The
situation is more complex and varied for the medium-sized companies, all of which are
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Table 8.1: Garment companies in La Laguna and their position within the production chain
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involved in assembly, and most also in the procurement of trim and in finishing of the final
garments. Many do not have their own cutting room or laundry and need to rely on other
companies, either buyers or local companies, for the completion of the process. Large
companies on average have a slightly more extensive command over the production chain,
especially the pre-assembly stages: many have a cutting room and a few buy fabric, at least for
part of their total production. There is a comparatively large capability gap between the large
and the very large companies in the region, as the latter are by far the most well-rounded and
have the most extensive command over the production chain. All local giants are engaged in
the procurement of trim and in cutting, assembly and finishing, and most also buy fabric and
have a laundry. Many use their all-round capabilities for the production of full packages. For
many FDI companies, local integration of the production process is limited: pre-assembly
activities are in most cases not undertaken in the facilities in La Laguna but are centralised in
their US facilities. In some cases, the shift of these processes to Mexico may be just a matter of
time. Finishing is done locally, and most foreign-owned jeans manufacturers also have
laundries in the region. Bearing in mind the local linkages patterns outlined in the previous
chapters, the general pattern of increasing command over the value chain with larger company
size in Table 8.1 does not constitute a great surprise.
For a more detailed understanding of how command over the production chain is translated
into various positions in bi-national production networks, Table 8.2 synthesises the functional
position of companies in the GVC.
Table 8.2 illustrates that La Laguna can longer be typified as a pure assembly cluster as many
local companies also perform non-assembly activities. Most noteworthy in relation to the
upgrading discussion outlined in Chapter 3 is the fact that several companies in La Laguna have
developed the capability to produce full packages. Though the number of full-package
producers may appear small, it is a significant development, certainly when one bears in mind
the recent status of La Laguna as a pure assembly bulwark and the tremendous changes needed
for the switch from assembler to full-package supplier. Furthermore, the development has not
halted: there is a local push amongst the large local firms for more full-package production.
Some new companies are striving to develop full-package capability and those that already have
it are expanding their full-package volumes at the expense of assembly or CMT work.
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Table 8.2: Functional position of manufacturers in production networks
Position/activities No. of companies
Pure assembly 33
Assembly and finishing 9
Assembly, laundry and finishing 5
CMT 5
CMT and laundry 6
Mix of CMT and full package 9
Other 6
Total 73
Source: Baseline survey, 1998-1999
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Even though ‘full package’ has become a buzzword in La Laguna, the development of local full-
package capabilities is a selective and incremental process. Table 8.1 shows that only very large
local companies have the command of the value chain, that is necessary for full-package
production. Indeed, without exception full-package export producers belong to the group of
local giants. However, not all very large local companies produce full packages: even amongst
the local giants there are manufacturers that do not put the package together. Developing full-
package capability requires not only extending command over production activities in the pre-
and post-assembly stage of the production chain, but also the development of new capabilities
in such areas as logistics, financial management and planning. Another essential change lies in
the ownership of the products: in a contracting situation, the contractor alters products owned
by his clients, but full-package manufacturers own the product they produce from the
moment they buy fabric and trim until the moment they sell the finished product to their
clients. For most manufacturers in La Laguna, this is a true paradigm shift, with two major
implications that are only indirectly related to the mastering of new parts of the production
chain.
First, the shift of ownership leads to larger overall risks as well as a time risk: the
manufacturer is not entirely sure he will sell his production until it is received by the client, nor
does he know when he will sell. Second, for the manufacturer, financial management becomes
more complicated and more important because of the large amounts of capital involved, and
because of time lapses between payments to be made and payments to be received in almost
every step of the production process. Mexican manufacturers are generally treated as US
suppliers and are paid 60, 90 or even 120 days after garment delivery6, which for most local firms
is a large gap to bridge financially. On top of that, many manufacturers carry the inventory for
their clients. In doing so, they have a very large amount of unproductive capital tied up in
warehouses. Thus, even for larger companies full packages are a challenge as cash flows need to
be balanced and faulty production leads to tremendous losses (see Box 8.3). Small wonder, then,
that the process has been incremental: full-package manufacturers in the region started by
producing small volumes of full packages in combination with the bulk of their work, which
consisted of assembly of CMT contract work. As they gained experience they expanded the
share of full packages at the expense of other work, and by the turn of the century had
succeeded or were striving to make full packages the mainstay of their business. As a result of
this development, a conservative estimate of local full-package production for 1999 is
approximately 35% of the cluster’s total production.
The combination of tedious learning processes, the very large amount of liquid financial means
needed, the risk involved and the financial planning over very long time spans prevents many
smaller local manufacturers from entering the full-package arena. Clearly, most companies
cannot put the package together. Six companies produce half-packages (cutting, assembly, trim
and laundry) but most have not made so much progress. This is clearly illustrated by the
limited capabilities of local subcontractor SMEs, most of which do pure assembly. They do not
have the financial resources or the access to credit needed for full packages, half-packages or
even the procurement of trim. Also, in their subordinate position in local networks, they do not
receive any incentives to develop beyond pure assembly. On the whole, the local move towards
full packages is a process with selective and exclusionary traits. This is related to the preferred
route to full-package production of the Laguna cluster: full-package production is undertaken
by single companies that expand their in-house capabilities. The alternative route – developing
intra-cluster cooperative linkages between specialist cutting rooms, assemblers and laundries –
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has not been taken. The only exceptions are a few manufacturers with tight family linkages
who employ these linkages and the laundry and/or cutting capacities of factories of family
members to complete the package.
Why do manufacturers go to the trouble of developing full-package capabilities? In the eyes of
many local manufacturers, assembly work or maquilar is – despite quality and delivery time
challenges – a fairly straightforward way to make good profits. Then why make life more
complicated?
The shift to full-package production in La Laguna is largely a response to real and expected
changes in demand. The pressure on very large local manufacturers to develop full packages is
considerable. Changes in the US apparel market for garments, most notably the direct
involvement of retailers and marketers in sourcing (see Chapter 1 and 3), play a significant role
in pushing factories towards full-package production. Designer and private label marketers –
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Box 8.3: A spin-off: trade in seconds and rejected lots
The production of garments always leads to the production of seconds (garments with serious
defects), as well as of rejected lots, viz. batches of garments that were not sold because of late
delivery or a dispute between manufacturer and client. Depending on the reason for rejection and the
type of arrangement with the buyer, rejected garments are taken back by the buyer, are sold as they
are or are rid of labels, brand name buttons, et cetera. Alternatively, they may be marked as seconds
and sold with original labelling. Since the market for these types of goods, which are cheap, is much
larger in the US than in Mexico, in the case of La Laguna this trade generally intermediates between
local manufacturers and US clothes wholesalers such as ‘Ross ‘dress for less’ ’.
Recently, the trade in seconds has received a strong impetus from changes in the garment industry in
La Laguna in the following manners:
• The fashionisation of formerly more standardised garments means that many of the garments
produced now are more complicated than the ones produced a few years ago. The number of
possible mistakes and defects has increased as a consequence.
• The introduction of full packages, and the consequent shift of ownership from client to
manufacturer, has somewhat diminished the propensity for buyers to accept faulty garments or
late deliveries.
In practice this means an increase in the total volume of seconds and rejected lots, especially at times
of low sales. Essentially, production mistakes are still made and there is no reason to believe there
has been dramatic improvement or deterioration in this area in La Laguna. Rather, the increase in
seconds trading appears to be a result of a combination of the above-mentioned aspects. Unlike
many other industrial products, for garments quality control is hard to objectivise. In the words of a
local manufacturer: ‘If you want to find a defect or mistake in a garment, you’ll find it.’ Fashion, with
its higher number of operations, increases the potential number of defects. Also with full-package
production, buyers have no capital invested in the garments until the garments have passed the
auditing and are bought. In this situation, rejection represents a loss of sales rather than a loss of
sales and capital.
Recently, US buyers have been trying to prevent or limit the sale of their rejected garments in discount
stores by prohibiting their sale or by keeping it in their own hands.
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neither of which have production capacity of their own – are sourcing from La Laguna.
Designers pay higher prices then mass merchandisers and are thus attractive clients. Local
manufacturers in pursuit of these higher-end buyers have to be able to offer full-package
production. The resulting demand pull is strong, also because the quest for full-package
contractors is spreading to other buyers (such as Sara Lee and Levi Strauss) that are shifting their
core-business from manufacturing to design and marketing (see also Chapter 1). Many large
manufacturers recognise the full-package development as inevitable in the long term and a few
have already developed full-package capability.
However, not all local firms (not even all very large firms) are acting upon the full-package
trend. As discussed in the previous chapter, shifts in the strategic focus of US buyers are not
always directly translated into a demand for local full-package production. Through the
incorporation of intermediary firms into production networks or the centralisation of certain
activities (such as input procurement or cutting), buyers still allow for producers with more
limited capabilities. The presence of these types of networks in La Laguna goes some way
towards explaining the region’s hesitant and partial shift to full-package production by
providing alternatives, which in a short-term perspective may be more appealing. One
manufacturer in the region pointed out that the margins on several activities beyond assembly
were not as high as on assembly (on cutting and input procurement, for example, margins are
comparatively small) and therefore he saw no immediate point in undertaking such activities.
Other manufacturers also said that they are not willing to face more trouble in undertaking
new activities in exchange for smaller margins on these activities.
In general, at the turn of the century, the development of local full-package capabilities was
still a challenge for the garment industry in La Laguna. The potential of successful, large local
companies to develop into original brand manufacturers or even original design manufacturers
is at best something for the long term, especially since only few companies are marketing their
own branded garments in the regional or national market, and the understanding of the US
market is limited. Meanwhile, the relative importance of full packages is likely to increase and
this may have important implications for local SMEs. As increasing shares of the industry’s
total production are channelled through large full-package companies, SMEs face the risk of
becoming locked in as subordinated assemblers to these companies. As discussed in the
previous chapter, this not only puts them in a vulnerable, dependent position but may also
limit their learning and upgrading potential.
8.5 Labour strategies
The previous sections have discussed local progress in the areas of product and process
upgrading. In the area of product upgrading, local progress is mostly a response to or a
reflection of changes in demand. In line with patterns described by Hobday (1995) and Schmitz
and Knorringa (2000), the role of local firms has been larger in the area of process
improvements. With regard to process improvement, a combination of company-internal
strategies and external impulses – from buyers and in some cases support from public
organisations -has brought about the noted results.
However, at the beginning of this chapter labour and company-labour relations were
highlighted as the main concerns of garment companies in the region. It is in the area of
labour-related strategies that local companies have been especially proactive. A variety of
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dynamic changes have materialised and a number of distinct business strategies formulated.
The principal ones will be presented here.
8.5.1 Labour strategies in the urban core
As explained, even with the incorporation of large rural labour reserves, during the boom of
garment production in the region, the growth in demand for skilled labour constantly
outpaced its supply. Local companies were faced with recruitment difficulties and high labour-
turnover rates soon became a disincentive to investment in the on-the-job training of workers.
Moreover, the recruitment of more specialised shop-floor personnel as well as of administrative
and managerial personnel became problematic. Since garment production in La Laguna is
overwhelmingly concentrated in the urban core, these problems are most acute in the cities.
Faced with the acute need to fill orders and a generally limited return on investment on
training in an environment of high labour turnover, a few companies in the region have
‘solved’ the shortage of skilled labour by turning to less agreeable, if not unethical measures.
Labour poaching is not uncommon and affects all companies in the region. The most easy and
common poaching method is to send employees to wait at the gates of the competition. At
closing time, when all the workers flow out into the streets, they are offered slightly higher
wages if they come and work for the competitor. Employees with experience in certain
operations and supervisors (the popularity of the latter is due to the fact that their relationship
with a large number of sewing operators may be close enough for these operators to accompany
their supervisor to the new company). But poaching can take several other, and sometimes
quite extreme, forms (see Box 8.4).
It is difficult to assess the number of companies that engage in labour poaching, but it is clearly
causing problems and irritation amongst industrialists in the region, and in some cases
damages inter-firm relationships. While apparently only few companies undertake poaching
on a structural basis, it appears to be an emergency option for a larger group of companies. The
problem is that labour poaching (pirateaje as it is called locally) is a very quick and effective way
to avoid continuous investment in the on-the-job training of operators. Without engaging in
direct poaching aimed at specific companies or workers, some companies in the region are
trying very hard to attract experienced personnel from anywhere they can. In their efforts they
may stimulate regional labour mobility. For example, most vacancies advertised in the local
newspaper list all benefits and amenities, but companies have also been reported to award their
operators with a 100 peso bonus for bringing in a new operator. The impetus on labour
mobility resulting from these types of measures is obvious.
Companies that engage in poaching and those plagued by high turnover rates point to the
vicious circle that has been created and now forms the basis for continued poaching practices.
All are trying to avoid investing in the training of operators, because ‘other companies are
stealing workers anyway’ and thus the easiest way out is to contract experienced operators.
Attempts to stop poaching, both collectively through CNIV (see Chapter 6) and on a more
small-scale basis, have been unsuccessful.
Companies are developing other labour strategies aimed at improving their attractiveness to
employees or otherwise retaining or attracting them: for example, more than 50% of the
garment companies indicated that they are paying higher wages and offering better benefits in
an effort to win their employees’ loyalty. Especially in the area of fringe benefits companies are
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Box 8.4: Negative strategies: labour poaching
1. Bus kidnap
The problems of labour turnover and competition for skilled workers in the region have driven
industrialists to undertake rather drastic poaching measures. The most extreme story heard was the
following:
One day the bus that transports the workers of a medium-sized factory in Gómez Palacio from the
nearby villages to and from work did not arrive at the normal time. At first, the owner did not worry
and blamed the road works on the Periférico or possibly a punched tire. As time went by, however, and
the bus still did not arrive, she decided to phone the police to ask whether any accidents had been
reported. When they told her that no accidents had been reported she was reassured, but even more
puzzled about what could have happened. All morning there was no news of the bus or the workers.
At midday the owner finally found out what had happened: one of her workers arrived at the factory
and told her that somewhere along the way to the factory, a man had got on the bus. He had paid the
driver and the workers a small amount of money, and then the bus was driven to the factory he owned
where the workers were expected to work for him.
2. HR management
Illustrative of active engagement in and open recognition of labour poaching in the region is the fact
that twice during an interview with an HR manager the manager in question received a phone call
from a colleague inquiring about missing employees. In both case, after assuring the colleague that
his missing employees were not there, the manager started an open discussion about wages and
benefits:
• ’No, te lo juro, aquí no están. (No, I am telling you: they are not here.)
• Además, no andamos necesitando gente para la sala de corte. (What’s more, we do not need
personnel for the cutting room.)
• Ya has hablado a Azul y Verde? (Have you tried Azul and Verde?)
• Y no? y a Rojo? (They are not there? And in Rojo?)
• Pero si no es mucha indiscrecia: díme cuánto les pagas. (Okay, I don’t mean to pry, but how much are
you paying them?)
• Y de beneficios? (And in benefits?)
• Pues andas por debajo. Sí, en Azul les pagan igual, pero ahí tienen un 100% de subsidio en la
comida.(Well, you are below the going rate. Yes, they pay the same in Azul, but there they fully
subsidise the meals)
• Si, pero en Rojo pagan X pesos. Pues yo tampoco sé como lo hacen, pero parece que sí es cierto. (Yes,
but in Rojo they pay X pesos. Well I don’t know how they do that, but apparently that’s what they
pay.)’
When asked about these phone calls and more specifically about inter-firm labour poaching, the
managers admitted that during ‘emergencies’ or when ‘necessary’, company personnel would go out
to the villages or neighbourhoods where the workers lived in order to try and convince them to switch
companies and start working for them. The current general wages paid to specialist workers are
common knowledge, but even at the specific company-level, information flows relatively freely. The
competition therefore has a good idea of what it needs to offer in order to convince the workers in
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Box 8.5: On the positive side: fringe benefits and more
Both scorned and admired by local peers, Siete Leguas is one of the companies in the Laguna region
that is most actively designing a company-internal HR strategy aimed at maintaining stability in its
labour force. In fact, within its general business strategy, HR management appears to have an
exceptionally high priority. As a result of this focus, it is one of the few very large Mexican-owned
companies in the region to have significantly reduced both turnover and absenteeism rates.
According to data provided by the company, turnover is stable at 2% a month and absenteeism lies
around 1%. To achieve these low rates, the company has dedicated a lot of time and effort to
improving labour relations, most notably the improvement of the installations and labour conditions,
the implementation of a self-designed modular system, the subsequent upward adjustment of wages
and the broadening of the range of fringe benefits and activities offered and organised. Among
benefits and activities offered are:
• medical attention • celebration of birthdays
• transportation • Catholic service (once a month)
• a diner-style company canteen serving a variety of • sports tournaments
dishes free of charge • choir
• obligatory as well as extra holidays • dance classes
• Christmas bonuses/gifts • soccer team
• funeral expenses for workers’ direct family members
• musical band • compulsory collective aerobics (daily)
• study opportunities • compulsory collective hoisting of the flag
(daily)
question to switch jobs. This type of poaching is limited to specialist workers who work in cutting
rooms or laundries as well as to technicians or supervisors.
3. Amongst ‘friends’
Another illustration of labour poaching and the lack of scruples in this matter is the case of two
friends: one the owner of a cutting room, the other the owner of a small sewing facility with its own
cutting table. The two men had been close friends for a long time and at one point ended up working
for the same customer.
One day the owner of the sewing facility needed cutting specifications to be picked up from his
friend’s cutting room. He sent the best-qualified person – the person in charge of cutting at his
facility. Within a few days, this man stopped showing up for work. When one of the owner’s
employees visited his friend’s cutting room, he returned with the news that the cutting room
manager was now working at his friend’s. A bitter dispute then broke out between the two friends.
Finally, the case was arbitraged by the customer, who warned the cutting room owner and forced him
to fire the employee in question – who returned to the sewing facility but was not given a job.
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being increasingly creative when it comes to offering new opportunities and activities to their
employees. Many of the companies in the region now have a soccer field (where the company’s
team trains for the CNIV soccer competition and tournament) and a Christmas party (posada)
organised by the company, as well as a company group of Guadalupanas for the 12 December
celebrations. Some companies have even extended their efforts far beyond these activities (see
Box 8.5).
By the end of the 1990s, most medium-sized and all large and very large companies were
engaged in bidding against each other in the areas of wages and/or fringe benefits. The
effectiveness of these measures and their importance relative to other measures such as
poaching or automation are hard to measure or even estimate7. It is equally impossible to
generalise about the strategies implemented by different types of companies. Over all, each
company appears to, within its individual limits, focus on new incentives.
There are two general ways in which local companies may try to get around the local labour
shortage or minimise its impact on productivity and cost. The high-road reaction to the tight
labour market and the resulting turnover and absenteeism problems is to take technological
and organizational measures to minimise their impact on production levels. As shown above,
this is not the general reaction of local firms. A limited number of companies are implementing
company-internal measures, or changes in the organisation of the production process on the
shop floor in an attempt to alleviate the negative effects of high turnover and absenteeism rates.
Alternatively, companies can follow a more low-road, evasive strategy by investing outside the
region in locations with a larger and cheaper labour reserve. In this way they can escape from
the local labour market situation.
8.5.2 The involvement of the rural labour force
As the downturn in agricultural employment in La Laguna coincided with the initial phases of
the garment boom, the rural population has been involved in the garment industry since the
early stages of the boom. Initially, both intra-regional migration as well as commuting were
largely unorganised undertakings, set in motion by individual rural dwellers in search of
employment. Most commuters came from settlements in the immediate surroundings of the
cities and assumed the cost and time involved in their daily travelling themselves. Many of
these rural-urban commuters were garment workers; others were cleaners or housemaids.
This pattern changed when the prolonged garment boom resulted in a tight urban labour
market for un- and semi-skilled labour. From then on, local manufacturers had to actively
scout the regions’ rural hinterland for personnel to fill their factories and production orders. By
the end of the 1990s, almost the entire daily flow of commuters was being organised,
controlled, coordinated and provided by urban garment manufacturers. Twice a day they send
buses to pick up and deliver employees to the rural towns, villages and ejidos. Although not
traceable in statistical data, these commuter flows are readily observable in daily life in the
region. There also are no statistical data on the distances covered by commuters, but interviews
with local HR managers suggest that commuting flows have increased both in volume and in
geographical extension. During the late 1990s, more people as well as people from population
centres further removed from the urban node – sometimes as far away as a 90-minute drive –
became involved in this. Illustrative of the importance of intra-regional commuting is the local
estimate that as many as 170 buses transport inhabitants from San Pedro (an hour’s drive away)
[ 232 ]
117,A_TT van Dooren BW.job
to the urban core. Over the course of the years commuter flows have not only grown and
extended but also diversified to include men and especially youngsters.
Besides exerting a rural-to-urban pull on the rural population, industrialists have also side-
stepped the tight urban labour market by establishing garment factories in rural areas. As
mentioned in Chapter 4, during the 1990s several urban manufacturers as well as foreign-
owned garment TNCs invested in garment factories in the rural hinterland of the Laguna
region. Most of these investments were new arrivals to the region or company expansions.
Instead of closing down factories in the cities and opening new ones in the towns and villages,
urban and rural factories function next to each other. Over all, therefore, the dispersal of
garment factories over the rural areas has hardly affected the growth of the industry in the
cities. Nor has it had a great impact on the general concentration of wealth and opportunities
in the cities or the importance of urban garment factories as sources of employment for the
region as a whole. Migration to the cities and especially rural-urban commuting remain
important features within the region. In fact, during the 1990s intra-regional commuting
intensified significantly, though possibly less so than would have been the case in the absence
of rural garment factories.
8.6 Geographical shifts in garment production
Alongside changes in the areas of production technology and organisation in the past decade,
there has been a change in the geography of garment production in La Laguna. Indeed, spatial
changes have been quite dramatic considering the short time period under consideration. In
the late 1980s and even into the early 1990s, garment production in the region was by and large
an urban affair. Nowadays this is less so: over the past decade approximately eighty garment
factories have been established throughout the rural areas of the region. Together, these
factories employ an estimated 10,000 workers, which amounts to approximately 15% of the total
workforce in the garment industry. This section examines the intra-regional spatial dynamic of
the industry and its implications for the rural areas.
The dispersal of garment production into the rural areas is based largely on the coinciding
interests of the rural population, state governments and garment entrepreneurs. Over all,
garment production in the rural areas is not the result of an endogenous rural industrialisation
process driven by rural laguneros. The majority of rural factories are owned by entrepreneurs
with garment companies in the cities or by foreign investors. As will be discussed below, even
the cooperative factories, formally communally owned by rural inhabitants, were not
established on the initiative of these inhabitants.
The abundant supply of labour at a relatively low cost in the rural areas is the main reason for
investing in rural factories. Instead of bringing workers to the jobs – and paying for their
transportation, as the majority of urban factories do – a rural factory brings jobs to the workers.
Competition for workers, though not completely absent in the countryside, is much less fierce
than in the cities. Also, the absence of local job alternatives helps to keep turnover and
absenteeism rates down. The villages, ejidos and ranchos in La Laguna, with their effectively
captive labour force, provide the labour-related conditions many garment companies are
looking for. [ 233 ]
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Meanwhile, the state government of Coahuila has stimulated the establishment of rural
garment plants in an attempt to alleviate rural poverty and to stem migration flows. While
Durango does not have a clear policy with regard to investment in its rural muncipios, in
Coahuila state support for the garment plants has taken several forms. Firstly, within it its
promotion efforts for the state as a whole, SEFOMEC actively promotes the rural area of the
Laguna region as a location for garment factories8. In its efforts, SEFOMEC builds on the
reputation of the region as a garment production centre and on the abundant supply of cheap
labour in the areas surrounding the cities. Secondly, the state offers fiscal and other incentives
(e.g. reimbursement of training costs) to investors on a case-to-case basis. Thirdly, the state
provides basic infrastructure ‘from the nearest main road infrastructure up to the factory gate’
for investors in the rural areas, where infrastructure is either lacking or of inferior quality.
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Figure 8.5: Location and year of establishment of rural garment factories
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Figure 8.5 illustrates the diffusion of garment production over the rural hinterland of La
Laguna between the late 1980s and 1999. It shows a concentration of factories in and around the
towns of San Pedro, F.I. Madero and Matamoros, and in the areas just south of Cd. Lerdo.
Another striking phenomenon is the location of some factories at a very great distance away
from the urban node. The factories in Nazas, Rodeo and Gral. Simón Bolivar can only be
reached after a drive of about two hours, and the same applies to factories in Viesca, northern
San Pedro and Tlahualilo. Furthermore, these factories are very isolated from other factories
and even basic infrastructure, including telephone lines and sewer system. It is also remarkable
that there is no clear pattern connecting the location of the factories and the year of
establishment. Although a gradual dispersal from urban to peri-urban to rural locations may
be expected, the actual pattern is much more diffuse.
Types of factories
Rural factories can be roughly divided into three separate groups: foreign-owned factories,
subsidiaries of locally owned urban-based companies, and collectively owned factories
(cooperativas)9. Foreign-owned factories located outside the three major cities tend to be located
in the cabeceras municipales of La Laguna-Coahuila. These plants are concentrated in or just
outside Matamoros, F.I. Madero and San Pedro. Their locational preference is based on a
combination of labour market considerations and infrastructural requirements. Their on
average large scale of operation (180-700+ employees) means they require access to a sufficiently
large labour reserve. Furthermore, infrastructural requirements for the operation of these large
plants are relatively high, especially for those factories that do not have an office or other facility
in the conurbation, rendering establishment in a small village or ejido an unfeasible option.
Also, because of unfamiliarity with the region their choice of location is more easily influenced
by state agencies promoting the rural area and providing industrial infrastructure precisely in
the cabeceras. Some of the foreign-owned factories are located in the industrial parks in
Matamoros and San Pedro in Coahuila (see also Chapter 4). Others are scattered on the outskirts
of town, often physically separated from the town.
The majority of locally owned plants are subsidiaries of very large companies based in the
urban area of La Laguna. Rural subsidiaries are spread more or less equally over the states of
Durango and Coahuila. They are further removed from the central urban node and are not
confined to the cabeceras, but are also located in smaller villages and ejidos. Their factories are
relatively large, on average only a little smaller than the foreign-owned factories. The local
origin of their capital, however, results in a distinct geographical location pattern compared to
foreign-owned plants. The fact that they have urban headquarters and other production
facilities means that the quality of some types of infrastructure, most notably
telecommunications, can be less critical. Also, they are familiar with the area and do not rely on
the information and promotion offered by the state government. The geographical pattern
resulting from these considerations is more dispersed than the concentrated pattern of foreign-
owned plants.
In line with the historical communal ownership of the villages, a considerable number of rural
plants are cooperatives, owned and managed by the ejidatarios. Some cooperatives are new and
resemble the locally owned rural subsidiaries in their layout, size and activities; others are
located in former hacienda buildings or houses. Plant infrastructure and machinery of the
cooperativas are owned by the ejidatarios. Depending on the arrangement, credits may be linked to
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an exclusive business relationship with a contractor in the conurbation. This cooperative
model was promoted on the basis of its potential advantages. Firstly, it can be argued to foster
local entrepreneurial spirit and management capabilities. Secondly, it allows workers/owners
to share profits – which may lead to more commitment, lower turnover rates and higher
productivity. Finally, collective ownership ties in directly with the ejido structure that used to
govern small-scale agriculture in the region, which may ease the transition from agriculture to
industry.
Cooperative factories are located in ejidos, most of them in isolated locations far removed from
the urban node; others are located in neighbouring municipios just outside the region. In many
cases, urban entrepreneurs looking for subcontractors take the initiative for the construction of
a cooperative plant and select appropriate ejidos for the project. In these cases, two
considerations play a decisive role in the site selection: the size of the local, largely captive,
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Figure 8.6: Location of cooperatives, locally- and foreign-owned rural garment factories
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labour force in these isolated communities and the limited distance from major roads. This is
reflected in the locational pattern shown in Figure 8.6, which illustrates the location of the
various types of garment factories in the rural municipios of the Laguna region.
Spatial implications
In relation to the geography of the region, the most striking impact of the dispersal process is
the apparent reinforcement of the rural settlement hierarchy (see also van Dooren,
forthcoming). Not only is there a clear difference in service levels between the urban core of
Torreón, Gómez Palacio and Cd. Lerdo and the rural municipalities, but also within the rural
municipalities themselves there is a well-being gap between the towns/cabeceras and the rural
villages, ejidos and ranchos. This gap appears to be widening partly due to the fact that in the
cabeceras the garment boom may function as a lever for further local economic development
while development on the basis of garment production in the villages and ejidos remains
limited.
The outer appearance of especially the larger towns in Coahuila is changing: basic industrial
infrastructure has been developed, mainly through the earlier mentioned industrial parks, and
the quality and accessibility of road, sanitary and telecommunication infrastructure in general
have also improved. New employment opportunities in the garment industry – be it in the
urban or in the rural factories – have had a positive impact on household incomes, which is
becoming noticeable in the towns. Based on an increase in the purchasing power of their
population, the larger towns in the region, such as Matamoros and San Pedro, are able to retain
to some extent their position as service centres for their rural hinterlands. Services are mostly
commercial in nature; most notably, the number of shops and the types of products on offer
have grown over the past years. Business services have also gained in importance, partly due to
local businesses providing services to the garment industry. Not only has some of the
construction work been done by local businesses, but catering and the transport of personnel
are often also contracted from local entrepreneurs. Local informal businesses have also
benefited; especially local people selling sodas and home-made sandwiches (lonches) at the
factory gates are doing good business.
The larger towns of La Laguna-Coahuila have been revived with the establishment of the
garment factories through the directly created employment opportunities as well as through
some local multiplier effects (Otten, 2002). However, contrary to the hopes and expectations of
the state government these improvements have not changed the existing migration patterns
(see Box 4.3) or prevented them from worsening. Rather than evincing the insignificance of the
development in the cabeceras it may be evidence of the severed link between migration and
structural elements pushing out-migration. As pointed out by Zoomers (1986), persistent
migration to the US-Mexican border may be very difficult to influence, as it has become a
matter of course within the general context of family migration and the persistent attraction of
the American dream. In La Laguna, as in other parts of Mexico, migration is no longer directly
caused by structural push.
By comparison, the impact of rural factories in the villages and ejidos is often limited to one
small factory and much of the income leaks away to larger towns and cities. Here, the garment
factories are perceived as a mere drop in the ocean: while they are commonly the only sizeable
local employment creator, the development impetus resulting from them is very limited. Thus,
the existing rural service level hierarchy between towns, villages and ejidos may steepen as the
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Box 8.6: Rural garment factories in the Comarca Lagunera
For each of the three different types of rural factories introduced above, a real-life case will be
presented here.
1. A big player in town
As mentioned, the municipio of F.I. Madero accommodates a number of garment factories, one of
which is a factory of the US sportswear contractor Major League (or Liga Mayor, as it is called locally).
The plant is located just outside the town, in a rancho called Jaboncillo that can be reached via a good
quality, specially constructed branch off the main road. Liga Mayor’s F.I. Madero plant has 450
employees and produces about 60,000 sweaters or pants a week.
The headquarters of the company are in Tellico Plains, TS, and US sewing facilities are located in the
same town and in Jasper, GA. The company is a contractor for a number of very large branded
sportswear manufacturers in the US, while the plant in La Laguna produces pants and sweaters for
only one of these clients. The intra-company division of labour is such that it accommodates the
more labour-intensive products (hooded sweatshirts, placket shirts, etc.) in the Mexican plant, while
the more standardised and automated products stay in the plants in the US. The customer of Liga
Mayor takes care of all pre-assembly activities and contracts out only the assembly. Cut-piece goods
are delivered by the customer directly to the Liga Mayor plant, where the garments are assembled and
then sent back to the US.
The company thought F.I .Madero a suitable location for the Mexican plant, because at the time of its
establishment in 1994, the town had a population of about 20,000 inhabitants and a high
unemployment rate. The fact that there were other garment companies in the region meant that there
was some availability of experienced employees. Liga Mayor does not work with subcontractors in the
region. Caterers and security guards are contracted locally, but few other supply linkages are
maintained within the cluster.
2. Rural subsidiaries of an urban-based local company
Three subsidiaries of a local giant in Torreón are located in a small village about 60 km southwest of
the urban area. All three are dedicated exclusively to assembly activities. Plant no. 1 has 120
employees and was opened in December 1988; plants nos. 2 and 3 both have 500 employees and
were opened in October 1995.
The company that owns these rural factories was one of the first to choose rural locations for its
assembly factories, and did so based on labour supply and cost considerations. The production
organisation displays a very clear division of labour between plants and more specifically between
urban-based and rural-based plants. The company has a very large cutting room, located in an
industrial park in Torreón, where it does the cutting for all of its production. In addition, embroidery,
accessories (warehousing and logistics), finishing and laundry are done in urban production
facilities. Furthermore, in 1999 the company started centralising ‘special operations’ and small parts
assembly in a separate area, the Area Común of the urban cutting facility. Once in complete operation,
the area will be operated in three shifts, so as to be able to fully exploit the centralisation and
automation of the attachment of accessories, decorations and special pockets. The Area Común
supplies all the company’s assembly subsidiaries, which means that the assembly done in rural
facilities is largely final assembly. The reason for the shift of small parts and special operations is an
expected increase in efficiency of production.
120,A_TT van Dooren BW.job
[ 239 ]
3. A rural cooperative: Coronel Ilisario Prometeo
The ejido Coronel Ilisario Prometeo is located in the state of Durango at a distance of about 80 km
from the urban node of La Laguna. It was one of the first cooperative plants to be established in the
rural area and was opened in 1993 with credits provided by Bancomext. 26 cooperative plants in and
outside the region work under the same or similar agreements for the same client company. The case
of Coronel Ilisario Prometeo is illustrative of the vast majority of these cooperatives.
The cooperative is collectively owned by ejidatarios living in Coronel Ilisario Prometeo; however, the
initiative for its establishment came from the local garment company, which currently is the
cooperative’s only client. Using the Bancomext loan, the ejidatarios invested in the physical
infrastructure of the plant and in the machinery, while the local garment company initiating the
development stood surety for the investment. In exchange for the temporary (i.e. until the debt has
been paid off) monopoly on the production capacity of the cooperative, the client company provides
work, necessary inputs and support in areas of quality control, management, production techniques
and training. Payments received for the garments produced are administered by the cooperative and
used to pay for all operational/business costs and to pay off the loans. Initially the agreement
between ejido and garment company was to last for four years, during which time the ejido was to
repay its debts from the profit it made by producing garments.
In day-to-day practise, however, the Coronel Ilisario Prometeo cooperative has encountered a number
of serious drawbacks and problems, related to high turnover rate, the mediocre logistics of the client-
company, low unit prices and frequent changes of styles. Despite the expected lower turnover rate,
based on the co-ownership and the lack of local employment alternatives, the cooperative has been
plagued with a continuous very high turnover rate. Almost all employees of the plant are very young
(under 20; the majority is 16 or 17 years of age). According to the plant manager, they work in the
factory for a short while and then migrate, sometimes to the urban area of the region, but in most
cases to the border or to the US, where many have family. Another problem is dependency on the
client company for the delivery of inputs. Planning of deliveries does not always go smoothly. Since
deliveries are made once a week and the plant is located a long way from the urban area, a missing
input may lead to a one-week delay. In the case of a critical input, the plant may even have to close for
a couple of days. Other problems related to the relationship with the client company are the low
prices paid per garment and the frequent change of styles.
Because of these problems, the cooperative has not been able to operate profitably. Worse still,
instead of paying off the loans, it has been accumulating debts (which have been taken over by the
client company, to which payments are now made). As a consequence it has been working under the
arrangement since 1993 and no change is foreseen for the near future. The ejidatarios rarely share in
the profits, simply because most of the time there is nothing to share. There also is no or only very
little money to invest in the repair, replacement or upgrading of the machinery and equipment, and
this is likely to hamper the ejidatarios further development as an independent factory once they pay off
their old debt (if they ever manage to do so, that is).
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economic impact is deepest and widest in the towns, where most factories are located, most
employment is generated and some multiplier effects can be noted, while hardly any change
has taken place in the small villages and ejidos.
8.7 The bi-national value chain and La Laguna’s position in it
As NAFTA phased out the production-sharing regulations that had shaped the US-Mexico
garment trade for almost three decades, it freed Mexican assembly contractors from a tight-
fitting corset. The late 1990s were an especially important period for Mexican wearing apparel
manufacturers. In the liberalised trade environment, the lower Mexican labour cost and the
control and flexibility incentive of integration of the production process in one geographical
location became ever more compelling, leading to shifts in the value chain. Towards the turn of
the century, the cutting and finishing nodes of the manufacturing process were increasingly
being shifted to Mexico. This section shifts attention away from local firms and focuses on
extra-regional value chain linkages. It attempts to provide a broad insight into the actual
geographical configuration of the late 1990s bi-national value chain within which La Laguna is
positioned.
Soon after the passage of NAFTA duties on laundry were eliminated. In reaction, independent
as well as company laundries were built and existing laundries expanded their capacity. Within
a couple of years most jeans produced in La Laguna were finished and laundered in a local
laundry.
A few activities further downstream of finishing and laundry have been shifted, and other
activities in the post-assembly stage are beginning to be performed in La Laguna. Activities
such as packaging and the printing of barcodes and price tags are being undertaken in the
region. In the area of distribution, comparatively little local progress has been made. Even
though US buyers are increasingly penetrating the Mexican market (see Mendoza et al., 2002),
the distribution of their products is still largely concentrated in the US. Many, especially the
larger, companies carry the inventories for their clients. They do so mostly from warehouses
located on the US side of the border from where they feed into the distribution system of their
buyers. True store-to-store distribution and inventory control was in the late 1990s one step
too far for local companies.
With regard to cutting, shifts were not immediate; cutting rooms remained in the US for a
comparatively long time. The first reason for the lagging geographical adjustment of cutting to
the new rules is that it is a crucial job and in the Laguna region in the late 1990s there were still
very few specialist cutters. In addition, before the phasing out of duties on cutting, several of
the large and very large companies in the region had opened up a combined
office/warehouse/cutting room in El Paso. As the labour component in the cost of cutting in
relation to other parts of the manufacturing process is low, the facilities were used for a
number of purposes and highly skilled cutters in El Paso were not hard to find, these
companies did not have immediate, urgent incentives to move their cutting room closer to
their sewing facilities, especially since much of the fabric was still bought in the US. Instead,
they took their time to train cutting-room personnel and to set up a local cutting room and
then gradually shifted cutting from El Paso to La Laguna. A third and final reason for the
delayed arrival of cutting rooms to La Laguna is the position of US-based intermediary firms. In
the pre-NAFTA period, these firms had found a competitive niche not only in the coordination
of US demand and Mexican supply, but also in the performance or coordination of those
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manufacturing activities that under 807 regulations were confined to the US. Many
intermediaries have their own input procurement department and cutting room, and
sometimes also finishing facilities. Even after the passage of NAFTA, these intermediaries held
on to their cutting facilities in the US where they centralised the cutting for all or most of their
contractors. A specialist garment transporting company dedicated to garment transport
between La Laguna and El Paso confirms this pattern. By 1999 still 70% of the material
transported by the company from El Paso to La Laguna was cut fabric.
Upstream from cutting, some progress has also been made towards further local integration. As
discussed in the previous chapter, the industry-specific supply infrastructure has expanded
greatly and most companies that have a direct business relationship with a US buyer buy their
trim items at suppliers located in the region. As more companies are beginning to produce full
packages, the pre-assembly activities of pattern making and certainly the production of
markers (see Figure 1.2) has also begun to shift to Mexico.
By the very late 1990s, the configuration of the bi-national garment value chain was as
illustrated in Figure 8.7.
The phased geographical reconfiguration of the bi-national garment value chain that has
resulted from integration of the production process in the cluster largely follows the expected
pattern (see Chapter 3; van Dooren & Verkoren, 1998). However, the reconfiguration process
has not halted, but has also taken on an intra-regional dimension.
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Figure 8.7: Bi-national garment value chain, late 1990s
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Intra-regional division of labour
As mentioned, intra-regional disparities in labour availability and cost are the principal reasons
for establishing rural garment factories in the La Laguna. Of the companies that have a rural
factory, 88% mentioned the greater availability of labour or the lower wages in the countryside
as the main reason for establishing a rural factory. Extending the relocation trends illustrated
in the NIDL theory for higher levels of scale (see Chapter 2) would lead one to expect the
majority of rural factories to be dedicated to the most labour-intensive part of the production
process: assembly. Table 8.3 illustrates the production function of rural garment factories in La
Laguna. It shows the expected pattern: rural factories, irrespective of their ownership structure,
are overwhelmingly dedicated to pure assembly. Virtually all foreign-owned rural factories are
fully US-owned and can be typified as classical maquiladoras: they are relatively large factories
dedicated to pure assembly and most have hardly any local production linkages. Locally-owned
multi-plant companies generally use their plants to physically separate various nodes of the
production chain. As a rule of thumb, they locate sewing plants in the rural areas and, if
applicable, they keep the cutting room and laundry in the cities. Similarly, rural cooperatives,
despite their formally independent status, are often assigned only one production activity and
this is usually pure assembly.
The narrow assembly focus of rural factories is in contrast to the increasingly wide array of
production activities carried out by very large garment companies in the cities. This indicates a
deep urban-rural division of labour, where activities that are more capital- and skill-intensive
and that enjoy economies of scale are performed in the cities, while highly labour-intensive
activities are increasingly being located in rural areas. This pattern is based on the combination
of both the specific requirements of the various stages of the production process10 as well as the
characteristics or comparative advantages of the urban versus the rural area. In essence, labour-
intensive sewing plants are well suited to tap into the relatively cheap, rural labour pools. This
has given rise to a geographical differentiation of areas within the region on the basis of the
productive specialisation of factories located in them. Connecting this pattern to the value
chain sketched above, it gives rise to the incorporation of this geographical shift along the lines
as illustrated in Figure 8.8. This addition to the chain is warranted11 also because, as pressure on
the cluster increased after the turn of the century, the tendency to relocate assembly from the
urban core to the rural area or even to locations outside the region increased (see also Appendix
IV).
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Table 8.3: Main functions of rural factories, per type of factory
Types of production Rural subsidiaries Cooperatives FDI facilities Vicinity of La
facilities/activities of urban factories Laguna (rural)
Cutting 1 0 0 0
Assembly 33 14 11 9
Cutting & assembly 2 0 1 1
Laundry & finishing 2 0 0 0
Total no. of plants, based in or 38 14 12 10
directly linked to La Laguna
Source: Baseline survey, 1998-1999; Fieldwork, 2000
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Most rural factories depend on intra-company or network relationships with other
manufacturers for the completion of the production process. The geography of these
productive linkages differs slightly between the various types of factories. For locally-owned
subsidiaries as well as for cooperatives, the geography of productive linkages is predominantly
local in orientation. Despite formal differences in ownership structure, the position of both
these types of rural factories in relation to the local cluster is largely similar. Both are part of a
single, tightly controlled and coordinated production network centred on one large local
manufacturer that carries out pre- and post-assembly processes in urban production facilities.
This urban-rural division of labour gives rise to a material flow of cut-piece goods into and a
flow of assembled ‘raw’, unfinished garments out of the rural areas, the logistical coordination
over which is centralised in the urban node.
In contrast, for several rural FDI facilities, their rural assembly plant is the only factory in the
region. Thus for these companies there is no intra-company, intra-regional division of labour.
Inter-company division of labour is also rare: rather than working with local cutting rooms or
laundries in Torreón, Gómez Palacio or Cd. Lerdo, these companies receive cut fabric from and
ship unlaundered garments to their own production facilities in the US. Most of their
productive linkages are extra-regional in orientation. A few foreign-owned companies in the
region have plants in the cities as well as in the rural area. In these cases, the intra-company
division of labour resembles that of locally owned factories: the rural factories do the assembly,
and the urban factories take care of pre- and post-assembly processes.
8.8 Summary and conclusions
This chapter has shown that during the 1990s in La Laguna both the products produced and
the processes applied for their production have undergone significant changes, and in many
cases these changes have constituted improvements.
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Figure 8.8: An intra-regional shift in the bi-national garment value chain, late 1990s
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In line with general trends in the market discussed in Chapter 1, there has been a broad shift in
the nature of garments produced in the cluster, away from mass-produced, standardised
commodity jeans, to mass-produced fashion jeans. This shift in product composition can be
understood as a necessary, inescapable adaptation to market demand and a precondition for
securing a position in export networks to the US. Diversification outside the denim segment
remains limited to the few basic items noted in Chapter 5 and is not part of local companies’
product strategies. However, effort is being put into achieving higher and more consistent
product quality.
Concern with the organisation of production in local companies appears to be of a recent
date. From the early days on, expansion of production capacity has been high on the agendas of
local entrepreneurs and was mostly achieved by opening new factories, adding new sewing
lines and hiring more workers. By the end of the 1990s, this strategy’s limits became apparent
through a tight local labour market, higher wages and other costs as well as shrinking profit
margins. Furthermore, especially in the case of several very large companies, a lack of effective
control over the organisation of production was hampering the further development of
companies. Just before the turn of the century, an increased awareness of the need to become
more efficient became noticeable in the cluster. Practical measures remain limited, however.
Only a few companies have implemented changes on the shop floor to improve efficiency and
quality control, shorten throughput times and limit the impact of personnel turnover.
Many companies in La Laguna have responded to NAFTA liberalisation by extending
company capabilities beyond pure assembly. With the exception of SME subcontractors, the
cluster as a whole has moved away from pure assembly work. However, still few companies are
able to produce full packages and those that do generally combine full packages with more
limited assembly or CMT export work. Full-package producers are very large companies.
Generally, the smaller the company, the more limited its capabilities. On the whole,
government and public-private organisations play a limited, indirect role in firm- or cluster-
level upgrading processes. Buyers, who coordinate and control bi-national production
networks and mediate between the market and the firms in the Laguna cluster, have played an
important role in the changes in products, but also in process improvements. Through setting
standards and formulating demand, they have steered the development and the upgrading of
their contractors and the cluster as a whole. In a number of cases the involvement of buyers
with changes on the shop floor of local factories has even been direct and hands-on.
The apparently passive role of local entrepreneurs with respect to some of these issues
contrast with their active stand in relation to securing a stable workforce. Concerns and
strategies with regard to labour have been on the local agenda since the early 1990s when the
explosive growth of the garment cluster has brought to the fore a negative side of clustering:
tightening of the local labour market, rising wages and high turnover rates. Firms’ strategies
are focused on securing a sufficiently large, affordable labour force and the dispersal of garment
production to the region’s rural areas points to a tendency to scout for cheaper, stable labour
(with no or limited employment alternatives).
How can these patterns be related to the literature on upgrading and local learning?
First of all, learning in La Laguna is hardly a collective process. The low-trust character of the
cluster and the lack of stable, trust-based linkages or ties that cut through it (see Chapter 6),
have hampered collectivization of learning. More importantly, in relating the findings to the
GVC-perspective, it appears to be because ‘learning from global buyers’ (Schmitz & Knorringa,
2000; Gereffi, 1999; see also Chapter 7) plays such an important role that many local companies
[ 244 ]
123,A_TT van Dooren BW.job
are largely excluded from information and upgrading impetuses. Especially local producers
that have a direct relationship to branded manufacturers or designers/marketers find
themselves in a position to learn and take advantage of the expertise of these buyers. The
previous chapter showed that the networks of these buyers are concentrated on the cluster’s
larger – if not largest – producers and suggested this might be detrimental to the development
of local subcontractors. This chapter confirms these ideas: local subcontractors do not have
direct access to the knowledge and experience of buyers and it is not, or only to a limited extent
transmitted to them by their local client. Thus the participation of the Laguna cluster in the
US-Mexico garment commodity chain has not put the cluster as a whole on a dynamic learning
curve. It has put some firms on such curves (pushing them to improve and learn), but others
have been largely left behind, which has contributed to a process of polarization within the
cluster.
Secondly, the question remains whether the local learning that does occur is fast and pervasive
enough for the cluster to keep up with, let alone get ahead of the game. It is hard to shake off
the image of local entrepreneurs absorbed in past en present challenges in an industrial
environment that is focused on and speeding towards the future. Little of the upgrading that
has taken place has really enhanced the region’s unique competition strength: its geographical
location and potential to become the Quick Response source for the US garment market. EDI
does not connect local factories to their buyers, no UPS has been installed in any of the local
factories and sewing lines were only hesitantly converted to modules. Flexibility, service and
Quick Response have not been the priorities of local entrepreneurs. Furthermore, business and
upgrading strategies throughout the cluster are remarkably similar- to each other, but also to
those followed by or prescribed to garment producers in other parts of the world. Local firms all
appear to be following the same general, well-known path to competitiveness. This is
reminiscent of Porter’s competitive ‘rat race’ introduced in Chapter 2 and casts doubts on the
mid- to long-term developmental outcome of La Laguna’s upgrading process. All in all, it is
unlikely that the upgrading undertaken so far will lead to a repositioning of the Laguna region
(or even some of its firms) vis-à-vis its peers in the global market.
In addition, there are some indications that there is no general desire amongst local garment
entrepreneurs to engage in upgrading processes. This finding serves as a warning against the
tendency of upgrading and learning literature to take the desire amongst industrialists to
engage in upgrading for granted. The initial involvement of local garment firms (many of
which without prior experience in the garment industry) as pure assemblers in the production
networks of US buyers appears to have stunted their entrepreneurship by breaking their link to
the market, requiring limited expertise and vision and by rewarding that with fairly large profit
margins. Starting from this position, in the short- to medium-term upgrading – especially
upgrading in the direction of full packages – is a lot of trouble for no extra reward. Without
direct incentives or pressure many local entrepreneurs will not leave their current comfortable
position to secure their survival in the future.
In other words, policies that limit garment suppliers in LMICs to a starting position as pure
assembler may have a paralyzing effect on the entrepreneurial spirit of these suppliers.
Moreover, near future perspectives with regard to the international policy environment also
discourage upgrading by local producers: the integration of garments in WTO rules in 2005 is
widely believed to cause a massive shift of production away from high-cost locations such as
Mexico towards China and other truly low-cost countries.
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The limited desire to engage in upgrading in La Laguna underlines Dolan and Tewari’s general
observation on the importance of extra-chain aspects for the desire and capacity to upgrade (as
quoted in section 2.2.3 of this study). It is also exemplary of the disruptive effect international
policy measures have had on garment producers and production at different levels of scale – i.e.
in La Laguna and in other locations across the globe.
In light of the above it may hardly be surprising that troublesome ‘high road’ strategies are
often applied in combination with well-tried ‘low road’ strategies. The intra-cluster division of
labour discussed in the last part of this chapter points to the continuing cost pressures due to
international price competition and confirms the tendency of garment production, including
in La Laguna, to respond to such pressures by moving to new and cheaper locations. It
underscores the still footloose nature of parts of the production process. It is noteworthy that
especially low road strategies were immediately intensified – and geographically extended to
regions in South Mexico, Central America and even Asia – in reaction to the pressures of
diminishing demand, experienced after the turn of the century (see Appendix IV). While it may
offer some short term relief, it is a dead-end road to competitiveness in the longer run, as there
will always be cheaper production locations12. The cluster’s recent crisis and comparatively slow
recovery, discussed in Appendix IV, appear to validate these doubts.
The above-mentioned uncertainties and general vulnerability that come from La Laguna’s
participation in bi-national production networks and its general narrow orientation on exports
to the US could be counterbalanced by engaging more in the domestic market. Reform and
stimulation of the domestic market is just one way in which government policies could
support the development of Mexican industries.
Notes
1 This may also be due to a gap between a researcher’s questions/tools and the reality of LMIC entrepreneurs. This is
especially the case with regard to the owners of the smaller firms, who – as one put it – were ‘just making a living’.
2 Detailed quality specifications issued by buyers – spelling out the construction and quality requirement of each
style in great detail – accompany the more complex garments. Each style’s construction characteristics are given,
detailing such aspects as number of stitches per inch, types of stitches and seams, exact positioning of parts of the
garment in relation to other parts, as well as the buyer’s tolerance (i.e. the level of mistakes or faults that are
acceptable).
3 The geographical proximity of the region to the US may play a role here as it facilitates tighter and direct control on
the part of buyers. Intra-cluster competition for labour has also played a role in improving labour conditions.
4 The gains in terms of quality and consistency associated with automation lies in the fact that consistency is no
longer dependent on the operator and will not be affected by the personal circumstance of the operators nor by a
switch between operators. These labour-related considerations are especially important in a production
environment characterised by high turnover rates, such as La Laguna.
5 The cost of some of the machinery is quoted by some companies as the main reason for using them 24 hours a day
by working in shifts.
6 This places Mexican manufacturers in a disadvantageous position compared to Asian suppliers: the latter generally
receive a letter of credit against which they are paid upon shipment of the garments.
7 One of the reasons for this problem is that at the company level all HR-related policies and relations have a personal
component. This makes it very difficult to evaluate the causes and consequences of the problems mentioned.[ 246 ]
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8 The garment industry is considered especially suitable for a rural location, because of its minimal infrastructural
requirements, the non-polluting nature of the production process and its intensive use of non- or low-skilled
labour.
9 A very small number of locally owned rural factories are independent producers whose only production unit is
located in the rural area. Their number is too small for them to be discussed as a group, but they are included in the
figures and maps.
10 Cutting rooms and laundries require skilled labour and also have more specific infrastructural requirements.
Industrially skilled labour is a problem in the rural areas, where the limited employment experience of the
population is geared towards agricultural work. In the case of laundries, a good water supply and drainage system is
needed. This is not normally available in the rural area, where many ejidos still draw water from wells or norias. Both
cutting and laundry equipment need specific, expensive parts as well as maintenance by a specialised mechanic.
These can only be found in the urban node of La Laguna where all the support infrastructure (such as suppliers and
industry-specific services) is located. Finally and very importantly: both processes – especially when automated –
enjoy economies of scale and the quality of both is of decisive importance for the quality of the final product.
Cutting rooms and laundries are thus most suitably located in the cities, a fact illustrated by the data in the table.
11 In spite of the apparently limited numerical significance of 15% of the total number of garment workers employed
in rural factories (Gereffi et al., 2002b).
12 Moreover, rural garment factories have not brought what was hoped for in terms of regional development. The
arrival of garment factories in villages and ejidos was mostly a matter of ‘too little, too late’ for it to reverse the rural
exodus (see Chapter 5) or to reduce the urban-rural divide and spark a process of rural development.
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Appendix  III
Positioning garment companies in relation
to their competitive environment
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Figure III.1: Auto-evaluation on the competitive position of local garment firms
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Appendix  IV
Evidence of a crisis in La Laguna
Most of the field research for this study was performed in 1998-2000, when the surveys were
carried out and most of the interviews were held. The results of these research efforts are
presented in this study. In the years covered by this study, despite the noted vulnerabilities and
growing pains of the cluster, the growth of the local industry was phenomenal. However, this
changed in 2001. In the early months of that year, the first signs appeared of an impending
crisis for the Laguna cluster: local newspapers reported layoffs and the closure of local garment
SMEs, including several factories in the rural areas of the region. This pattern continued
through the summer and became dramatically worse after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the
ensuing economic uncertainty in the US. In apparent confirmation of the Mexican saying
‘When the US has the flu, Mexico gets pneumonia’, garment production in the Comarca
Lagunera collapsed as soon as US consumers started to hesitate and reduce their spending.
While it was not possible to carry out a new survey, a brief interview round was carried out at
the beginning of 2002. This provided insight into the impact of the crisis, local reactions to it
and ways the cluster and its firms were coping with it. The following is a summary of the most
important aspects of the crisis in the Laguna cluster.
The slow-down of the US economy has inflicted many casualties in La Laguna, as companies of
all sizes, in local as well as foreign ownership, were hit hard. The impact was most severe for the
most vulnerable echelon of the cluster, the subcontractor SMEs, many of which closed down
completely. However, large companies and the local giants were not spared: many were forced
to shut down some of their factories and to dramatically reduce their workforce as production
on average shrank to approximately 25-30% of the maximum production capacity reached in
2000. In some cases, the impact of the crisis on large companies was more dramatic, as the
example of the companies introduced in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 illustrates. Casolco – which was
commonly ranked amongst the very large leaders of the cluster, or at least as approaching that
status – went out of business a few months after the crisis set in. The owner of Roman – another
fairly prominent company in the cluster – absconded in order to escape his huge debts and the
impossibility of repaying them in the context of long-term depressed demand from the US.
One night, without notifying his workers, partners or suppliers, he emptied the factory, packed
all the best sewing machines in a large truck and disappeared from La Laguna. Others, like
Lajat, however, had accumulated more of a financial cushion for bad times and managed to
hang on – but only by their fingernails and by accepting any order, even for the most difficult
and complicated styles. Most of the subcontractors were forced to close down, many went out
of business and only some reopened when the worst of the crisis was over and recovery began.
The medium-sized, large and very large contractors with direct relationships with US buyers
looked for work everywhere. They often failed to find any, but on the whole they were able to
secure just enough to stay in business with a minimal capacity and workforce.
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Contrary to the experiences recorded for clusters in crisis in Brazil (Schmitz, 1999), India
(Knorringa, 1999) and Pakistan (Nadvi, 1999), and even for a shoe cluster in Central Mexico
(Rabellotti, 1999), in La Laguna the 2001 crisis did not give rise to initiatives for stepping up
inter-firm cooperation. While the nature of the crisis – which was rooted in a generally
depressed market, rather than in more successful competitors or a mismatch between local
capabilities and market demands – may have something to do with it, the local socio-cultural
environment appears to have been an insurmountable barrier to cooperation (see Chapter 6).
Representatives of the local CNIV intensified their lobby for support and understanding from
the IMSS (to temporarily suspend payments), Bancomext and other organisations, including
governmental ones. Most of their activities were defensive, and while representative of general
cluster-wide sentiments, they were not based on a broad or even massive mobilisation of
garment entrepreneurs. Most entrepreneurs were too busy trying to find work and save their
businesses to look beyond these immediate concerns and to cooperate with local peers.
However, the local and social embeddedness of local garment entrepreneurs was fully exploited
as a relief system, for example by bartering garment batches at a time when most local firms
had limited or no cash flow. Such survival strategies were more easily employed based on the
embeddedness of the cluster, its firms and interrelations.
For individual firms that survived the crisis, the experience appears to have provided a strong
impetus to the upgrading activities started but not completed before the crisis. The years of
trying to catch up with continuous demand growth by adding new sewing lines and more
workers without focusing on measures to improve production efficiency ended with the crisis.
From it emerged leaner firms that had implemented efficiency improving measures, such as
transforming sewing lines into module-type production units, automating key operations and
generally reducing labour input to the minimum. Especially in FDI facilities and in several of
the local giants, the focus on efficiency was evident.
With regard to the cluster, individual firms’ strategies during and after the crisis have
contributed to a sharpening of the existing intra-cluster hierarchy. During the first months of
2001, when faltering demand caused problems amongst subcontractor SMEs, forcing several to
go out of business, a few local giants decided to take over the facilities, machinery and
workforce of these SMEs. This was seen as an immediate and comparatively easy way to expand
production capacity.
After the crisis, when demand started to recover, local giants attempted to fill their factories as
quickly as possible. In their attempts they were willing to accept small order sizes as well as low
prices. They are reported to have undercut not only the price quotations of other local
contractors but also the indicated prices of the buyers.
The garment workforce was the most direct and all-round victim of the crisis. First, many
garment workers lost their job in 2001. At the height of the crisis, 30,000 garment workers were
estimated to be out of work. Many of these workers were not formally laid off, but indirectly
forced to quit their jobs, as their employers stopped providing transportation services.
Especially for workers living in a far-off rural area, arranging their own transportation was too
complicated and too expensive. They lost their jobs and on top of that had no right to the
compensation they would have been entitled to had they been fired. A visit to various rural
towns and villages confirmed that there were no employment alternatives available locally: as
noted in Chapter 4, the absorption capacity of the agricultural sector is limited and most rural
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garment factories were either closed completely or working at much reduced capacity. All rural
cooperatives were closed for at least a couple of months, and some for more than six months.
The population in the ejidos that had cooperative garment factories reported that the lack of
employment opportunities was pushing especially young males to temporarily migrate to the
border. In the cities there was wide recognition of the crisis and the massive layoffs, but few
officials or entrepreneurs expressed concern for the unemployed. Continued investment in the
region was seen to predestine the region’s prosperous future, and many of these urban
informants thought the unemployed would return to what they had been doing before the
garment boom: being a housewife or working in the informal sector (the enormous number of
taxis driving around confirmed the latter trend). Alternatively, it was suggested, some might
find work in the newly built malls.
The garment workers who were not laid off also suffered. The crisis affected their income
almost immediately, as firms responded to the situation by cutting costs, which included
wages and benefits. There was a general downward pressure on wages, some factories
suspended payments temporarily, while other firms lowered wages by 100-200 pesos and
cancelled bonuses and benefits.
Of course, these events need to be seen in the context of the cyclical nature of the world
economy as well as that of the garment business. There will be a recovery and there is no reason
to believe that all garment production will disappear from La Laguna in the coming years.
However, a full recovery is unlikely and local estimates are that the local capacity will have to be
reduced to 50-65% of its former level. This is also foreseen at the national level. In fact, the
recovery of the Mexican garment industry in 2002 was less complete and slower than that in
other countries (Haisley, 2002; Reforma, 2003; EU, 2003).
Despite the above and despite the expected negative effects of NAFTA liberalisation in food
processing and agriculture in the form of increased import penetration from the US, the urban
area of La Laguna, especially Torreón, is bustling and booming. The economic downturn in the
US economy and its direct impact on the Mexican border region, the Mexican export sector and
the Mexican economy in general have apparently not affected the region. Investments from the
US in chains such as Wal-Mart, Office Depot, Home Depot and HomeMart have transformed
the conurbation, giving it a more modern appearance. The expansion of Mexican stores such as
Gigante and Soriana has been impressive, as has the construction of new luxury hotels and the
opening of a number a large, new car dealerships. The two large, modern shopping malls
opened in 2001 also fit into the picture of Torreón as a booming, modern, prosperous city1.
Such investments are based on long-term expectations concerning the economic growth of the
region. However, in La Laguna in 2002, they were startling because of the absence of a link
between them and the local economy. In general, the physical appearance of the cities does not
correspond with the true state of the local economy, which appears better reflected by the
insides of both malls: they are almost always empty. Furthermore, the malls can also been seen
as symbols or warning signs of the large, growing and increasingly dominant position of US
business interests and investment capital in the region, in some cases at the expense of local
businesses.
Notes
1 Recently there have even been rumours and newspaper articles about the possible construction of a Disney
amusement park in the region. While this may make one smile at the fortune-telling talents of Fidel Castro – who
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not too long ago typified northern Mexico as a Disneyland – it also poses more serious questions concerning the
development of the Laguna region.
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9 Summary and interpretations
9.1 Summary of main findings
The globalisation of the world economy has given rise to rapid and far-reaching changes in the
organisation and geography of industrial production. New production locations, often LMIC
clusters, are constantly becoming incorporated into globalised value chains. Operating on
demanding export markets through GVCs orchestrated by powerful buyers, presents clusters of
producers in developing countries with new challenges and opportunities. For buyers,
sourcing linkages to new LMIC clusters represent a low-cost opportunity to tap into
geographically concentrated knowledge and experience. Whilst both the globalisation and the
clustering of industrial production are well-known phenomena, the need for a more detailed
insight into the interaction between the two has only recently become apparent. It is this
interaction that is the topic of this study.
A focus on networks is the most suitable for the analysis (at multiple levels of scale) of the
highly volatile and dynamic garment industry. Currently, two network-based approaches are
receiving much attention: the global value chain and the cluster approaches. The former
focuses on the division of labour patterns at the global level and on the governance
mechanisms used to control and coordinate these patterns and their underlying processes. The
cluster approach focuses on cooperation and competition dynamics that support the
competitive position of clustered firms in a certain geographical place. Both approaches share a
focus on industrial organisation but also incorporate geographical aspects.
This study concerns the garment cluster in La Laguna, northern Mexico, which has recently
boomed thanks to its growing exports to the US. Whichever criterion is used to measure
industrial success – growth in local production capacity, growth in exports, the creation of new
firms or employment growth – all the evidence indicates that La Laguna is an exceptional case
of rapid, export-based growth. Its success is based on the preferential access of Mexican imports
to the US under NAFTA since 1994. In fact, based on its development, La Laguna has been
hailed as ‘a NAFTA success story’ (Gereffi & Martínez, 2000). This study focuses on this
exceptional export cluster in order to examine the interaction and network linkages between
the producers in the cluster and global forces in the industry and poses a few specific research
questions. In the first part of this chapter, the main findings are summarised in order to answer
the research questions. In the second part, the case of La Laguna is positioned in a wider,
national context. Then the findings are interpreted.
Research question 1: What are the main features and trends of the global and North American industrial context
within which the Laguna garment cluster is operating?
The global, industrial context within which the Laguna garment cluster operates is
characterised by geographical and organisational complexity and dynamism. Over the past
decades, the garment industry has constantly changed under the influence of shifts in the
wearing apparel market and/or the marketing strategies adopted to shape and manipulate it.
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Among the most relevant trends is what in this study has been called ‘fashionisation’, that is,
the faster pace of fashion change and the increased introduction of fashion elements in basic
commodity garments which until recently were characterised by standardisation. Also, retailers
of wearing apparel, marketers of designer label garments and branded manufacturers are
adopting increasingly similar business and retail strategies which lead to hybridisation,
making it harder to tell them apart. A reflection of this development is the use of the term
‘buyers’ in reference to all of them. A common element in the strategies of buyers is an
increased emphasis on the retailing aspects of the industry, where brands and labels are
commonly applied tools for the manipulation of consumption patterns. With regard to
manufacturing, buyers generally rely on international sourcing networks, while their new
retailing strategies call for tight control and coordination, Quick Response and a shortening of
their supply chain and lead times. These latter developments are facilitated by developments in
telecommunications and computer technology but without annihilating the relevance of
geographical distance: nearby suppliers benefit most from these trends.
Many studies deal with the geography of garment production – more specifically, with the
motives and drives underlying the process of the continuous incorporation of new garment-
supplier countries. The fragmented nature of the industry, its history of vertical disintegration
and specialisation, and the labour intensive nature of the manufacturing process formed the
foundation of its position as forerunner in the globalisation of industrial production.
Undeniably, there is truth in the view that garment production is constantly shifting to new
low-wage areas, as evidenced by the recent entry of China, Vietnam and many other countries.
On the other hand, several high-wage countries still maintain considerable production levels,
thanks to the elaborate MFA trade regulation system designed to protect Western market from
imports. More importantly, there is a segment in the Western garment markets for which
quick response and short lead times are equally or more important than paying the lowest
wages and, as a consequence of the general trends discussed above, this segment appears to be
growing. Furthermore, as buyers are getting bigger and broadening the portfolio of brands and
labels, they balance their sourcing strategies and engage in strategic localisation across the
globe. As a result, more garment suppliers in countries on the periphery of the main markets
are incorporated into the production networks of buyers operating on these markets.
Mexico is one of the countries that benefits from the regionalisation trend in garment
sourcing. But it would be misleading to attribute its recent rise as a garment exporter solely to
new marketing strategies and a push for quick response: it was aided by the powerful incentive
of NAFTA liberalisation, and in less than a decade it has become a significant player in the
international garment trade. Rather than participating in global trade, Mexico’s exports have a
regional destination; the vast majority is destined for the US. Mexico is thus a relative
newcomer on the global garment scene: for decades, rules regulating US-Mexican trade limited
the role of Mexican garment manufacturers exporting to the US to that of pure assemblers, in
production networks orchestrated by US manufacturers. The organisational and logistical
complications of such arrangements and the comparatively limited cost advantages proved to
be significant barriers to the success and growth of such bi-national manufacturer-centred
networks, and their impact remained modest. NAFTA changed this: it paved the road for a
geographical reconfiguration of the US-Mexican garment value chain towards greater local
integration of the production process in Mexico. Under this liberalised model, several garment
export clusters have grown explosively and have turned Mexico into one of the main suppliers
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to the low to mid segment of the US market for basic garments. On the US side, more buyers
and, more importantly, new types of buyers are beginning to source from Mexico. This
broadening of Mexico’s buyer base, or even the succession of manufacturers by retailers and
designers, may play a vital role in the development of the Mexican garment industry. Most
particularly, the involvement of retailers and designers with their specific sourcing standards is
believed to be pushing Mexican garment export firms to transform themselves from pure
assemblers into more all-round, ‘full-package’ suppliers.
As the US continues to lose jobs in the wearing apparel manufacturing sector, Mexico is
gaining them. The result is a bi-national division of labour in garments in which the US and
Mexico can fully exploit their complementarities. The US specialises in those (capital and
knowledge intensive) activities in which it has a competitive advantage, viz. design, textiles and
marketing. Mexico does the same and employs its army of industrial labourers to broaden its
garment manufacturing base. Within this context, in the 1990s the Laguna region of Northern
Mexico developed into one of the world’s main production sites of blue jeans.
Research question 2: What are the main economic, geographical and historical characteristics of the Laguna
region, and does its current position as garment export cluster stem from these characteristics?
The economy of the semi-desert Laguna region was for the major part of its history centred
on agriculture. Yet now it is known as the main Mexican jeans export cluster. The
industrialisation and urbanisation processes that set in during the 1970s and accelerated in the
late 1980s lie at the basis of this regional transformation.
La Laguna was once the country’s main producer of cotton, and this brought the region much
prosperity. However, a few decades ago, problems started to arise with regard to agriculture in
La Laguna. The monoculture of labour-intensive cotton became a problem, especially with
declining world market prices and fierce international competition, and in response local
production was diversified. Also, the climatic conditions in the region became increasingly
adverse. The impact of these changes was felt most acutely by the ejido or smallholder segment.
Nowadays, the agricultural sector is still very important but it is becoming concentrated in
large farms where processes are capital intensive and mechanised. The smallholder segment is
under pressure and in general employment in agriculture is diminishing, causing grave un-
and underemployment in the rural areas of the Laguna region. Faced with a lack of
employment opportunities, rural inhabitants began to leave the countryside and over the past
decades depopulation has affected the rural municipios of the region.
Fortunately, a forceful industrialisation process (La Laguna was one of the first regions in
Mexico, outside the major cities, to industrialise in the 1970s) was well on its way in the urban
core of the region. Early industrialisation was based largely on the processing of the region’s
agricultural products: processed food and textiles and garments were amongst the early
industrial products of the region. Towards the end of the twentieth century, export processing
became diversified and now, in addition to garments and food products, includes different
industrial products, such as television tubes and components for the automotive industry. FDI
in large and modern factories has underlined the importance of mass production to the
regional economy and set it firmly on the export path. At the same time, the urban service
sector has expanded and modernised partly also under the influence of foreign investment and
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franchises. Both the urban industrial sector and the service sector absorbed the rural labour
reserve and thrived on it.
As a result of diverging developments, today the Laguna region is marked by a deep dichotomy:
its relatively modern, prosperous and industrialised urban core is surrounded by a largely poor
rural hinterland marked by high unemployment and a limited infrastructure. The impact of
this economic dichotomy is reflected in the opposing demographic trends of a growing urban
core and a rural hinterland facing a sizeable exodus of its population.
The region’s geographical location – away from the overcrowded, highly industrialised
Northern border cities but still relatively close to that border and the US market on the other
side – and its position as infrastructural hub have played an important role in the region’s
current economic success. Its historical economic development is also important. The region’s
industrial experience built up over decades and its large labour reserve of unemployed rural
inhabitants have provided fertile grounds for the region’s recent development into the New
Jeans Capital of the World. In a counter-reaction to the commuter flows that bring workers to
their work, recently garment factories have been established in the rural areas. They provide an
escape from the wage pressures in the booming urban industrial environment. At the same
time there is hope that they may be the start of a more diversified rural industrialisation
process.
Research question 3: What is the structure of the Laguna garment cluster, in terms of product- and market-
orientation and firm characteristics and does it correspond to the structure of other garment clusters?
The first garment factories in La Laguna in the 1940s made use of locally produced cotton and
denim and specialised in the production of jeans and other types of pants. During the 1990s the
centre of gravity shifted towards assembly for export, a shift that severed the links with local
cotton and denim production. Today, La Laguna produces mostly blue jeans for export to the
US. By the end of the 1990s, over 200 garment companies were engaged in this industry;
between them they operated more than 400 factories in the region. New are the few foreign-
owned garment factories that were established in the years immediately after NAFTA came into
effect. They are exceptional, as the vast majority of local companies are in local ownership. Local
garment companies in the region range from small to very large, but on average the scale of
operation is large and the cluster is dominated by several giant companies, many of which
predate NAFTA. Many of the SMEs in the region were established during the mid to late 1990s.
Garment factories are distributed fairly evenly over the region: though initially concentrated in
the cities, they are beginning to disperse into the rural areas. Formal factories and fairly
standardised mass production predominate while sweatshop-type informality is exceptional.
The structure of the garment industry in the Laguna differs from that of other garment clusters
dealt with in the literature. Whereas many garment clusters are more diversified and produce a
range of garments, garment firms in the Laguna region share an exceptionally narrow focus on
blue jeans and a limited volume of other ‘bottoms’ for the US market. The large scale of
operation of local garment factories is also exceptional: even small companies are generally
larger than small factories in other regions, but most exceptional are the very large local
companies that employ a few thousand operators. There is a very large gap, in terms of size as
well as of competence, between them and the other companies in the region. Furthermore, the
narrow export orientation of La Laguna is not found in other LMIC garment clusters.
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The cluster’s exceptional features and its tremendous post-NAFTA boom evince the key role of
the demand pull exerted by US garment buyers in moulding the cluster into its current shape.
The large exogenous demand of the late 1990s rather than a historically grown localised,
endogenous industrial expertise and know-how, appears to have played a determinant role in
shaping the Laguna cluster. While distinctive, the mentioned characteristics do not disqualify
La Laguna as a cluster or even necessarily place it outside the cluster literature. La Laguna is a
garment contracting cluster specialised in export production, and it displays the broad features
of Pederson’s (1997) ‘subcontracting cluster’. In trajectory terminology, it has the physiological
characteristics (viz. a few large firms amongst an army of SMEs) also found in mature LMIC
clusters. However, given the relatively short history of the Laguna cluster and its particular
development path, the maturation process that led to the current structure does not appear to
have originated from a broad base of specialist garment SMEs, as was the case in other clusters
recorded in the literature.
Research question 4: To what extent is the garment industry in La Laguna locally embedded through intra-
cluster linkages? If it is embedded, how does embeddedness in the economic and sociocultural environment affect the
competitive position of the cluster and its firms?
An examination of intra-cluster dynamics reveals the localised nature of many network
linkages of local garment companies. Supply linkages to trim suppliers and subcontractors as
well as linkages to organisations and the labour force are mostly geographically concentrated
within the cluster. This localisation is based on and also translated into extensive factual
knowledge regarding the local industrial infrastructure and actors. Moreover, local
industrialists strongly identify with La Laguna as ‘the jeans cluster’. Local business linkages are
embedded in social or even family ties and networks; this smoothes the flow of general
knowledge and facilitates practical support amongst industrialists. However, many other
positive side effects or by-products often associated with the spatial concentration of industrial
activity are not or are only to a limited extent found in La Laguna. Inter-firm supply linkages
predominantly take the shape of traditional subcontracting linkages: governance is highly
formalised and relations are dependent, unstable and relatively distant. Very large local
factories are the pivot of often large local subcontracting networks. Though the supply linkages
to trim suppliers are also mostly confined to the cluster, foreign suppliers play an important
role. Global suppliers of machinery, thread, buttons, rivets and other trim items are all
represented in La Laguna and, based on the specifications of US buyers, have become
incorporated into the local production networks. Their presence, as well as that of local
suppliers and subcontractors, contributes to the passive economic externalities (reduced
transaction costs, and scale and scope economies) in the cluster, but true local decision-making
is limited: sourcing decisions are dictated by buyers outside the cluster.
A large number of organisations are directly or indirectly involved with the local garment
industry. Within the liberalised Mexican policy environment, the role of public organisations
has been greatly reduced, mostly to administrative and facilitative tasks. State and local
governments are primarily concerned with the attraction of foreign investment and with
employment creation. Direct, effective support for local business is hardly being developed and
financial support for local businesses is selective and against market credit rates. There does not
appear to be a clear, coherent medium- to long-term industrial policy or regional development
plan behind the activities of public organisations.
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The local labour market is putting a strain on intra-cluster relations. With the growth of the
cluster, the tightening of the local labour market and high labour turnover rates, labour is
increasingly viewed as a troublesome factor rather than as a valuable resource. The build-up of
expertise in the local labour force is not reflected in a high incidence of small garment business
start-ups. Barriers to entry to the local garment industry are too high for individual garment
workers, who lack access to capital and face the minimum requirement of twenty to thirty
sewing machines to be able to operate as a subcontractor in the local networks.
The generally assumed benevolent relations between geographical and cultural proximity,
specialisation, interdependence, trust and cooperation hardly exist in La Laguna. In general,
intra-cluster linkages mirror local sociocultural values and display low levels of trust and
cooperation. This does not contribute to the development of joint, proactive action or of local
social capital. Moreover, the very narrow competitive focus of the cluster works against internal
cohesion and cooperation, as individual firms are direct competitors. Even though there is a
strong localisation of many network linkages, in the case of La Laguna such localisation does
not appear to promote dynamic cluster effects, which – through co-operation, local learning
and upgrading processes – support a cluster’s competitive position.
Research question 5: What is the composition of the garment production networks connecting La Laguna to the
US market, in terms of the actors involved and their productive, organisational and strategic activities and
responsibilities?
Chapter 7 examined the various types of networks that connect the Laguna cluster and its
garment firms to US buyers. Traditionally, in La Laguna – as in the rest of Mexico – branded
manufacturers were the most important buyers for the cluster. However, in the 1990s the buyer
base of the region expanded significantly and now includes a large number of retailers and a
few designers/marketers.
The network structures and strategies of these different types of buyers in La Laguna differ. The
importance of manufacturer-centred networks in La Laguna is reflected by a modest number of
FDI facilities, and especially by a relatively long history of extensive sourcing in the region.
Branded manufacturers work directly with local producers of different sizes, including in some
cases SMEs, and do not allow the subcontracting of their work. Although initially local firms in
these networks did pure assembly, branded manufacturers increasingly expect them to take
over input procurement and other manufacturing activities and are increasingly looking for
large suppliers. Branded manufacturers exercise tight governance and offer practical support
and expertise in the area of product quality and the efficiency of the production process.
Designers are the latest buyers to have become engaged in the Laguna cluster. They work only
with the largest local companies and buy full packages from them. During the initial stages of
the relationship, they are directly involved with their suppliers to ensure that their standards
and requirements are understood and respected. As their standards are higher than those of
many other buyers and they exercise tight governance, their work is rarely subcontracted and
then only to certified subcontractors. By the end of the 1990s, several designers were sourcing
from the region, but generally in small, pilot programs. Despite the initial investments in the
relationship and the production capabilities of the local contractor, no stable relationship with
designers have materialised. It is not quality problems that hamper these relationships, but
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flexibility and more intangible aspects of the sourcing relationship, such as service-mindedness
and business mentality.
Most of the jeans produced in La Laguna are bought and sold by retailers, viz. mass
merchandisers and department stores. Though some retailers work directly with local
contractors, the bulk of the work for retailers is channelled to the region through and by US
intermediaries. Some of the most important intermediaries for La Laguna have local
production facilities through which they supply full packages. Some have cutting rooms,
laundries and sewing facilities, but also subcontract a large share of the assembly work to local
SMEs. The subcontracting of work for retailers is pervasive and facilitated by the fact that the
intermediary/key supplier is responsible for respecting any codes of conduct and for certifying
subcontractors.
The network strategies of buyers are important for the network position and opportunities of
local producers. In general, local giants are in the best position to plug into the networks of all
the mentioned types of buyers and to be engaged in several at the same time. By combining
various types of buyers, they are able to fill their factories with work for branded manufacturers
and designers, and to subcontract the less attractive and/or profitable work for retailers. In
doing so, they mimic the intermediaries and occupy a strategic hub position in the local export
networks, which allows them to control and coordinate production in many local assembly
subcontractors. This position is reserved almost uniquely to local giants: even large local
companies are much less able to combine direct work for several US buyers; instead they
commonly combine direct export work with local subcontracting orders. While the local giants
are directly exposed to the demands of buyers and are working to adapt to these demands, most
other firms are not or are doing so only to a much more limited extent. In fact, for most firms,
especially subcontractor SMEs in the Laguna region, the difference between being incorporated
into manufacturer-centred as opposed to retailer-centred networks may not be very large at all.
Research question 6: Have upgrading processes taken place in the garment cluster, and if so, what kinds of
upgrading processes are found, which factors are driving these processes and who are the actors involved?
Chapter 8 examined the dynamics concerning upgrading of products, processes and position
in the value chains as well as changes in labour strategies and the geography of production
within the cluster.
Several of the shifts in the garment market as described in Chapter 1 are evident in La
Laguna’s product composition. Though specialised in the production of garments that
traditionally are mass-produced and standardised, fashionisation has made inroads into the
cluster. La Laguna is increasingly producing ‘mass-produced fashion’. Furthermore, much
attention is focused on quality improvement and on the consistency of quality levels. By
comparison, the production organisation in most factories has changed comparatively little
over the past years. There is a growing awareness, especially among the larger firms, of the need
to strive for good and consistent quality and higher efficiency. However, few companies have
implemented changes on the shop floor to improve quality control, shorten through-put times
and limit the impact of the turnover of personnel. Also, the advantages of La Laguna’s
geographical proximity to its main market have not yet been fully exploited. EDI and other
quick response technologies have not been implemented, partly because the
telecommunications infrastructure in the region does not support the intensive use required
by these systems.
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The establishment and ensuing boom of the garment industry in the Laguna region is part of a
supra-regional process of spatial reconfiguration of the US-Mexico garment value chain. Pre-
dating NAFTA, the garment industry in the region and in the rest of Mexico was largely
confined in its export activities to pure assembly. NAFTA’s gradual elimination of restrictive
trade rules has allowed companies in the region to extend their command to other, non-
assembly nodes of the chain. While most local exporters have assumed responsibility for input
procurement, many have also become more integrated and have extended their command over
the chain by developing laundry, finishing and, more recently, cutting capabilities. However,
by the turn of the century, only the very largest local companies had mastered full-package
production. They were still combining full-package production with more limited export
roles, but were gradually increasing their full-package production. There is a tendency towards
the greater local integration of the production process. However, developments are more
cautious and selective than may be expected on the basis of recent literature. Characterising La
Laguna at the turn of the century as a full-package cluster is too hasty and too much of a
generalisation.
The above-mentioned changes, especially in the areas of products but also in the local
integration of the production process, are driven partly by actors external to the cluster, viz. its
US buyers. These gradual changes are more a reflection of a shift in the demand of buyers than
of strategic behaviour on the part of local entrepreneurs. Efforts towards process upgrading
were especially for SMEs facilitated by local branches of government organisations, but in other
cases they were supported by active coaching on the part of buyers. In general, towards the end
of the 1990s local direct exporters were mostly trying to keep up with demand growth and
shifts, and displayed little purposeful strategic behaviour in any of the mentioned fields.
Driven by market trends and steered by buyers, local firms were in the process of adopting new
processes, new products and new standards. The high degree of market unawareness of local
entrepreneurs and their one-sided dependence on buyers explains why these changes did not
happen overnight and why they met with resistance. Steady adaptation and dissemination of
new practices were the challenges faced by the Laguna cluster; innovation was not (yet) an issue.
As buyers are steering many of the noted changes, these are only indirectly relayed to SME
subcontractors. In other words, mental distance from the market or market unawareness
increases with more subordinate positions in the export networks, which in La Laguna applies
generally to SMEs.
As mentioned, the examination of local dynamics of the Laguna cluster and its firms in Chapter
8 also includes changes in the labour and relocation strategies of local firms.
The one challenge that affects all firms in the cluster and is a uniquely local concern is the
negative impact of local labour-market dynamics. The tightening labour market and its
consequences for labour turnover rates, wages and benefits are at the forefront of
entrepreneurs’ concerns, and all firms are trying to devise means and strategies to attract and
maintain a stable labour force. Based on the urban-rural employment imbalances outlined in
Chapter 4, organised commuting between the rural areas and the urban core is an important
facet of garment production in the region. Faced with a tight urban labour market, urban
factories have increasingly resorted to the recruitment and daily transportation of rural
inhabitants to the cities. Over the course of the years, personnel transportation routes have
covered increasingly large distances and penetrated remote areas.
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Geographical dispersal of garment factories into the rural areas has also occurred: rural garment
factories have been established throughout the region. Subsidiaries of US-owned TNCs,
factories in private ownership of urban entrepreneurs and locally-owned cooperativas have
become important sources of non-agricultural employment in ejidos, villages and towns.
Notwithstanding differences in ownership and locational preferences, rural factories share a
relatively isolated position vis-à-vis their local production environment and a narrow focus on
assembly activities. The latter observation points to the emergence of an intra-regional division
of labour, between the conurbation and the rural hinterland. The resulting pattern of intra-
regional division of labour indicates the relevance of NIDL principles at a lower level of scale.
The process has been depicted as a further reconfiguration phase of the bi-national value chain.
In other words: parallel to the bi-national reconfiguration of the value chain there is an intra-
regional shift based on the progressive incorporation of the low-cost rural areas as assembly
locations. The latter points to a combination of low- and high-road strategies in local business
behaviour.
9.2 La Laguna: a unique case?
Chapter 5 examined the structure of the Laguna cluster and showed it to be different from
other garment clusters described in the literature. This may prompt questions on the relevance
of the research findings of this study. In other words, are the findings of this study relevant
beyond this particular case? How do they relate to garment production for export in other parts
of Mexico? As discussed in Chapter 3, since the passage of NAFTA, garment production for
export is a booming business throughout Mexico and not just in La Laguna. During the 1990s,
new garment factories were established in cities, towns and villages from northern Chihuahua
to the southern states of Chiapas, Oaxaca and Yucatán. The question concerning the possibly
unique nature of the Laguna cluster and its development will be briefly explored here with
reference to the Mexican context.
As in La Laguna, garment factories in other regions tend to cluster together. There are a few
Mexican clusters that are comparable to La Laguna in size and significance. The two export
clusters that will be briefly discussed here are that in Puebla/Tehuacan and the recently
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Table 9.1: General characteristics of the Laguna, Tehuacan and Yucatán garment clusters
La Laguna Tehuacan Yucatán
Types of product Jeans, casuals Jeans, casuals T-shirts, jeans, shirts,
lingerie, sportswear
Market destination Export US Export US Export USA &
regional market
Weekly Production 6 million 3-3.5 million n.a.
Capacity (est.)
FDI Some; mainly US Hardly any Much; mainly US and 
Asian
Position in value Assembly, CMT+ Assembly, CMT Assembly, CMT,
chain/prod. activity wash, full package full package
Source: Fieldwork 2000
NB. Words in italic are a region’s main production activity/market destination.
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developed Yucatán or Henequen cluster; these are also the most direct competitors of La
Laguna. Table 9.1 summarises the basic characteristics of the three production regions.
Especially the Tehuacan region is perceived by both clients and local manufacturers in the
Laguna region as a direct competitor. The table clearly shows the similarities in product- and
market-orientation between the two clusters. The history of the Tehuacan cluster is similar to
that of La Laguna: there was a local garment production capacity throughout most of the late
twentieth century and it was oriented towards the domestic market. While the opening up of
the Mexican market at the end of the 1980s inflicted many casualties among garment factories,
just a few years later large export opportunities provided new ways to exploit local expertise. In
its current form and orientation, the Tehuacan cluster has its roots in the early 1990s. The
cluster in Tehuacan is also dominated by a few very large garment firms. In Tehuacan fewer
very large companies exist next to more and generally smaller SMEs. The dynamic of the local
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Table 9.2: Main buyers with interests in La Laguna, Tehuacan and Yucatán
La Laguna Tehuacan Yucatán
Main clients Marketers/designers Marketers/designers Marketers/designers
Old Navy/Gap Gap Old Navy/Gap
Liz Claiborne CK Liz Claiborne
Tommy Hilfiger Guess Victoria’s Secret
Eddie Bauer Liz Claiborne OshKosh B’kosh
The Limited Mudd Ralph Lauren
Polo Jeans
Mudd
Branded manufacturers Branded manufacturers Branded manufacturers
VF (Wrangler)** Levi Strauss La Perla**
Sara Lee/Hanes** Savane Sara Lee **
Levi Strauss VF (Lee)**
Savane Vogue**
Retailers Retailers Retailers
JC Penney KMart JC Penney
Kmart Wal-Mart
Wal-Mart JC Penney
Sears
Target
Intermediaries Intermediaries Intermediaries
(vendors/hybrid) (brokers/vendors) (vendors/hybrid)
Sun Apparel*/** Sun Apparel* Kellwood
Kellwood Kellwood Oxford Industries*
Aalfs** Tarrant*
W. Stevens* Azteca
807*/**
Easy Wear Group
A & A Consultants
Source: Baseline survey, 1998-1999 and Fieldwork 2000
* These US intermediaries are also involved in retailing through licensing or own brand production.
** These US companies have FDI production facilities in the region.
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labour market is also largely similar and, as in La Laguna, a tight urban labour market has
caused factories to flee the urban area. In fact, garment production is much more dispersed
than in La Laguna, and many garment factories have been established in the indigenous villages
surrounding Tehuacan.
A few differences between the Laguna and the Tehuacan clusters also need to be noted. On
the whole, the development of the Tehuacan cluster appears to be one step behind that of La
Laguna. Local companies, even the very large ones, are overwhelmingly pure assemblers and by
the turn of the century the concept of full packages was only just being introduced into the
cluster. Also, labour conditions, especially in the village factories, are below those found in La
Laguna: more children are working in the factories, and the facilities are often improvised and
not built specifically to serve as a garment factory, as is mostly the case in La Laguna. The
dispersed pattern of production as well as the larger distance from the US makes direct
governance by buyers in these areas more difficult.
The Yucatán cluster – which was also briefly discussed in Chapter 5 – differs somewhat from the
other two cases: it is more diversified in terms of its product orientation, and FDI assembly
facilities now play a much more important role in the cluster, in fact they play a dominant role.
As in the other two cases, local garment industry expertise was present in Yucatán before its
recent export boom. The Mayans in the region are known for their traditional garments and
embroidery work, and traditional men’s shirts made in Yucatán have had a strong position in
the domestic market for decades. In the garment industry in the region today, little remains of
the former specialisation in guayaberas. In recent years it has been replaced by export production.
While the presence of a very large skilled local labour reserve (especially in the rural areas) is the
main pillar supporting the rapid growth of the cluster, local ownership of garment factories is
comparatively limited, certainly in the export sector. The garment industry is dominated by
the large-scale facilities of US, Asian and even European manufacturers and contractors. Export
production is overwhelmingly destined for the US market and is transported by ship from the
Progreso port in Yucatán to several eastern US ports.
Table 9.2 shows the main clients of the industries in La Laguna,Tehuacan and Yucatán.
Although the precise mix of clients differs between the clusters, clearly all three clusters work
predominantly for major US buyers. They also occupy a dependent, contracting position vis-à-
vis these buyers.
All in all there are a few striking similarities between the three clusters:
• They are narrowly oriented towards the export market (domestic market production has
been mostly crowded out);
• They produce basic, mass-produced garments;
• The average scale of operation is large and dominated by a few very large companies; and
• Their recent growth and success is a result of exogenous demand rather than of endogenous,
evolutionary growth.
On the whole, rather than a deviant case, La Laguna appears to be a rather typical example of the
Mexican garment industry and its recent export-oriented boom. Its peculiarities (especially
since they appear to apply to the entire Mexican garment export industry), raise questions with
regard to the cluster’s future prospects.
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9.3 Interpreting the findings
The evidence presented does not necessarily warrant great optimism. In fact, La Laguna has not
stepped out of the looming shadow of El Paso and its dramatic demise. Of course, less than a
decade has passed since the garment export boom took a hold of the Laguna cluster and
significant headway has been made in this short period: growth has been impressive, more
fashion is being produced, a few nodes of the bi-national value chains are shifting to Mexico,
which has led to a greater local integration of the manufacturing process, and more US buyers
are buying their jeans in La Laguna. Yet, perhaps because of the daunting quantitative
challenges posed by the US demand boom, the more qualitative and strategic of these changes
have been made hesitantly and, in some cases, under direct pressure exerted by outside buyers.
Words like pro-activity and flexibility do not describe the local business attitude. And while
there may be sound reasons for this, it is cause for concern in an industry that places growing
emphasis on commitment, cooperation, flexibility, speed and service on the one hand, and is
marked by apparent locational volatility on the other, low-end hand. Generally, LMICs that
participate in regional sourcing patterns are thought to compensate for their often higher
prices by offering the mentioned other, quick-response-related advantages. La Laguna does not
do this, yet. With the upcoming integration of garments and textiles in general WTO rules in
2005 and the expected global reshuffling of garment production locations, the local garment
industry offers little or no competitive advantages allowing it to look forward with great
confidence. This appears to be validated by the cluster’s crisis in 2001 and 2002, which was
briefly discussed in Appendix IV.
This study does not validate the idea that the development of the Mexican garment industry
will be modelled after the East Asian example. In this proposition, a number of important
factors are ignored. First of all, timing: over the past four decades, especially with revolutionary
improvements in computer technology, the garment industry and most notably its marketing
and sourcing strategies have changed. The competitive environment and challenges facing
current newcomers like Mexico are very different from those of the East Asian pioneers. Many
of the new entrants start as pure assemblers and are restricted by existing trade regulations or
by a dependent supplier position vis-à-vis their buyer. East Asian pioneers initially faced no
such restrictions. Also, East Asian garment exporters had few or no LMIC competitors, whilst
current newcomers have many, some of which have longstanding experience. Besides these
general changes in the competitive environment, a few specifics of the Mexican case need to be
noted as well. As the Laguna case clearly shows, Mexico’s market orientation is narrowly
focused on the US market and its participation is based on regionalisation and not on
globalisation, as was the case for most Asian suppliers. Compared to the more all-round Asian
suppliers, Mexico is in a more dependent position and is more limited with regard to learning
about other markets and governance styles. Finally, Mexico’s sociocultural environment and,
more importantly, its policy environment are very different from those in East Asia. All in all, it
cannot be taken for granted – in fact, it is unlikely – that Mexico will follow the path
established by the East Asian NICs.
So, how is Mexico’s position to be regarded? Trade policy (changes) are highly important in
explaining Mexico’s development and current position. Here, Loo’s (2002) cake metaphor
appears appropriate. Loo envisions the global garment industry as divided into a cream portion
of flexible production regions with creative, innovative and high value-added activities, and a
cake portion of low value-added activities. In between the cake and the cream, she describes a
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layer of artificial cream resulting from the international regulatory framework and uniting the
low-paid and low value-added activities of the cake portion with the high profits and export
values for industrialists and governments found in the cream portion. Mexico is a typical
example of an ‘artificial cream location’ that may lose much of its raison d’être with the ending of
the MFA in 2005. Trade policy changes, in the form of NAFTA, have opened up a window of
opportunities for the Mexican garment industry but a decade later impending international
trade policy changes are already threatening to close it again.
La Laguna differs from most other garment cluster described in cluster literature. Most LMIC
export clusters were broad SME clusters that have become internally diversified and/or
oriented towards exports as the outcome of a steady endogenous development process. La
Laguna is different. Its humble garment industry was devastated by a surge in cheap imports,
and then a few years later what remained of the industry was faced with an overwhelming
demand from the US that launched it as a major player onto the world’s largest market. Local
factories that predate NAFTA found themselves in a forerunner position. Several became local
industrial giants that dominate the cluster and especially the newly established SMEs that
work as their subcontractors. The result is a polarised cluster, where polarisation not only
separates domestic market producers from export producers, as noted by Chinchilla and
Hamilton (1994). This study clearly shows internal polarisation within the Laguna export
cluster, which may serve as a model for the export-oriented segment of the entire Mexican
garment industry. Moreover, polarisation has increased during the export boom. In this
respect, the case of the Laguna cluster is illustrative of the warnings issued by Dussel Peters
(1997a) and Valdes-Ugalde (1995) concerning the development of the Mexican economy in
general under the influence of its current liberalisation course.
In relation to the cluster literature, two lessons can be drawn from this study. First, without
being able to precisely pinpoint or rank the reasons, the Laguna case shows that the prevalence
of trust-based, cooperative linkages as a basis for collective efficiency in clusters cannot be taken
for granted. While the nature of the local sociocultural environment may play an important
role that should not be overlooked, the exogenously driven growth spurt may be especially
disruptive to the materialisation of such links. Such a dramatic outside demand boom may well
position local firms as each other’s direct competitors. Direct competition for a position in the
export networks of not necessarily loyal, external buyers is likely to form an important
structural barrier to cooperation within the cluster. This is all the more relevant and deserving
of academic attention, not only because La Laguna is exemplary of the Mexican garment
industry, but also – and more importantly – because progressive globalisation and the
incorporation of ever new LMIC clusters into GVCs may well bring into existence many more
new clusters like La Laguna outside Mexico as well.
Second, the above mentioned structure and dynamics have negative repercussions for
learning and upgrading processes that support the competitive position of the cluster. There is
no local think-tank, and hardly any sharing of information or lessons. Furthermore, while
dominant large firms do function as upgrading pioneers (Scott, 1992; Humphrey & Schmitz,
2000) – subcontractors in the lower tier generally do not receive the incentives and information
– , there is little evidence that their efforts benefit the cluster in general. In La Laguna, learning
is not a collective process. [ 267 ]
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The GVC perspective has contributed significantly to the understanding of the Laguna region’s
development and of the core issues at stake. In the post-NAFTA export boom, vertical, chain-
based linkages to US buyers have played a determinant role. Learning from global buyers
(Schmitz & Knorringa, 2000) and buyer succession have been important, and one of the
important challenges facing the larger local producers is to extend their command of the value
chain in the direction of full-package production. With regard to the outcome of these
processes, however, the narrow focus on intra-chain dynamics and vertical, top-down linkages
that is typical of GVC studies does not do justice to the complexities of global-local interaction
that lies at the heart of the success or failure of La Laguna as a major supplier to the US market.
In this case, local and historical circumstances are highly important. For example, the former
limited role of local producers as pure assemblers appears to have had a paralysing effect that is
currently reflected in market unawareness, dependency and risk avoidance on the part of local
producers. Also, the turn to liberalisation and the current absence of focused policies have
harmed the relations between public organisations and industry, which receives little or no
support. Leaving these aspects out of consideration introduces the risk of applauding potential
instead of actual results and of oversimplifying the difficult upgrading process to be
undertaken. In other words, there is a clear need for a more explicit and extensive incorporation
of extra-chain elements into GVC studies.
Upgrading efforts have been concentrated on the improvement of production processes and
techniques. There is no indication that the upgrading trajectory will extend beyond
production, viz. into the design, marketing and sales activities of the GVC. Gibbon (2000) has
already cast doubt on the validity of quoted examples of OBM garment producers in East Asia,
and thus on the development trajectory modelled on these examples. Dussel Peters, Ruiz
Durán and Piore (2002) also stress the fact that US buyers generally do not teach their Mexican
suppliers the skills they need to operate independently on the international market (see also
Schmitz & Knorringa, 2000; Hobday, 1995). For La Laguna it is highly unlikely, at least in the
short to medium term, that local firms in La Laguna will attain an independent OBM position
in the US market. This leads to questions concerning the developmental result: even if the
cluster manages to safeguard its competitive position in the US market, it may not be able to
appropriate much of the gains. In a locked-in position as a successful but subordinate
contractor cluster, the benefits of local upgrading processes will likely be reaped by the cluster’s
buyers rather than by the local producers.
As mentioned, the relevance of the observations with regard to the internal development of the
cluster as well as the cluster’s (and its participants’) position in the GVC extend beyond the
Laguna case to the rest of the Mexican garment export industry. Not only that, there appears to
be little reason to believe that these observations do not apply to large parts of the Mexican
maquila, or export, sector. If this is true (and more research is needed to determine whether it
is), one of the effects of the economic integration of the US and Mexican economies in NAFTA
may well be the lock-in of Mexico in a subordinate position vis-à-vis it northern neighbour. It
also raises questions with regard to the relevance of the distinction between ‘buyer-driven’
versus ‘producer-driven’ GVCs in relation to the local developmental outcome that
incorporation in such chains may have.
Finally, what conclusions might be drawn concerning the relation between global and local? It
is almost unavoidable to relate the findings of this study to the dispute between anti-globalists
and the proponents of export-based local development. Unsurprisingly, the findings of this
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study affirm the wisdom of steering a middle course between the complete rejection of
globalisation – as is done by the anti-globalists – and the belief that participation in
globalisation will lead to development – as proposed by EOI enthusiasts. Certainly in the
garment industry, the globalisation process cannot be reversed – nor should it be, as it brings
with it many valuable economic development opportunities for LMICs. On the other hand, this
study clearly shows that insertion in the global market or GVCs does not automatically
guarantee the beginning of growth and an upgrading process with positive developmental
results in the medium to long term. Learning from global buyers and their standards is not
enough, even if only because these buyers’ primary concern is with sales and profits and not
with pushing the development process in their sourcing countries. To achieve industrial and
regional development based on (export) industrialisation, involvement of the state is needed.
Both the success of several East Asian NICs and the difficulties of La Laguna may serve to
underline this general but important point. The involvement of institutions that support the
adjustment of Mexican firms to the needs of the market and that promote the continuous
upgrading needed to stay in the market would appear a worthwhile initiative1 Strengthening
of the domestic market (for example, through striving for a more equal distribution of income
and power) and of the position of domestic firms on that market is especially important, also
because it would somewhat attenuate the risks of depending on the volatile US/global market.
Notes
1 In terms of concrete measures one could think of extending and improving the existing government-sponsored
consultancy programmes for SMEs and of improving credit or loan conditions and availability. Institutions akin to
the Fashion Development Centre in El Paso (see van Dooren & van der Waerden, 1997) can serve to improve market
awareness amongst local entrepreneurs. The promotion and support of ‘empresas integradoras’ (see section 3.3)
could strengthen the position of SMEs as well as help them to achieve the capacity requirements needed to operate
on export  market
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Annex 1: Research methodology
The general introduction to this study described the fieldwork activities carried out for this
research. Here, the choice of the research location, the sampling methodology, the resulting
databases and their uses will be discussed. Most importantly, the interviewees are listed – in
gratitude for their cooperation.
Research carried out in El Paso in 1996 showed that most of the jeans production capacity
concentrated in this border city was being shifted to Mexico. A few destination areas appeared
of particular importance: La Laguna in Northern Mexico, Puebla/Tehuacan and Aguascalientes
in Central Mexico. The areas surrounding Mérida in Yucatán was also booming with garment
factories. Secondary sources, most notably census material published by INEGI, were consulted
to gain insight into the developments in these regions, but they offered little useful
information. Therefore, an exploratory fieldwork was carried out to these production locations,
where information was gathered and local informants were interviewed. Experts in Mexico City
were also consulted. Based on the interviews and available information La Laguna was chosen as
a research location.
La Laguna
The most important source of information for this study is the company database which was
compiled on the basis of an extensive, standard survey carried out at 73 local garment firms.
The survey covered a broad range of subjects, including company history and structure,
products, clients, subcontracting practices, human resource policies and business strategies. It
was developed at IDSUU on the basis of the research proposal and tested and adapted in La
Laguna.
As discussed at some length in Chapter 6, in Mexico, and certainly in La Laguna,
interpersonal relationships carry great weight in business relations. In addition, there is a
general atmosphere of secretism and mistrust in the local garment industry. The combination
of these facts made the construction of the company database – the main database used for this
study – based on an extensive company survey, in an industry where the researcher had
virtually no contacts, a fairly complicated and time-consuming task.
As available information was highly fragmented, data from different sources were combined
to create a more complete listing of companies. Since export networks are the central theme of
the study, the decision was taken to select a number of very large companies that could be
identified as local lead export firms. This selection was made based on interviews with key
persons in the industry and other available information. The selected companies – generally
large or very large companies – were first contacted ‘cold’ without using references or letters of
recommendation of the CNIV or FOMEC. After many hours on the phone, a few appointments
were made and surveys were carried out in a small number of firms. The aim of the study was to
cover the local export networks as extensively as possible. Therefore, following the interviews
with the large firms where possible the subcontractors of these firms were contacted and
visited and this process was continued until no more (subsequent tiers of) subcontractors were
found. Simultaneously, the contacts with the managers/owners of garment companies in
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several cases resulted in direct recommendations with their friends or acquaintances in the
industry who were hard to persuade to cooperate without a direct network contact. As a result
of this strategy, the top-end of the local industry was well covered. The consequence of this
manipulated snowball methodology could have been a possible over-sampling of large
companies and a bias towards the export sector. In order to avoid such a bias and to get an
accurate picture of the garment cluster as a whole, the data obtained during the first survey
round was complemented by randomly selecting a number of medium- and small-sized
companies. These companies were selected from the company listing, but some that were not
on the listing were visited as they were accidentally encountered in the cities or villages. At
these companies the same standard questionnaire was applied after which they were included
in the survey.
To complement the survey information of the garment companies, information was also
systematically collected from a number of suppliers of different supplies, ranging from
machine parts to needles and thread. Suppliers were asked about developments in their own
business but also about the general trends in the cluster. In addition, ten laundries, including
laundries belonging to multi-plant companies and specialist, independent laundries were
visited and information was collected using a short questionnaire. Since little specific
information on employees, employment structure and labour conditions in the local garment
industry was available, a small employee survey was carried out in a medium-sized garment
plant in Gómez Palacio and in two small co-operative plants in ejidos; one close to the urban
core of the region and one much further removed from the cities. At all three locations the
workers interviewed were randomly selected. Although the results can not be used to
generalize beyond the plants surveyed, they gave a valuable first impression of socio-economic
characteristics of the urban and rural workers, their families and living conditions.
Finally, more in-depth information – in particular on topics such as rural garment factories,
informal local linkages, relations with buyers and the impact of the 2001 crisis – was gathered
by means of semi-structured, open-ended interviews with key-entrepreneurs and key persons
at institutions such as SECOFI, Bancomext and CNIV. Also, several immediate ‘bystanders’
such as suppliers, specialist merchandise and personnel transporters were interviewed and gave
the researcher a different angle on the relevant developments. Information obtained in an
informal manner and by day-to-day observation has also been very important and in some cases
highly valuable and informative. A visit to the annual regional garment Expo – where suppliers,
US buyers, regional garment producers as well as producers from other regions in Mexico
gather, present their products and socialise – was both interesting and useful as it provided
many new and valuable contacts.
During all the fieldwork rounds, both national and local newspapers were frequently
consulted and valuable information was obtained from them. In addition, a large body of other
secondary sources was consulted, including statistical material published periodically in
economic censuses, population censuses and a yearly publication dedicated specifically to the
national garment industry, by INEGI.
El Paso
During the first and third fieldwork period El Paso was also visited.The database of the El Paso
garment industry created in 1996 for a MSc. thesis (van Dooren & van der Waerden, 1997) was
used as the entrance point for a follow-up study, parallel to the research in La Laguna. In order
to trace the developments in the El Paso garment industry and the changes it went though
during the late 1990s, the 1996 database was compared to 1998-1999 listings of the Chamber of
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Commerce and the Yellow Pages of the same years. The aim was not only to monitor the
collapse of the – then former – Jeans Capital of the World in itself (see van Dooren & Verkoren,
2003). Rather, successful and unsuccessful firms, firms with different backgrounds and
strategies, with and without productive linkages to Mexico and/or La Laguna were identified
and contacted. Managers and/or owners of these companies as well as labour representatives
were interviewed with the aim of drawing lessons for and parallels with its successor Jeans
Capital, La Laguna. Where relevant, direct business linkages between El Paso and La Laguna
were discussed at length. The interviews in El Paso were open-ended and semi-structured. El
Paso data was used in Chapters 3 and 8.
Elsewhere US
A few of La Laguna’s main buyers in the US were visited. The interviews held with them in
Miami and New York were focused specifically on their global sourcing and business strategies,
and on the role of Mexico and La Laguna within these strategies. These interviews helped to see
the Laguna region and its development from the buyers’ global perspective. All the buyer
interviews were open-ended and semi-structured.
Puebla/Tehuacan and Mérida
Finally, in order to be better able to position the Laguna cluster in its national context (Chapter
9), brief exploratory fieldworks were carried out in two other regions that are booming on
garment production for export: Puebla/Tehuacan and Mérida. There the managers or owners
of randomly selected firms were interviewed on a number of pre-determined topics, using
open-ended interviews. In addition, secondary sources of information – including statistical
data, industry listings, and studies – were gathered. Local key-informants of the garment
chambers and SECOFI were also interviewed.
During the course of the fieldwork for this study, many people were interviewed. There names
are listed below.
Garment entrepreneurs, La Laguna
Goméz Palacio
Interviewee Company Interviewee Company
M. Nahle 807 Co. de Mexico
L. Garcia Industrial Denim D. Youtsee Aalfs de Mexico
R. Soto Ramos Acatex F. Juan Marcos Industrial JM
I. Rodriguez Alaska Jeans I. Puente Industrias Mirsa
K. Abularach Apache Jeans R. Tohmé sr. Industrias Pantalonera
Mexicana
V. Medrano Arias R. Tohmé Industrias Pantalonera
Mexicana
E. Arias Arias F. Muñoz Industrias Zarpa
L. Rosas Bordados y conf. La Laguna V. Iza Los Cedros
J. Ramirez Bull Denim J. Arreola Valdes Madesa
C. Mexen Flores Camexport H. Chamut Manufacturas 
Chamanta
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L. Juan Marcos Camisas Siete Leguas S. Rodriguez Maquiladora La Texana
P. Callau Casolco O. Medellin Maquilas Harper
P. Torres Casolco L. Espinoza Marcas de Impacto 
Mundial
M. Cardona Comercial Waco L. Montoya Marylus Castell
I. Rodriquez Confecciones Roper G. Rosas Meromex
E. Valadez Confecciones y Maquila J. Salazar Meromex
Montana
G. Chaín Creaciones Lobo F. Morales Morca Apparel
M. Rodriguez Desert Apparel S. Sanchez OMJC
N. Cruz Santillan Dustin M. Cruz Macias OMJC
R. Perales Dustin Lavanderia O. Juarez Pantalonera Laguna
C. Jaidar Fabrica de Ropa ManJai H. Juarez Pantalonera Laguna
C. Garcia Fabrica de Ropa ManJai R. Juarez Pantalonera
Laguna/Blitzer
F. Salinas Fersal E. Armendariz Quality Jeans
Ma. Pamanes Grupo Pafer Huichita E. Gonzalez Remmington
E. Alvarez Grupo Pafer Huichita U. Jaidar Ranchero
G. Pamanes Refaccionaria Huichita sr. Palma Sala de Corte Palma
N. Roman Grupo Roman G. Cobarrubios Ticora
M. Monreal Grupo Textil Bros H. Montes Tops & Bottoms
de Mexico
M. Salas Happy Jeans R. Jaidar jr. Vikingo
A. Fuentes Impecable R. Jaidar sr.
Torreón
M. Villar de Callau Arels de La Laguna A. Ramirez Maquiladora Angel
Ramirez
G. Sordo Arels de La Laguna A. Mery Milan Maquiladora Mevi
H. Garza Roque Basic Co. A. Afife Nuñez Maquiladora Santa
Maria
R. Albeniz Franco Creaciones Crisma F. Zavala Maquila y Servicio
de la Laguna de Confección
A. Herrera Colección Laguna J. Chaul Franch Maquilas Tauro
J. Bitar Cowboy P. Villalobos MSE
P. Chan Derringer Apparel M. Nahle Naher
F. Cuitlahuac Eslo F. Guttierrez Ralph Lauren
Childrenswear
J. Castellanos Felsa D. Ray R.K.I. de Mexico
K. Gidi Grupo Gidi C. Bannon TexBlast
C. Martinez Grupo Libra V. Penaloza VF Jeanswear Sourcing
C. Papadopulos Grupo Papadopulos J. Rios Wrangler
H. Ramos Industrial Textil Ramco D. Rush Wrangler
C. Ortíz Perez Industrias Maquiladora A. Mafud Kaim Productos West
Daro
T. Bello Lajat F. Mafud Kaim Productos West
J. Lara Aguirre Lajat R. Castro Santa Fe Jeans
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P. Garcia Lajat R. Palacios Tramex del Norte
A. Hinojosa Lajat K. Gidi Tower Apparel
S. Bañuelos Manufacturas BAHER J. Kort Van Kort de Mexico
Cd. Lerdo
S. Villalobos Diaz Industrial de Ropa Morales
J. Zarzar Maquilas Zarzar
Antonio Gil Castro Laísa
Walter Gil Castro Laísa
J. Miranda Pami
E. Salas Siete Leguas
M. Martinez Siete Leguas
Rural municipios
G. Uribe Aramark San Pedro
E. Lopez Dickies de Parras Parras de la Fuente
E. Alvarez Fabrica la Estrella Parras de la Fuente
A. Hernandez Grupo Onsite de Mexico San Pedro
H. Sheheb Jaidar Industrias Maquiladoras Ejidales F.I. Madero
S. Schwartz Liga Mayor F.I. Madero
A. Hernandez Madero Internacional (Hanes) F.I. Madero
F. Pamanes Pafer Huichita La Florida, Coah.
E. Cox Parras-Cone Parras de la Fuente
F. Gaytan UCOMEX La Union
G. Marshall Wrangler San Pedro
Suppliers La Laguna
M. Silos American & Efird Torreón
F. Garcia American & Efird Torreón
J. Melendez CIRO Torreón
J. Rosas Coats Timon Torreón
B. Flattmann Dunlap Sales de Mexico Torreón
E. Pena Mayoreo y Confecciones del Norte Torreón
E. Vera Parras de La Laguna Torreón
A. Mafud Productos West Torreón
S. Guerra Scovill Torreón
Ma. Aguilera The Fox Company Gómez Palacio
E. Puishes Comercial Samy/West Texas Textiles Torreón/El Paso
C. Alatorre Volunteer Thread
Government institutions and organisations La Laguna
J. Castañeda Bancomext Gómez Palacio
J. Ayala CANACINTRA Torreón
C. Gonzalez CANACINTRA Gómez Palacio
B. Orduña CNIV-La Laguna Gómez Palacio
O. Juarez Presidente CNIV-La Laguna Gómez Palacio
F. Pamanes Presidente CNIV-La Laguna Gómez Palacio
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Lic. Gomez Diaz IMSS Torreón
J. Ramirez Prodinur Gómez Palacio
A. Carlos FOMEC-Torreón Torreón
S. Reyes FOMEC-Torreón Torreón
R. Cepeda Cepeda SECOFI Torreón
R. Garcia SECOFI Torreón
H. Solís SECOFI Torreón
Ing. Gomez Secretaria de Economia Torreón
S. Coral Secretaria de Economia Gómez Palacio
M. Dávila Consultoria y Estudios Economicos Saltillo
M. Duran SEFOMEC, Gobierno del Estado Saltillo
de Coahuila
S. Sologaistoa Fomento Econ. Mcpio Cd. Lerdo Cd. Lerdo
O. Dominquez CNIV Mexico D.F.
El Paso: Intermediaries and suppliers
A. Mowad Mowad Apparel
A. Mansur A&A Consultants
R. Shapiro Action West
M. Azouley American Garment Finishing Corp.
M. Valdez American&Efird
L. Lazaro Atlas Sewing Parts and Supplies
J. Alcantar BAB Customs Broker
A. Levine Cotton Street
C. Betancourt Fahnos
C. Arnold La Mujer Obrera
E. Lopez Levi Strauss
H. Whitley Monterrey Canon
J. Mainwearing OMSA
T. Bruder Onsite International
C. Zwezerijnen Savane
J. Adames Savane
J. Ramirez Savane
J. Sierra Sierra Western
T. Turley Sun Apparel
J. Ferguson The 807 Co.
B. Isaac retired
Buyers and suppliers elsewhere USA
J. Elekes VF Jeanswear Greensboro
R. Narvaez JC Penney Dallas
G. Ross Liz Claiborne New York
J. Cox Polo/Ralph Lauren New York
F. Attwood Polo/Ralph Lauren
C. Campbell The Limited New York
D. Brewer Bend’n Stretch Miami
P. Freeze American &Efird Mount Holly
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Mérida
G. Cortes American & Efird
H. Rosado CNIV
G. Cohen Createx
J. Dalton Doulton de Mexico
M. Herrera Oxford de Mexico
F. Atta Produce Mexico
G. Mendez Promoción Industrial
M. Mayr VF Jeanswear
Puebla/Tehuacan
L. Marlon Camera de la Industria Textil Puebla
J. Lopez CANACINTRA Tehuacan
O. Castañeda Centro de Confección Puebla
R. Osorio CNIV Tehuacan
S. Patricio CNIV Tehuacan
O. Garcia Confexpo Tehuacan
J. Vargas Jones Apparel Group Tehuacan
A. Anaya REMCO Tehuacan
I. Velazquez SECOFI Puebla
I. Balderas Secretaria de Obras Publicas Tehuacan
A. Carrasco SEDECO Tehuacan
P. Toscano Gil Martinez Ajalpan
C. Lopez Grupo Exportador Jeans Ajalpan
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Annex 2: Corporate Code of Conduct of a
garment marketer
CODE OF VENDOR CONDUCT:
This Code of Vendor Conduct applies to all factories that produce goods for XXXX or any of its
subsidiaries, divisions, affiliates or agents (‘XXXX’).
While XXXX recognizes that there are different legal and cultural environments in which
factories operate throughout the world, this Code sets forth the basic requirements that all
factories must meet in order to do business with XXXX The Code also provides the foundation
for XXXX’s ongoing evaluation of a factory’s employment practices and environmental
compliance.
As a condition of doing business with XXXX, each and every factory must comply with this Code
of Vendor Conduct. XXXX will continue to develop monitoring systems to assess and ensure
compliance. If XXXX determines that any factory has violated this Code, XXXX may either
terminate its business relationship or require the factory to implement a corrective action plan.
If corrective action is advised but not taken, XXXX will suspend placement of future orders and
may terminate current production.
I. General Principle
Factories that produce goods for XXXX shall operate in full compliance with the laws of their
respective countries and with all other applicable laws, rules and regulations. A. The factory
operates in full compliance with all applicable laws, rules and regulations, including those
relating to labor, worker health and safety, and the environment. B. The factory allows XXXX
and/or any of its representatives or agents unrestricted access to its facilities and to all relevant
records at all times, whether or not notice is provided in advance.
II. Environment
Factories must comply with all applicable environmental laws and regulations. Where such
requirements are less stringent than XXXX’s own, factories are encouraged to meet the
standards outlined in XXXX’s statement of environmental principles. A. The factory has an
environmental management system or plan. B. The factory has procedures for notifying local
community authorities in case of accidental discharge or release or any other environmental
emergency.
III. Discrimination
Factories shall employ workers on the basis of their ability to do the job, not on the basis of
their personal characteristics or beliefs. A. The factory employs workers without regard to race,
color, gender, nationality, religion, age, maternity or marital status. B. The factory pays workers
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wages and provides benefits without regard to race, color, gender, nationality, religion, age,
maternity or marital status.
IV. Forced Labor
Factories shall not use any prison, indentured or forced labor. A. The factory does not use
involuntary labor of any kind, including prison labor, debt bondage or forced labor by
governments. B. If the factory recruits foreign contract workers, the factory pays agency
recruitment commissions and does not require any worker to remain in employment for any
period of time against his or her will.
V. Child Labor
Factories shall employ only workers who meet the applicable minimum legal age requirement
or are at least 14 years of age, whichever is greater. Factories must also comply with all other
applicable child labor laws. Factories are encouraged to develop lawful workplace
apprenticeship programs for the educational benefit of their workers, provided that all
participants meet both XXXX’s minimum age standard of 14 and the minimum legal age
requirement.
A. Every worker employed by the factory is at least 14 years of age and meets the applicable
minimum legal age requirement.
B. The factory complies with all applicable child labor laws, including those related to hiring,
wages, hours worked, overtime and working conditions.
C. The factory encourages and allows eligible workers, especially younger workers, to attend
night classes and participate in work-study programs and other government-sponsored
educational programs.
D. The factory maintains official documentation for every worker that verifies the worker’s
date of birth. In those countries where official documents are not available to confirm
exact date of birth, the factory confirms age using an appropriate and reliable assessment
method.
VI. Wages & Hours
Factories shall set working hours, wages and overtime pay in compliance with all applicable
laws. Workers shall be paid at least the minimum legal wage or a wage that meets local industry
standards, whichever is greater. While it is understood that overtime is often required in
garment production, factories shall carry out operations in ways that limit overtime to a level
that ensures humane and productive working conditions.
A. Workers are paid at least the minimum legal wage or the local industry standard,
whichever is greater.
B. The factory pays overtime and any incentive (or piece) rates that meet all legal
requirements or the local industry standard, whichever is greater. Hourly wage rates for
overtime must be higher than the rates for the regular work shift.
C. The factory does not require, on a regularly scheduled basis, a work week in excess of 60
hours.
D. Workers may refuse overtime without any threat of penalty, punishment or dismissal.
E. Workers have at least one day off in seven.
F. The factory provides paid annual leave and holidays as required by law or which meet the
local industry standard, whichever is greater.
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G. For each pay period, the factory provides workers an understandable wage statement
which includes days worked, wage or piece rate earned per day, hours of overtime at each
specified rate, bonuses, allowances and legal or contractual deductions.
VII. Working Conditions
Factories must treat all workers with respect and dignity and provide them with a safe and
healthy environment. Factories shall comply with all applicable laws and regulations regarding
working conditions. Factories shall not use corporal punishment or any other form of physical
or psychological coercion. Factories must be sufficiently lighted and ventilated, aisles
accessible, machinery maintained, and hazardous materials sensibly stored and disposed of.
Factories providing housing for workers must keep these facilities clean and safe.
Factory:
A. The factory does not engage in or permit physical acts to punish or coerce workers.
B. The factory does not engage in or permit psychological coercion or any other form of non-
physical abuse, including threats of violence, sexual harassment, screaming or other verbal
abuse.
C. The factory complies with all applicable laws regarding working conditions, including
worker health and safety, sanitation, fire safety, risk protection, and electrical, mechanical
and structural safety.
D. Work surface lighting in production areas – such as sewing, knitting, pressing and cutting
– is sufficient for the safe performance of production activities.
E. The factory is well ventilated. There are windows, fans, air conditioners or heaters in all
work areas for adequate circulation, ventilation and temperature control.
F. There are sufficient, clearly marked exits allowing for the orderly evacuation of workers in
case of fire or other emergencies. Emergency exit routes are posted and clearly marked in
all sections of the factory.
G. Aisles, exits and stairwells are kept clear at all times of work in process, finished garments,
bolts of fabric, boxes and all other objects that could obstruct the orderly evacuation of
workers in case of fire or other emergencies. The factory indicates with a ‘yellow box’ or
other markings that the areas in front of exits, fire fighting equipment, control panels and
potential fire sources are to be kept clear.
H. Doors and other exits are kept accessible and unlocked during all working hours for
orderly evacuation in case of fire or other emergencies. All main exit doors open to the
outside.
I. Fire extinguishers are appropriate to the types of possible fires in the various areas of the
factory, are regularly maintained and charged, display the date of their last inspection, and
are mounted on walls and columns throughout the factory so they are visible and
accessible to workers in all areas.
J. Fire alarms are on each floor and emergency lights are placed above exits and on stairwells.
K. Evacuation drills are conducted at least annually.
L. Machinery is equipped with operational safety devices and is inspected and serviced on a
regular basis.
M. Appropriate personal protective equipment – such as masks, gloves, goggles, ear plugs and
rubber boots – is made available at no cost to all workers and instruction in its use is
provided.
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N. The factory provides potable water for all workers and allows reasonable access to it
throughout the working day.
O. The factory places at least one well-stocked first aid kit on every factory floor and trains
specific staff in basic first aid. The factory has procedures for dealing with serious injuries
that require medical treatment outside the factory.
P. The factory maintains throughout working hours clean and sanitary toilet areas and places
no unreasonable restrictions on their use.
Q. The factory stores hazardous and combustible materials in secure and ventilated areas and
disposes of them in a safe and legal manner.
Housing (if applicable):
A. Dormitory facilities meet all applicable laws and regulations related to health and safety,
including fire safety, sanitation, risk protection, and electrical, mechanical and structural
safety.
B. Sleeping quarters are segregated by sex.
C. The living space per worker in the sleeping quarters meets both the minimum legal
requirement and the local industry standard.
D. Workers are provided their own individual mats or beds.
E. Dormitory facilities are well ventilated. There are windows to the outside or fans and/or air
conditioners and/or heaters in all sleeping areas for adequate circulation, ventilation and
temperature control.
F. Workers are provided their own storage space for their clothes and personal possessions.
G. There are at least two clearly marked exits on each floor, and emergency lighting is
installed in halls, stairwells and above each exit.
H. Halls and exits are kept clear of obstructions for safe and rapid evacuation in case of fire or
other emergencies.
I. Directions for evacuation in case of fire or other emergencies are posted in all sleeping
quarters.
J. Fire extinguishers are placed in or accessible to all sleeping quarters.
K. Hazardous and combustible materials used in the production process are not stored in the
dormitory or in buildings connected to sleeping quarters.
L. Fire drills are conducted at least every six months. M. Sleeping quarters have adequate
lighting.
N. Sufficient toilets and showers or mandis are segregated by sex and provided in safe,
sanitary, accessible and private areas.
O. Potable water or facilities to boil water are available to dormitory residents.
P. Dormitory residents are free to come and go during their off-hours under reasonable
limitations imposed for their safety and comfort.
VIII. Freedom of Association
Workers are free to join associations of their own choosing. Factories must not interfere with
workers who wish to lawfully and peacefully associate, organize or bargain collectively. The
decision whether or not to do so should be made solely by the workers.
A. Workers are free to choose whether or not to lawfully organize and join associations.
B. The factory does not threaten, penalize, restrict or interfere with workers’ lawful efforts to
join associations of their choosing.
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Samenvatting
Kleding in beweging: de lokale dynamiek van export-netwerken in La Laguna, Noord-Mexico
Inleiding
Dit onderzoek heeft zich gericht op de recente economische ontwikkeling van de Laguna-regio
in Noord-Mexico. De ontwikkeling van deze regio wordt gekenmerkt door een explosieve groei
van de plaatselijke kledingindustrie sinds de inwerkingtreding van het NAFTA-
vrijhandelsakkoord tussen de Verenigde Staten en Mexico in 1994. Kledingbedrijven in de regio
hebben zich toegelegd op de productie van spijkerbroeken. Op basis van deze specialisatie is de
regio bekend geworden als de ‘nieuwe spijkerbroeken hoofdstad van de wereld’ (in opvolging
van de Texaanse grensstad El Paso, waar de lokale spijkerbroekindustrie goeddeels instortte
toen in de tweede helft van de jaren negentig steeds meer kledingproductie naar Mexico
verschoof). Om de belangrijkste aspecten van de ontwikkeling van La Laguna goed te kunnen
plaatsen is het van belang om deze in de internationale en historische context van
kledingproductie te plaatsen. Dit is gedaan in hoofdstukken 1 tot en met 3 en heeft een aantal
belangrijkse inzichten en trends aan het licht gebracht.
Reeds in de jaren vijftig begonnen enkele Aziatische ontwikkelingslanden kleding te
produceren voor de Amerikaanse en Europese markten. Binnen korte tijd veroverden een aantal
van deze landen een sterke positie in de Westerse kledingmarkten. Bovendien waren
verschillende van de Zuidoost-Aziatische pioniers in staat de ervaring opgedaan met
kledingexport te gebruiken als basis voor een breder export-industrialisatiebeleid. Landen als
Hong Kong, Taiwan en Zuid-Korea zijn inmiddels vooral bekend als producenten van meer
‘high-tech’ elektronicaproducten en in de kleding hebben zij zich grotendeels toegelegd op
delen van het productieproces met de hoogste toegevoegde waarde.
Kleding produktie is niet beperkt gebleven tot deze landen: gedreven door grote
internationale loonverschillen en gefaciliteerd door technologische ontwikkelingen in
transport en telecommunicatie en de ‘opknipbaarheid’ van het productieproces heeft de
internationalisering van kledingproductie in de afgelopen decennia ongekende vormen
aangenomen. Tegenwoordig wordt de kledingindustrie dan ook algemeen gezien als hét
schoolvoorbeeld van een geglobaliseerde industrie. Een zeer groot en groeiend aantal landen
produceert en exporteert kledingstukken.
Een tweetal marktontwikkelingen is ook kenmerkend voor de afgelopen jaren. Ten eerste
zijn grote klanten in de belangrijkste markten (met name retailers (detailhandelaars) maar ook
enkele grote producenten) een steeds belangrijker, sturende rol in de internationale
handelsstromen gaan spelen. Ten tweede zijn de strategieën van deze grote klanten erop
gericht de kledingverkoop in de volwassen Westerse markten te stimuleren door middel van
snellere modeveranderingen en verregaande segmentatie op basis van kledingmerken en -
labels. In organisatorisch opzicht betekent dit dat de steeds dynamischer kledingmarkt
bediend moet worden door flexibele producenten, opgenomen in strak georganiseerde
toeleveringsnetwerken. In geografisch opzicht lijkt dit te leiden dit tot regionalisering van de
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handelsstromen, ofwel een groeiend marktaandeel voor (producenten in) landen aan de
periferie van de Amerikaanse en de Europese markten. Turkije en Marokko maar ook de Oost-
Europese landen zijn van groeiend belang in de West-Europese markten; landen in het
Caribisch gebied en Latijns Amerika zijn belangrijke toeleveranciers voor de Amerikaanse
markt.
In deze laatste groep neemt Mexico een uitzonderlijke plaats in omdat de exportpositie van het
land extra wordt ondersteund door NAFTA en andere vrijhandelsovereenkomsten met de VS.
Zo levert NAFTA Mexico een kwantitatieve groei van de export op, omdat Mexico niet langer
gebonden is aan exportquota en bovendien goedkoper is geworden omdat over haar exporten
niet langer invoerrechten geheven worden. Bovendien opent het de weg naar een kwalitatieve
verbetering van Mexico’s exportpositie omdat Mexico niet langer beperkt is tot pure
assemblage-activiteiten, maar complete eindproducten naar de VS kan exporteren. Net als
andere kledingexporterende landen heeft Mexico nu in potentie de mogelijkheid om in de
voetsporen van haar Zuidoost-Aziatische voorgangers te treden, door haar kledingexport-
positie te versterken.
Vaak hebben kledingbedrijven in ontwikkelingslanden zich geografisch geconcentreerd in
bepaalde regio’s, waar deze zogenaamde kledingclusters een belangrijke factor in de lokale
economie zijn. Dit is ook het geval in Mexico. Het grootste kledingexport-cluster in Mexico is
de Laguna-regio, gelegen op de grens van de staten Coahuila en Durango in het noorden van
het land. Tegen de hierboven kort geschetste brede industriële achtergrond, analyseert deze
studie de recente ontwikkeling van het Laguna-kledingcluster vanuit een netwerkperspectief.
In hoofdstuk 2 zijn hiertoe twee verschillende netwerkperspectieven tegenover elkaar gezet:
het zogenaamde global value chain (GVC)-perspectief, dat het belang van internationale, verticale
machtsrelaties binnen de productieketen benadrukt, en het cluster-perspectief dat uitgaat van
relaties (en samenwerkingsverbanden) gebaseerd op wederzijdse afhankelijkheid tussen min of
meer gelijkwaardige bedrijven in een bepaalde regio. Voor een geval als La Laguna lijkt het
aannemelijk dat beide perspectieven elkaar aan kunnen vullen. Vanuit die gedachte zijn de
volgende onderzoeksvragen geformuleerd:
1. Wat zijn de belangrijkste economische, geografische en historische kenmerken van de Laguna- regio, en vloeit de
huidige positie van de regio als kledingexport-cluster voort uit deze kenmerken?
2. Wat is de structuur van het Laguna-kledingcluster (met betrekking tot product- en marktoriëntatie en
bedrijfskenmerken) en komt deze structuur overeen met die van andere kledingclusters?
3. In welke mate is de kledingindustrie in La Laguna lokaal ingebed door relaties binnen het cluster? Als inbedding
van belang is, wat voor invloed heeft inbedding – in de lokale economische en sociaal-culturele omgeving – dan op
de concurrentiepositie van het cluster en haar bedrijven?
4. Wat is de structuur en samenstelling van de kledingproductie-netwerken die La Laguna verbinden met de markt in
de VS, gelet op de betrokken actoren en hun productieve, organisatorische en strategische activiteiten en
verantwoordelijkheden?
5. Hebben er veranderings- en verbeteringsprocessen plaatsgevonden in het cluster? Indien dit het geval is, welke
soorten verbeteringsprocessen hebben plaatsgevonden en door welke factoren worden deze processen gedreven en
welke actoren zijn hierbij betrokken?
Bevindingen
Onderzoeksvraag 1: Wat zijn de belangrijkste economische, geografische en historische kenmerken van de
Laguna-regio, en vloeit de huidige positie van de regio als kledingexport-cluster voort uit deze kenmerken?
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De lokale economie in La Laguna heeft lange tijd zwaar geleund op landbouwactiviteiten, met
name de katoenteelt. Over de afgelopen decennia heeft de landbouwsector in de regio echter in
toenemende mate onder druk gestaan. Het aan monocultuur grenzende grote belang van
katoen werd een probleem toen de wereldmarktprijzen begonnen te dalen en er een aantal
sterke internationale concurrenten opkwam. In reactie op deze ontwikkeling werd reeds in de
jaren zeventig de landbouwproductie gediversifieerd. Ondanks succesvolle diversificatie bleef
landbouw problematisch omdat de regio werd geplaagd door toenemende droogte. Ook de aan
het begin van de twintigste eeuw doorgevoerde landhervorming, met de daaruit voortgekomen
ejidos (land in collectief beheer van vele kleine boeren), bleek niet te voldoen aan de eisen van de
jaren negentig. De kleine percelen in de ejidos bleken na verloop van tijd nauwelijks rendabel te
exploiteren. Toen in 1992 een verandering in de grondwet het collectief landeigendom in
privaat eigendom veranderde had dit dan ook in veel gevallen verhuur of verkoop van ejido
land aan grotere boederijen tot gevolg. Het algemene resultaat van deze ontwikkelingen is een
concentratie van land in de handen van een beperkt aantal grote boeren (met in hoge mate
gemechaniseerde boerderijen) en toenemende werkloosheid onder de rurale bevolking.
In de stad had een in zekere zin tegengestelde ontwikkeling plaats: sinds de jaren zeventig
kwam daar een industrialisatieproces op gang dat tot op de dag van vandaag voortduurt. In
eerste instantie bouwde de stedelijke industrie met name op de regionale landbouwproductie
en was gericht op voedselverwerkende activiteiten. In de loop van de tijd is de lokale economie
zich in toenemende mate gaan richten op grootschalige exportassemblage. Tegenwoordig is
ook de dienstensector in het urbane centrum goed ontwikkeld. Zowel de industriële als de
dienstensector hebben een deel van de uit de landbouw uitgestoten rurale arbeidskrachten
geabsorbeerd. De absorptie van deze rurale arbeidsreserve heeft de snelle groei van deze
sectoren mogelijk gemaakt en is weerspiegeld in intensief forensisme en het urbanisatieproces
(en een rurale exodus) van de afgelopen decennia.
De geschetste ontwikkelingen – met name het voor Mexicaanse begrippen relatief vroeg
ingezette industrialisatieproces en de aanwezigheid van een groot en relatief goedkoop (ruraal)
arbeidsreservoir – zijn belangrijke verklarende factoren voor de snelle opkomst van de regio als
‘spijkerbroeken hoofdstad van de wereld’ tegen het eind van de jaren negentig. Bovendien heeft
de regio een gunstige geografische ligging ten opzichte van de Amerikaanse markt en een
relatief hoogwaardige lokale fysieke infrastructuur.
Onderzoeksvraag 2: Wat is de structuur van het Laguna-kledingcluster, met betrekking tot product- en
marktoriëntatie en bedrijfskenmerken, en komt deze structuur overeen met die van andere kledingclusters?
In de vroege jaren van haar bestaan, omstreeks de jaren veertig, was kledingproductie in La
Laguna voornamelijk waardetoevoeging voor de lokaal geproduceerde katoen en een manier
om eventuele katoenoverschotten af te zetten. Er ontstonden verschillende textielbedrijven die
grove katoen, met name denim, produceerden. De van deze stof geproduceerde kleding werd
verkocht in de regio en in Noord-Mexico. De huidige kledingindustrie in de regio heeft niet of
nauwelijks met deze vroege kledingproductie te maken: tegenwoordig assembleren de
fabrieken in de regio geïmporteerde stof vanuit de VS op basis van de specificaties van hun
Amerikaanse klanten en de eindproducten worden geëxporteerd. De link naar zowel de
regionale katoen als ook de regionale markt is dus geheel verbroken. Toch is dit nieuwe
systeem is een kwantitatieve groeiformule gebleken: tegen het einde van de jaren negentig
waren er ongeveer tweehonderd bedrijven met vierhonderd fabrieken en vijfenzeventig-
duizend werknemers verantwoordelijk voor de productie van ruim zes miljoen spijkerbroeken
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per week (een ruime verdubbeling van het aantal bedrijven en een vertienvoudiging van de
productiecapaciteit ten opzichte van die in het begin van de jaren negentig). Er zijn enkele
buitenlandse fabrieken, maar het merendeel van de bedrijvigheid is in lokaal eigendom. De
bedrijfsomvang van de lokale kledingbedrijven varieert van klein tot zeer groot. De zeer grote
bedrijven hebben soms enkele duizenden werknemers en drukken hun stempel op het cluster.
Geografisch zijn de bedrijven min of meer gelijkmatig verspreid over de beide staten en de
laatste jaren is er een groot aantal fabrieken op het platteland geopend.
La Laguna verschilt in een aantal opzichten sterk van kledingclusters elders in de wereld.
Andere clusters produceren meestal een breder assortiment aan kledingstukken. Bovendien
bestaan zij vaak voornamelijk uit kleine en middelgrote bedrijven en produceren zij zowel voor
de lokale en/of nationale markt als voor export. Het afwijkende karakter van het Laguna-cluster
kan worden verklaard aan de hand van de bepalende rol die de Amerikaanse klanten en hun
eisen hebben gespeeld in het vormen van het cluster sinds het in werking treden van NAFTA.
Met andere woorden, de huidige structuur is niet de uitkomst van een langzame endogene
groei (zoals bij de meeste andere kledingclusters het geval lijkt), maar van een plotselinge,
exogene vraagexplosie. In relatie tot de beschikbare literatuur kan worden vastgesteld dat La
Laguna overeenkomsten vertoont met de door Pederson (1997) gevonden subcontracting clusters.
Ook lijkt het op de zogenaamde ‘volwassen’ clusters die wel in andere ontwikkelingslanden
zijn gevonden. In het specifieke geval van La Laguna moet dan wel worden vastgesteld dat het
in een uitzonderlijk korte tijd (in de vijf jaar sinds het in werking treden van NAFTA)
volwassen is geworden.
Onderzoeksvraag 3: In welke mate is de kledingindustrie in La Laguna lokaal ingebed door relaties binnen het
cluster? Als inbedding van belang is, wat voor invloed heeft inbedding – in de lokale economische en sociaal-culturele
omgeving – op de concurrentiepositie van het Laguna-cluster en haar bedrijven?
Deze studie laat zien dat het merendeel van de bedrijfsrelaties in de lokale kledingindustrie
geconcentreerd zijn binnen het cluster en dat de meeste bedrijven en ondernemers in hoge
mate ingebed zijn in het cluster. Relaties met toeleveranciers – zowel subcontractors
(onderaannemers) als toeleveranciers van ritsen, knopen en andere materialen – zijn
gecentreerd rondom en lopen via de grote bedrijven. Deze grote bedrijven onderhouden vaak
relaties met een groot aantal kleinere onderaannemers. Ondanks het feit dat ondernemers vaak
geboren en getogen laguneros zijn en elkaar kennen (en soms zelfs familie van elkaar zijn) zijn
deze relaties vaak tamelijk formalistisch, afstandelijk, wisselend en is er – in plaats van
wederzijdse afhankelijkheid – sprake van eenzijdige afhankelijkheid van de onderaannemers
ten opzichte van de grotere lokale opdrachtgever. Grotere bedrijven onderhouden over het
algemeen ook de relaties met de Amerikaanse klanten en met de toeleveranciers van materialen
(dit laatste veelal op basis van specificaties van de Amerikaanse klanten).
Alle publieke en private organisaties met welke kledingbedrijven te maken (kunnen)
hebben, bevinden zich binnen de regio. Hierbij dient te worden opgemerkt dat in de huidige
‘geliberaliseerde’ Mexicaanse beleidsomgeving genoemde organisaties nauwelijks een actieve,
ondersteunende rol spelen. Hun aanwezigheid in de regio betekent dan ook nauwelijks meer
dan een vergemakkelijking van het onderhouden van de verplichte relaties. Ten slotte is ook de
relatie tussen kledingbedrijven en hun werknemers van belang. Het personeel van de
kledingbedrijven is afkomstig uit de regio. Onder invloed van de recente explosieve groei van
de kledingindustrie hebben er verschuivingen in de samenstelling van het personeel (in
vergelijking met enkele jaren geleden werken er nu bijvoorbeeld meer jongeren en meer
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mannen in de kledingfabrieken). Toch is de regionale arbeidsmarkt bijzonder krap geworden
en dit heeft de arbeidsrelaties, maar ook de relaties tussen op arbeidsmarkt concurrerende
bedrijven, onder druk gezet.
De geschetste brede structuur van het cluster, met de aanwezigheid van een veelheid aan
actoren, ondersteunt het cluster en haar bedrijven door middel van passieve clustervoordelen
(lagere transactie kosten, schaal- en scopevoordelen). Echter, de vaak gevonden positieve
relaties tussen geografische (en sociaal-culturele) nabijheid van bedrijven en specialisatie, die
kunnen leiden tot wederzijdse afhankelijkheid, vertrouwen en samenwerking, zijn nauwelijks
gevonden in La Laguna. Een mogelijke verklaring voor deze bevinding is het feit dat de lokale,
sociaal-culturele omgeving in zijn algemeenheid wordt gekenmerkt door achterdocht en
geheimzinnigheid. Bovendien zorgt de huidige, eenzijdige structuur van het cluster ervoor dat
lokale bedrijven in uitzonderlijk hoge mate elkaar’s directe concurrenten zijn. Zij zijn
afhankelijk van opdrachten van Amerikaanse klanten en moeten direct tegen elkaar
concurreren voor het werk van deze klanten, die niet altijd loyaal zijn ten opzichte van hun
producenten.
Onderzoeksvraag 4: Wat is de structuur en samenstelling van de kledingproductie-netwerken die La Laguna
verbinden met de markt in de VS, gelet op de betrokken actoren en hun productieve, organisatorische en strategische
activiteiten en verantwoordelijkheden?
Hoofdstuk 7 van deze studie heeft laten zien dat in de loop van de jaren negentig het aantal
Amerikaanse klanten dat werkt met producenten in La Laguna sterk is toegenomen. Bovendien
zijn er naast de Amerikaanse merkproducenten – traditioneel de belangrijkste klanten in
Mexico – ook retailers (detailhandelaars) en zogenaamde marketers (bedrijven die eigen (merk-
)kledinglijnen ontwerpen en verkopen maar geen eigen productiecapaciteit hebben) kleding
uit La Laguna gaan betrekken. De productienetwerken van deze verschillende klanten
verschillen licht van elkaar en dit heeft gevolgen voor de rol en verantwoordelijkheden van de
lokale bedrijven die opgenomen zijn in deze netwerken.
Merkproducenten zoals Levi Strauss, Wrangler en Hanes werken van oudsher met producenten
die kunnen voldoen aan hun kwaliteitseisen; bedrijfsomvang is hierbij geen bepalende factor.
Omdat merkproducenten vaak al decennia lang een eigen productiecapaciteit hebben, brengen
zij productie-technische kennis in hun netwerken en zijn zij in staat met nieuwe, beginnende
(vaak kleine) producenten te werken en deze te ondersteunen. De lokale onderaannemers
worden op assemblage-basis aangetrokken onder de strikte voorwaarde dat geen van de
overeengekomen werkzaamheden verder uitbesteed worden. Alle non-assemblage-activiteiten
worden over het algemeen samengebracht in de fabrieken van de Amerikaanse merkproducent.
Hoewel al de genoemde kenmerken nu nog traceerbaar zijn in de netwerken van de
merkproducenten, zijn de strategieën van de merkproducenten de laatste jaren veranderd. In
de loop der jaren lijken merkproducenten steeds vaker ook bedrijfsomvang te hanteren als een
selectiecriterium voor onderaannemers (hun onderaannemers worden steeds groter) en
verwachten zij in toenemende mate dat onderaannemers grotere delen van het productieproces
voor hun rekening nemen. Dit past binnen de strategie van merkproducenten om de eigen
productiecapaciteit terug te brengen en zich meer en meer toe te leggen op design en
marketing.
Retailers, in het bijzonder KMart, Wal-Mart en andere bedrijven in de lage- en midden
segmenten van de Amerikaanse markt, zijn in de loop van de jaren negentig belangrijker
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geworden voor het Laguna-cluster. Zij nemen inmiddels het grootste deel van de
produktiecapaciteit van het cluster voor hun rekening. Retailers hebben over het algemeen geen
eigen productie-ervaring en -capaciteit en kunnen dus alleen werken met all-round-
producenten die een compleet eindproduct kunnen leveren. In La Laguna, met haar
assemblagebasis, is het proces richting integratie van het productieproces pas op gang
gekomen nadat NAFTA-liberalisering dat toeliet. Het (zeker van oudsher) beperkte aanbod van
geïntegreerde producenten heeft ertoe geleid dat het meeste werk voor retailers nog gedaan
wordt via Amerikaanse intermediairs. Deze intermediairs nemen de hoogwaardige activiteiten,
zoals ontwerp, snijden en afwerken, voor eigen rekening en besteden de assemblage uit aan een
groot aantal kleine en middelgrote onderaannemers in La Laguna. De intermediairs zijn hierbij
verantwoordelijk voor aansturing en controle van deze onderaannemers. In sommige gevallen
werken zij vanuit de VS, maar enkelen van hen hebben eigen productiefaciliteiten in La Laguna.
Marketers of designers zijn veeleisende maar goedbetalende klanten. Zij zijn pas recentelijk
productierelaties aangegaan met lokale kledingbedrijven. Vooralsnog werken zij met kleine
hoeveelheden in zogenaamde pilot programmes en dan nog alleen met de grootste en meest
geavanceerde bedrijven die hen een compleet product kunnen leveren. Voornamelijk omdat de
lokale producenten maar met moeite kunnen voldoen aan de hoge verwachtingen van de
marketers op het gebied van dienstverlening, flexibiliteit en ondernemingsgeest, is hun rol en
betekenis in het Laguna- cluster beperkt gebleven.
In de theorie, zoals beschreven in hoofdstuk 2, wordt voor kledingbedrijven en -clusters in
ontwikkelingslanden een ontwikkelingspad geschetst waarin na verloop van tijd
laagwaardigere klanten verdrongen worden door hoogwaardigere – en betere betalende –
klanten. Lokale bedrijven ontwikkelen zich zo van pure assemblage-fabrieken tot
geïntegreerde producenten van complete eindproducten. Uit de bevindingen in hoofdstuk 7
blijkt dat het in de praktijk in La Laguna maar gedeeltelijk op deze manier verloopt. Lokale
bedrijven hebben de grootste moeite hun afhankelijke assemblagepositie te ontgroeien en
blijken in hun ontwikkelingsmogelijkheden beperkt.
Over het algemeen bevinden de allergrootste lokale producenten zich in de beste positie in
de exportnetwerken. Zij zijn zelfs in staat de relatie met hun klanten, met name met de betere
klanten, te monopoliseren. Het is echter zo dat zelfs zij de omslag naar een hoogwaardigere
productie maar ten dele hebben kunnen maken. Het leeuwendeel van de productie is nog
steeds bestemd voor laagwaardige retailers. Bovendien zijn de onderaannemers door de
centrale positie van de grote bedrijven grotendeels beperkt gehouden tot hun (assemblage-
)activiteiten. Op deze manier worden onderaannemers maar zeer indirect aan de eisen van de
markt blootgesteld en kent hun ontwikkeling niet de nodige impulsen.
Onderzoeksvraag 5: Hebben er veranderings- en verbeteringsprocessen plaatsgevonden in het cluster? Indien dit
het geval is, welke soorten processen hebben plaatsgevonden en door welke factoren worden deze processen gedreven en
welke actoren zijn erbij betrokken?
Hoofdstuk 8 heeft laten zien dat er inderdaad veranderingen hebben plaatsgevonden: in
overeenstemming met een algemene tendens in de internationale kledingmarkt, is de lokaal
geproduceerde kleding langzaam maar zeker modegevoeliger en minder gestandaardiseerd
geworden. Ook is veel nadruk gelegd op de verbetering van de kwaliteit van producten en is er
in nieuwe technologie geïnvesteerd. In vergelijking tot de veranderingen van producten zijn de
veranderingen in het productieproces beperkt. De nadruk heeft steeds gelegen op uitbreiding
van de productiecapaciteit, door het toevoegen van nieuwe sewing lines en het bouwen van
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nieuwe fabrieken. Pas tegen het eind van de jaren negentig zijn bedrijven begonnen met het
treffen van maatregelen om de efficiëntie te verhogen. Dit laatste had veel te maken met de
toenemende krapte op de lokale arbeidsmarkt waardoor het aannemen van steeds maar weer
nieuwe arbeidskrachten niet langer haalbaar was. In dezelfde periode begon een aantal
bedrijven ook te experimenteren met zogenaamde ‘modules’ waarin kleinere groepen
werknemers meer verantwoordelijkheid krijgen en directer bij elkaar en het eindproduct
betrokken zijn dan in de traditionele (Tayloristische) ‘lijnen’. Omdat andere belangrijke
voordelen van de modules een grotere flexibiliteit en een kortere doorlooptijd van het product
zijn, hebben sommige Amerikaanse klanten de introductie van modules bij hun
onderaannemers gesteund of zelfs afgedwongen.
Ten slotte, met het in werking treden van NAFTA, werd het voor bedrijven in Mexico
mogelijk complete producten te maken en te exporteren. In La Laguna heeft de liberalisering
op dit gebied geleid tot een geleidelijk toenemende integratie van het productieproces. Pre-
assembly- (met name het snijden van de stof) en post-assembly-activiteiten (zoals het wassen,
inspecteren en verpakken) worden steeds meer binnen de regio uitgevoerd. Aan het einde van
de jaren negentig waren echter alleen de allergrootste lokale bedrijven in staat het gehele
productieproces, inclusief het inkopen van stof, voor eigen rekening te nemen. De meeste van
deze bedrijven combineerden de levering van complete eindproducten, de zogenaamde full-
packages, met pure assemblage of het leveren van halffabrikaten. Hoewel er zich een trend
richting complete producten aftekent, is het nog wat voorbarig om het cluster als geheel te
bestempelen als een full-package-cluster.
Bovengenoemde veranderingen en verbeteringen, met name de introductie van meer
modegevoelige producten en de lokale integratie van het productieproces, zijn gedreven door
Amerikaanse klanten.
Over het algemeen richten lokale producenten zich voornamelijk op het bijbenen van de
groei en verandering in de vraag, maar zijn zij nauwelijks in staat eigen strategieën voor de
middellange- en lange termijn te formuleren. Kortom, de switch naar nieuwe producten, het
implementeren van nieuwe processen en hogere standaarden gebeurde vanwege trends in de
markt en vonden plaats op aangeven van klanten. Afstand tot de markt, gebrekkig
marktinzicht en een eenzijdige afhankelijkheid van Amerikaanse klanten verklaren waarom
genoemde veranderingen vaak langzaam werden doorgevoerd en soms zelfs op weerstand
stuitten. Van werkelijke innovatie in het cluster is dan ook geen sprake.
Omdat klanten de belangrijkste bron van informatie zijn, worden lokale bedrijven – met
name kleine- en middelgrote bedrijven – die geen rechtstreekse relatie met klanten hebben,
maar indirect blootgesteld aan marktinformatie. Zoals al eerder vastgesteld zijn zij dan ook
nauwelijks op de hoogte van de dynamiek van de markt en uit hoofdstuk 8 blijkt dat zij ook
slechts in zeer beperkt mate hebben deelgenomen aan bovengenoemde verbeteringsprocessen.
Eén verandering heeft zich opgedrongen aan het cluster als geheel: de toenemende krapte en
onrust op de lokale arbeidsmarkt. Alle bedrijven hebben te maken met de groeiende
problemen rondom het aantrekken en het vasthouden van werknemers. In reactie op deze
ontwikkeling is er clusterbreed een tweetal veranderingen opgetreden. Ten eerste zijn
bedrijven tegen elkaar op gaan bieden; om de gunst van werknemers te winnen worden hogere
lonen geboden en secundaire arbeidsvoorwaarden verbeterd. Ten tweede worden er steeds
meer rurale arbeidskrachten ingeschakeld, waarbij dagelijks transport vaak door de bedrijven
zelf georganiseerd en betaald wordt. Ten slotte zijn vooral de grotere bedrijven (buitenlands en
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lokaal) fabrieken gaan bouwen op het platteland. Andere schakelen nieuw opgezette
plattelandsfabrieken in communaal eigendom van ejido-bewoners in. Ongeacht de
eigendomsvorm worden de meeste plattelandsfabrieken alleen ingeschakeld voor pure
assemblage-activiteiten. Als gevolg hiervan is er een intra-regionale arbeidsverdeling tot stand
gekomen waarin hoogwaardigere activiteiten veelal in de stad zijn gebleven en de laagwaardig
activiteiten naar het platteland zijn uitgeschoven.
Interpretatie onderzoeksresultaten
De hierboven geschetste, algemene onderzoeksbevindingen geven geen reden tot groot
optimisme over de toekomst van het kledingcluster in La Laguna. Eenzelfde lot als dat van El
Paso, La Laguna’s voorganger als ‘spijkerbroeken-hoofdstad’, dreigt. Een aantal bevindingen is
hierbij van bijzonder belang. Zoals reeds opgemerkt, is in de jaren negentig bijna alle tijd en
energie van de lokale ondernemers ingezet om de explosieve kwantitatieve groei van de vraag
naar kleding uit La Laguna bij te benen. Deze pragmatische korte-termijnaanpak, lijkt een
meer strategische benadering, gericht op kwalitatieve verbeteringen op de lange termijn, naar
de achtergrond te hebben verdrongen. Voor de toekomst van kledingproducenten in La Laguna
is het schijnbare gebrek aan langetermijnvisie en strategisch ondernemerschap een gevaar, met
name omdat de ontwikkelingen in de kledingmarkt van de kledingproducenten juist steeds
meer flexibiliteit, snellere levertijden, service, commitment en samenwerking eisen. Hoewel dit in
de lage segmenten van de kledingmarkt (waarin La Laguna zich nog steeds hoofdzakelijk
beweegt) minder geldt, is dit een segment waar – met oog op kostenbesparingen – voortdurend
internationale relocatie van productie op de loer ligt. Dit laatste is voor La Laguna een
bedreiging omdat de lokale productiekosten relatief hoog zijn en verder stijgen onder invloed
van de krappe arbeidsmarkt. Kortom, zolang La Laguna niet in staat is haar hogere kosten te
compenseren met flexibiliteit en service is de toekomst voor het kledingcluster onzeker. Dit is
des te belangrijker omdat in 2005 kleding geïntegreerd zal zijn in algemene WTO-regels, als
gevolg waarvan een grootscheepse relocatie van productie op wereldschaal wordt voorzien.
Bovenstaande leidt ook tot de conclusie dat het niet waarschijnlijk is, zoals vaak wel in de
literatuur gesuggereerd is, dat La Laguna – of Mexico in zijn geheel – het Zuidoost-Aziatische
voorbeeld zal volgen. De factoren die hierbij ook een rol spelen, zijn:
• Timing: Mexico is pas vier decennia na Zuidoost-Azië een rol van betekenis gaan spelen in de
wereldhandelsstromen van kleding. In de vier tussenliggende decennia hebben er
veranderingen plaatsgevonden op technologisch gebied en op het gebied van marketing- en
uitbestedingstrategieën. Bovendien zijn er veel nieuwe kledingexporteurs opgekomen zodat
Mexico nu te maken heeft met een groot aantal concurrenten over de hele wereld. Ten slotte
opereert Mexico nu in een streng gereguleerde wereldmarkt (met name door het Multi Fibre
Agreement), terwijl daar ten tijde van de Aziatische pioniers nog geen sprake van was.
• (Geografische) exportoriëntatie: participatie van Mexico is gebaseerd op regionalisering, en niet op
internationalisering/globalisering van kledingproductie. Mexico is zeer eenzijdig gericht op
en afhankelijk van de VS.
• Sociaal-culturele en beleidsverschillen: waar er in de eerste Aziatische kledingexporterende landen
sprake was van sturing vanuit de overheid, opereren Mexicaanse kledingproducenten in een
‘geliberaliseerde’ Mexicaanse economie waar geen gericht beleid wordt gemaakt of een
ontwikkelingsstrategie voor de lange termijn is geformuleerd.[ 308 ]
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Het patroon zoals gevonden in La Laguna, wijkt af van de patronen die veelal in de
clusterliteratuur worden beschreven. Zoals gezegd heeft dit veel te maken met La Laguna’s
unieke ontstaansgeschiedenis. Het huidige cluster is het resultaat van een plotseling ontstane,
grote exogene vraag en niet van een gestage, endogene groei. Veelzeggend is het feit dat meer
dan de helft van de bedrijven pas in de tweede helft van de jaren negentig is opgezet. Een klein
aantal bedrijven kon op basis van ervaring of kapitaalkracht in de hectische jaren na NAFTA
snel een dominante positie in het cluster innemen. Gevolg is een zeer uitgesproken polarisatie
in de clusterstructuur. Deze bevinding sluit aan bij recente Mexicaanse literatuur waarin wordt
gewaarschuwd dat het liberaliseringbeleid van de Mexicaanse overheid tot (verdere) polarisatie
in de economie kan leiden.
In relatie tot de bestaande literatuur over clusters (in ontwikkelingslanden) is het van belang
twee bevindingen te benadrukken.
1. Het geval van La Laguna laat zien dat bedrijven binnen een cluster niet automatisch de
vertrouwensrelaties en samenwerkingsverbanden aangaan die de basis vormen van
zogenaamde collectieve efficiency. De lokale sociaal-culturele omgeving lijkt in het geval van
La Laguna een een negatieve rol te spelen, maar het is belangrijker om vast te stellen dat een
exogene vraagschok het ontstaan van dit soort relaties heeft bemoeilijkt. Het resultaat
hiervan is dat lokale bedrijven tegenover elkaar komen te staan als directe concurrenten.
Directe concurrentie voor een positie in de exportnetwerken is een belangrijke, structurele
barrière voor samenwerking in het cluster. Deze bevinding is vooral van belang omdat het
niet denkbeeldig is dat, in de context van een globaliserende wereldeconomie, steeds weer
nieuwe en door exogene vraag geleide clusters zullen ontstaan die lijken op La Laguna.
2. Bovenbeschreven structuur en dynamiek kan negatieve consequenties hebben voor de
concurrentiepositie van het cluster. Er is geen lokale ‘denk-tank’, ervaringen worden
nauwelijks uitgewisseld en er is geen lokaal front om tegenover externe klanten een
gezamenlijke vuist te kunnen maken. Hoewel dominante, grote bedrijven dikwijls optreden
als pioniers op het gebied van verbeteringsprocessen, zijn er weinig aanwijzingen dat hun
inspanningen het cluster als geheel ten goede komen (onderaannemers staan over het
algemeen niet bloot aan informatie uit of over de markt). In tegenstelling tot de situatie in
andere clusters in de literatuur, is leren in La Laguna geen collectief proces.
Inzichten verkregen uit global value chain (GVC)-studies zijn relevant gebleken om de kernzaken
en belangrijkste ontwikkelingen van het Laguna-cluster te identificeren. Zoals benadrukt in
GVC-studies zijn ook voor het Laguna-cluster verticale ketenrelaties met Amerikaanse klanten
van groot belang, met name het leren van klanten en de opvolging van klanten. Zoals voorspeld
in GVC-literatuur is één van de belangrijkste uitdagingen voor het cluster de lokale integratie
van het productieproces, zodat complete producten geleverd kunnen worden.
Echter, de bevindingen van overhavige studie wijzen op het belang van het nuanceren van
GVC-publicaties met betrekking tot de uitkomsten van bovengenoemde ontwikkelings-
processen. De nauwe focus van GVC-studies op verticale, ‘top-down’-ketenrelaties doet geen
recht aan de complexiteit van de interactie tussen lokale bedrijven en een globaliserende
industrie die de kern vormt van het succes of de mislukking van La Laguna als belangrijke
toeleverancier in de Amerikaanse markt. In het geval van La Laguna zijn lokale en historische
omstandigheden van groot belang; de invloed van vroegere handelsbeperkingen en huidig
overheidsbeleid zijn hierboven al besproken. Omdat deze en vele andere aspecten in GVC-
studies weinig (of zelfs helemaal geen) aandacht krijgen, lopen genoemde studies een reëel
risico zich blind te staren op het ontwikkelingspotentieel van een cluster of haar bedrijven. In
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hun enthousiasme lijken zij gefixeerd op een positief eindresultaat en onderschatten zij de
moeilijkheden, obstakels en problemen die onderdeel zijn van verbeterings- en
ontwikkelingsprocessen. Het mag duidelijk zijn dat de bevindingen van deze studie de
aanbevelingen van andere studies die wijzen op het belang van de incorporatie van
omgevingsfactoren in GVC-studies, ondersteunen.
In La Laguna hebben met name op het gebied van productieprocessen verbeteringen
plaatsgevonden. Er is geen reden om aan te nemen dat de integratie van het productieproces
zich uit zal strekken naar het ontwerpen van kleding, naar marketing-&-sales-activiteiten of
uiteindelijk naar een zelfstandige positie van lokale bedrijven in de (export)markt. Op grond
van de recente ontwikkelingen lijkt het zelfs onwaarschijnlijk dat een dergelijke verbetering
zich voor zal doen. Dit geeft reden voor het plaatsen van grote vraagtekens bij het uiteindelijke
ontwikkelingsresultaat: zelfs als het Laguna-cluster in staat is haar positie in de Amerikaanse
markt vast te houden, is zij maar zeer ten dele in staat zich de winsten of opbrengsten van alle
verbeteringsprocessen toe te eigenen. Als La Laguna’s positie van afhankelijk subcontractor-
cluster niet wordt doorbroken, komen de resultaten van lokale verbeteringsprocessen vooral
ten goede van de Amerikaanse klanten.
Ten slotte was deze studie niet compleet geweest zonder aandacht te besteden aan de crisis die
La Laguna sinds 2001 heeft geplaagd. In het voorjaar van 2001 verschenen de eerste
krantenartikelen over de sluiting van enkele kleinere fabrieken en naarmate de zomer
vorderde, leek de vraag uit de VS verder te stagneren en werd de situatie voor kledingbedrijven
in La Laguna nijpender. De aanslagen op het WTC in New York op 11 september en de daarop
volgende onzekerheid in de VS bezegelde het lot voor veel kledingfabrieken en hun
werknemers. Begin 2002 waren veel kleinere fabrieken gesloten en alle grote bedrijven waren
zeer sterk ingekrompen. De productie was teruggelopen van 6,5 tot een geschatte 2 miljoen
paar spijkerbroeken; van de 75.000 werknemers waren minstens 30.000 hun baan kwijtgeraakt.
Veldwerk gedaan aan het begin van 2002 heeft uitgewezen dat de crisis in La Laguna niet of
nauwelijks aanleiding is geweest voor lokale bedrijven om samen te gaan werken. Ondanks het
feit dat de werkgeversorganisatie wel heeft gelobbyd voor begrip en steun van lokale
(overheids-)instanties, is de afstandelijke houding van deze instanties niet veranderd. Als
gevolg van de crisis is de structuur van het cluster verder gepolariseerd, grotendeels door de
strategieën van de grote bedrijven: het opslokken van onderaannemers en het naar beneden
drukken van de prijs. Tegelijkertijd zijn het wel vooral, maar niet alleen, deze grote bedrijven
geweest die de meeste vooruitgang hebben geboekt op het gebied van verbetering van de
efficiëntie.
De grootste slachtoffers van de crisis zijn echter de werknemers. Niet alleen zijn er heel veel
werknemers zonder enige compensatie van de ene op de andere dag werkloos geworden,
degenen die nog wel hun baan hebben behouden, moeten nu genoegen nemen met een veel
lager loon en aanzienlijk minder aantrekkelijke secundaire arbeidsvoorwaarden. De
plattelandsbevolking heeft het meest te lijden gehad onder deze ontwikkelingen omdat in veel
gevallen de personeelstransporten tussen stad en platteland zijn stopgezet (wat hen dwong
‘vrijwillig’ ontslag te nemen zonder aanspraak te kunnen maken op wettelijke compensatie) en
omdat het merendeel van de plattelandsfabrieken voor korte of lange tijd (of zelfs definitief)
gesloten zijn.[ 310 ]
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